IR 05000213/1980004
| ML19330C234 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Haddam Neck File:Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Co icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/25/1980 |
| From: | Keimig R, Smith I NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML19330C232 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-213-80-04, 50-213-80-4, NUDOCS 8008080111 | |
| Download: ML19330C234 (5) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFEICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
REGION I
Report No.
50-213/80-04 Docket No.
50-213 License No.
DPR-G1 Priority Category C
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Licensee:
Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company P.O. Box 270 Hartford, Connecticut 06101
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Eacility Name:
Haddam Neck Plant Inspection At:
Haddam Neck, Connecticut Inspection Conduc March 18-21, 1980 Inspectors:
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6/yr[s'o J. H. Smith, Reactor inspector date date date Approved by:
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4-2 f-8o V R. Kelmig, chlet, actor Projects date Section No 1, R0 Branch Inspection Summary:
Inspection on March 18-21, 1980 (Report No. 50-213/80-04)
Areas Inspected:
Routine, unannounced inspection by a regional based inspector (20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br />) at emergency procedure conformance to Westinghouse Small Break Loss of Coolant Operator Guidelines and status of. licensee 1nvest'igation concerning
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contamination discove' red on plant property outside the radiologically controlled area.
Results:
No items of noncompliance were identified.
Regica I Form 167 (August 1979)
8008080111
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DETAILS 1.~
Persons Contacted
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D. Bement, Nuclear Records Supervisor H. Clow, Health Physics Supervisor
- J. Ferguson, Station Services Supervisor S. Fleming, Training Supervisor
- R. Graves, Station Superintendent W. Nevelos, Rad Waste Foreman
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The inspector also interviewed and talked with other licensee personnel during the course of the inspection including management, operations and clerical parsonnel.
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- Denotes those present at the exit. interview.
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Review of Licensee-Small Break Loss of Coolant Accident (SBLOCA)
Emergency Procedures The inspector-reviewed the licensee's SBLOCA emergency, procedures.
A summary of the findings is noted in the following sections.
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a.
Procedure Review i
(1) The inspector reviewed the following licensee procedures against
the NRC-staff approved Westinghouse SBLOCA guidelines:
E0P 3.1-45C, Diagnostic and Immediate Action for Safety
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InjectionandRecoveryfrom'SpuriousActuationofSafety
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Injection, Revision 1, January 19, 1980.
E0P3.1-4C,LossofCoolant, Revision 11(major), January 18,
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1980.
(2) Based'on the review, the inspector verified the following:
The licensee's procedures closely follow the guidelines
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established by their Nuclear Steam System Supplier (NSSS).
j Symptoms include a diagnostic chart which clarifies symp-
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toms to channel operator actions into the correct emergency procedures.
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. Symptoms contain sufficient diversity to clearly identify the particular emergency.
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All. items addressed in the NSSS guidelines for immediate
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actions are included in the licensee's procedures.
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Licensee procedures follow the same format as the NSSS
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guidelines.
' Precaution statements are incorporated in the appropriate
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procedural locations and are consistent with NSSS guide-
~line precautions.
Within the areas inspected no discrepancies were identified.
Additional review of procedural adequacy,ll be addressed in a future NRC inspection.a use the subject procedures, wi b.
Training Requirements Formal classroom presentations were provided on December 4, 7 and 14, 1979.
The training consisted of presentations, by a corporate office engineer, on Loss of Coolant Accident Analyses, and presentations by on-site training personnel covering E0P 3.1-4C and E0P 3.1-45C.
The content of the presentations appeared to cover adequately the desired subjectmaterial.
No discrepancies were identified in the area of operator training.
c.
System Considerations (1) Pressurizer PORV Indication
The inspector verified that the emergency procedures directed the operators to monitor the several indications available in
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the control room which indicate the position of the pressurizer power operated relief valves (PORV).
These indications include indicator lights on the PORV control switches which indicate the existance of an open/close signal to the valves; acoustically activated pressurizer relief valve open panel alarms; relief line thermocouple indications; and pressurizer relief tank level and
pressure indications.
(2) Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Loop Isolation Valves As required-by the standard Westinghouse guidelines, the licens-
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ee's emergency procedures contain a warning against using the RCS
.1-loop isolation valves in attempting to isolate the source of a loss of coolant.
(3) Resetting Safety Injection System (SIS) Signal The inspector verified that the emergency procedures contain a warning statement to alert operators that after the SIS signal is-blocked, an automatic actuation of Emergency Core Cooling Sys-tems (ECCS) would not occur.
The procedures, however, do not
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contain a statement warning operators that manual manipulation of ECCS equipment onto emergency, power sources would be required if offsite power was lost some time after safety injection had occurred.
This item is considered unresolved pending a procedure
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revision which the licensee has committed to make prior to the end of the upcoming refueling outage (213/80-04-01).
(4) Containment Isolation The emergency procedures require that the operator initiate con-tainment isolation if conditions warrant and it has not occurred automatically, or verify that auto isolation has functioned properly.
In addition, the procedures require that appropriate
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system integrity is verified prior to opening any valve closed by the containment isolation system to ensure a potential release path is not created.
(5) Manual Switchover from Injection to Recirculation The inspector verified that the switchover from ECCS in'iection from the refueling water storage tank (RWST) to recirculation
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from the containment sump will be accomplished prior to exhaust-ing the supply of water in the RWST.
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(6) Caution Notes The inspector verified that caution notes are placed at appro-
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priate steps in the procedures.
(7) Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) Trip Criteria
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Using the Westinghouse guidelines, the licensee calculated the RCS pressure which'would require manually tripping'the RCP's, i
however, due to a unique system configuration, RCP s are tripped manually well before this pressure would be reached.
At Haddam Neck, when ECCS systems receive an actuation signal, the contain-
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ment isolation system also receives a signal to isolate the con-l tainment.
Containment isolation secures component cooling water i
to the RCP's which requires their shutdown to prevent pump damage.
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The trip pressure calculated, using the Westinghouse guidelines, was less than the 1700 PSIG pressure which would initiate ECCS,
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cause containment isolation, and recuire RCP's to be tripped
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manually by the operator at the Hadc:am Neck plant.
In'the area of system considerations, no discrepancies were-identified other than the unresolved item noted in (3) above.
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3.
Investigation of Radioactive Contamination Outside the Radiologically Controlled Area The licensee initially reported the discovery of spots of soil contamina-tion to the NRC on March 13, 1980.
These spots were found during a routine survey of a grassy area south of the plant inside the owner controlled area.
The initial spots of material were removed for disposal and the surveying of other areas around the plant was begun. - To date, approxinately 30 spots of soil contamination have been discovered.
Area surveys are continuing.
Isotopicanalysisshowedthemajorityofthespotscontainedfissionprod-uct activity.
The most likely source of the material is the plant stack.
Dispersal of the material may have been caused by any one of several events which occurred in 1979 which resulted in air or steam being released through the ventilation system and out the stack stripping contaminated material from the inside surfaces of the stack.
One spot contained Cobalt-60.
Its probable origin was from materials which had been stored previously in the area.
The activity levels of the material found to date are less than that allowed by Federal regulations in uncontrolled areas.
The licensee is continuing the investigation the results of which will be reviewed in a future NRC inspection.
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Exit Interview i
Theinspectormetwithlicenseerepresentatives(denotedinParagraph1)
at the conclusion of the inspection.
The inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection as detailed in this report.
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