IR 05000206/1988005

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Insp Repts 50-206/88-05,50-361/88-05 & 50-362/88-05 on 880126-29.No Deficiencies or Violations Noted.Major Areas Inspected:Nine Open Items Identified During Previous Emergency Preparedness Insps.Followup Discussions Held
ML13316B860
Person / Time
Site: San Onofre  Southern California Edison icon.png
Issue date: 02/18/1988
From: Fish R, Good G
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V)
To:
Shared Package
ML13316B859 List:
References
50-206-88-05, 50-206-88-5, 50-361-88-05, 50-361-88-5, 50-362-88-05, 50-362-88-5, NUDOCS 8803080186
Download: ML13316B860 (6)


Text

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION V

Report No /88-05, 50-361/88-05, and 50-362/88-05 Docket No, 50-361, and 50-362 License No DPR-13, NPF-10, and NPF-15 Licensee:

Southern California Edison Company P. 0. Box 800 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 9177 Facility Name:

San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 1, 2 and 3 Inspection at:

San Onofre Site, San Diego County, California Inspector:,

G. M. Good, Emefgency Preparedness Analyst Date Signed Approved by:

____

R. F.. Fish, Chief Date Signed Emergency Preparedness Section Summary:

Inspection on January 26-29, 1988 (Report Nos. 50-206/88-05, 50-361/88-05, and 50-362/88-05)

Areas Inspected:

Unannounced, reactive follow-up inspection on 9 (nine) open items identified during previous emergency preparedness inspections. In addition, as a result of a recent Emergency Plan revision review, follow-up discussions were held regarding the emergency preparedness drill progra Inspection Procedure 92701 was utilize Results:

No deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements were identifie (III6

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DETAILS Persons Contacted K. Bellis,. Manager, Nuclear Affairs and Emergency Planning P. Dooley, Supervisor, Emergency Planning 0. Peacor, Manager, Station Emergency Preparedness Action on Previous Inspection Findings (Inspection Procedure 92701)

(Open) Open Item (50-206/86-23-01):' Pending resolution of Control Room (CR) habitability issue, determine adequacy of Technical Support Center (TSC) habitability. This item was identified during the Unit 1 Emergency Response Facilities (ERF) appraisal conducted in July 1986. The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) is responsible for determining the adequacy of the CR habitability., NRR personnel were contacted during this inspection to determine the current status of this issue. NRR personnel indicated that they intended to issue a request for additional information (RAI) in the near future. This item will remain ope (Open) Open Item (50-206/86-23-02): After NRR evaluates Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.97 submittal, assure that appropriate variables are available to the TSC and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). -This item was identified during the aforementioned ERF appraisa According to NRR personnel, the licensee responded to an RAI with a submittal dated May 29, 1987. This submittal is still under review. This item will remain ope (Closed) Open Item (50-206/86-23-03):

Insure plant specific fuel damage/dose rate correlation is correct. This.item was identified during the aforementioned ERF appraisa This item 'involved a graph depicting the extent of fuel damage as a function of containment Hi-Range Radiation Monitor dose rat This graph is included in chemistry procedure S0123-III-8.8, "Alternate Methods of Post-Accident Parameter Sampling".

The graph was evaluated and determined to be incorrect. The procedure/graph was revised on July 29, 1986. This item is considered close (Closed) Open Item (50-206/87-01-01):

Potential for delay in completing notifications due to teletype malfunctions. This item was identified during a routine inspection of the licensee's notification and communication system conducted in January 1987. The licensee is currently in the process of replacing the Yellow Phone/Teletype System with a Southern California Edison (SCE) owned "speech plus" system which consists of a number of master and slave stations. Communication allows for voice and data transmission. The voice transmission is two way and the data transmission is one way from master to slav Data communication simultaneously provides one or more slave.stations with hard copy notification form Licensee personnel stated that all five master stations (transmit/receive) were in place and that about twelve of the slave stations (receive only) have been installed. Training on the new system is being conducted and complete operability is expected by about March 1, 1988. This item is considered close (Open) Open Item (50-206/87-15-01):

The Health Physics (HP) group in the TSC needs to be more-effective at disseminating essential radiological information. This item was identified during the licensee's annual emergency exercise conducted in August 198 Since the exercise, Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) S0123-VIII-10, "Emergency Coordinator Duties," and S0123-VIII-40, "Health Physics Leader Duties,"

have been revised to address the specific problems identified during the exercise. Additionally, this matter was made a specific objective of an Emergency-Plan Drill conducted on December 3, 1987. The licensee's formal critique-report for the dri '11stated that the objective had been met. This item will remain-open pending demonstrat-ion.o.f the licensee's ability to accomplish these actions during the next annual: exercis (Open) Open Item (50-206/87-15-02):

Inability to adequately notify inplant personnel during exercise. This item was identified as an exercise weakness during the 1987 exercise. Since the exercise, EPIPs S0123-VIII-20, "Emergency Planning Coordinator Duties," and S0123-VIII-30.1, "Shift Communicator Duties," have been revised to expedite the process for notifying inplant personne This matter was included as an objective for the December 1987 dril The objective was met, however, the critique report-indicated there were some areas where the siren and Public Address (PA) were reported to be inaudible. This item will remain open pending demonstration of the licensee's ability to accomplish these actions during the next annual exercis (Open) Open Item (50-206/87-15-03):

Inability to provide proper contamination control in the Operations Support Center (OSC) during exercis This item was identified as an exercise weakness during the 1987 exercise. Subsequent to the exercise, the licensee has determined that some changes could be made to improve contamination control in the OSC by funneling emergency response personnel through a single contamination control point located at the entrance to the OSC. This funneling process was successfully demonstrated as an objective during the December 1987 dril This item will remain open pending demonstration of the licensee's ability to accomplish these actions during the next annual exercis (Open) Open Item (50-206/87-15-04):

Accountability and access control were not maintained in the EOF during the exercise. This item was identified during the 1987 annual exercise. In order to improve accountability and access control in the EOF, the licensee has acquired a card reader system for the EOF. The units have been purchased, but not installed. In the mean time, this issue has been re-emphasized with security personne Accountability and access control were successfully demonstrated during the December 1987 dril This item will remain open pending demonstration of the licensee's ability to accomplish these actions during the next annual exercis (Open) Open Item (50-206/87-15-05):

Inability to establish appropriate HP controls in the EOF during the exercise. This item was identified as an exercise weakness during the 1987 annual exercise. Since the exercise, HP Technicians from the Nuclear Training Division have been added to the EOF's emergency support organization. As part of the December drill, these technicians were requested to evaluate procedures

applicable to radiological controls in the EOF. This subject was included as an objective in the December dril Although the drill critique report indicates the objective was not met, the HP Technicians identified several specific areas, including the lack of clear procedural guidance for the establishment of contamination and radiation control, where improvements could be made. Steps have been taken to improve the issuance and monitoring of personnel dosimetry. In addition, applicable EPIPs have been revised to provide for communication with the security guard officer located at the Mesa Road guard house.. This applies to situation where emergency response personnel might have to traverse a plume to get to the EOF. The security guard would then be responsible for providing precautionary instructions (e.g.,.roll up windows, etc.).to EOF responders. This item will remain open pending demonstration of the licensee's-ability to accomplish these actions during the next annual exercis.

Emergency Preparedness Drill Program This inspection included follow-up discussions concerning the execution of certain segments of the Emergency.Preparedness Drill Program which resulted from our review of two recent revisions to the licensee's Emergency Plan (EP) (Revision 2.0 submitted June 11., 1987 and Revision 2.01 submitted December 10,.1987). Region V's responses to these EP revisions were documented in letters dated November 16, 1987 and January 15, 1988. The discussions were focused mainly on the conduct, scope and evaluation (critique) of the licensee:'s Radiological Monitoring Dril (Environmental). Based on the results of the EP reviews and the follow-up discussions, the licensee has decided to make a number of significant changes to the manner in which the environmental drill is conducted and documented. Due to the extent of the changes being considered, the Region intends.to track this issue to ensure that future environmental monitoring drills include the following: collection and analysis of air, water, soil and vegetation samples; record keeping and communications; and identification and documentation of weak or deficient areas that need correctio This item will be tracked as open item. (50-206/88-05-01). Exit Interview The inspector held an exit interview with the licensee on January 29, 1988 to discuss the preliminary findings of the inspection. The attachment to this report identifies the licensee personnel who were present at the meeting. During the exit interview, the licensee was informed that no deficiencies or violations of NRC requirements had been identified. In addition to summarizing the findings described in Sections 2 and 3, the inspector mentioned two notable improvements to the licensee's emergency preparedness program that were brought to her attention during this inspection. One improvement involved the addition of two new Emergency Action Levels to the event classification EPIP and

the other i'nvolved development of a formal drill controller program. The latter should strengthen performance, as well as the quality of the training provided in the licensee's emergency preparedness exercise/drfll progra ATTACHMENT EXIT INTERVIEW ATTENDEES C.-Anderson, Emergency Planning Specialist K. Bellis, Manager, Nuclear Affairs and Emergency Planning 0 Dack, Quality Assurance Engineer P. Dooley,'Supervisor Emergency Planning H. Morgan, Station-Manager D. Peacor, Manager,.Station Emergency Preparedness R. Plappert, Supervisor, Compliance 0. Schone, Manager, Site Quality Assuranc S. Wylie, Administrator, Training Support. Services M. Zenker, Compliance Engineer 0C 0K