IR 05000206/1988025
| ML13329A127 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 11/25/1988 |
| From: | NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13329A126 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-206-88-25, 50-361-88-26, 50-362-88-28, NUDOCS 8812150141 | |
| Download: ML13329A127 (37) | |
Text
SALP BOARD REPORT U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE 50-206/88-25, 361/88-26, 362/88-28 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA EDISON COMPANY SAN ONOFRE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION OCTOBER 1, 1987 THROUGH. SEPTEMBER 30, 1988
)000
SUMMARY Enforcement Items*
Functional Inspection Percent Severity Level Area Hours of Effort I II III IV V D*** Plant Operations 1802 33.14
B. Radiological 622 11.44
1 Controls C. Maintenance/
1262 23.21
Surveillance D. Emergency Pre.10 E. Security 247 4.54 F. Engineering/
584 10.74 1** 4
Technical Support G. Safety Assessment/
860 15.82
1
Quality Veri Totals 5437 100.00
15
2
Severity levels are discussed in 10 CFR 2, Appendix C. Two deviations (one each in areas F and G) were identified during this SALP perio **
This violation was a Category B violation concerning E ***
Denotes deviations discussed in Table 2 This information is current through inspection reports 206/88-23; 361/88-24; and 362/88-2 TABLE 2 ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY Unit 1 Inspection Severity Functional Report N Subject Level Area 88-03 Failure to make proper safety system IV A
operability determinations 88-06 Failure to post a high radiation area IV B
88-07 Failure to conduct an audit of the
V G
Emergency Preparedness program 88-10 Environmental qualification deficiencies B
F/G 88-23 Whole body exposure in excess of the IV B
quarterly limit
Applies to Units 1, 2, and Unit 2 Inspection Severity Functional Report N Subject Level Area 87-25 Failure to post a radiation area V
B 87-31 Failure to report steam generator
IV G
safety valve inoperability 88-03 Failure to document nonconforming
IV C
conditions during maintenance 88-03 Failure to comply with Technical
IV F
Specification requirement for testing main steam safety valves 88-10 Failure to report component cooling ##
IV G
water system design deficiencies 88-10 Failure to include analyses of
IV F/G adverse effects of earthquakes on the design of equipment
Table-2, Enforcement Items (Continued)
Inspection Severity Functional Report N Subject Level Area 88-10 Failure to include saltwater cooling ##
IV F
valves in the in-service testing program 88-10 Deviation - Mode of operation of
F component cooling water provides no monitoring ability for the loop containing the letdown heat exchanger 88-15 Inadequate control of M&TE (two examples)
IV C/G 88-15 Deviation - Fuel pool purification piping ##
G not installed in accordance with the FSAR 88-18 Train A and B cables in direct contact with IV F
one another in a post accident panel
- Applies to Units 2 and Unit 3 Inspection Severity Functional Report N Subject Level Area 87-25 Continued operation with a main feedwater IV G
isolation valve and ADS valves inoperable 88-04 Inadequate QA audit program for radioactive IV G
transportation packages 88-20 Failure to comply with procedures for IV C
temporary spent fuel pit transfer pumps 88-22 Failure to adequately control the IV C
performance of an integrated leak rate test Functional Areas A -
Plant Operations B -
Radiological Controls C - Maintenance/Surveillance D - Emergency Pre E - Security F - Engineering/Technical Support G - Safety Assessment/Quality Verification
TABLE 3A - Unit 1 SYNOPSIS OF LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (LERs)
Functional SALP Cause Code*
Area A
B C
E X
Totals Plant Operations
2 3 Radiological
1 Controls C. Maintenance/
2
7 Surveillance D. Emergency Pre E. Security
1 F. Engineering/
1
Technical Support Safety Assessment/
1 Quality Veri Totals
1
4
18
- Cause Code A -
Personnel Error B - Design, Manufacturing or Installation Error C -
External Cause D - Defective Procedures E - Component Failure X -
Other Functional Areas A -
Plant Operations B - Radiological Controls C - Maintenance/
Surveillance D - Emergency Pre E - Security F -
Engineering/
Technical Support G - Safety Assessment/
Quality Veri The above data are based upon LERs 87-15 through 88-1 TABLE 3B -
Unit 2 SYNOPSIS OF LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (LERs)
Functional SALP Cause Code*
Area A
B C
D E
X F--
Totals A. Plant Operations
3
B. Radiological
1
Controls C. Maintenance/
5
Surveillance D. Emergency Pre E. Security F. Engineering/
18
Technical Support G. Safety Assessment/
Quality Veri Totals
18
3
- Cause Code A -
Personnel Error B - Design, Manufacturing or Installation Error C -
External Cause D - Defective Procedures E - Component Failure X -
Other Functional Areas A -
Plant Operations B - Radiological Controls C - Maintenance/
Surveillance D - Emergency Pre E - Security F - Engineering/
Technical Support G - Safety Assessment/
Quality Veri The above data are based upon LERs 87-22 through 88-2 TABLE 3C -
Unit 3 SYNOPSIS OF LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS (LERs)
Functional SALP Cause Code*
Area A
B C
D E
X Totals A. Plant Operations Radiological
1 Controls C. Maintenance/
1
4 Surveillance D. Emergency Pre E. Security F. Engineering/
2
Technical Support G. Safety Assessment/
Qua-lity Veri Totals
2
1
10
- Cause Code A -
Personnel Error B - Design, Manufacturing or Installation Error C -
External Cause D - Defective Procedures E - Component Failure X -
Other Functional Areas A -
Plant Operations B - Radiological Controls C - Maintenance/
Surveillance 0 - Emergency Pre E - Security F - Engineering/
Technical Support G -
Safety Assessment/
Quality Veri The above data are based upon LERs 87-17 through 88-0 ATTACHMENT 1 Unit 1 Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
The Analysis Branch of the Office for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Data (AEOD) reviewed 17 LERs issued by Southern California Edison, not including revisions, for Unit 1 during the assessment period from October 1, 1987 through September 30, 1988. The review included LERs numbered as follows: - 87-015 to 88-013 The LER review followed the general instructions and procedures of NUREG-1022. The specific review criteria and the findings were as follows:
1. Significant Operating Events The following four occurrences were determined to be potentially significant by the AEOD screening process:
-
LER 87-15, concerning single failures of engineered safety features systems pertaining to decay heat removal, main steam line break mitigation, and steam generator overfil LER 87-16, involving failure of four air operated valves to function due to solenoid valve failures, rendering independent trains in multiple systems inoperabl LER 88-01, referring to environmental qualification program deficiencie LER 88-09, regarding electrically loading both emergency diesel generators in excess of the Technical Specification maximum allowable kilowatt loadin. Causes Root causes associated with the 17 events included:
-
Three personnel errors
-
Four procedural/administrative errors
Four design/installation/fabrication
-
Six undetermined These events evaluated did not appear to involve related occurrences, and no causes were found to be prominent. However, on two occasions (LERs 87-17 and 87-18) voluntary entry into Technical Specification 3.0.3 occurre Attachment 1 (Continued)
3. LER Quality The LERs reviewed adequately described all the major aspects of the events, including component or system failures that contributed to the event and corrective actions taken or planned to prevent recurrence. The reports were reasonably complete, well written and easy to understand. Root causes were identified, as appropriate, and previous similar occurrences were properly referenced in the LER However, many LERs indicated the root cause was unknown pending further investigations (e.g., LERs 87-16, 87-17, 88-04, 88-06, 88-08, and 88-09).
Updated LERs were then to be issued at the conclusions of the investigations. As of the date of this evaluation performed by AEOD, none of the supplemental reports were received by the NR Units 2 and 3 1. LER Review San Onofre submitted about 34 reports and four updates for Unit 2 and about eight reports for Unit 3 during this assessment period. Unit 2 promised updates for LERs 87-02, 87-24, 88-05, 07, 08, 09, 11, 13, and 17 which have not been received. Unit 3 has one outstanding update, 88-02. Our review included the following LER numbers:
Unit 2, 87-18 to 87-31 and 88-01 to 88-20; Unit 3, 87-17 and 88-01 to 88-0 One LER was classified as significant, 88-17 for Unit 2 concerning the siphoning of the spent fuel poo The causes were the following:
-
Six personnel errors for Unit 2 and two for Unit 3
-
Four maintenance errors for Unit 2 and none for Unit 3
-
Six design/installation errors for Unit 2 and none for Unit 3
-
Eight procedural/administrative errors for Unit 2 and four for Unit 3
-
Six causes unknown for Unit 2 and one for Unit 3
-
Four equipment failures for Unit 2 and one for Unit 3 The majority of the LERs were concerned with actuations of the toxic gas isolation system, fuel handling building isolation system, control room isolation system, and the containment isolation syste These problems were recurring and have been for a long time. Because of this, the arguments for the causes given were not persuasiv That is to say, the root cause for these spurious problems was probably not know The LERs adequately described the major aspects of the events, including component or system failures that contributed to the event and the corrective actions taken or planned to prevent recurrenc The reports were well written. Updated LERs provided new information, denoting the portion of the report that was revised by a vertical line in the right hand margi Attachment 1 (Continued)
2. Preliminary Notifications (PNs)
The Region wrote a number of PNs during this period concerning the two plants. No LER could be found for three of these which may have been reportabl PNO-V-88-022 Reactor Shutdown Caused by Increased Steam Generator for Unit 2 Tube Lea PNO-V-8-002 Reactor shutdown Commenced for More Than 48 Hours for Unit 3 Due to Alarms on the Main Generator Hydrogen Detraining Uni PNO-V-88-047 Cavitation of the Shutdown Cooling Pump Occurred for Unit 3 During Drain Down of the Reactor Vesse.
10 CFR 50.72 Reports A review of reports made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 identified no reporting deficiencies.