IR 05000220/1991029

Insp Repts 50-220/91-29 & 50-410/91-29 on 911222-920125. Major Areas Inspected:Plant Operations,Radiological Controls,Maint,Surveillance,Security & Safety Assessment/ Quality Verfication

ML17056B680
Person / Time
Site:	Nine Mile Point
Issue date:	02/20/1992
From:	Larry Nicholson NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML17056B679	List: IR 05000220/1991029 ML17056B678
References
50-220-91-29, 50-410-91-29, NUDOCS 9202280026
Download: ML17056B680 (36)

Text

e U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION I

Report Nos.:

Docket Nos.:

License Nos.:

91-29; 91-29 50-220; 50-410 DPR-63; NPF-69 Licensee:

Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 301 Plainfield Road Syracuse, New York 13212 Facility:

Location:

Nine Mile Point, Units 1 and 2 Scriba, New York Dates:

December 22, 1991 through January 25, 1992 Inspectors:

W. L. Schmidt, Senior Resident Inspector R. A. Laura, Resident Inspector R. R. Temps, Resident Inspector P. W. Harris, Resident Inspector, Vermont Yankee Approved by:

icholson, Chief Reactor Projects Section No. 1A Division of Reactor Projects Dae Th>>

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plant operations, radiological controls, maintenance, surveillance, security, and safety

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assessmentlquality verification activities.

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See Executive Summary.

9202280026 920220 PDR.

ADDCK 05000220

PDR

ARY Nine.Mile Point Units 1 and 2 NRC Region I Inspection Report Nos. 50-220/91-29 and 50-410/91-29 December 22, 1991 through January 25, 1992 Pl n rations NMPC continued to operate both units safely during this inspection period.

The inspector observed an isolated instance of a newspaper in the Unit 1 station shift supervisors office. This specific issue was properly resolved by the operations department manager.

Identification by control room operators of the bypassing of portions of the turbine/generator trip reactor scram signal at Unit 1 was handled properly.

Inspector and NMPC review into a previous event concerning a lowering condenser vacuum indicated that control room operators might have found and corrected the cause of the problem ifmore attention had been paid to non-safety related computer alarms.

Unit 2 operator performance was generally good.

However, an engineered safety feature actuation (starting of the secondary containment unit coolers) could have been avoided ifmore

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attention had been paid to the plant impact of a tagout.

Radiolo ical Controls The observed radiological controls were generally appropriate for the given conditions at both units.

Maintenance The routine maintenance activities observed at both units were conducted well. The inspector observed proper use of procedures and good technical judgement by maintenance personnel.

One minor deficiency was noted.

A required signoff for a-technical review of a Unit

troubleshooting plan was not made, but the review had been completed.

The inspector assessed that this was caused by the lack of a questioning attitude before the work,was begun.

irv illan e The surveillance activities observed were performed properl Executive Summary (Continued)

En ineerin nd T hnical u

rt The potential bypassing of the turbine/generator trip reactor scram function at a power level greater than the TS allowed 45

% reactor power. is considered unresolved (220/91-29-01)

pending inspector review ofNMPC's root cause determination and final corrective actions. Unit 1 management adequately addressed a previous NRC concern over the inservice testing of the, check. valve in the intertie piping between the containment spray raw water system and the core spray and containment spray systems.

Review of the Unit 2 modification generation and development process indicated that the program had appropriate control in place to provide an effective program.

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n li V rifi i n The special report and licensee event reports reviewed during this period adequately addressed the root causes and corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence.

Further, the Unit

operations department self-assessment activities were found to be commendable.

The Unit 2 temporary waiver ofcompliance submitted and subsequently withdrawn on January 9 was in an acceptable format and of generally good qualit '

TABLE F

NTE 1.0

.SUMMARYOF FACILITYACTIVITIES 1.1 Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation Activities 1.2 NRC Activities........;.......-....

2.0 PLANT OPERATIONS (71707, 93702)........'.

2.1 Routine Plant Operations Review - Unit 1 2.2 Routine Plant Operations Review - Unit 2

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'3 3.0 RADIOLOGICALAND CHEMISTRY CONTROLS (71707).... ~........

4.0 MAINTENANCE 4.1 Unit 1 4.2 Unit. 2

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5.0 SURVEILLANCE 5.1 Routine Observation of Surveillance Activities - Unit 1

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7 ENGINEERING AND TECHNICALSUPPORT (71707, 37702)

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6.3 Observation of Daily. Planning Meetings - Unit 2.... ~...

SAFETY ASSESSMENT AND QUALITYVERIFICATION.....

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Routine Review of. Licensee Event Reports (LERs) and Special 7.2 Operations Department Self-Assessment Activities - Unit 1..

7.3 Temporary Waiver of Compliance - Unit2........,...

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Reports

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8.0 MANAGEMENTMEETINGS....................,'..........

~ The NRC inspection manual procedure or temporary instruction that was used as inspection guidance is listed for each applicable report section.)

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DETAIL/

'1.0 SUMMARYOF FACILITYACTIVITIES 1.1 Nia ara M h wk P w r tion A tiviti The Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (NMPC) safely operated Nine Mile Point (NMP)-

Unit 1 at near fullpower over the period, except for short power reductions to allow circulating water system manipulations due to low lake temperatures.

During one such power reduction plant operators noticed that an annunciated alarm for turbine generator first stage bowl low pressure was alarming.

NMPC management review of this alarm indicated that portions of the reactor protection system (RPS) anticipatory turbine/generator trip reactor scram logic were inappropriately bypassed.

Atemporary modification was performed to prevent the bypass ofthis scram function until the cause could be better understood.

In two instances NMPC identified and resolved potential problems during reverse flowinservice testing (IST) ofcontainment spray raw water intertie check valves to the containment spray and core spray systems.

NMPC safely operated NMP - Unit 2 at full power from the start of the reporting period un'til January 19, when problems with the seals on two of the three feed pumps forced a power reduction to within the capacity of a single feed pump.

On January 25 NMPC commenced a

reactor shutdown to allow correction of the feed pump seal problems.

On January 9, NMPC requested a temporary waiver of compliance (TWC) from the technical specification allowable outage time of seven days for one of the two primary containment hydrogen/oxygen monitors, because of problems. encountered during the normal quarterly surveillance testing. 'Later that day the TWC was withdrawn by NMPC because the monitor had been successfully returned to service.

1.2 N~RA Resident inspectors conducted inspection activities during normal, backshift and weekend hours over this period.

There were 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br /> of backshift (evening shift) and 28 hours3.240741e-4 days <br />0.00778 hours <br />4.62963e-5 weeks <br />1.0654e-5 months <br /> of deep backshift (weekend, holiday, and midnight shift) inspection during this period.

2.0 PLANT OPERATIONS (71707, 93702)

2.1 Routine Plant ti n Review -

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The inspector assessed that routine plant operations generally were performed properly. During the inspection period the inspectors observed control room activities including'perator shift turnovers, shift crew briefings, panel manipulations, and response to alarms.

The number of lit annunciators remained low and operator response to alarming annunciators was observed to be prope.1.1 News r in ntr l R m

During a weekend control room tour the inspector observed the business section of the daily local newspaper laying on the station shift supervisor's (SSS) desk.

The SSS, who was not reading the newspaper, stated he did not know whose paper it was and then threw it out.

The SSS was responsive to the inspector's concern and was aware that non-work related reading material should not have been left laying out in the control room.

The inspector discussed this observation with one of the operations department assistant supervisors.

He informed the inspector that newspapers were allowed to be read during breaks outside the control room and that NMPC's policy was that no reading of non-work related material'was allowed in the control room.

He further stated that he was not very concerned because no one had actually been observed reading the paper. Afterreview of the administrative procedure (AP) -6 Administration of Operations, the inspector determined that non-work related reading material was prohibited from the control room.

The AP was found to be generally consistent with IE Circular No. 81-02, Performance of NRC-Licensed Individuals While on Duty.

The inspector assessed that the station staff was not fully aware of the NMPC policy on the prohibition of non-work related reading material from the control room.

This issue was discussed with the operations department manager who agreed with the inspector's concern and took the following corrective actions:

Remediation was provided to the individuals involved in the above incident.

The NMPC policy on non-work related material was revised to clarify and include more detail. This was discussed with all shift personnel.

Operations department management committed to review the appropriateness of having operations department personnel lockers in the rear of the control room.

The corrective actions, for this isolated observation, appeared to be timely and thorough.

2.1.2 Followu n the D m er

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nd n er Vacu m As discussed in the previous inspection report, (50-220/91-24), operations personnel failed to detect and correct a low level on the mechanical vacuum pump loop seal tank before it led to increased condenser air in-leakage and lowering of vacuu Following further review of this event, NMPC determined that a computer point for the tank level was in the alarm condition for seven days prior to the event.

The inspector agreed with NMPC's root cause determination that the operators were not cognizant of the alarm condition.,

Although 'there was no control room annunciators to warn the operators, routine evaluation of the computer points in the alarm condition should have detected this condition.

To prevent recurrence',

plant management directed operations personnel to print and assess the alarmed computer points once each shift. Further, NMPC review determined that the non-safety related butterfly valve connecting the tank to the condenser was leaking and identified that the valve seat was composed of a rubber based material that requires routine replacement.

This was the originally installed valve and had not been rebuilt.

As corrective actions, NMPC plans to rebuild the valve during, the 1992 refuel outage and place this activity on a preventive maintenance schedule.

The inspector assessed that the root causes and corrective actions taken by NMPC were thorough.

2.1.3 R view f the ntr I n

t r Aids The inspector found that the controls in place for operator aids at Unit 1 were acceptable.

This inspection activity included a review of the operations department procedure S-SUP-6, Control of Operator Aids, a walkdown and verification of a representative sample of aids in the control room and in the plant, and a complete review of the paper work controlling all posted aids.

Various control room operators were questioned as to the purpose of particular aids as well as in the use ofprocedure S-SUP-6.

Overall, the operator aids reviewed were properly placed and contained correct information which could be expected to contribute to the safe operation of equipment.

2.2 utine Plant n Rviw-ni 2 During the inspection period the inspector observed that the control room operators exhibited a safety conscious approach to operations, The shift turnovers observed were well conducted.

Normal manipulations of control room equipment were observed to be proper.

2.2.1 Feed Pum Seal Pr bl ms While operating at 100% power the pump seals on feed pump C degraded to the point where the pump had to be secured.

Plant operators lowered power to 55% in preparation for securing feed pump C and starting feed pump A. Once this was completed, operators initiated a return o full power.. However, excessive seal leakage was encountered on feed pump B which equired that it too be secured.

With only feed pump A in operation reactor power was limited o 65% while repairs to the feed pumps B and C seals were pursued.

NMPC was unable to chieve adequate mechanical isolation on these pumps while operating, and a unit shutdown was ommenced on January 25,

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f Feature'A i n D P r nn l Err r The inspector concluded, as did NMPC, that an inadequate plant impact assessment of an electrical isolation resulted in the actuation of the standby gas treatment system (SGTS) logic and an automatic start of the secondary containment (SC) unit coolers (UCs), both unplanned engineered safety feature (ESF) actuations.

Specifically, on January 10, a markup to support maintenance on one of the above refueling floor radiation monitor sampling pumps was hung which secured the power supply to the radiation monitor and caused the ESF.

At the time of the actuation, the SGTS was already operating in the recirculation mode as a result of the radiation monitor having been declared inoperable tlie previous day. However, when the SGTS logic was actuated, the divisionally associated SC UCs started, which was considered an ESF actuation and was properly reported as such.

The inspector reviewed the plant impact statement for the markup and identified that the licensed operator who approved the plant impact statement mistakenly thought that with the detector in bypass, which it was at the time, that all automatic actions would be bypassed.

This was true for any signals that the detector might produce.

However, when the circuitry was de-energized, the ESF signal was generated as part of the "fail-safe" design of the circuit, The inspector's assessment was that this event was the result of operator error caused by a failure to fully understand the consequences ofde-energizing the circuit. A deficiency event report (DER) was initiated and an LER willbe issued as a result of the ESF actuation.

3.0 RADIOLOGICALAND CHEMISTRY CONTROLS (71707)

During plant tours the inspector observed that routine radiological practices and postings were being adhered to and were appropriate for the conditions.

4.0 MAINTENANCE(62703)

R utine bservation of Maintenance Activities The inspector observed and reviewed selected portions ofpreventive and corrective maintenance to 'verify adherence to regulations, use of administrative and maintenance'rocedures, conformance with codes and standards, proper QA/QC involvement, and proper equipment alignment and retest.

The following activities were observed:

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4.1.1 Electri 1 M in enance n

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RP le Electrical maintenance technicians were observed to use good work practices while verifying the condition of spare cables located in the RPS cabinets in the reactor building. The maintenance was done under work request 187648 and the work instructions were contained in a special

maintenance instruction.

The work consisted of the identification and check of voltage, continuity and insulation resistance on the spare cables.

This was'in preparation for an upcoming modification to the RPS system.

The electrical maintenance technicians were observed to use good work practices and reflect a

'good safety perspective.

An example of this was when 107 volts d.c. was detected during the voltage frisk, the technicians immediately stopped and consulted their supervisor and'engineering for guidance.

The inspector reviewed the work package and found all documents were properly utilized and filled out.

4.1.2 rrectiv Mainten nth N

nden te T f rPum Disassembly for inspection and repair of high vibration on the No. 12 condensate transfer pump was observed by the inspector and found to be properly performed.

The inspector reviewed red markup 1-92-0022 and verified that the mechanical and electrical isolation established was proper.

Proper cleanliness controls were maintained to preve'nt foreign material intrusion. The inspector's assessment was that this maintenance was properly conducted.

4.1.3 Re airs to Containmen Raw Water In i V Iv The inspector observed maintenance activities conducted as a result of two failures of reverse flow inservice testing /ST) on containment spray. raw water intertie check valves a's discussed in section 7.1.2 below.

The inspector observed the disassembly of valve 93-73, a motor operated plug valve downstream of check valve 93-62 on the intertie to the containment spray system.

Also observed was the disassembly of check valve 93-58 on the intertie to the core spray system.

In both cases the isolations established were appropriate for the specific work.

The maintenance crews in both instances were knowledgeable with the equipment and appropriately utilized generic valve procedures and approved technical" manuals to accomplish the maintenance.

The only concern raised during these observations was with the lack of formality in the radiological controls.

This concern is further discussed in section 3.2 above.

4.1.4 D

well Floor Drain vel Troublesh tin Following observation of the surveillance activities discussed below in section 6.1.1'on the drywell floor drain level instrument, the inspector reviewed the troubleshooting work package for the downscale reading on the drywell fioor drain level rate of rise instrument.

All documentation in the work package was found to be proper except that a required signoff on the troubleshooting plan for an independent technical review was not made.

The technicians stated they were not aware of this condition.

The inspector discussed his concern with the I&C department supervisor who stated the troubleshooting plan would be properly reviewed prior to continuing any further work and a review by NMPC would be performed to determi'ne ifthe technical review had been performe NMPC completed their review of this missed signoff in the form of a root cause analysis conducted by the independent safety engineering group gSEG).

It was determined that an adequate technical review had been completed by the supervisor and the chief technician prior to the work being commenced, but the signoff had not been completed.

The fact that the signoff was not made had been identified by the SSS when he signed the troubleshooting plan, b'ut he believed that it would be signed prior to use.

The inspector assessed that the missed signoff

'ndicated an inattention to detail prior to the start of work.

4.2 Qni~2 4.2.1 Review fP lar ran Pr v ntive Main n

t The inspector reviewed portions of the semi-annual mechanical preventative maintenance (PM)

on the reactor building polar crane, by procedure N2-MPM-MHR-SA801 and found that it was acceptable with respect to the manufacturer's technical manual and updated safety analysis report (USAR). Additionally, the inspector reviewed the maintenance surveillance test required by technical specifications.

Specifically, the inspector reviewed the PM requirements on the brakes and 'gear box for the 125-ton main hoist.

Section 7.2 of the PM required an inspection of gears for excessive wear, cracks or chips, excessive backlash and damaged or broken bearings, Discussions with the cognizant mechanical maintenance supervisor revealed there were no known problems in the past or present with the gears.

Section 7.7 of the surveillance procedure provided instructions on performing an inspection of the 125-ton brake assembly.

Numerous aspects of the brake clearances, adjustments and function were. verified. Discussions with the cognizant supervisor revealed no load was ever inadvertently dropped nor has brake failure occurred.

USAR section 9.1.4.2.2 stated that the main hoist has phase loss and phase reversal protection to prevent hoist brakes from being released until the motor field is energized and current is flowing.

Further, the hoist has'an'mergency dynamic lowering feature that automatically lowers the load at a safe rate in the event of simultaneous loss ofAC power and holdin'g brakes.

The main hoist has two independent shoe type brakes that contact automatically with the motor shaft when the motor-is deenergized.

The main hoist has a single failure proof design'so that any component failure in the hoist train does not result in dropping of the lifted load.

Maintenance Surveillance N2-MSP-MHR-W001, Reactor Building Polar Crane Interlock and Travel Restriction Test, is performed within seven days prior to and at least once per seven days during operation with loads in excess of 1,000 pounds.

Inspector review of this procedure indicated that it meets the intent of technical specification surveillance requirement 4. In summary, the inspector found that these two procedures met the intent ofthe technical manual recommendations and technical specification requirements.

Base'd on intervie'ws with the cognizant mechanical maintenance supervisor, and review ofthe surveillance procedures, the 125 ton hoist brakes and gearbox were functioning properly.

Further, the inspector noted that the crane PM procedures were undergoing an upgrade under the guidance of the vendor.

5.0 SURVEILLANCE(61726)

5.1 tin rv in f urvilln A i'i'

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The inspector observed and reviewed portions of completed surveillance tests to assess performance in accordance with approved procedures and technical specifications. limiting conditions of operation.. Further, the inspector observed removal and restoration of equipment, deficiency review and resolution.

5.1.1 D

ll Fl r Drain v l In trum n ti n rv ill Instrument and control g&C) technicians properly performed an instrument calibration on the No. 12 channel drywell floor drain level rate of rise instrument.

The inspector observed the performance of procedure Nl-ISP-201-R004, Revision 00, Attachment 3, done as a post-maintenance test for work request 201191 which repaired the chart recorder.

The recorder reading had failed downscale due to a bent pin in the rear of the chait recorder on the control room panel.

The I&C technicians performing the surveillance were observed adhering to the pro'cedure and were experienced with the equipment.

Electrical leads were lifted and controlled properly in support of the test.

When the technicians were unsure of how to perform a step, they stopped and sought clarification from their supervisor.

The surveillance test could not be completed due to a problem with the clock timing circuit. The inspector's assessment was the surveillance test was properly run and secured when the problem with the clock circuit was identified.

5.1.2 Li uid P ison stem urveillance The inspector observed good performance during portions of the normal monthly surveillance test on the ¹12 liquid poison system, per surveillance test N1-ST-Ml.

This test was being performed to allow the IST group to check the effectiveness of procedure changes made to increase the accuracy ofthe ultrasonic flowmeasuring devises (controlatrons).

From discussions with the IST technicians and through observation of the activity and the flowrate indication on the controlatron, the inspector assessed that the changes had been effective at limiting the variations in the determined flowrate.

The operators and the IST personnel involved were knowledgeable of the system performance and used the test procedure properl.0 ENGINEERING AND TECHNICALSUPPORT (71707, 37702)

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m inl The inspectors reviewed the potential inadvertent bypassing ofa reactor scram function, required following a loss ofthe turbine generator'at power levels greater than 45% (turbine control valve closure and generator load reject).

During power reductions to allow the shifting of the circulating water paths for deicing of the unit water inlet, a control room annunciated alarm for turbine first stage bowl pressure was received at approximately 70% reactor power. This alarm indicated that one or more of the four turbine generator anticipatory reactor scram instrument channels were bypassed.

These scrams are normally bypassed when the unit is operating at less than 45% to prevent an unnecessary reactor scram.

The bypass valves have sufficient capacity below 45% power to accommodate the loss of steam flow to the turbine. In this instance reactor power is measured by the first stage bowl pressure on the high pressure turbine.

At Unit 1, 45% power equates to less than 310 psig'.

Control room operators made operations department management aware of this alarm and proceeded to increase reactor power after the circulating water system had been realigned.

The annunciator cleared as power level was being increased, clearing the bypass.

In order to prevent the inadvertent bypassing of this scram function, Unit 1 management directed that a temporary modification be conducted which removed the bypass feature from the circuit.

The inspector reviewed temporary modification 5391, which lifted leads in the RPS system thus preventing the bypassing of the turbine stop valve closure and turbine trip scrams, and found that it was properly reviewed and implemented.

'Subsequent to the implementation of the temporary modification discussed above, NMPC identified that the gauge line root valve common to two of the four first stage bowl pressure

'witches was not fullyopen.

NMPC determined that this could have caused these two switches to see a lower pressure than the actual first stage pressure, resulting in the bypass of two of the four turbine/generator trip scram instrument channels.

NMPC management directed that this valve be reopened and that the associated pressure switches be calibrated.

The switches were all found to be within acceptable tolerances.

NMPC management then directed that the temporary modification installed above be removed to reinstate the bypasse Initial inspector review of the circuitry showed that the annunciator would have come in ifone or more of the four pressure switches reached its setpoint.

Each pressure switch, when its setpoint is reached,.closes contacts which bypa'ss one instrument channel ofthe turbine/generator anticipatory trip.

The effect of the partially opened valve would have been that one trip instrument was bypassed in each of the two trip systems, leaving the other two anticipatory turbine/generator trip instrument channels, one per RPS trip system, functional to cause a reactor scram.

Thus the RPS system for this function would have been in a one-out-of-one taken twice logic configuration vice a one-out-of-two taken twice configuration, which was normal for the anticipatory turbine/generator trip scram, while above 45% reactor power.

Operations department management realized that they were operating outside the technical specification requirements for the number of instrument trip channels available for the turbine/generator anticipatory trip while above 45% reactor power.

NMPC initiated a DER to allow determination of the root cause this event and planned on issuing an LER.

This issue is unresolved (220/91-29-01) pending further NRC review of NMPC's root cause determination and corrective actions.

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k V lv The inspector found that Unit 1 management took adequate actions in their re-evaluation of IST requirements on four check valves in the containment spray raw water (CSRW) system.

These check valves were in the intertie piping between CSRW and containment spray and core spray systems and function to allow CSRW flow to the other system while not allowing reverse flow.

InitiallyNMPC proposed relief requests for these valves as part oftheir second ten-year interval IST program plan (CS-RR-3 and CNT-RR-3).

NMPC proposed to verify operability of these valves by disassembly and inspection on a staggered basis over a six-year period and to verify reverse flow closure as part of normal outage containment leak rate testing.

NRC evaluation of these requests, documented in the March 7, 1991, safety evaluation ofNMPC's IST program, determined that interim relief would be granted for six months to allow NMPC time to further evaluate the needed testing on these valves.

By letter dated October 8, 1991 NMPC withdrew these relief requests, stating that they had developed testing to satisfy ASME section XI requirements for quarterly forward and reverse flow testing.

The inspector reviewed ST-M-28 and found that it was acceptable to meet the ASME section XI requirements.

Forward flow verification was conducted by opening the check valve using a torque wrench on the actuator hand wheel and ensuring that the torque needed was below a defined procedure maximum.

Reverse flow testing was conducted by pressurizing the space between the check valve and the downstream plug valve with nitrogen and observing that the pressure drop, once the nitrogen bottle was isolated, was within acceptance criteria in the procedur Unit 2 6.2.1 Desi n

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ifii ti nPr mR view-ni 2 In preparations for the second refueling outage, scheduled to commence in late February or early March 1992, the inspector performed a review of the modification program.

The inspector focused on two aspects:

the methods by which modifications were initiated, and the manner in which design changes/modifications were developed by corporate engineering.

During the period, the inspector; interviewed cognizant personnel at the site and at the NMPC corporate office, reviewed the appropriate site administrative and nuclear engineering (corporate)

- procedures, and'reviewed two safety-related modification packages scheduled forimplementation during the outage.

The inspector found the method of initiating a modification per Administrative Procedure (AP)-

6.0, Modification/Simple Design Change Program to be adequate.

Any NMPC personnel can document the need for a potential modification through use of a Plant Change Request (PCR)

form. Ifapproved by the originator's supervisor, the PCR is prioritized (on a scale of one to six for scheduling purposes) and then goes to the modification coordinator (MC) where the PCR is assigned a control number and logged into a computerized data'ase for tracking purposes.

The PCR then is reviewed for approval or disapproved by, in ascending order, the appropriate system engineer, manager of technical support and then the supervisor project management.

If approved, the PCR is issued a modification control number and sent to corporate engineering for development of the modification package.

The inspector determined that the MC was quite knowledgeable of the modification program requirements and assessed the computerized data base to be a valuable tool for tracking the status of modifications.

Through interviews with the corporate engineering personnel, specifically the project engineering group, the inspector determined that each modification is assigned to'a project engineer (PE).

The PE is then responsible for development of the modification and for putting together an interdisciplinary team for design and development of the modification package.

These teams typically consist of engineers from the design group, personnel from the licensing and ALARA groups, contractor personnel ifthe design work is to be contracted out, and representatives from the site operations group as well as the cognizant system engineer.

Other personnel are added to the team depending on the scope of the modification and the disciplinary reviews needed.

Throughout the modification/design process, periodic team meetings are held to discuss the status and progress of the modification. 'eeting minutes are maintained so that all personnel are aware of agreements and commitments made during the meetings.

The inspector assessed that operations/system engineering participation in these meetings to be a valuable feature as this ensures that the modification, when implemented, willnot adversely affect operation of the plant or place undue burden on the operators.

The inspector also reviewed the appropriate nuclear engineering administrative. procedures and determined that they were comprehensive and adequately detailed the requirements for the design/modifications proces The inspector determined that all modifications are reviewed, via a checksheet, for determination that it does not involve an unreviewed safety question or a change in the technical specifications.

Where necessary, a safety evaluation is prepared and it, along with the modification package, is reviewed by the SORC prior to final approval.

Once the modification package is completed, it is sent to the MC at the site.

The MC then issues a Modification Work=Request (MWR) and the modification receives a MWR number.

In order to prevent the release of unauthorized packages, the MC willnot issue a MWR unless the 50.59 review and/or SORC approved safety evaluation is also attached to the package.

The inspector reviewed two safety-related modification packages, MWRN2-86-085, Delete Nuisance Alarms in the Control Room, and N2-89-066, Suppression Pool MOVs Required Sealing to Prevent Corrosion, and determined that all the paperwork, documentation, work instructions, and safety evaluations were complete and appeared to be of good quality.

Overall, the inspector assessed that, at Unit 2, NMPC has a good program for identifying, prioritizing, tracking, developing and implementing modifications (safety and non-safety related)

to plant systems.

Appropriate administrative controls were in place and personnel were knowledgeable of the requirements and implementing them in accordance with the program.

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6.3 Observation of Dail Plannin Meetin

- Unit 2 Over the period the inspector attended numerous daily planning meetings to assess management and supervision direction and control of plant maintenance and planning activities.

These meetings were generally well controlled utilizing dialogue between management and various department (i.e., operations, radiation protection, maintenance, chemistry, etc.) supervisors in a team work, full participatory atmosphere.

The structure and scope of the meetings.gen'erally followed the daily work instruction issued by the planning department.

The work instructions were complete and included descriptions ofdaily plant conditions, technical specification limiting-conditions foroperations, operational concerns, significant planned maintenance and surveillance activities, urgent work requests, and updated schedules for the upcoming refueling outage.

Generally open discussions were observed which lead to identification of items which needed to be completed.

Potential safety issues raised were properly discussed and dispositioned, this included daily review ofnewly issued deficiency event reports (DERs) by the plant manager and their delegation to appropriate level of plant supervision for actio.0 SAFETY ASSESSMUVT AND QUALITYVERIFICATION (40500, 92700)

7.1 ine Review f Li n

Ev n R i

Re rt 7.1.1 gni~l

. Special Report dated January 4, 1992, on the inoperability of the No. 12 hydrogen monitoring system due to a blown fuse.

The report was reviewed and found acceptable.

The root cause of the blown fuse was not known at the time of issuance of the report.

Inspector review determined the root cause was due to a maintenance technician's personnel error. The fuse was blown when the technician was installing a test jumper and inadvertently contacted a 120 VAC power supply in the monitor.

The jumper used by the technician was too short for the application which caused the inadvertent grounding of the power supply. A contributing factor was the hazardous location of the terminals being jumpered.

There was exposed power, a rotating fan and the terminals were located in the back of the monitor which required the technical to reach inside.

NMPC was in the process of performing a detailed root cause and issuing a lessons learned transmittal.

7.1.2 +nit 2 The following LERs were reviewed and found satisfactory:

91-23, Reactor scram on low reactor water level due to loss of feed water pumps.

The events described in this LER were reviewed and assessed by the inspectors in IR 91-24.

91-18, Reactor scram during surveillance testing due to procedure inadequacy.

This LER describes a scram which occurred on September 9, 1991, while the plant was shutdown.

The scram signal was generated as a result of a poorly sequenced surveillance which required several surveillance procedures for testing of the Turbine Control Valves'ircuitry to be implemented at the same time.

As a result of this incident, the surveillance was revised incorporating all the requirements into one procedure.

No problems have been encountered with the surveillance since the revision.

The inspector assessed NMPC's actions to be proper and appropriate.

91-19, ESF actuation due to a low air flow caused by a failed component.

This LER documents a SOTS initiation on September 20, 1991, due to low air flow in the normal reactor building ventilation system.

The root cause of the event was determined to be equipment failure, specifically, a*faulty flow switch. The inspector assessed corrective actions to be appropriate.

Further, the inspector was in the CR when the ESF actuation occurred and assessed the operator's actions to this event to be Gmely and prope.2 91-16, Supplement II, Loss of configuration control caused by mispositioned valves due to inadequate work practices.

The original LER and supplement I as well as the issue of the mispositioned valve were reviewed in previous reports and was the subject of an enforcement conference.

This supplement was issued to reflect that the inoperability of this UC did not result in its associated train of the SGTS being inoperable for greater than the technical specification allowable out of. service time as had been reported origin'ally. Also, the status of the LER was changed to voluntary.

No concerns were identified by the inspector while reviewing this supplement.

rations De artm n lf-A m n A 'vi '

nit 1 The inspector assessed that the Unit 1 operations self-assessment activities were commendable and well conducted.

As part of a continuing program to improve performance within the department a self-assessment program was initiated to provide a critical examination of various performance attributes including; policy, procedures, communications, and nuclear and industrial safety.

Management provided their expectations to the staff in a number of memorandums that listed specific goals and philosophies for improving performance.

These expectations require assessors to be critical of performance in order to identify weaknesses and strengths and then provide proposed solutions to correct identified weaknesses.

Quarterly summary reports were sent to the operations manager to allow his review and overall assessment of the program.

The inspector found that the program topics reviewed were diverse and paralleled recognized are'as for improvement identified by NMPC management.

This appeared to have received adequate management attention and has resulted in a concerted effort to identify areas for improvement.

The use of the SSS as an assessor and the expectations for individuals to propose solutions to identified weaknesses were excellent initiatives, 7.3 Tem ra Waiver f m li nce -

nit 2 The temporary waiver of compliance (TWC) sent by NMPC to the NRC on January 9, 1992, was in an acceptable format and ofgenerally good quality.'MPC requested the TWC because of difficulties encountered during a normal quarter surveillance on one of the byo primary containment hydrogen/oxygen monitors.

NMPC believed that the potential existed that they would not be able to complete the surveillance within the technical specification allowable out of service time of seven days and without relief would have to shutdown the unit. The TWC was subsequently withdrawn when NMPC returned the monitor to service before the out of service time was exceede ~

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8.0 MANAGEMENTMEETINGS At periodic intervals and at the conclusion of the inspection, meetings were held with senior station management to discuss the scope and findings of this inspection.

Based on the NRC Region I review of this report and discussions held with Niagara Mohawk representatives, it was determined that this report does not.contain safeguards or proprietary informatio ~

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