IR 05000220/1980002
| ML17053B688 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Nine Mile Point  |
| Issue date: | 04/10/1980 |
| From: | Baunack W, Jerrica Johnson, Kister H NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML17053B687 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-220-80-02, 50-220-80-2, NUDOCS 8006020266 | |
| Download: ML17053B688 (18) | |
Text
U.S;.
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION ANO ENFORCEMENT Region I.
50-220/80-02 Oo k t No.
50 220 License Ho.
DPR-63 Priority Category Licensee:
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation 300 Erie Boulevard West Approved by.
J.
Johnso Reactor Inspector
. B. Kister, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 4, RO&NS Branch Syracuse, New York 13202 Facil ity Name Nine Mile Point Nucl ear Station, Unit
Inspection at.
Scriba, New-York Inspection conducted:
Inspectors:
W. Baunack, Acting Chief, Nuclear Support-Section No. 2, RO&NS Branch dat signed date signed po date signed e
s gned Ins ection Summar
Inspection on March 3-7, 1980 Re ort No. 50-220/80-02)
~AI:
R
.
by
11y based inspectors of small break loss of coolant accident procedures; small break loss of coolant procedures training; verification of as built safety related piping systems; isolation, condenser piping s6'pports; and facility tours.
Arrangements for establishment of an on-site office for a full-time NRC inspector were also made on March 5, 1980.
The inspection involved 64 inspector-hours on-site by two NRC regionally based inspectors and one supervisor.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were identified during this inspection.
Region I Form 12 8 0.0 6 0 2 0940
/] g()
DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- R. Abbott, Supervisor Operations
- J. Aldrich, Supervisor Training A. Crittenden, Senior Nuclear Staff Engineer J. Duell, Assistant Supervisor Radiochem and Rad Protection
- T. Lempges, Vice President - Nuclear Generation M. Meehan, Supervisor Mechanical Maintenance B. Ness, Field Engineer
- T. Perkins, Station Superintendent M. Roberts, Niagara Mohawk Design Engineer
.G. Yang, Mechanical Engineer - Niagara Mohawk Corporate Staff NRC
- H. Keister, Chief, Reactor Projects Section No. 4,.
ROSNS Branch J.. Mc0scar, Chief, Administrative Branch The inspectors also talked with and interviewed other licensee employees,, including members of the facility and corporate technical staff, contractor personnel, and reactor operators.
- denotes those present at the exit interview.
2.
Mana ement Meetin A meeting was held on March, 5, 1980, between the licensee, a telephone company representative,.and Region I personnel to discuss arrangements
,for establishment of an on-site office for a full-time NRC inspector.
Agreement was reached whe} eby the licensee will provide office space in a trailer"located on site.
3.
Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident SBLOCA Procedures a.
The following SBLOCA procedures were reviewed to verify that the vendor submitted and NRC approved SBLOCA procedure guidelines for operator actions had been incorporated as required:
Special Operating Procedure No. Nl-SOP-29, Pipe Break Inside Drywell, Revision 0, December 3, 197 Special Operating Procedure No. NI-SOP-30, Pipe Break Outside Primary Containment, Revision 0, December 5,
1979.
b.
The above procedures were reviewed to verify the incorporation of the following items:
Sufficient symptoms have been provided to identify the emergency Immediate actions addressed in the guidelines are included in the procedures Subsequent actions addressed in the guidelines are included in the procedure Caution statements are incorporated in the appropriate procedural locations and are consistent with guidelines precau tions Instrumentation to be used by the operator to perform certain actions is adequate Procedures are available to cover the loss of offsite power situation c ~
The following findings resulted from the above review:
Essentially all vendor. submitted and NRC approved guidelines have been incorporated in the SBLOCA procedures The requirement, during isolated conditions, to manually depressuri ze the reactor pressure vessel if the suppression chamber reaches 120 F (T.S. 3.2.2.f)
was omitted fr'om the pr ocedure.
The licensee stated this requirement would be incorporated into the procedure.
This item is unresolved pending completion of licensee action described above (50-220/80-02-01)
.
The guideline caution relating to level instrumentation error resulting from reference leg temperature increase was not included in the procedure.
Several minor items such as ADS level setpoint change had been noted by the licensee and were scheduled for incorporation into a procedure revision.
Cautions relating to the use of loop isolation valves though not present in the procedures are posted on the control panel
4.
Small Break. Loss of Coolant='Procedure'Trainin a.
The inspectors reviewed documentation relating to formal training associated with SBLOCA procedures provided to the operators, Documents revi ewed included:
Classroom training lesson outlines for instructions in level instrumentation, containment isolation, ADS light indications and SBLOCA procedures NI-SOP-29 and NI-SOP-30..
Records of operator classroom training attendance Randomly. selected completed examination papers Records of on shift SBLOCA procedure training b.
The inspectors walked through the SBLOCA procedures using P 5 ID's and control room indications to ensure that r equired operator actions can be performed.
c.
The inspectors interviewed several licensed operators to determine the adequacy of the SBLOCA procedures from a functional standpoint and the effectiveness of the training program.
Operators selected for interview included:
Two staff SRO license holders One shift supervisor One chief shift operator Two licensed auxiliary operators d.
The following findings resulted from the above review:
All licensed operators received the classroom training All watch standers participated in the on shift review of SBLOCA procedures All operator s interviewed appeared to be properly trained in the implementation of the SBLOCA procedures
P
.A number of items were discussed with.the licensee which it appeared operators were not completely familiar with, hesitant about or which had not been discussed during SBLOCA procedure training.
The following were among the items discussed:
(.1)
What happens to the ADS timer if vessel level recovers during the 120 second delay period?
(2)
At what vessel pressure would the raw water pump begin to provide flow to the vessel?
(3)
Guidance on what actions the operators should take if following.a SBLOCA the high pressure systems successfully maintain level?
(4)
The limited vessel level indication available to the operators. following the ADS permissive on LoLoLo level (5)
Guidance on what actions the operators should take if automatic actions which should have occurred did not occur.
The licensee stated the above items would be reviewed for possible inclusion in procedures and/or the training program.
The licensee's actions will be reviewed during a future inspection (50-220/80-02-02).
5.
.Verification of As Built Safet Related Pi in S stems a ~
The inspectors reviewed written instr'uctions and interviewed field engineers relating to verification of as built safety r elated piping systems.
Documents reviewed included:
Procedure SCVP - As Built Restraint Verification Procedure, January 15, 1980.
Anchor (Mechanical Por tion), Field Inspection -Inside Drywell Procedure
e b.
The inspectors witnessed support verifications being performed in the drywell..
The following were among the supports for which verification was observed:
~Su ort.
52-HS-23 52-HS-24 MSK-21A'SH-21 B
MSH-22A MSH-22B 33-HS-3'Sstem Recir culati on Recircula tion Main Steam Main Steam Main Steam Main Steam Cleanup The inspectors also witnessed anchor and rod hanger field inspections in the. drywell.
c.
The inspectors independently verified measurements associated with pipe geometry and seismic support locations of a segment of the high.
pressure feedwater l.ine in the turbine and reactor building which had previously been completed by the licensee..
I d.,
The inspectors independently verified pipe seismic,,support designs which had previously been verified by the licensee.
The following were among the supports verified:,
~Su ort 51-SC-26 51-SC-2 54-SCH-51 54-SCR-5A 113-R-3D
~Ss tern Feedwa ter Feedwa ter SFP Filter System SFP Filter System Instrument Air
~Su ort 113-R-3E 80-SC-R2 8I 3C 80-SC-8 80-PT-C
'0-SCR-1A 70-SC-15
~Ss ten Instrument Air Containment Spray Containment Spray Containment Spray Closed Loop Cooling Closed Loop Cooling e.
The following findings resulted from the above verifications:
The instructions,-documentation, organization, and personnel qualifications appeared to be adequate to perform the tasks.
The licensee inspections witnessed by the inspectors was performed in an organized professional, workman like manner.
No deficiencies were noted during the witnessing of support verifica tions.
No deficiencies were noted during independent, verification of pipe geometry and seismic support locations.
With the exception of one minor measurement error. (support
, SA), which was promptly corrected, no deficiencies were noted during the independent verification of pipe seismic support designs.
6.
Isolation Condenser Pi in Su orts In response to a memorandum from E. Jordan, Assistant Director for Technical Programs, ROI, to E. Brunner, Chief, Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch, Region I, the inspectors reviewed the isolation condenser piping supports to ensure that the support on the isolation condenser steam line Just outside the containment was included in licensee reviews.
No documentation relative to the above was onsite.
However, discussions with the Senior Nuclear Staff Engineer responsible for the performance of the evaluations, who was onsite, indicated:
a.
This support was included in-Bulletins 79-02 and 79-14 review b.
The subject support was analyzed for both seismic and HELB
~ loads.
7.
~Fi1!
T
'a 4 b.
On several occasions during the inspection, tours of the facility were conducted of the drywell, reactor building, turbine building, and the security fence.
During the tours, the inspectors discussed plant operations and observed housekeeping, radiation control measures,.
and controls for Technical Specification compliance.'n addition, the inspectors observed control room operations on both day and evening.shifts'for control room manning, and facility operation in accordance with administrative and Technical Specification requirements.
The following findings resulted from the tours described, above:
A number of broken and damaged spray nozzles were identified on the containment spray system header inside the drywell.
The licensee stated new nozzles were on route to the site and that broken and damaged nozzles would be replaced prior to startup.
This item is unresolved pending completion of licensee action described above (50-220/80-02-03).
A number of spray nozzles were noted as having ribbons attached which completely cover the nozzle diffusers.
These ribbons were used in conjunction with a spray nozzle surveillance test.
The present spray nozzle surveillance test procedure specifies the removal of the ribbons, following test completion.'he procedure, when last performed, did not specify ribbon removal following completion of the test.
The licensee stated the ribbons would be removed or placed so as to not interfere with the flow to the diffuser; This item is unresolved pending completion of licensee action described above (50-220/80-02-04).
A number of valves which had had chains attached for the purpose. of locking the valves were noted to have the handwheels removed with the chain still attached to the valve and wrapped around the valve stem.'s a result of this finding the licensee surveyed all locked valves in the drywell.
This survey showed that all valves shown as locked in the FSAR are locked and specified as locked on valve checkoff sheets.
Many other valves. (mostly drains and vents) which are shown as locked on facility PEIDs are not specified as locked on valve checkoff sheets and may or may not be locked in the plant.
The licensee stated that locked valves would be addressed in response to an item of noncompliance resulting from inspection 50-220/80-0 e
8.
Unresolved Items Unresolved i'tems are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items or items of noncompliance.
Unresolved i tems identified during.the inspection are discussed in paragraphs 2.c and 6.b.
9.
Exit Interview'he inspectors met with licensee representatives (denoted in paragraph 1)
at the conclusion of the inspection on March 7, 1980.
The inspection purpose,.
scope and findings were summarized.