IR 05000213/1989015
| ML19325E056 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 10/12/1989 |
| From: | Anderson C, Della Greca A NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19325E055 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-213-89-15, IEIN-84-23, NUDOCS 8911010099 | |
| Download: ML19325E056 (9) | |
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U;S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSIONl
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RECION I-
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Report No..
50-213/89-15 a
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.. Docket.No.;
50-213'
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.. Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company
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' Licensee:.
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P.O. Box 270
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Hartford, Connecticut 06141 i
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. Facility-Name: 'Haddam Neck
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.. Corporate Office in Berlin, Connecticut
'i Inspection'At:
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' Inspection-Conducted:
September 11-15, 1989
Inspector::
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A. L. Della Greca, Reacti6r Engineer, PSS, EB date
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a Approved by:
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C.f. Anderson, Chief,'PlantSystemsSection, date-i
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h EInspection Summary:
Inspection on September 11-15, 1989 (Inspection Report No.
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50-213/89-15)
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~ Areas Inspected: Announced inspection by regional personnel to review the
status.of previously identified open items and to determine the adequacy of the t
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Results: The inspector determined that the licensee has satisfactorily responded
to the previously identified items. No new violations were identified.
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892101oo99 ge/1020
{DR ADOCK 05000213
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DETAILS
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1.0 Persons Contacted y
Northeast-Utilities Service Company s
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- P. A.'Blasioli, Supervisor Nuclear Licensing
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A. K. Gulesserian, Qaa11fication. Engineer
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- W. E. Hutchins, Licer sing - EEQ Coordinator
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- B. James, Qualification Engineer
- M. R. Lombardi, Qualification Engineer
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- Re S. Peterson, Sr. Qualification Engineer
- K. Petschaner, C. Y. Engineering - EEQ Contact.
B. Tuthill, Supervisor Qualification Engineering
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- Denotes personnel present at the exit meeting of September 15, 1989 i
2.0 Purpose
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The purpose of the inspection was to review the status of previoush identified items and to determine the adequacy of the licensee' corrective
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actions in resolving each issue.
3.0 Status of Previously Identified Items 3.1 (Closed) Violation Item No. 50-213/87-28-02 regarding the improper lubrica-
tion of motors associated with 20 safety related Limitorque valve operators.
During the November 1987 EQ inspection the NRC inspector observed four Limitorque valve motors with buckets under the T-drain collecting oil dripping from the motor housing. Discussions with the licensee revealed that 20 environmentally qualified Limitorque valve motors had been improper-
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ly lubricated in that the electricians had put grease in the motor housing, instead of the pinion gear housing. The problem had been discovered by the licensee. The source of the problem was primarily attributed to inadequate MOV maintenance procedures, lack of training of the personnel involved and
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improper supervision.
The root cause and the subsequent corrective actions taken by the licensee are addressed in its Licensee Event Report of December 17, 1987 and, again, in its response to the Notice of Violation in the letter of May 6, 1988.
Review of the documentation provided by the licensee shows that:
a.
Preventive Maintenance Procedure No. PMP 9.5-4 was revised to address the specific lubrication concern by means of Temporary Procedure Change Notice No. 88-20 on January 15, 1988.
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bE Procedure PMP.9-4 was formally revised to provide step by step
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instructions and warnings on May 9,1989 and again with minor modi-
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fications on August 16, 1989.
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c.
Personnel training was last conducted in June, 1989.
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.The licensee conducted a visual inspection of all MOVs' to ensure that no other incorrect maintenance had'b. ten performed.
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The licensee reviewed all Work Orders after July:18, 1987 to ensure
'that work performed on safety related equipment did not invalidate:
s its environmental qualification.
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The improperly lubricated moters were inspected, disassembled, cleaned _and. tested by the motor manufacturer.
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The corrective actions taken by the licensee to resolve the MOV lubrica-tion problem are considered adequate and this item is closed.
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3.2 (Closed). Violation Item No. 50-213/87-28-03 relative to the lack.of
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adequate qualification documentation for the Rockbestos cable.
During the November 1987 EQ review, the qualification package for the Rockbestos cable indicated that the licensee based its qualification of the subject cable on a report which was considere:i invalid by the NRC
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because of the deficiencies identified in IE Information Notice 84-44.
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In response to the NRC finding, the licensee obtained qualification report No. QR 7802, dated Jan. 21, 1988 from the cable manufacturer.
Review of.
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this report shows that it adequately addresses qualification of the cable for the Haddam Neck environment and the NRC concerns relating to the lack-of a QA program and to the inadequate evaluation of test anomalies.
The licensee's resolution of the finding is acceptable and this item is I
closed.
3.3 (Closed) Unresolved Item No. 50-213/87-28-04 pertaining to the discrepancies found between SCEW sheet and check list for the Rockbestos cable.
Review of the qualification package for the Rockbestos cable during the November, 1987 inspection revealed that the check list and the SCEW sheet did not agree as to the submergence of the cable.
Subsequent discussions with the licensee indicated that the cable would be subject to submergence, as shown on the SCEW sheet, and that the check list would be appropriately
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revised.
The revised check list shows that the item was corrected. In addition the submergence issue was adequately addressed in an analysis performed by the licensee. This item is considered close.
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'3.4 (Closed) Violation Item No. 50-213/87-28-05 pertaining to the lack of.
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adequate. qualification documentation forIfia Kerite cable.
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The November,1987 review of envivonmontal qualification package for the-l
. r Kerite cable revealed that.the reports.used by the licensee indicated low
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cable insulation resistance during a LOCA and no testing for submergence.
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,4 sd.i An evaluation of the revised qualification package revealed the following:
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The FR/rfi fn? te cable at Haddam Neck is used in control circuits j
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cnly, is subject to submergence and is qualified by Isomedix Report
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No. I-R978-02
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Qualification Report No. I-R978-02 ' identifies no anomalies resulting
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from high leakage current or: low insulation resistance. The readings
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taken by the manufacturer during and following the accident test
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conditions are acceptable for the intended application.
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c.
The HTK/FR Ke-ite cable used at Hadda:n Neck has an insulation rating
.i of 1000 V., ia used in' power applications only, is subject to sub-
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mergence and 1s ' qualified by Franklin Institute Research Laboratories
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Report No. F-L4020-2.
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For the 1000 V. insulation cable, the qualification report in item c.
shows acceptable readings for insulation resistance and no failures y
during the post DBE voltage withstand test.
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The Compound K19 (Regular) Kerite cable used at Haddam Neck has an insuletion rating of 5000 V., is used in power applications'only, is
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not subject to submergence and is qualified by Wyla Report No. 47-176-1.
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The Wyle qualification report shows no anomalies and acceptable leakage current readings during and following the DBE test.
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The HT/NS-5KV cable at Haddam Neck is used in power applications, is
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not subject to submergence and is qualified by Isomedix qualification
report No. I-R975-01
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The qualification report in item g. shows acceptable leakage current readings and acceptable test results.
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Neither the FR/FR nor the HTK/FR cables were subject to submergence during the qualification testing. Submergence is addressed in an analysis performed by the licensee with supporting documentation from tbc manufacturer.
On the basis of the above this item is considered closed.
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,3.5 (Closed) Unresolved Item No.50-213/87-28-05 pertaining to the use of o<
out-of-date LOCA profiles with the SCEW sheets for the Limitorque valve actuators and the Marathon 300 terminal blocks used in the actuator,
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During the November 1987 inspection, the NRC inspector. observed that the
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F SCEW sheets for several Limitorque valve actuators and associated Marathon l*
300 terminal blocks used a containment peak temperature of 305 degrees Fahrenheit. Comparison of this temperature with the test temperature
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L revealed that the requirement for a 15 degree margin was not met. Subse-quent discussions with the licensee'showed that the accident profile had been revised and that the new peak temperature was enveloped by the test profile with adequate margin.
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Review of the qualification package during the subject inspection sNved P
that the accident profiles had been revised to show the latest data. How-ever, a comparison of these with the test profiles showed an area where no
overlap existed. Specifically, the Haddam Neck accident profile exceeds the MOV test profile by a maximum of 30 degrees Fahrenheit for approximately 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> (from 3000 to 18000 seconds, approximately) and the terminal i
blocks test profile by a maximum of 20 degrees for approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />
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(from 4000 to-14000 seconds, approximately).
In addition, the lack of overlap had not been addressed, at required by item II.3. of the ched list.
Prior to the closure of the inspection, the licensee performed an analysis to address the lack of overlap and added it to the qualification package which was revised in accordance with its current procedure.
The analysis adequately justifies qualification for the period and the item is considered closed.
3.6 (Closed) Unresolved Item No. 50-213/87-28-09 regarding the use of DBE testing to calculate the post accident operability period of the Asco solenoid valves.
The November 1987 review of the qualification package for the Asco solenoid L
valve revealed that the DBE simulation and the post accident operability time simulation were treated together in the Arrhenius calculation analysis and compared with the required OBE and post accident operability time to
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demonstrate qualification for the post accident period.
L In response to the NRC concerns about the impropriety of the method used, t -
the licensee performed an additional analysis to show qualification. The l
analysis was found acceptable pending further review by the inspector.
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Review of the qualification package during the subject inspection shows i
that the licensee reevaluated the required post accident operability
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period and found it to be a maximum of 30 hours3.472222e-4 days <br />0.00833 hours <br />4.960317e-5 weeks <br />1.1415e-5 months <br /> and, hence, well within l
the post accident simulation of 32 days.
This item is closed.
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k 3.7 (Closed) Unresolved Item No. 50-213/87-28-30 pertaining to the licensee's response to IE Information Notice 84-23 and qualification of Asco solenoid valves Model NP-8316.
During the November 1987 review of the qualification file for the Asco solenoid valve, the NRC inspector determined that the licensee had justi-fied qualification of solenoid valve Model NP-8316 on the basis of Asco Report AQR-67368, which was the subject of IE Information Notice 84-23.
The licensee's position was based on the fact that Asco " feels" that the aging sequence used in the failed NRC sponsored test end discussed in the IE Notice was not indicative of the true aging process.
In addition, the licensee had established that the DBE simulation test used in the NRC test was significantly higher than the required temperature profile for the Haddam Neck plant.
Since the inspector did not consider the licensee's explanation as sufficient justification for not using Isomedix' test report AQS-21678/TR-Rev. A, suggested by the information notice, the licensee evaluated the results of the Isomedix test and committed to investigate the possibility of obtaining revised certificate of compliance from the manufacturer.
Review of the rcvised qualification file shows that.the qualification of the Asco solenoid valve is based on the Isomedix test report and that the use of such report was approved by Asco.
This item is considered closed.
3.8 (Closed) Violation Item No. 50-213/87-28-11 regarding the lack of similarity analysis between the the installed and tested Valcor solenoid valve.
In reviewing the qualification package of the Valcor solenoid valve, the NRC inspector noticed that the model installed at Haddam Neck (V526-6042-17)
was not in the list of models addressed by Valcor qualification report No.
QR526-5683-6. During the course of the November 1987 inspection, the licensee obtained a letter from the manufacturer which certified the applicability of the report to the model installed at Haddam Neck.
The Valcor qualification package was revised to include this letter, therefore, the item is considered closed.
3.9 (Closed) Unresolved item No. 50-213/87-28-12 relating to the service temperature and qualified life of the Weed RTD.
In reviewing the qualification package of the Weed RTD, the inspector observed that the temperature for aging evaluation and DBE simulation appeared to be based on the ambient temperature only and did not consider temperature rise due to self heat and heat conduction from the process medium.
In response to the NRC concern, during the November, 1987 inspec-tion, the licensee provided Weed Report No N9004-87-A.
This report showed, by test, that 15 degrees Fahrenheit was a conservative boundary for the temperature rise.
In addition, the licensee showed, by calcula-tion, that the qualified life and the post accident operability period of the RTD, using the 15 degree temperature rise, would exceed the specifi-cation requirements f or 40 years and 1 year, respectively.
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i Review of the RTD qualification package during the subject inspection showed that the calculations and associated documentation had been revised to address the required 15 degree temperature rise. Therefore, this item is considered closed.
3.10 (Closed) Unresolved Item No. 50-213/87-28-13 pertaining to the inadequate qualification documentation of the Gems DeLaval level transmitter, t
While reviewing the qualification documentation of the Gems DeLaval level
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transmitter the inspector noticed that the submergence test performed by
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WYLE 1asted 30 minutes and that the qualification documents did not
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address the required submergence time.
Further discussions with the l
licensee revealed the only portion of the transmitter which was potentially sensitive to submergence was the junction box and that this was was located
above flood level. At the time of the November 1987 inspection, the l
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licensee committed to revise the qualification file to document the installed configuration and to clarify that the junction box was not subjected to submergence.
Evaluation of the Gems DeLaval qualification file shows that the licensee
had revised the &pplicable documents to correct the discrepancy.
This item i
is closed.
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While reviewing the licensee's corrective actions for the closure of the subject unresolved item, the inspector observed that the temperature
profile used in the Gems Delaval test did not envelop the required DBE
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profile for a period of approximately 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br /> (from 7200 to 25000 seconds,
approximately) and a maximum of 55 degrees Fahrenheit.
In addition, the
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check list did not address the apparent discrepancy.
Prior to the closing of the inspection, the licensee prepared an analysis to justify qualifi-
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cation of the instrument for the post accident period and revised the
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qualification packdge in accordance with its current procedure.
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The analysis prepared by the licensee is acceptable and this issue also is
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considered closed.
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3.11 (Closed) Violation item No. 50-213/87-28-14 relative to the lack of qualifi-cation data for the Bishop tape splice.
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During the November 1987 audit, the NRC inspector determined that the licensee had based the qualification of the W-963 Bishop tape splices used at Haddam Neck upon test data for a W-942 tape and upon the qualification
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testing of Okonite T-95 tape. However, neither did the qualification file address the similarity between the Bishop W-963 tape and the other splice components nor did it contain data to show that the splice configuration
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had been tested for use in harsh environments.
In response to the inspector concern, the licensee indicated that the W-963 tape was being analyzed for its similarity to the other two tapes, i
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Review of the revised package shows that a comprehensive material's
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analysis was performed by the Institute of Materials Science at the
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University of Connecticut. Although the analysis identified several dif-
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ferences between the three EPR tapes it concluded that the W-963 tape r
would perform equally well or better than the other two tapes.
i Since the Bishop tape splices were performed using the qualified Okonite
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l f,plice procedure and similarity between the Bishop and the Okonite tapes
was established by the University of Connecticut tests, this item is closed,
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3.12 (Closed) Violation Item No. 50-213/87-28-15 pertaining to tb licensee's i
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identification of six pieces of cable with unknown qualification status.
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During the week of November 9, 1987, while the plant was in a refueling l
outage, the licensee identified 6 pieces of cable, the qualification status of which was unknown.
These cables were later identified to be
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Ansconda Continental $15 14AWG HLPE insulated cables.
However, at the time of the November 1987 inspection, no qualification file existed nor
was the Anaconda cable included in the EQ master list. Although the t
licensee's evaluation showed that the finding did not constitute a safety
concern, the licensee decided to replace the cables with equivalent
qualified ones.
Review of Work order Nos. CY 87 11109 CY 87 11909, and CY 87 11905 (and e
related documents) shows that tha cables were replaced with qualified l
Brand-Rex XLP/CU No. 14AWG SIS cables.
Therefore, this item is closed.
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3.13 (Closed) Violation Item No. 50-213/87-28-17 regarding the lack of qualifica-l tion documentation for a Raychem splice configuration found in Namco limit
switches.
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During the November 1987 EQ inspection of the Namco limit switches associated l
with PORV A0V-568, the NRC inspector discovered Raychem splices which did j
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not meet the two inch splice seal length because the overall length was
much shorter than those qualified by the Raychem test (2" and 1-3/4"
versus 6").
In response to this finding, the licensee cited a recent test i
performed by Wyle in which short splices with as little as 1/2 inch seal
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length had been successfully qualified for DBE conditions enveloping those at Haddam Ns.k.
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i The revised qualification package and the analysis by the licensee show I
tnat qualification of the Raychem splices found in the Namco limit switches
I is supported by the Wyle test report No. 17859-02P, dated 3/11/87.
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report is part of the revised qualification file.
This item is considered closed.
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i 4.0. Plant Walkdown The plant physical inspection consisted of an examination of the outboard Main Steam Isolation Valves and of other safety related electrical equip-ment located in the PAB, the only areas which were available for inspection.
Components reviewed included solenoid operated valve, motor operated
valves, pumps, motor control centers, and terminations.
No violations were observed during this inspection.
5.0 Exit Meeting The inspectors met with the licensee's personnel denoted in paragraph 1.0 of this report at the conclusion of the inspection period on August 25, 1989. At that time, the scope of the inspection and the inspection's results were summarized. At ne time during the inspection was written material given to the licensee.
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