IR 05000219/1980033
| ML20003B594 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oyster Creek |
| Issue date: | 12/30/1980 |
| From: | Briggs L, Keimig R, John Thomas NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20003B592 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-219-80-33, NUDOCS 8102120529 | |
| Download: ML20003B594 (7) | |
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O U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-219/80-33 Docket No. 50-219 License No. DPR-16 Priority
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Category C
Licensee:
Jersey Central Power and Light Company Madison Avenue at Punch Bowl Road Morristown, New Jersey 07960 Facility Name:
Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station Inspection at:
Forked River, New Jersey Inspection conducted: November 3 - November 28, 1980 Inspectors:
0 t A%)L, Tys islhlto L. E. Br'
s, Senior Resident Reactor Inspector date signed 1219lOD w
J. A. Thomas, Resident Reactor Inspector
'dats signed date signed Approved by:
8 O.
O,b lt!3sldd R. R. Keimig, Chief, Reactor Projects date signed Section No. 1, RO&NS Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on November 3 - November 28, 1980 (Report No. 50-219/80-33)
Area Inspected:
Routine inspection by the resident inspectors (71 hours8.217593e-4 days <br />0.0197 hours <br />1.173942e-4 weeks <br />2.70155e-5 months <br />) of:
l Tours of the facility; log and record review; follow-up of on-site events; review of maintenance activities; and follow-up of IE Bulletins and Circulars.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
81021205p.4
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted J. Carroll, Director, Oyster Creek Operations K. Fickeissen, Manager, Plant Engineering I. Finfrock, Jr., Vice President JCP&L, Director, Oyster Creek J. Maloney, Manager, Plant Maintenance W. Stewart, Plant Operations Manager J. Sullivan, Manager, Operations l
D. Turner, Radiological Controls Manager i
The inspectors also interviewed other licensee personnel during the l
course of the inspection including management, clerical, maintenance, and operations personnel.
2, Plant Tour a.
During the course of the inspection, the inspector made observations and conducted multiple tours of:
Control Room;
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Reactor Building;
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Turbine Building;
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Augmented Off-Gas Building;
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Cooling Water Intake Structure;
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New Rad-Waste Building;
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l Old Rad-Waste Building;
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Monitoring Change Areas;
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Fire Pump House; and,
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Yard Areas.
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b.
The following determinations were made:
Monitoring instrumentation. The inspector verified that
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selected instruments were functional and demonstrated parameters within Technical Specification limits.
Radiation controls. The inspector made observations to
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verify that control point procedures and posting requirements were being followed.
Fluid leaks. No fluid leaks of significance were observed
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which had not been identified by plant personnel and for which corrective action had not been initiated.
Plant housekeeping conditions. Observations of plant house-
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keeping relative to fire hazards identified no notable conditions.
-- Piping vibration. No excessive piping vibration was noted during the plant tours.
Control room annunciators.
Selected lit annunciators were
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discussed with control room operators to verify that the o
reasons for them were understood.
Selected valves in safety related systems were checked to
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verify proper system alignment.
By frequent observations during the inspection, the inspector
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verified that control room manning requirements of 10 CFR 50.54(k)
and the Technical Specifications were being met.
In addition, the inspector observed shift turnovers to verify that continuity of system status was maintained.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
c.
The following acceptance criterb were used for the above items:
Technical Specifications;
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10 CFR 50.54(k); and,
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Inspector judgment.
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3.
Shift Logs and Operating Records a.
The inspector reviewed the following plant procedures to determine the licensee established requirements in this area in preparation l
for review of selected logs and records:
Procedurc N6, Conduct of Operations;
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j P.arure 108, Equipment Control; and
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Procedure 115, Standing Order Control.
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The inspector had no questions in this area.
b.
Shift logs and operating records were reviewed to verify that:
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Control Room logs were filled out and signed;
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Equipment logs were filled out and signed;
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Log entries involving abnormal conditions provided sufficient
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detail to communicate equipment status;
-- Shift turnover sheets were filled out, signed, and reviewed; Operating orders did not conflict with Technical Specification
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requirements; and, Logs and records were maintained in accordance with the
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procedures in a above.
c.
The review included the following plant shift logs and operating records as indicated and discussions with licensee personnel.
Reviews were conducted on an intermittent selective basis:
Control Room Log, November 3 through November 28;
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Control Roan Alarm Sheets;
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Control Rod Status Sheets;
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Technical Specification Log;
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Reactor Auxiliary Log;
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-- Reactor Log; Control Room Turnover Check List;
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Standing Orders, all active; and,
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l Operational Memos and Directives, all active.
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No items of noncompliance were identified.
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4.
Follow-up of On-Site Events i
l On November 5,1980, the licensee attempted to remove the 'B' isolation condenser from service to repair a packing leak on vent isolation valve V-14-19. At approximately 2:00 pm while isolating the condenser both solenoid aperated vent isolation valves, V-14-1 and V-14-19, failed to close prcperly when actuated from the control room. The vent lines from the isolation condenser loops to the main steam lines downstream of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIV's) are provided with two solenoid operated isolation valves in series. These valves close auto-matically on isolation condenser actuation or on MSIV isolation signals.
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Failure of these two valves to operate properly would have resulted in a degradation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary and primary containment in the event of an isolation signal. The 'B' isolation condenser system was declared ineperable and an operability check of the 'A' isolation condenser system (Procedure 609.4.001) was performed satisfactorily. The 'B' system was tNn isolated by closing the steam inlet valves. After depressirization of the vent header, both valves were cycled satisfactorily.
Valve V-lt.-19 was repacked and the valve cycled to verify freedom of movement. After extensive trouble-shooting, the cause of the failure of V-14-1 and V-14-19 could not be
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determined. Subsequent testing after repressurization of the vent header and returning the 'B' isolation condenser to service revealed no further abnormalities.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Plant Maintenance During the inspection period, the inspector observed maintenance and problem investigation activities. The inspector reviewed these activities to verify compliance with regulatory requirements, including those stated in the Technical Specifications; compliance with the administrative and maintenance procedures; proper use of safety tags; proper equipment alignment; radiological controls for worker protection; and, fire protection. The following activities were reviewed:
-- Repacking of isola. ion condenser vent valves Repair of 'C' react r Feed Pump Minimum Flow Valve
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I No items of noncompliars were identified.
6.
IE Bulletins and Circulars a.
Bu'letins Licensee actions concerning the following IE Bulletins were reviewed by the inspector to verify that:
the Bulletin was forwarded to appropriate on-site management; a review for applicability was performed; information discussed in the licensee's reply was accurate;
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corrective action taken was as described in the reply; and the reply was within the time period described in the bulletin.
IEB 79-21, Temperature Effects on Level Measurements, and
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IEB 79-22, Possible Leakage of Tubes of Tritium Gas Used in Timepieces for Luminosity, were reviewed and determined to be l
not applicable to Oyster Creek.
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IEB 80-14, Degradation of Scram Discharge Volume Capability.
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By correspondence dated July 23, 1980, the licensee responded to this bulletin. The inspectors verified through interviews with l
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cognizant plant personnel that the licensee had conducted adequate records review to detennine that there had been no incidents of degradation of any scram discharge volume (SDV)
level switch due to damaged float assemblies, no incidents of degradation of SDV vent and drain valve operability, and no incidents of water hamer related damage to SDV piping. The inspector reviewed Procedure 617.4.006, " Scram Discharge Volume Vent Piping Blockage Test," and Procedure 619.3.011,
" Scram Discharge High Water Level". Procedure 617.4.006 is performed prior to a startup from a reactor scram and verifies operability of the SDV vent and drain valves. Procedure l
619.3.011 is performed monthly and prior to startup from a reactor scram to verify operability of the SDV level switches.
In addition, a memo was issued to all operations department personnel giving guidance on operability requirements of the SDV vent and drain valves and reporting of deficiencies to the NRC.
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The inspector had no further questions on IEB 80-14.
IEB 80-19, Failures of Mercury-Wetted Matrix Relays in Reactor
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Protective Systems of Operating Nuclear Power Plants Designed by Combustion Engineering.
By correspondence dated August 13, 1980, the licensee reported that mercury wetted relays are not utilized in the reactor protection system or any other safety related system at the Oyster Creek facility. This was verified by the inspector by direct observation and by discussions with cognizant plant personnel. No further corrective action will be required.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
IEB 80-20, Failure of Westinghouse Type W-2 Spring Return to
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Neutral Control Switches.
By correspondence dated August 28, 1980, the licensee reported that no Westinghouse Type W-2 switches are utilized in safety related systems at the Oyster Creek facility.
l This was verified by the inspector by direct observation and by discussions with cognizant plant personnel. No further corrective action will be required.
The inspector had no further questions on this item.
b.
Circulars Licensee actions concerning the following IE Circulars were reviewed to verify that the circular was received by licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed, and that action taken or planned is appropriate.
All of the following circulars were determined to be not applicable to the Oyster Creek facility:
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IEC 78-01, Loss of Well Logging Source.
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IEC 78-05, Inadvertent Safety Injection During Cooldown.
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IEC 78-10, Control of Sealed Sources in Radiation Therapy.
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IEC 78-12, HPCI Turbine Control Valve Lift Rod Bending.
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IEC 78-14, HPCI Turbine Reversing Chamber Hold Down Bolting.
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The inspector had no further questions on the abo 9e items.
7.
Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of this inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss inspection scope and findings.
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