IR 05000220/1980008
| ML17053C248 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 10/09/1980 |
| From: | Baunack W, Sharon Hudson, Kister H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17053C244 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-220-80-08, 50-220-80-8, NUDOCS 8101220450 | |
| Download: ML17053C248 (22) | |
Text
U.S.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
. OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I
0 0: ~5-220-0 Docket No.
50-220 License No.
DPR-63 Priority Category Licensee:
Nia ara Mohark Power Cor oration 300 Erie Boulevard West S racuse, New York 13202 Facility Name:
Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station, Unit
Inspection at:
Scriba, New York Inspection conducted:
August 16 - September 15, 1980 Inspector s:
.
Bauna
,
en>or esi en nspec or d te signed
u son, ess en nspec or da e signed Approved by:
.
B. Ksste
,
se
,
eac or rogects Section No. 4, R05NS Branch da e signed d te signed Ins ection Summar
Ins ection on Au ust 16-Se tember 15, 1980 Ins ection Re ort No. 50-220/80-08
Areas Ins ected:
Routine, onsite regular and backshift inspectors by the resident inspectors
ours).
Areas inspected included operational safety verification, wit-nessing of surveillance tests, observation of. physical security, plant tours, equipment controls, jumper/lifted leads controls, ISE Bulletins and Circulars, and an NRR meeting with the licensee on the Reactor Building crack.
Results:
Of the seven areas inspected, no items of non-compliance were noted in four areas.
Four items of noncompliance were identified in three areas (Infraction-failure to maintain Reactor Building track bay door sealed, paragraph 5.b.7; Infraction - Block-ing open a fire door, paragraph 5.b.9; Infraction - failure to maintain valves locked, paragraph 6. c.2; Deficiency - Failure to meet procedural requirements for lifting of t
leads, paragraph 7.a. 3).
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
8'lOx @39 ygy
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted R. Abbott, Supervisor-Operations K. Dahlberg, Supervisor-Maintenance W. Diews, Supervisor
- Reactor Analyst E. Leach, Supervisor - Radiochemistry and Radiation Protection T. Perkins,'General-:Superintendent
- Nuclear'Gene>ation R.
Raymond, Fire Protection Coordinator
.T.
Roman, Station Superintendent B. Taylor,.-Supervisor - Instrument
& Control The inspectors also interviewed and talked with other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection including shift supervisors, adminis-trative, operations, health physics, security, instrument and control, and contractor personnel.
2.
0 erational Safet Verification a.
Control Room Observation Routinely throughout the inspection period, the inspectors indepen-dently verified plant parameters and equipment availability of engi-neered safeguards features against a plant specific checklist to ensure compliance with the limiting conditions for operation (LCO s).
The plant specific checklist has been developed to assist the inspec-trs in ensuring the following items are observed during control room tours:
Switch and valve position required to satisfy the LCO's Alarms or absence of alarms Meter indications and recorder valves Status lights and power avai lable lights Front panel bypass switches Computer print-outs Comparisons of redundant readings Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being take r
. Shift turnovers were observed to ensure proper control room and shift manning on both day and back shifts.
Shift turnover checklists and-log review by the oncoming and off-going shifts were also observed by the inspectors.
No.items of noncompliance were identified.
b.
Review of Lo s and 0 eratin Records
The inspectors reviewed the following logs and instructions for the period August 16 through September 15, 1980:
Control Room 'Log Book Station Shift Supervisor's Log Book Station Shift Supervisor's Instruction Licensee Event Report Log The logs and instructions were reviewed to:
Obtain information on plant problems and operation Detect changes and trends in performance Detect possible conflicts with technical specifications or regul atory requirements Determine that records are being reviewed as required Assess the effectiveness of the coranunications provided by the logs and instructions Determine that the reporting requirements of technical specifica-tions are met.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
3.
Ins ector Witnessin of Surveillance Tests The inspector witnessed the performance of a required test to verify the following:
The test was performed in accordance with a proper'ly reviewed and approved procedure.
The system was properly returned to servic Test data was accurately recorded, and met procedural requirements.
Testing was performed by'ualified personnel.
The inspector witnessed the performance of the test performed to verify that all'xtensions of the NRC Emergency Notification System located at Nine Mile Point Unit 1 and the James A. FitzPatrick sites remain fully
.
operable from the facilities to the NRC Operations Center in the event of a loss of normal power to the system., Batteries and battery charger for the system are located on the Nine Nile Point Unit 1 site.
The test was performed in accordance with Procedure No. N1-80-15, NRC Emergency Notification System Test Procedure (Red Phones) for Bulletin 80-15, Revision 0, August 22, 1980.
No discrepancies were identified.
4.
Observation of Ph sical Securit The inspectors made observations and verified during regular and off-shift hours, that selected aspects of the plants physical security system were in accordance with regulatory requirements, physi al security plan and approved procedures.
The following observations relating to physical security were made:
The security force on both regular and off-shifts was properly manned and appeared capable of performing their assigned functions.
Protected area barriers were intact - gates and doors closed and locked if not attended.
Isolation zones were free of obstructions and objects that could aid on intruder in penetrating the protected area.
Persons and packages were checked prior to entry into the protected area.
Vehicles were= properly authorized, searched, and escorted oil con-trolled within the protected area.
Persons within the protected area displ'ayed photo-identification badges, persons in vital areas were properly authorized, and persons requiring escort were properly escorted.
No items of noncompliance were identifie,.
Plant Tours
.
a.,
~Scc e
During the course of the report period the inspectoi"s made multiple tours of plant areas to make an independent, assessment of equipment conditions,'lant conditions, radiological controls, safety, and adherence to regulatory requirements.
The following areas were among those inspected:
. Turbine Building Auxiliary Building Auxiliary Control Room Switchgear Rooms Yard Areas and Perimeter Fence Radwaste Area Diesel Generator Rooms Screen House Reactor Building Torus Area b.
~Findin s
The following determinations were made:
(1) --
Monitoring instrumentation:
The inspectors verified that selected instruments were functional and demonstrated para-meters within Technical Specification limits.
(2)
System Operability:
The inspectors verified that selected valves in the Core Spray System No.
12 were in the position or condition required by the Technical Specifications for the applicable mode.
Yerification. was accomplished by phyi-sically observing that each accessible or remote position indication was correct.
(3) --
Radiation protection controls:
The inspectors verified that that licensee's Health Physics policies and procedures were adhered to in the following areas:
(1)
Access control including roping, tagging, posting, and maintenance of step-off pad (2)'onfirmation of licensee survey results by independent measurement.
(3)
Verification that requirements of effective Radiation
- Work Permits are appropr'iate and are 'being followed.
(4)
Verification that radiation protection instruments in use are being calibrated as required.
Plant Housekeeping:
Observations relative to plant house-keiping identified no unsatisfactory conditions.
During observations of several areas, in which contractor person-'el were working on major modifications, the inspector noted that considerable effort was being devoted to maintaining excellent housekeeping conditions.
(5). --
Fluid leaks:
No significant fluid leaks were observed.
(6)
Piping vibrations:
No excessive piping vibrations were observed and no adverse conditions were noted.
Secondary containment:
During a routine reactor building tour the inspector noted an opening of approximately 3/4 inch by 8 feet at the bottom of the outer reactor building track bay door.
The inner track bay door was open to sup-port torus work in progress.
The licensee immediately closed the inner door to fully restore secondary contain-ment.
The 'opening resulted from improperly replacing.
removable door seal assemblies following a door opening.
Standing Order NMPSO No. 7, Operation of Track Bay Exten-sion Door D-198, September 16, 1975, provides the instruc-tions for the operation of the outer reactor building track bay door.-.
The inspector*noted that the failure to follow a procedure resulted in a reduction in secondary containment capability and was considered to be an item of noncompli-ance at the infraction level (50-220/80-08-01).
The licensee reported the occurrence in accordance with reporting requi rements as LER 80-19.
Control room annunciators:
Selected lit annunciators were discussed with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required was taken.
Fire protection:
The inspector verified that selected fire extinguishers were accessible and inspected on schedule, that fire alarm stations were unobstructed, and that ade-quate control over ignition sources and fire hazards was maintaine During a tour, conducted on September 5,
1980 the inspector noted that the fire door between the rooms housing diesel generators 102 and 103 was blocked open while the rooms were unoccupied.
The licensee's administrative controls for insuring the fire doors are maintained closed consist of two labels on each side of the door.
One label states
"Caution - Keep Closed" the other label reads "Caution-Fire Door Do Not Block."
The inspector stated the failure to keep the fire door closed was considered to be an item of noncompliance at the infraction level.
(50-220/80-08-02)
The inspectors discussed the station's administrative controls of fire doors with the licensee's management representative.
Fire doors are currently designated by 3" x 5" signs applied directly to the appropriate doors.
Beyond these signs there are no written procedures concerning fire doors.
This item is unresolved pending review of the need for additional administrative controls by the licensee (50-220/80-08-05).
With the exception of the items identified above, the inspectors had no further questions relating to the items inspected.
6.
E ui ment Controls
~
~
The inspectors reviewed the mark-up (tag-out) records to determine that the licensee has complied with Technical Specification LCO's with respect to removal of equipment from service.
The inspectors independently veri-fied one mark-up, on the control rod drive air filter, for proper conduct.
The inspectors also independently verified that the following mark-ups had been properly returned to service:
BMU¹65055 - ¹11 Feedwater Pump BMU¹65080 - ¹122 Core Spray Pump Suction Valve BMU¹65081 - ¹122 Containment Spray Pump Suction Valve BMU¹65083 - ¹111 Containment Spray Raw Water Discharge Isolation Valve BMU¹65084 - ¹112 Containment Spray Raw Water Discharge Isolation Valve Two valves in the feedwater system, valves No.
FW-70, ¹11 F.W.
pump recir-culation-stop valve and FW-71, ¹12 F.W.
pump recirculation-stop valve are required to be locked open, by Procedure No.
N1-0P-16, Feedwater System-Booster Pump to Reactor, Revision 4, dated June 26, 197 These valves were in the open position, as required but were unlocked.
The inspectors noted the failure to maintain the valves locked as required-was contrary to procedural requirements and considered to be an item of noncompliance at the infraction level (50-220/80-08-03).
The failure to maintain valves locked as required, has been the subject of previous items of noncompliance in Inspection Reports
¹79-21 and ¹80-01.
, The licensee subsequently made a change to Procedure No. Nl-OP-16, delet-ing the requirement for the valves to be. locked.
The inspector noted that deleting the requirement to maintain the above valves locked will not affect the operability of the system.
Controls on Jum ers and Lifted Leads The inspector audited the licensee's jumper/lifted leads controls to verify:
that there were no conflicts with procedures or Technical Specifi-cations; that the licensee is actively pursuing corrections =to the condi-tions requiring jumpers; and that jumpers/lifted leads have been installed and removed properly.
The inspector noted that the following Jumper/Block Log Sheets did not list a procedure reference as required by APN-7A, Placement of Jumpers, Blocks, or Lifting of Leads, Revision 1, dated March 6, 1980:
Jumper/Block Log ¹639 dated March 18, 1980 Jumper/Block Log ¹690 dated July 18, 1980 Jumper/Block Log ¹691 dated July 21, 1980 All of these Jumper/Block Logs involved the lifting of leads from LPRM detectors into their flux amplifier.
The procedure for testing the LPRM's Nl-IMP-NEU-4.1, LPRM Detector Test, Revision 1, dated August 1980 does not specify the action to be taken if the detector or its leads are found to be defective.
The inspector noted that APN-7A allows intallation of jumpers and blocks or lifting of leads only in accordance with approved procedures, or to preserve the integrity of a system.
If this second option is used then the installation in accordance with APN-7A must be approved by the Station Superintendent the next licensee day and reviewed by the Site Operation Review Committee within 7 days.
These approvals were not obtained for the LPRM detector leads.
Failure to meet the requirements for jumpers or lifted leads constitutes an item of noncompliance at the deficiency level.
(50-220/80-08-04)
The licensee stated that Procedure Nl-IMP-NEU-4.1 will be revised to specify the 1 ifting of leads if the LPRM detector leads are found to be defective.
8.
Ins ection and Enforcement Bulletins a.
~Sco e
Licensee action concerning the following Inspection and Enforcement Bulletins (IEB's) was reviewed to verify that:
Written responses were within the stated time period and con-tained the required information.
Written responses included adequate corrective action comitments.
Licensee management forwarded copies -of the written responses to appropriate onsite management.
Information discussed in the licensee written responses were adequate.
b.
C.
Corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written responses.
The following IEB's are considered closed.
IEB 80-01, 0 erabilit of ADS Valve Pneumatic Su
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated January 17, 1980.
No further information is required.
IEB 80-02, Inade uate ualit Assurance for Nuclear Su lied E ui ment The inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated February 19, 1980.
No further information is required.
d.
IEB 80-03, Loss of Charcoal from Standard T
e II, 2", Tra Adsorber Cel s
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated March 19, 1980
=
and surveillance test results of January 9,
10, and 11, 1980.
These surveillance test results did not document a visual inspection for loss of charcoal although the licensee stated that one was.performed.
A subsequent visual inspection on September 9,
1980 showed no signs of charcoal loss after nine months of intermittent use.
e.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
IEB 80-09, H dramotor Actuator Deficiencies The inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated June 9,
1980.
No further information is require ~
r
IEB 80-14, De" radation of Scram Dischar e Volume Ca acit The inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated July 25, 1980, Operating Procedure N1-0P-5, Operations Surveillance.Test Procedure Nl-ST-(4, and Instrument Surveillance Test Procedure N1-ISP-RD-08 to verify that the required changes had been completed.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
IEB 80-15, Possible Loss of Emer enc Notification S stem ENS With Loss of Off-Sste Power The inspector reviewed the licensee's response dated September 3,
1980 and witnessed the loss of power test conducted August 22, 1980.
The additional reporting requirements have been incorporated in APN-21, Procedure for Reporting Variations from Normal Plant Operations, Defects and Noncompliance.
The inspector had no further questions in this area.
g.
Ins IEB 80-19, Revision I, Failure of Mercur -Wetted Matrix Rela s in t e Reactor Protective S stems The inspector reviewed the licensee.'s response dated August 27, 1980.
No further information is required.
ection and Enforcement Circulars For the below Inspection and Enforcement Circulars (IEC's) sent to the licensee, the inspector ascertained the following actions were taken by the licensee:
The circulars were received by the licensee.
A review was performed by the licensee for applicability.
Corrective actions have been or will be taken by the licensee on applicable circulars.
The IEC's reviewed were:
IEC 80-01,, Service Advice for GE Induction DisC Relays IEC 80-07, Problems with HPCI Turbine Oil System The inspector had no further questions in these areas and the circulars are close A A
10.
Reactor Bui1 din Crack The inspector participated in a meeting and plant tour conducted on August 21, 1980 with Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) and licensee representatives to discuss a crack in the northeast corner of the Reactor Building;-
The licensee hypothesizes that'the crack is due to thermal expansion of the Screenwell Building wall into the north face of the Reactor Building.
The preliminary conclusion by the NRR staff agreed with the licensee's findings.
In order to,finalize their evaluation, NRR,requested the
.licensee to formally provide the following information:
Calculations and drawings used in the analysis.
A commitment for a monitoring program to quarterly ascertain crack propagation as well as building wall movements.
An evaluation of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake impact due to possible design deficiencies.
A commitment to advise the staff of any additional significant build-ing cracks when they, become known.
11.
Unresolved Items An item about which more information is required to determine acceptability is considered unresolved.
Paragraph 5(g) contains an unresolved item.
12.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals throughout the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and findings.
The items of noncompliance were identifie t