IR 05000213/1989021
| ML20011D582 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 12/20/1989 |
| From: | Kaplan H, Strosnider J, Winters R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20011D581 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-213-89-21, NUDOCS 8912280029 | |
| Download: ML20011D582 (6) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-
REGION I
Report No.
50-213/89-21 Docket No.
50-213 License No.
Licensee:
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company RR #1, Box 127E
East Hampton, Connecticut 06424 Facility Name: Haddam Neck Plant Inspection At: Hadoam Neck and Berlin, Connecticut
Ir.spection Dates: December 4 - 8, 1989 Inspectors:
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H. J. Kaplan,'Sebior Reactor Engineer, MPS, date EB, DRS, Region I IE20!%
R. W. Winters, ' Reactor Engineer, MPS, EB,
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DRS, Region I
'//u/8f Approved by:
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. Arm J.
. Strosh'ider Chiaf, MPS, Engineering Branch, date i
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@, Regior I Inspection Summary: A routine anne.nced inspection was performed from
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December 4 - 8,1989 (Report No. 50-213/89-21). The engineering support of
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the plant both onsite and from the corporate office was assessed.
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Results: No violations or deviations were identified.
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DETAILS 1.0 Persons Contacted
- P. L'Heureux, Assistant Engineering Supervisor
- C. Gladding, Engineering Supervisor W. Heinig, Quality Assurance Engineer
- D. Miller, Station Superintendent T. Nichols, Procurement Engineer Northeast Nuclear Service Company
.L P Godha, Engineering Supervisor
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S. Frolov, Sy: tem Engineer S. Wey1 rad, System Engineer
- Denotes those attending the exit meeting.
The inspectors also contacted other administrative and technical personnel during the inspection.
t 2.0. Scope The scope of the mpe: tion was to ascert.11n that the licensee has developed an effective engineering organization to support plant changes and modifica-tions and to assure that these char.ges were in conformarc e with the Technical Specifications,10 CFR 50.59, the Safety Analysis Report, and other regulatory
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requirements. The inspection focused on design changes and modifications that did not require prior approval by the NRC.
s 3.0 Engineering Program (37700,37828)
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Th4 inspectors ray 12wed the licensee's engineering-program with cognizant personnel to deterr.iine the method used in determining if modifications
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were major or min 9r.
Initial evaluations of all design changes and modifica-tions are perfor'.ied in accordance with procedure N00-3.05, Evaluation of Plant Changes ead Modifications. This procedure requires that an evaluation be made to determine if the following criteria are changed:
reduce design margin,
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-affect stress and/or seismic calculations,
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revise any of the environmental qualifications,
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adversely affect engineering parameters, i.e. (temperature,
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pressure, material compatibility),
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adversely affect fire protection (Appendix R) considerations,
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potentially create or increase the potential.for offsite radittien or
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airborne radioactivity, and have potential for creating an unreviewed safety question.
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If during the evaluation any of the answers to the above are positive the change is considered to be a major design change or modification.
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If all of the above considerations are negative the change is considered minor.
Major design changes and modifications, called Plant Design Change Records (PDCR),are the responsibility of the corporate engineering organization with active participation by the plant staff. Minor design changes and modifications, called Plant Design Change Record Evaluations (PDCE), are the responsibility of the plant staff.
For both major and minor design changes and modifications the Plant Operations Review Committee (PORC) has the final review authority.
Corporate engineering also provides s'ignificant. support to the plant during outages by supplementing the plant staff with engineers. During:this inspection 12 engineers from the corporate office were assigned to various tasks in the plant. Thete were six mechanical, four electrical..one reactnr, and one computer engineer working in the plant at the time of the inspection.
Most of these individuals were following modification installations being performed during the ocage.
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Conclusions-The licensee has developed a program for the evaluation of plant design changes and modifications to ascertain if the changes are major or minor.
Ma.ior changes are performed by the corporate engineering' staff, minor changes are performed by the plant staff. To determine whether a change is major or minor all modifications are first evaluated to assure that predetermined parameters are not affected. These parameters include design margin, stress
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radioactive releases, or creating ur. reviewed safety questions.
If none of these parameters are adversely affected the design change or modification
.1 is considered minor. All others are major.
j Corporate support to the plant was evidenced by the assignment of'12 engineers to the plant for various projects.
These assignments significar'ly increased the plant staff during the outage so that modifications could be accomplished with adequate engineering input, i
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4 4.0 Major Modifications (37700, 37828)
The inspectors selected two major design changes and several minor modifica-tions for review.
The major design changes were the installation of new design check valves in the service water system, (PDCR-945), and the installation of two motor operated valves as a replacement for a single air operated valve in the High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) system, (PDCR-931).
PDCR-945 - Water System Surge Ar.elysis As a result of water hammer expeM enced in the service water system the filter housing cover had failed. The licensee performed a failure analysis the cover and determined that tne failure was not caused by fatiga or
material defects. The engineering department elected to install a different type of check valve in each of the four lines of the system in order to eliminate water hammer transients.
The inspectors reviewed the engineering package developed by the licensee for this project and interviewed the cognizant engineering personnel to determine that the at.ove engir.ecring evaluations and requirements had been addressed.
The inspectors observeci that the installation had been completed and appeared to be in accordance witi; the drawings. The records show that the installation
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was performed by the plant maintenance organization. Hydrostatic and operational testing had been successfully completed but flow testing was
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scheduled during plant startup from the current outage.
PDCR-931 - HPSI Pump Miniflow Modifications
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The purpose of the HPSI miniflow line modification was to satisfy the requirements of General Design Criteria 35 and eliminate the need for the plant to operate under an exemption of the single failure criteria for the emergency core cooling system.
The inspectors reviewed the. design package prepared for this modification,
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interviewed the cognizant engineers, and observed the completed installation.
The requirements for revior and approval of the modification had been completed. The installation of the valves had been completed but the electrical connections to the new motor operators had not been completed.
Preoperational testing was scheduled upon completion of the installation.
Visual examination of the socket welds revealed no anomalies.
Conclusions The licensee has performed comprehensive reviews of the safety significance of these modifications prior to initiating the design and installation.
Both of the modification packages reviewed were found complete. There
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c.ppeared to be good working relationships between the plant staff and the corporate engineering staff.
During installation the corporate engineers were at the plant to answer questions and oversee the installation. During testing these engineers were present to assure the installations worked as designed.
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5.0 MinorModifications(37700,37828)
The inspectors reviewed selected minor modifications to determine that they were actually minor and whether the engineering performed by the plant was adequate.
In all cases the inspectors verified the licensee had determined that none of the above criteria were adversely affected and the modifications were actually minor. The following modifications were reviewed:
i CY-89-24 - Replace Westinghouse Model ARD Relays
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CY-89-71 - Switchgear Ventilation Security Barrier
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CY-89-75 - Modification to EG2A and 2B Per Electromotive Division
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Maintenance Instruction MI 9618 and MI9660 CY-89-86 - Reactor Vessel Head Ladder
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CY-89-89 - CH-V-267 and CH-V-276 Replacement
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CY-89-108 - DWST Emergency Supply Connection
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CY-89-125 - Rep'acement Service Water Nipples
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CY-89-126 - Reroute Section SHPD-601-28
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CY-89-127 - Emergency Diesel Gei erator 2A/2B Instrument Air System
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Filter (FL-128-1A,1B) Renlacement
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CY-89-136 - Replacement of Valve FW-CV-125A
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CY-89-138 - Replace Hot Leg Sample Heat Exchanger Outlet Throttle
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Valve SS-V-967 CY-89-150 - Replace CC-RV-763B
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In addition to the review performed by the plant staff, corporate engineering reviews minor modifications to verify that the assumptions made by the plant are correct with: regard to the classification of the modification.
Conclusions The licensee's program for control of minor modifications was determined to be adequate and included appropritse safeguards to prevent misuse of the system.
Corporate review of minor modification packages is an added safeguard for assuring all requirements are met.
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6.0 Quality Assurance i
The inspectors interviewed representatives of the Quality Assurance organization concerned with modification package review and hardware
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installation. Procedure QSD-4.06, Revision 0, Review and Control of Auto-
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mated Work Orders was reviewed to determine the degree of Quality Assurance involvement in the design and modification process.
The inspectors determined from these interviews and review that Quality Assurance participated in all phases of installatie and testing.
The licensee's Assessment and Staff Services section performed an audit from October 5, 1989 to November 15, 1989 of PDCE's. This audit was requested by the Vice President of Nuclear Operations to evaluate the use of-the PDCE process. The audit report concluded that except for two minor unresolved items vne PDCE process was being implemented properly with the necessary design controls.
7.0 Procurement The licensee is in the process of establishing a procurement section within the engineering departnient:at the site.
This section will be responsible for assuring that all purchase requisition for safety related materials, components, and services contain the technical and regulatory requiremslits.
In the interim, guidance is provided by Engineering Department Instruction, EDI-3.24, Revision 0, Review of QA Purchase Requisitions, and Administrative Control Procedures ACP-1.2.-4.1, Revision 22, Procurement Document Preparation-and Review, and ACP-1.2-4.3, Revision 1, Substitution of Spare Parts, to assure engineers performing procurement functions have ready reference to t
applicable requirements. The inspectors reviewed selected purchase requisi-tions and determined that requirements were specified and appropriate
documentation was reviewed.
Procurement of safety related products is normally from vendors previously approved by the licensee's Quality Assurance
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Department.
Such vendors are on the Approved Suppliers List maintained by
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the Quality Assurance Department.
8.0 Management Meetings Licensee management was informed of the scope and purpose of the inspection at the beginning of the inspection..The' findings of the inspection were discussed with licensee representatives during the course of the inspection and presented to licensee management at the December 8, 1989 exit interview (see paragraph 1.0 for attendees).
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At no time during the inspection was written material provided to the
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licensee by the inspector. The licensee did not indicate that proprietary information was involved within the scope of this inspection.
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