IR 05000213/1980021
| ML19341D278 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 01/08/1981 |
| From: | Keimig R, Tanya Smith NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19341D273 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-213-80-21, NUDOCS 8103050271 | |
| Download: ML19341D278 (12) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No.
50-213/80-21 Docket No.
50-213 License No. DPR-61 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company P. O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101 Facility Name:
Haddam Neck Plant Inspection at:
Haddam, Connecticut Inspection conducted:
Or obe
- November 7, 1980 Inspectors:
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H. Smit enior t Inspector date signed dat! signed
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date signed
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/- [- N Approved by:
. R.' KeimigV
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date signed Chief, R tor Projects Section 1, Pp&NS Bran Inspection Summary:
Inspection on October 6 - November 7, 1980 (Report No. 50-213/80-21)
Areas inspected:
Routine, onsite, regular and backshift inspection by the resident inspector (69.5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />) including plant operations; licensee action on previous inspection findings; TMI Short Term Lessons Learned Category A Item implementation; and review of periodic and special reports.
Results:
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
Region I Form 12 (Rev. April 77)
8103050 Nd
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DETAILS
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1.
The below listed technical and supervisory personnel were among those contacted:
J G. H. Bouchard, Maintenance Supervisor
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N. A. Burnette, Technical Assistant T. W. Campbell, Instrument and Control Supervisor H. E. Clow, Health Physics Supervisor J. H. Ferguson, Station Services Superintendent R. L. Gracie, Operations Assistant R. H. Graves, Station Superintendent G. R. Hallberg, Security Supervisor J. M. Levine, Operations Supervisor R. P. Traggio, Unit Superintendent The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection including management, clerical, maintenance, operations, health physics, and engineering.
2.
Status of Previous Inspection Items (Closed) Unresolved Item (213/79-18-01):
Missing fire barriers in Switch-gear Room.
Numerous tours by the inspector did not identify any areas in the Switchgear Room where fire barrier material was not in place.
This item is considered resolved.
3.
TMI Short Term Lessons Learned Category A Items The TMI Short Term Lessons Learned Category A Items were provided to the licensee in the following references.
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Denton clarification letter dated October 30, 1979.
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The licensee responded to these items in the following references.
Counsil to Denton letter dated December 31, 1979.
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Counsil to Denton letter dated April 11, 1980.
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Other correspondence on these matters is referenced in the above documents.
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a.
Item 2.1.1 Emergency Power Supply Requirements for the Pressurizer Heaters, Power Operated Relief and Block Valves, and Pressurizer Level Indicators Requirements Provide redundant emergency power for the minimum number of pressurizer heaters required to maintain natural circulation conditions in the event of a loss of offsite power.
Also provide emergency power to the control and motive power systems for the power-operated relief valves and associated block valves and to the pressurizer level indication instrument channels.
Licensee Commitment The licensee has committed to the stated requirements.
The licensee noted in his commitment that the items of equipment stated above are required to be connected to emergency buses through devices qualified in accordance with safety grade requirements.
Most of the required items above are part of the plant's original design and were procured and installed prior to current qualification standards.
Inspection Findings The inspector has determined that normal and emergency power supplies to the above equipment meet the requirements as committed to by the licensee.
This item has been adequately satisfied by the licensee.
b.
Item 2.1.3.a Direct Indication of Power-Operated Relief Valve (PORV)
and Safety Valve Position
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Requirements Reactor coolant system relief and safety valves shall be provided with a positive indication in the control room derived from a reliable valve position detection device or a reliable indication of flow in the discharge pipe.
Licensee Commitment The licensee has basically committed to the stated requirements.
At present all position indication instrumentation is not environmentally qualified.
As required, the licensee has stated his intentions and given schedules relative to environmental qualification of the above equipment.
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Inspection Findings The following arrangement presently exists to detect the opening of a PORV or safety valve.
(1) Stem-mounted limit switches on each PORV.
(2) Acoustic monitor on the commen discharge header of the PORV's and the Safety Valves.
(3) Temperature elements in the discharge line of each Safety Valve and in the PORV common header.
Using a combination of the above systems it is possible to determine if a PORV or Safety Valve is open, and determine which one is open.
The licensee has satisfied the requirements of his stated commitment, c.
Item 2.1.3.b Instrumentation for Detection of Inadequate Core Cooling Requirements (1) Procedures shall be developed to be used by operators to recognize inadequate core cooling.
(2) Each PWR shall install a primary coolant saturation meter.
Licensee Commitment The licensee has committed to the requirements as referenced and as stated above.
Inspection Findings (1) The following plant procedures are available to plant operators to diagnose inadequate core cooling situations using installed instrumentation.
E0P 3.1-45c, " Diagnostic and Immediate Action for Safety
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Injection and Recovery from Spurious Actuation of Safety Injection", dated January 19, 1980.
E0P 3.1-4c, " Loss of Coolant", dated January 18, 1980.
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Training has been provided to plant operators in the use of the stated procedures.
(2) A Subcooling Margin Monitor has been installed which meets the licensee commitment and the requirements as stated.
Licensee action in this area is satisfactory.
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Item 2.1.4 Containment Isolation Provisions Requirements (1) Diversity required in the parameters sensed for the initiation of containment isolation.
Nonessential systems isolated.
(2) Design of containment isolation valve reset system which does not allow inadvertent opening of containment isolation valves.
Licensee Commitment After several exchanges of correspondence between the licensee and NRR the licensee has committed to the above requirements.
Inspection Findings (1) The licensee has modified the containment isolation system to cause isolation on high containment pressure and the safety injection actuation signal.
Diversity of initiation is thus achieved.
Original plant design used only high containment pressure for containment isolation.
(2) The licensee has modified the containment isolation (CI) valve reset system to preclude accidentally opening a containment isolation when the CI signal is reset.
In order to reset the CI signal, all CI valve control switches must be placed in the close position.
The modifications made to the plant adequately satisfy the stated requirements.
e.
Item 2.1.6.a Integrity of Systems Outside Containment Likely to Contain Radioactive Materials Requirements Licensees shall provide a summary description of their program to reduce leakage from systems outside containment that would or could
contain highly radioactive fluids during a serious transient or accident.
The program shall contain immediate leak reduction measures, including a report to the NRC of actual measured leak rates, and a continuing leak reduction program.
Licensee Commitment The licensee has committed to the requirements as stated above.
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Inspection Findings The licensee has submitted a description of the immediate actions taken to reduce leakage on systems identified as possibly carrying-highly radioactive fluids in a post accident environment.
Leakage from those systems was measured at 4 liters per day.
Prior to the NUREG 0578 requirements the licensee had a leakage inspection / reduction program in existence for the RHR system.
The RHR system is inspected for leakage by an operator during each shift in accordance with the requirements of SUR 5.1-20.
This will remain as part of the long term leakage reduction program.
Other aspects of the long term program will be related to ASME Code Section XI test requirements.
The licensee action on this item is considered satisfactory at this time.
f.
Item 2.1.7.a Automatic Initiation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System Item 2.1.7.b Auxiliary Feedwater Flow Indication to Steam Generators Requirements Provide automatic initiation of all auxiliary feedwater systems.
Provide safety grade indication in the control room of auxiliary feedwator flow for each steam generator.
Licensee Commitment / Inspection Findings The Haddam Neck Plant was originally built with a manually operated auxiliary feedwater system.
Automatic initiation of the system is the subject of many items of correspondence between the licensee and ths NRC.
The licensee has installed automatic initiation circuitrv and flow indication and is presently awaiting NRR approval of Te' ical Specifications and permission to activate the system.
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Item 2.1.8.a Improved Post-Accident Sampling Capability Requirements Review and upgrade the capability to obtain samples from the reactor coolant system and containment atmosphere under high radioactivity conditions.
Licensee Commitment The licensee has reviewed his capability to obtain the required samples and stated his conclusions in the referenced documents.
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Inspection Findings The licensee has provided procedural guidance for sampling the reactor coolant system and the containment atmosphere under high radioactivity conditions.
The procedure, ADM 1.1-63, was reviewed by the inspector.
No plant modifications were made as a result of this item.
The licensee has satisfied his stated commitment regarding this item.
h.
Item 2.1.8.b Increased Range of Radiation Monitors Requirements Provide high range radiation monitors for noble gases in plant effluent lines.
Licensee Commitment The licensee has committed to the requirement as stated.
Inspection Findings The licensee has installed a high range stack monitor downstream of all potential sources of radioactive effluent to the main stack and has established a procedure, EP 1.5-6, for its use and for conversion of instrument readings to release rates.
The licensee has also pro-vided a portable instrument, an Eberline Teletector - Model 6112, to monitor potential releases from the atmospheric steam dump in the event of a steam generator tube rupture or primary to secondary system leak.
All potential gaseous release paths are monitored or are capable of being monitored.
The licensee's actions in this area are satisfactory.
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Item 2.2.2.a Control Room Access Requirement Limit access to the control room under normal and accident conditions to those personnel required for the safe command and control of opera-tions.
Licensee Commitment The licensee committed to the above requirement as stated.
Inspection Findings The following documents were reviewed:
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ADM 1.1-60, " Access to Control Room During Emergency Conditions",
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dated January 1, 1980.
SEC 1.3-5, " Personnel Access Control", dated October 23, 1980.
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Normal access to the control room is controlled by the plant key card access system.
Key cards are authorized by plant management based on the need of an individual to have access to the control room. ADM 1.1-60 limits access to the control room during emergencies to specifically titled per?annel.
The control room Supervisory Control Operator has the responsibility to limit access to those authorized individuals.
This adequately satisfies the licensee's commitment in this area.
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Item 2.2.1.b Shift Technical Advisor (STA)
Requirements Provide, on shift at each nuclear power plant, a qualified person with a bachelor's degree or equivalent and with specific training in plant response to off normal events to serve in an advisory capacity to shift supervisors.
Licensee Commitments The licensee has committed to provide an on shift STA.
The interim STA will have a bachelor's or associate's degree in engineering or science, or an SR0 license or equivalent, with plant specific training.
As of January 1,1982 all STA's will have a bachelor's or associate's degree or equivalent.
Inspection Findings The following documents were reviewed:
CYSP-30, " Interim Shift Technical Advisor", dated December 28,
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EP 1.5-37, " Manager, On-Site Technical Support", dated January 1,
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CYAPCO, " Interim Shift Technical Advisor Job Description", dated
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December 31, 1979.
The inspector determined by review of the above documents and the list I
of personnel assigned as interim STA's that the licensee has satisfied his commitment as stated above.
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Item 2.2.1.c Shift Turnover Procedures
Requirements Ensure shift turnover checklist is provided for individuals responsible for command of operations in the control room and other shift personnel in the operations department.
Licensee Commitme,it The licensee has committed to the above requirement as stated.
Inspection Findings The following documents were reviewed:
ADM 1.1-44, " Shift Relief and Turnover", dated January 1, 1980.
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NOP 2.2-2, " Steady State Operation and Surveillance", dated March
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28, 1980.
The above documents adequately satisfy the stated requirements for operations department shift personnel.
This item is considered satis-factory.
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Item 2.2.1.a Shift Supervisor Responsibilities Requirements (1) Ensure that reactor operations command and control responsibilities are properly defined.
(2) Corporate management is to issue a directive that emphasizes the duties, responsibilities, authority and lines of command of control room operators.
Licensee Commitment The licensee has committed to meet the requirements as stated.
Inspection Findings The following documents were reviewed:
W. G. Counsil Memo to all Shift Supervisors dated December 26,
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1979.
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ADM 1.1-1, " Connecticut Yankee Organization, Responsibility and
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Authority", dated June 5, 1980.
By document review and discussions with licensee personnel, the inspector has determined that the licensee has satisfied his stated commitment.
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Item 2.2.2.b Onsite Technical Support Center Requirements A separate technical support center shall be provided for use in an emergency for assessment of plant status and potential offsite impact in support of the control room command and control function.
Licensee Comitment The licensee has comitted to the requirements as stated.
Inspection Findings The licensee has established the Onsite Technical Support Center in the Operations Supervisor's Office, an office directly connected to the Control Room.
The following functions / items are available from this location.
(1) Direct, dedicated comunications to the NRC (ENS) and the near site Emergency Operations Center.
(2) Portable radiation and airborne radioactive contaminant monitoring equipment.
Radiation monitoring equipment, shielding and venti-lation systems provide the same degree of habitability as that of the Control Room.
(3) Access to plant computer information.
(4) Remote control television camera capable of viewing and reading all control board meters, switch positions, etc.
(5) Access to all plant drawings.
The licensee's comitment has been adequately satisfied in this area.
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Item 2.2.2.c Onsite Operational Support Center Requirements An onsite operational support center shall be established outside the control room.
In the event of an emergency, shift support personnel (auxiliary operators and technicians) report to this center for further orders and assignmen.
Licensee Commitment The licensee has committed to the requirements as stated and referenced above.
Inspection Findings The licensee has established the Control Room viewing gallery as the Onsite Operational Support Center.
The gallery is outside the Control Room, however, several large windows afford a clear view of all control boards.
The licensee's commitment has been adequately satisfied in this area.
The inspector had no further questions relative to short term items at this time.
4.
Review of Plant Operation - Plant Inspections a.
During the course of the inspection, the inspector conducted multiple tours of the following plant areas:
Control Room
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Primary Auxiliary Building
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Vital Switchgear Room
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Turbine Building
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Control Point
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Security Building
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Yard Areas
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b.
The following observations / determinations were made:
Radiation protection controls.
Step-off pads, storage and disposal
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of protective clothing and control of high radiation areas were observed for adequacy in all areas toured.
No unsatisfactory conditions were observed.
Monitoring instrumentation.
The inspector verified that selected
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instruments were functioning properly and that the displayed parameters were within Technical Specification limits.
Control room annunciators.
Lighted annunciators were discussed
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with control room operators to verify that the reasons for them were understood and corrective action, if required, was being taken.
On average, only one or two annunciators were lighted on each control room visit.
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Valve positions.
The inspector verified that selected valves
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were in a position or condition required by the Technical Specifi-cations.
A detailed inspection was made of diesel support system valves and valves in the diesel start system.
No discrepancies were identified.
Plant housekeeping.
Housekeeping was observed in all areas
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toured.
No unsatisfactory conditions were identified.
Fluid leaks.
All areas toured were examined for evidence of
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excessive fluid leaks.
None were found.
Piping vibrations.
All areas toured were examined for evidence of
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excessive piping vibration.
None were indicated.
Control room manning.
The inspector verified that control room
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manning requirements of the Technical Specifications were being met.
Security.
During this inspection, observations were made of
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plant security including adequacy of physical barriers, access control, vehicle control and searches.
No unsatisfactory con-ditions were noted.
The inspector had no questions relative to plant tours.
No items of noncompliance were identified.
5.
Review of Periodic and Special Reports Upon receipt, periodic and special reports submitted by the licensee pursuant to Technical Specification 6.9.1.d were reviewed by the inspector.
This review included the following considerations:
the report includes the information required to be reported by NRC requirements; planned corrective action is adequate for resolution of identified problems; determination whether any information in the report should be classified as an abnormal occurrence; and the validity of reported information.
Within the scope of the above, the following periodic reports were reviewed by the inspector:
Monthly Operating Report 80-09, for the month of September 1980.
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Monthly Operating Report 80-10, for the month of October 1980.
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Exit Interview At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were
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