IR 05000219/1980019
| ML20008E195 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 08/07/1980 |
| From: | Briggs L, Chaudhary S, Christopher R, Keimig R, Rich Smith, John Thomas NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20008E184 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-219-80-19, 50-219-80-21, NUDOCS 8010240351 | |
| Download: ML20008E195 (11) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION I
Combined Report No. 5"-219/80-19 and 80-21 Docket No.
50-219 License No.
DPR-16 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
Jersey Central Power and Light Company
Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road Morristown, New Jersey 07960 Facility Name:
Oyster Creek, Unit 1 Inspection At:
Forked River, New Jersey InspectionConductfd-ay 6-9, May 13-14, May 20-23, May 27-30, 1980 Inspectors:
lldMM 4 8// /&o L. Br SenioryesidentInspector
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kN hy Yi lS'o J. Thpmas' ilesidenJ. Inspector
'date P11/h A-
- 5.K.Chaudhary,ReptorInspector,RC&ES date 1240
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l R. K. Christopher Irfvestigation $pecialist gate'
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K/; Smith ~,Investigationspecialist
/daje Approved by:
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d VR. Keimig,fhief, R tor Projects Section date No. 1, RO&N5 Branc Inspection Summary:
Inspection on May 6-9, 13-14, 20-23, 27-30, 1980 (Combined Inspection Report No. 50-219/80-19 and 80-21)
Areas Inspected:
Routine inspections by the resident inspectors (129 hours0.00149 days <br />0.0358 hours <br />2.132936e-4 weeks <br />4.90845e-5 months <br />)
and one regional based construction branch inspector (3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />) of; licensee action on previous inspection findings; followup on commitments made in response to Performance Appraisal Branch (PAB) inspection; review of onsite events that occurred during the inspection; refueling activities; review of licensee action to placa administrative controls on override of safety actuation signals during containment purging; followup on regional requests; review of Woodward Governor operating procedures; fire protection system installation review; and, investiga-tion, by two investigators on May 22-23, 1980 (32 hours3.703704e-4 days <br />0.00889 hours <br />5.291005e-5 weeks <br />1.2176e-5 months <br />), into the circumstances
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surrounding a licensee reported event concerning bypassed interlocks in the con-trol rod drive system (Paragraph 3.b).
Region I Form 167 (August 1979)
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Results:
Two items of noncompliance were identified (Infraction - failure to follow plant procedures (Paragraph 3.a.); and Infraction - inadequate procedure concerning bypassed refueling interlocks (Paragraph 3.b.)).
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted J. Carroll, Station Manager K. Fickeissen, Support Superintendant
- V. Foglia, Project Engineer D. Gaines, Manager, Operations Quality Assurance W. Garvey, Director, Station Administration E. Growney, Engineering Supervisor, Acting T. Johnson, Supervisor, Station I&E Maintenance J. Maloney, Operations Supervisor
- J. N ncinelli, Project Engineer
- R. Pinelli, Project Engineer J. Riggar, Security Supervisor J. Sullivan, Plant Superintendent The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during the course of the inspe: tion including management, clerical, maintenance, and opera-tions personnel.
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- Attended fire protection system installation review exit meeting on May 23, 1980.
2.
Licensee Action on 9revious Inspection Findings (Closed) Infraction (219/79-18-01):
Procedura 108 did not provide for independent verification of lifted leads and jumpers.
The inspectors veri-fied that procedure 108, " Equipment Control", Revision 18, dated April 24, 1980, requires independent verification of tags placed on or removed from valves, switches and breakers, and lifted leads and jumpers.
Implementation of thi.s procedure will be' reviewed on a continuing basis.
(0 pen) Infraction (219/79-18-05):
Fire doors open and combustible material on 119 foot elevation of the reactor building.
Procedure 120, " Fire Hazards",
Revision 7, dated April 30, 1980, allows fire doors to be open if an indivi-dual is stationed at the door to close it in event of a fire emergency or prior to leaving the area.
Also included in the licensee's response to this item, was'a commitment to obtain letters of agreement with fuel suppliers for fire retardant fuel packing and crating materials and to revise fuel receipt inspection procedures to include inspection for fire retardant pack-ing and crating materials.
The fuel suppliers have denied the licensee's request, thus far.
This itedi will remain open pending the licensee's deci-sion regarding alternative measures to prevent the accumulation of hazardous quantities of flammable materials in the fuel handling areas of the reactor building and other vital areas.
(0 pen) Infraction (219/79-18-07):
Inadequate instructions for anchor bolt installation and grouting and incomplete work orders.
Contractor employees
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are now being instructed during their site orientation program that there are certain site rules and procedures that must be followed and contractor management is now provided an orientation package of selected plant rules and procedures that must be read prior to the contractor performing work onsite.
Also, the Site QA Inspection Supervisor has verified that the inspection check lists include a reguirement to check for completion of work orders j
foralljobsundersurveillance.
The QA engineering group has added an
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item to its audits to assure those inspection activities are completed.
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These actions adequately address the specific circumstances that led to the item of noncompliance.
However, on page 4 of Attachment "A" to the licens-ee's response to items of noncompliance stemming from inspection 50-219/
79-18, the licensee committed to review and strengthen the mechanism for auditing instructions given to contractor employees on applicable plant rules and procedures.
This matter has not been resolved and will remain open pending completion of licensee action.
(Closed) Deficiency (219/79-19-26):
Returned weld rod not identified and tagged for storage in accordance with procedure 3005.
Procedure 3005 is a quality assurance procedure that establishes methods for the receipt of l
material and the attachment of identifying tags on material.
A new set of procedures (9000 series) has been issued for material management.
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series of procedures provides direction to warehouse personnel for the
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handling, issuing,andstorageofQAmaterial,includingweldrod.
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procedures specify that returned material will be tagged as " accepted" indicatin to issue.g that it must be reinspected and tagged " released for use" prior
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A tour of the weld rod storage area in the warehouse found no unacceptable conditions.
Additionally, an audit check list has been prepared to cover all aspects of weld rod control and audit number 80-53 has been added to the 1980 l
schedule to perform an audit of weld rod control.
l The effectiveness of the new 9000 series procedures will continue to be monitored by NRC resident inspectors.
(0 pen) Infraction (219/79-18-14):
Duplicate file system not complete.
The inspection verified that modification package 297, Piping Modification for Installation of 4 Containment Spray Heat Exchangers, has been reconstructed and filed in the site document control center; however, this item will remain open pending a complete audit of all engineering modification pack-ages by the licensee. This audit is scheduled to be completed by January 1, 1981.
l (0 pen) Infraction (219/79-18-31):
Analysis of samples from standby gas treatment system charcoal adsorbers not performed..The required analysis has-been added to the master surveillance schedule and the licensee has l
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conducted a detailed review of Technical Specification changes to insure tilat all surveillance reguirements are included in the master surveillance schedule.
However, in view of the event of May 16, 1980, which is discussed in detail in LER No. 50-219/80-17/IT, this review ap) ears to have been inadequate.
This item will remain open pending furtier review for adequate procedural coverage and institution of an acceptable means of tracking required surveillance performance dates.
(Closed) Deficiency (219/79-18-34):
Regional office not notified of change to site security plan.
The inspector verified that Procedure 101, Paragraph 3.16,ications to the NRC.does direct the Site Security Supervisor to prepare all report notif The matter was discussed with station management and the Site Security Supervisor.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
The following commitments, made in the licensee's letter of March 17, 1980, in res 79-18)ponse to the Performance Appraisal Branch (PAB) inspection (50-219/
and not discussed elsewhere in this report, were reviewed:
Review Fire Protection Administrative Control procedures to assure
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control of functions disabling the fire arotection system. and storage of combustibles.
Procedure 333, " Plant : ire Protection System", Rev1-sion 7, dated April 23, 1980, prescribes the steps to be taken to pro-vide adequate backup fire protection when it is necessary to disable portions of the fire suppression system.
Procedures 119, "Housekeep-ing"
" Fire Protection Inspection",inistrative Procedure" were 120.1,119.1,ing, inspectors.
120, " Fire Hazards", and
" Weld Burning, and Grinding Adm reviewed by the These procedures adequately control stor-ageofcombustiblematerial,jobrelatedtrashanddebris,andflame producing devices.
The inspector had no further questions on this matter.
Complete Fire Protection System Modifications.
Modifications are still
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in progress and will be turned over to the site by the contractor prior to the end of the current refueling outage.
Appoint Manager of Training.
A Manager of Training has been appointed
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at the corporate level and reports to the Vice President of Generation.
Establish an enforceable housekeeping policy.
This has not yet been
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completed due to the workload imposed by the current refueling outage.
The Station Manager will draft a letter to NRC:RI explaining the rea-sons for not meeting this commitment.
Of the list of 82 commitments made by the licensee in response to PAB inspection (50-219/79-18),16 that reached their due date were inspected.
Of these, 10 are closed and 6 remain open pending further action by the hcense._
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(0 pen) Unresolved (219/80-09-01):
Steam path through open conduit on Limitorque valve operators.
At various times during this inspection, dis-i cussions were held with the licensee concerning the problem of possible steam intrusion, under LOCA conditions, into the Limitorque valve operators located in the drywell possibly leading to accumulation of condensate in the operator housings.
The licensee provided an Environmental Test Report conducted on Limitorque actuators by destinghouse Nuclear Energy Systems (WNES)in1969.
In addition, the licensee (Generation Engineering) had performedanevaluationofthesubjectvalveoperators.-
The WNES test consisted of heat aging, seismic testing, cycle life testing, radiation effects testing and a nine hour test with live steam piped directly into the. limit switch compartment of the operator.
One transient i
failure was noted at the time of resistance measurements during full stroke
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cycle testing at 275F.
However, this problem did not reappear in subsequent testing and a precise cause for the failure was not determined.
All other tests caused no failures or noticable difference in measured values or appearance.
Thelicensee's'evalua' ion (GP-80-675 dated May 22,1980) indicated that t
7 valves in the drywell could experie,nce the stated problem due to open conduit:
Closed Cooling Water System inlet to (V-15-148) and outlet from
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.(V-5-166) the drywell and the cleanup system outlet (V-16-1) from the drywell.
These valves isolate immediately on a LOCA and the conduit enters from the bottom of the actuator thus providing a drain point-for any condensate.
IsolationCondenserSystemIandIIreturn(V-14-36andV-14-37).
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These valves are normally,open and will close only on a rupture of the isolation condenser conduit to these valves. piping.
The licensee will seal the open ShutdownCoolingSysteminletto(V-17-54)andoutletfrom(V-17-19)
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the drywell.
These valves are normally closed when reactor pressure is above 150 psi and would not be required to operate during a LOCA unless reactor pressure was below 150 psi with the Shutdown Cooling System in operation. The core spray systems (two) can also serve as a backup to the shutdown cooling system.
This matter was discussed with Region I and NRC Systematic Evaluation Pro-gram (SEP) Branch personnel during the inspection period and on June 13, 1980.
The licensee's evaluation and proposed actions are considered accept-able based upon the information reviewed to date.
Additionally, an indepen-denttestingcontractor(FranklinInstitute)isperforminganin-depth analysis of the environmental qualification of Oyster Creek electrical com-ponents under an NRC/SEP contract.
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- his item will remain open pending NRC r'eview of the Franklin Institute findings.
3.
Follow-up of Events Occurring During the Refueling a.
Fuel Pool Overflow On May 8, 1980, at approximately 1200 hours0.0139 days <br />0.333 hours <br />0.00198 weeks <br />4.566e-4 months <br />, the fuel pool high level alarm annunciated on Control Room panel "3FG".
The high level alarm was investigated by plant personnel at that time and the water level appeared to be normal.
No attempt was made to lower the water level to clear the alarm and no follow-up observations were made to determine if the water level was continuing to rise.
The annunciator remained in an alarmed condition. At about 1800 hours0.0208 days <br />0.5 hours <br />0.00298 weeks <br />6.849e-4 months <br />, vater was observed drip-ping from the reactor building santilation ducts.
It was discovered that the fuel pool level had risen to the point that it overflowed into the pool ventilation skimmers and resulted in approximately 1000 gallons of slightly contaminated water being spilled through the reactor building ventilation system.
Subsequently, it was found that a shut-off valve was open in a demineralized water hose which was being used intermittently to add makeup water to the fuel pool while the condensate transfer system (normal makeup water supply) was out of service.
The water level was lowered by draining the pool to the rad waste system.
Cleanup of the spilled water and decontamination was
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completed by 0300 on May 9, 1980.
Procedure 501, " Annunciators and Alarms", Section 3F.G, requires that the water level in the fuel pool be lowered at the time of a high level alarm.
Failure of plant per-sonnel to adhere to the requirements of this procedure constitutes an apparent item of noncompliance at the infraction level (219/80-19-01).
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Bypassed Control Rod Drive System Interlocks On May 16, 1980,.at approximately 0130 hours0.0015 days <br />0.0361 hours <br />2.149471e-4 weeks <br />4.9465e-5 months <br /> during the performance of control rod interference checks, the operator observed abnormal position indication while withdrawing rod 10-23.
The " Green-Green" back light on the position indicator remained illuminated indicat-ing full insertion of the rod.
An investigation by the licensee revealed that the "one rod interlock bypass jumper" for control rod 10-23 had not been removed after the replacement of the control rod i
blade and prior to insertion of the rod for subsequent fuel loading.
l The same condition was found to exist on control rod 14-15.
The licensee submitted LER 80-17/IT concerning this matter.
Failure to
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remove the bypass jumpers could have allowed the withdrawal of the control rods while in the refueling mode with the resultant potential l
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for an inadvertent criticality event.
Review of fuel move sheets indicated that the jumpers had been installed en February 18, 1980 and had remained improperly inplace since that date.
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i The NRC resident inspector conducted interviews with control room operators, instrumentation and control technicians and supervisory
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staff, and lerformed a detailed examination of logs and records to
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determinetiecircumstanceswhichledtothetwobypassjumpersnot being removed.
On May 22-23 1980, two investi weredispatchedtothesite(IEInspectionNo.hationssecialists 19/80-21 to assist in the investigation of this matter'and to determine if any falsifica-l tion of procedural sign-offs or intentional maleficence were involved.
The investigation concluded that the cause of the event was inadequate procedures and controls and a lack of strict adherence to procedural requirements.
No falsification of records or intentional maleficence were found.
Additionally, other administrative controls would have prevented the withdrawal of more than one control rod.
Procedure 205.7, " Control Cell Unloading / Loading", the procedure being imple-mented for the installation and removal of the "one rod interlock bypassjumper",alsorequiresverificationofrodat"00" position from the control room and visual verification of rod insertion from the refueling bridge prior to fuel loading.
Procedure 617.4.005,
" Control Rod Interference Check", Paragraph 6.2 requires the verifi-cation that all rods are at position "00 before rod withdrawal.
The procedural inadequacies and controls coupled with a lack of strict adherence to the procedural requirements which allowed the interlock jumper to remain in place could have contributed to but could not
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have by itself caused an inadvertent criticality.
Technical Specification 3.9.F.1 states, in part:
...all refueling
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interlocks are operable... refueling interlocks associated with the controlrodsbeingwithdrawnmaybebypassedasrequiredafterthe fuel assemblies have been removed...,.
Technical Specification 6.8.1 states, in part:
" Written procedures shall be established, imple-mented, and maintained that meet or exceed the requirements of Section 5.1 and 5.3 of American National Standard N18.7-1972...,".
American National Standard N18.7-1972, Section 5.3 states, in part:
" Nuclear power plants shall be operated in accordance with written procedures....Each procedure shall be sufficiently detailed for a qualified individual to perform the required function without direct supervision...,".
Inadequacies in Procedure 205.7, " Fuel Cell Unloading / Loading", per-mitted the interlocks which prevent withdrawal of more than one con-trol rod while the reactor was in the " refuel" mode, to be improperly bypassed on control rods 10-23 and 14-15, with fuel loaded in the associated control cell from February 18, 1980 to May 16, 1980.
This constitutes an apparent item of noncompliance at the infraction level (219/80-19-02).
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4.
Observation of Refueling Activities Final fuel moves (6) following completion of core spray sparger clamp installation were observed by the resident inspector during the 12 to 8 a.m.
shift on Ma 14, 1980.
All moves were conducted in accordance with approved procedures.y Procedure review was conducted and documented during inspection 50-219/80-01.
5.
Followup on Regional Requests a.
Operator Awareness of NRC Policy Concerning Licensed Operator Citations The inspector interviewed various licensed operators on different shifts to discuss NRC enforcement policy regarding licensed indivi-duals.
The operators interviewed were familiar with the policy dis-cussed in IE Information Notice 79-20, "NRC Enforcement Policy - NRC Licensed Individuals".
b.
Review of Licensee Tagging Procedures Licensee;s equipment tagout instructions were reviewed to determine whether unusual valve line-ups that are to be maintained over a shift change require tagging.
Theapplicablegrocedures,106,"Conductof Operations", and 108, " Equipment Control do not specify when tags are required for switches, breakers, and valves.
However, interviews with various operators and supervisors indicated that the general sta-tion policy was that any unusual valve or switch lineup requires a tagout unless the line-up is governed by an approved procedure which includes steps to restore the lineup.
However, the licensee will revise procedure 108, "Eguipment Control", to incorporate this exist-ing but undocumented policy.
This will be done by August 1, 1980.
This item is considered unresolved pending licensee action to revise theprocedure(219/80-19-03).
6.
Implementation of Terry Corporation Procedures for Operation of PG-PL Woodward Governors (11251b/22, dated April 1,1980)
The inspector verified that there are no Terry Turbines in use at the Oyster Creek facility; therefore, the procedures to assure turbine restart within 30 minutes without erroneous overspeed trips are not applicable to Oyster Creek.
7.
Plant Tours The inspector conducted tours of plant areas which included the control room, reactor building, drywell, augmented off gas building, turbine build-ing, cable spreading room, yard areas, and the warehous.
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The following areas were observed:
Radiation controls;
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Housekeeping, including attention to the elimination of fire hazards;
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Fluid leaks;
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Condition of hangers and seismic restraints; and
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Control room manning
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The following significant finding was discussed with plant management:
During a drywell tour, valve V-24-29 (reactor water sample isolation
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valve) was found to have its electrical conduit pulled from its pack-
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ing, gland.
The licensee was informed and repairs were completed and verified by the inspector.
j No items of noncompliance were identified.
8.
Verification of Administrative Controls on Defeat of Safety Actuation Signals During Containment Purging (Itc /8-19)
The licensee has completed the installation of mechanical stops on all ten
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containment purge' supply and exhaust isolation valves.
The stops serve to limit the valves to 30 percent of full open (27 degrees) so that they will be capable of closing under LOCA conditions.
In addition, the only auto-matic isolation signals affecting these valves are high drywell pressure i
or reactor double low water level, neither of which can be bypassed in the
"Run" mode.
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The inspector had no further questions on this item.
9.
Fire Protection System Anchor Bolt Installation (219/79-18-07)
a.
Direct Inspection of Anchor Bolt Installation The inspector conducted a visual inspection of Plant Fire protection building, ping at elevations 51', 75', and 95' inside the reactor system pi and observed that no hangers were attached to walls by concrete expansion anchors in close proximity to abandoned anchor holes.
Abandoned holes have been filled and repaired.
The hangers and other pipe supports originally installed in close proximity to abandoned holes have been relocated at least ten anchor diameters from abandoned hole.
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b.
Review of Documentation The inspector reviewed the following documents pertaining to the installation of concrete expansion anchors:
Field Revision Authorization, FRA-32, dated November 13, 1979
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Nonconformance and Corrective Action Reports-- 79-208, dated November 20, 1979 79-209, dated November 20, 1979 79-210, dated November 20, 1979 79-211, dated November 23, 1979 79-212, dated November 23, 1979
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Drawing No. A-800-2C4-001 Rev. 3
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Based on the review of above documents and discussion with the licensee's project manager for exparysion anchors, and other engineers, the inspector determined the following:
The licensee has issued a procedure specifying acceptance criteria for relocating hanger / pipe support attachments to walls in case of any abandoned holes (at least ten bolt diameters away from an aban-doned hole).
The licensee has initiated nonconformance and corrective action reports to document the installation of hangers / pipe supports not complying to the above acceptance criteria.
The licensee has completed the corrective action on the unacceptable installation by relocating the affected hangers / pipe supports and repairing abandoned holes.
The inspector had no further questions concerning fire protection system anchor bolt installation.
This item (219/79-18-07) is con-sidered resolved.
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Unresolved Items Unresolved items are items about which more information is needed to determine if the item is acceptable, an item of noncompliance or a devia-tion.
The unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in Paragraph 5.b.
11.
Exit Interviews At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings.
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