ML20008E187
| ML20008E187 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 09/03/1980 |
| From: | Ross D JERSEY CENTRAL POWER & LIGHT CO. |
| To: | Brunner E NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20008E184 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8010240338 | |
| Download: ML20008E187 (3) | |
Text
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Jersey Central Power & Ught Company
.I c D A I-JGDH uaoison Avenue at runen so i scao Momstown, New Jersey 07960 (201)455-8200 September 3,1980 Mr. Elton J. Brunner, Chief Reactor Operation and Nuclear Support Branch United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region I 631 Park Avenue King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406
Dear Mr. Brunner:
Subject:
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Docket No. 50-219 I. E. Inspection No. 80-19 This is in reply to your letter of August 11, 1980 regarding the inspection conducted by Mr. L. Briggs from May 6, 1980 to May 30, 1980 at the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station.
In Appendix A of your letter there are noted two activities which were not conducted in full compliance with the conditions of the Oyster Creek NRC Facility License.
The items and our responses to them are given below.
Item No. A Technical Specification 6.8.1 states in part " Written procedures shall be established, implemented...."
Procedure 501, " Annunciators and Alarms" Section 3F.G, " Fuel Pool High Level or High Temperature", states, in part: " Adjust fuel pool level as necessary by draining system to either the hotwell...or rad waste...,".
Contrary to the above, on May 8,1980 at approximately 12 noon, a fuel pool high level alarm was annunciated on panel 3FG.
The high level alarm was investigated at that time, however, no attempt was made to lower the fuel pool level in accordance with procedure 501.
This, in conjunction with the failure to perform subsequent observations of fuel pool level during the time the high level alarm was annunciated (12 Noon to 6:00 p.m.), resulted in the overflow of approximately 1000 gallons of slightly radioactivity contaminated water into the reactor building ventilation ducts via the fuel pool ventilation skimmers.
Response
8010240 333 This occurrence resulted from a failure to continue follow up of the original alarm until the cause was understood and the alarm reset.
The procedure, as written, is clear, and directive, and further revision will not significantly increase its effectivenesss.
The operator failed to remove the hose which, subsequently was determined to be the cause of the high level.
Due to the other activities demanding the attention of Operations personnel the area was not re-inspected to determine if an actual level increase was occurring.
Jersey Central Power & Light Company is a Member of the General Public Utikt:es System
Mr. Elton J. Brunner, Chicf S:ptember 3, 1980 The system was being operated in an isolated mode, at tne time.
The Condensate, Control Rod Drive, and Cleanup Letdown Systems were secured and thus unable to add water to or remove water from the Fuel
- Pool, As noted in your inspection report the alarm was investigated and conditions appeared normal.
This occurrence will be discussed with the Operations personnel as an example of the problems that can occur when alarms are not promptly followed up and corrected.
This material and a directive memo from the Operations Supervisor will be promulgated to all Operation personnel.
Item No. B Technical Specification 6.8.1 states in part, " Written procedures shall be established, implemented, and maintained that meet or exceed the requirements of Section 5.1 and 5.3 of American National Standard N18.7-1972....".
American National Standard N.8.7-1972, Section 5.3 states, in part:
" Nuclear power plants shall be operated in accordance with written procedures.... Each procedure shall be sufficiently detailed for a qualified individual to perform the required function without direct supervision...,".
Contrary to the above, inadequacies in Procedure 205.7, " Fuel Cell Unloading / Loading" permitted the interlocks, which prevent withdrawal of more than one control rod while the reactor is in the " refuel" mode, to be improperly bypassed on control rods 10-23 and 14-15. This condition existed from February 18,1980 to May 16,1980.
Response
Upon discovery of the bypassed "one rod permissive" interlocks for control rods 10-23 and 14-15 the bypass jumpers were imediately removed. This action restored the interlock system to the fully operable condition, thus, full compliance with the Technical Specifica-tions was achieved.
Corrective steps to avoid further items of non-compliance include:
1)
Revision of Procedure 205.7 " Fuel Cell Unloading / Loading" to incorporate two (2) sets of fuel move sheets (one (1) for the refueling bridge and one (1) for the control room) each set containing only the applicable signature spaces for the activities performed.
This revision will assign proper accountability for each step performed.
2)
Revision of Procedure 205.7 to incorporate a positive means for the control room operator to verify that the "one rod permissive" bypass jumpers are installed on and removed from the correct rod at the proper time.
This revision will eliminate the use of ambiguous light indication to accomplish the verification.
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Mr. Eltta J. Brunn:r, Chicf September 3,1980 3)
A new surveillance procedure will be written to ensure that all aspects of Technical Specification 3.9.E and 3.9.F as required by Technical Specifications 4.9.E and 4.9.F. are met.
The procedure revisions will be completed by June 30, 1981 and thus full compliance will be achieved at that time.
It should be noted that these procedures will not be used until the next refueling outage which is scheduled for September 12, 1981.
Vr truly yours, NY Donald A. Ross, Manager Generating Stations-Nuclear DAR:WVS:dh i
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