IR 05000206/1985032
| ML13323B073 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 12/10/1985 |
| From: | Dangelo A, Huey F, Johnson P, Stewart J, Tang R, Tatum J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML13323B072 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-206-85-32, 50-361-85-31, 50-362-85-30, NUDOCS 8601080277 | |
| Download: ML13323B073 (18) | |
Text
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION V
Report No /85-32, 50-361/85-31, 50-362/85-30 Docket No, 50-361, 50-362 License,Nos.: DPR-13, NPF-10, NPF-15 Licensee:
Southern California'Edison Company P. 0. Box 800, 2244 Walnut Grove Avenue Rosemead, California 92770 Facility. Name:
San Onofre Units 1, 2 and 3 Inspection at:
San Onofre-, San Clemente, California Inspection conducted:
September.27 through November 15, 1985 Inspectors to rF. R. uey, Senior Resident Date Signed Insp tor, Units 1, 2 ahd 3 J ewart, Resident.Inspector Date Signed-kA D elo Resident Inspector Date Signed-f tum, Resident Jnspector Date Signed-t rR.~ ang, Resident Inspector Date Signed Approved B*
P. hnsoh Chief Date Signed React Projects Section 3 Inspection Summary Inspection on September 27 through November 15, 1985 (Report No /85-32, 50-361/85-31, 50-362/85-30)
Areas Inspected:
Routine resident inspection of Units 1, 2 and 3 Operations Program including the following areas:
operational safety verification, evaluation of plant trips and events,.monthly surveillance activities, monthly maintenance activities, refueling activities, independent inspection, licensee event report review and follow-up of previously identified items. This inspection involved 285 inspection hours on Unit 1, 210 inspection hours on Unit 2 and 196 inspection hours on Unit 3 for a total of 691. inspection hours 6601080277 851216 PDR
'ADOCK.05000206 G
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-2 by five NRC-inspectors, including 96 hours0.00111 days <br />0.0267 hours <br />1.587302e-4 weeks <br />3.6528e-5 months <br /> of backshift or week-end inspection activities._ Inspecttion Procedures 93701, 93702, 93703, 92700, 92701, 92702, 92705, 30703, 35751, 37700, 37701, 37702, 40700, 40702, 60705, 60710 61726, 61729, 62703, 71707, 71710, 86700, and 93701 were covere Results:
No violations or deviations were identifie *~
DETAILS Persons Contacted Southern California Edison Company
- H. Ray, Vice President, Site Manager
- G. Morgan, Stati'n Manager M. Wharton, Deputy"Station Manager D. Schone, Quality Assurance Manager D. Stonecipher, Quality Control Manager
- R. Krieger, Deputy.Station.Manager D. Shull,. Maintenance. Manager j. Reilly, Technical Manager P. Knapp,- Health Physi-cs Manager
- B. Zintl, Compliance Manage J. Wambold Traiining Manager
- D.rPeacor, Emergency Preparedness Manager P. E11er, Security Manager W. Marsh Operations Supeintendent,.Units 2/3 J. Reeder, Oerations Superintendent, Unit 1 V. 'Fisher, Assistint Operations Superintendent, Units 2/3 B. Joyce, Maintenance Manager, Units 2/ H. Merten, Maintenance Manager, Unit 1,
- R. Santosuosso, Instrument and Control Supervisor T. Mackey, Compliance -Supervisor G. Gibson, Compliance Supervisor
- C. Kergis, Comgliance Engineer
- King, Quality Assurance Supervisor San Diego Gas & Electric Company
- R. Erickson, San Diego Gas and Electric
- Denotes those attending the exit meeting on November 15, 1985..
The inspectors also contacted other licensee employees during the course of the inspection, including operations shift superintendents, control room supervisors, control room operators, QA and.QC engineers, compliance engineers, maintenance craftsmen, and health physics engineers and technician.
Operational Safety Verification The inspectors performed several plant tours and verified the operability of selected emergency systems., reviewed the Tag Out log and verified proper return to service of affected components. Particular attention was given to housekeeping, examination for potential fire hazards, fluid leaks, excessive vibration and verification that maintenance requests had been initiated for equipment in need of maintenanc No violations or deviations were note II Evaluation of Plant Trips and Events a.,
Unit2 Reactor Trip on October 18, 1985 Orf.October 18, 1985, at 1242, while at 100% power,.the reactor tripped due to.a turbinetrip (loss of load trip).- The turbine trip was caused by a false indication.of a high level in a moisture separator reheater (MSR) drain tank. The false level indication in the MSR drain tank occurred as a result of a maintenance craftsman breakinga level sensing line while removing a pipe to repair a gage glass level indicato (2) Reactor Trip on October 19, 1985 At 0901 on October 19, 1985, with Unit 2 at 19% power, the reactor tripped due to Core Protection Calculator (CPC)
auxiliary trips resulting from the hot channel Axial Shape Index (ASI) reaching the CPC Auxiliary trip setpoin The hot channel ASI trip setpoint was reached because return to power in transient Xenon conditions requires a more rapid power increase than the actual power increase at the time. In
. reactor restarts during transient Xenon conditions, the rate of power increase must be rapid enough to minimize Xenon being burned out of the top of the core because only limited corrective action is available due to restrictive Technical Specifications on ASI and available control rod insertion
.limit At the time,.,when reactor power reached 20%, ASI was negative to the point where power could not be increased above 20%, the limit imposed by Technical Specification 3.2.7 Action Statemen With the reactor staying at 20% power.and power concentration in the top of the core, Xenon continued to burn out of the top of the core which slowly drove ASI even more negativ Operators attempted to optimize control rod position while at 20% power. However, the reactor tripped on CPC auxiliary trip for AS ASI is of concern during return to power following a shutdown or power reduction of short duration. The licensee is currently pursuing several alternatives with regard to minimizing ASI events, including utilizing an additional group of control rods, and/or requesting less restrictive ASI limitations at reduced power. Also, as a result of this event, an analysis of plant response to ASI on restart during Xenon transients has been performed. This analysis will help predict the magnitude of the transient and the appropriate delay prior to commencing power escalation in order to assist the 'operator in dealing with these condition (3) Reactor Trip on November 9, 1985, During a Plant Shutdown Due to a Reactor Coolant System Leak On November 9, 1985, at 0301., while shutting down-Unit 2 to repair a reactor coolant system leak of approximately 0.5 gpm, the reactor tripped on a CPC high negative ASI auxiliary tri The RCS leak was located on the controlled bleed-off (CBO)
return from the 2P003 reactor coolant.pump. The CBO leak was determined to be caused by corrosion of CBO flange bolts resulting from boric acid, build up in the vicinity of the bolts. The licensee and. Combustion Engineering were evaluating this corrosion mechanism to determine if RCS 'pressure retaining fasteners may have been-affected and what corrective actions are necessary. The reason for the high negative ASI auxiliary trip was similar to that discussed above. The licensee was having Combustion Engineering assist them in expanding ASI limits 'at low power since at low power levels a large ASI is technically acceptabl This is an open item (50-361/85-31-01). Unit 3 On October 16, 1985, an inadvertent partial engineered safety features actuation (ESFAS) occurred on Unit 3 with the plant.in Mode 6. The partial ESFAS was the result of inadvertent de-energization of two power supplies associated with Train "A" ESFAS bays 7 and 8, while performing a design change (DCP 195J) to install controls for the auxiliary feedwater bypass valves. As a result of loss of power to bays 7 and 8, half of the Train "A" ESFAS auxiliary relays were de-energized, causing activation of several engineered safety features (ESF) component This event had the following impact on systems affecting plant safety:
Radiation moiitor 3RT-7804 was isolated for about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and
>40 minutes,-while containment purge was in progress. Monitor 3RT-7804 monitors containment purge air and provides automatic I" termination of containment purge (as, required by Technical Specification 3.,3.3.9) in the event.that specified release limits for containment 'air activity are-exceeded. The licensee
,took prompt action (15 mihutes) to restore monitor.3RT-7804 as soon as the, loss of.,this monitor was recognized. 'It should be noted that-although no automatic containment purge termination was.available based,.on air activity levels, monitor 3RT-7856 was in service atd available to automatically terminate purge (if containment radiation levels exceeded 2.5 mR/hr) in the
.event of a serious fuel handling accident. It should also.be noted that portable airborne and area radiation monitors were in service and being monitored by health physics personnel to identify a4ny radioactivity problems and allow manual purge isolation in the event of less serious fuel handling problems requiring containment isolation. During' this event actual
4, containment air activity levels were more than 4 orders of magnitude less tha the 3RT-7804 automatic purge termination setpoint of 9 X 10 cp Movement of irradiated fuel in containment continued for about 1,hour and 50 minutes while the activity monitoring portion of the containment purge isolation system was inoperable. The licensee took immediate action to suspend fuel handling" activities, as required by technical specification 3.9.9, when the loss of automatic. containment purge isolation capability was recognize Instrument air to containment was isolated for about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 40 minutes. Instrument air is the primary source of pressurization to the reactor cavity seals and steam generator nozzle dam It should be noted that during this event, there was no loss of seal pressure. Furthermore, in the..event of any leakage from-these pressurized seals, an independent backup source of nitrogen pressure inside containment would have prevented seal failure as a result of loss.of instrument ai Several problems and deficiencies were noted as a result of review of the circumstances involved with this event.- The following is a listing of these problem areas and the corrective actions initiated by the licensee:
(1) Automatic containment isolation (CIAS)} and safety injection (SIAS) are not uequired in Modes 5-or However, there is no
,readily available means to block inadvertent actuation of CIAS and SIAS.signals during Modes 5 and 6. As noted 'above, inadvertent signalsduring Modes 5 or 6 can result in the isolation of components required to operate during Modes 5 and ~
The license performed a review of all components affecting planta'fety which are required to operate during Modes 5 or 6 and which could be impacted by an inadvertent CIAS or SIAS. As'
a result of this review the licensee took action to jumper out the CIAS-and SIAS close signals for radiation monitor RT-7804 and RT-7807 sample line isolation valves during Mode 6 operation. The licensee concluded that no other jumpers were warraInte Specifically, with regard to instrument air, the licensee concluded that sufficient safety margin was incorporated into the redundant seal'design and backup nitrogen pressurization system to not warrant an instrument air jumpe (2) Control room operators did not recognize that radiation monitor 3RT-7804.had become inoperable until 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> and 40-minutes after the monitor sample lines were isolate The licenseehas initiated a.design change (DCP 6460.ON) to provide an audible alarm in the control room upon. the failure of any radiation monitor. It should be noted that this problem
-5 had been previ6sly recognized, by the licensee and the design change was in preparation p rr to this even (3) This event was initiated b a sequential, inadverteit trippin of 2 ESF bay pwer supply breakers in the vicinity of construction effort associated with DCP 195J. Each of these breaker trips provided an audible and visual alarm on'r annunciator.panel 56 in the control room. Neither of these alarms was noted or responded to by shift. operations personnel because, at the time these alarms came in, a computer technycian was operating.the annunciator acknowledge and reset buttonsat panel 56, as part of a surveillance test he was performing. Apparently, the computer technician inadvertently acknowledged'the ESE bay loss of power alarms without advising operations personnel that these unexpected alarms had come i In this regard, the following specific problems were noted:
(a) Operations personnel did not implement adequate controls to ensure proper response to control room alarms during the period of time that.control of annunciator acknowledge and reset was turned oyer to a computer technician. In this regard, neither station operating or technical procedures provided any specific requirements for controlling turnover of this operating function to nonoperations personne (b) As a result of the large number of invalid annunciators locked into the alarm panels due to the existing Mode 6 plant conditions., control room operators'did not note the valid alarms associated with ESF bay loss of powe The licensee is revising station operating and technical procedures to provide necessary control of activities similar to that discussed in paragraph 3(a) above. The licensee was reviewing the problem discussed in paragraph 3(b) above to determine what corrective actions are warrante This is an open item (50-362/85-30-01).
(4) The original work authorization for DCP 195J included a clearance on 'the power supply for ESF bay 8. 'This was done 'to allow temporary repositioning of the power supply in support of cable pulling efforts. On-September 24, a work authorization modification (WAM) was implemented to restore power to bay 8, permitting continued DCP work with minimal.risk of inadvertent ESF actuation (e.g. ensure that both redundant.power supplies were in service).
In this regard, two problems with the WAM were noted:
(a) The WAM was not,properly filled out (no date or time recorded).
(b) The WAM did.not require or document actual restoration of power to bay 8. The WAM only lifted the clearance on the
inverter power supply breaker but did not specifically check the local breaker or power indicating lights at bay The licensee took action to reemphasize proper completion of operating pkocedure-forms with'cognizant operations personne The licensee was reviewing the problem discussed in paragraph 4(b) above to determine what corrective action is warrante This is-an open item (50-362/85-30-02)..
No violations or deviations were identifie.
Monthly Sui eillance Activitie's. Failed Surveillance(Unit 1)
The inspector reviewed all Unit 1 technical specification surveilia.nces whic. did not meet specified acceptance criteria which were performed during the inspection perio The scope of this review included an.assessment of the significance of the failure on equ-ipmepnt operability "proper documentation of surveillance.results, reviewfof surveillance results by cognizant technical personnel, proper performance of necessary corrective maintenance, proper performance of necessary surveillance retest and evaluation for
- A, failure trends. The inspector noted no deficiencies with regard to any of the above.review categorie. Load Sequencer (Unit 1)
The inspector observed surveillance testing on the #2 load sequencer. The surveillance was conducted in accordance with procedure S01-12.3-7. No diffIculties were encountered and the load sequencer was found to be operabl Daily and Shiftly Surveillance (Unit 2)
During-this inspection period, theinspector observed the licensee conducting several daily.and shiftly sutveillance activities for Unit 2, as required by the Unit Technical Specification Activities observed included determination of control element assembly (CEA) transient insertion limits ;- shutdown margin determination, inspection of differential.pressure across hydraulic oil filters in the auxiliary feedwater system, determination of refueling water storage tank (RWST) temperature, monitoring reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage and demonstration of operability of loose parts detection system. These surveillances were conducted in accordance with the approved operating procedures and no deficiencies were note The inspector observed portions of the monthly reactor coolant
.
system calorimetric flow measurement. The surveillance was
. conducted in accordance with procedure S023-V-1.20 and satisfied the
7, requirements specified by note 8 of Table 4.3-1 of the Technical Specifications for Functional Units 10 and 1 d..18 Month Surveillance (Unit 3)
The inspector.-
observed.,a portion of the 18 month surveillance SQ23-II-9.258 "Plant Protection System and Bistable Card and Variable.Set Point CardCalibiation" on Unit 3. The.setpoint calibrations,observed.ware, performed in accordance with the approved operating procedures and no deficiencies were note As.a function of the refueling outage,,the inspector observed the following surveillances:
o Steam.Generator:pressure and level transmitter 18 month calibrations o
Electrical bus 3A04 outage to visually inspect and clean the
.switchgear internals o
Battery quarterly and refueling interval.inspections and the refueling interval battery service test'in accordance with procedures SO23-I-2.13, S023-I-2.14, and S023-I-2.1 These surveillances were conducted in accordance with the approved procedures and no deficiencies were note Remote Initiation of Shutdown Cooling (Unit 3)
As a function of cooling down Unit 3 in preparation for the refueling outage, the licensee conducted procedure S03-SPSU-1271,
"Remote Initiation of Shutdown Cooling Demonstration". This demonstration was performed to satisfy BTP RSB 5-1 regarding-control room operation of the shutdown cooling system for natural circulation cooldown capabilities. No deficiencies were observe No violations or deviations were identifie.
Monthly Maintenance Activities Unit 2 The inspector observed maintenance activities to repair the nitrogen regulator which supplies nitrogen to one of the Marotta valves for Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) 2HV-8205. While work was accomplished on the defective nitrogen regulator, the regulator associated with the other safety train remained operable. Work was authorized in accordance with approved procedure Unit 3 The inspector observed the following maintenance activities while the unit was shutdownfor refueling:
o Diesel Generator 3GO02 supply breaker auxiliary contacts were examined for excessive arcing aeSafety Injectionank vent header isolation valve packing replacement Safety Related Pump Lubrication Program The inspector performed an inspection of the licensee's program to maintain adequate lubrication for Safety Related Pumps. The inspector reviewed the following documents:
o Pump Technical Manuals
Pump Lubrication Maintenance Procedures o
Proposed Facility Change (PFC) 2/3-84-170, Auxiliary Feedwater Pump Oil Cooling Systems o
Procedure S023-0-38, Routine Operations The inspector interviewed the following station personnel who implement the routine surveillance and preventive maintenance programs for the pump-lubrication system o Nuclear Plant Equipment Operators (NPEO)
Maintenance Planning Engineers o
Cognizant Station Technical Engineers
'o Maintenance Craft Workers The inspector observed, the following preventive and corrective maintenance activities:
o Refilling of pump bearing lubrication oilers o
Adjusting pump bearing cavity lube oil level
-
ouine preventive mintea
'Roui maintens ce inspection of pump bearing lube di levels Based upor the review of the ab"ove plant procedures and interviews with the-NPEO.and-maintenance planners, the inspector determined that the 'operations NPEO's are responsible for implementation of the preventive maintenance program for maintaining adequate lubrication of all safety related pump The duties of the NPEO to maintain proper -beailng 'lubrication include the following:
Checking'for proper bearing oil level
Addingoil to all pumps.with oiler bottles and charging pumps
Initiating maintenance orders to add oil to pumps without oiler bottles o
Writing deficiency tags for observed deficient conditions such as oil leaks The inspector determined that although NPEO's were knowledgeable about maintaining adequate lube oil level and were aggressive in maintaining oil levels, several.deficiencies in the licens -".s program to maintain adequate bearing lubrication, were noted. These problems are discussed belo.The inspector observed excessive oil leaks on the Unit 2 charging pumps, auxiliary feedwater pumps and component cooling water pumps which did not have deficiency tags.attached or maintenance orders outstanding. The licensee was in the process of.developing and implementing an enhanced program for increasing the attention paid to beating lubrication systems. The inspector will continue to monitor this effor The inspector observed the addition of lube oil byan.NPEO to CCW pump P024 and noted that no maintenance order was used to document the type or amount of oil added to the oil feeder. The inspector noted that.this is standard practice for oil additions performed.by the NPEO. The 'inspector determined that since no documentation of the oil addition is made, there is no tracking of the rate-of oil leakage by management, 6i review.by quality control to ensure the correct oil type was.added. Asnoted above, the licensee is currently reviewing what actions are necessary to ensure proper-attention to' bearing lubricatio This review will address-docmentationand rending of,oil additions to safety-related equipment, -This -will1 be exakined~during future inspection (50-361/85-31-02 The (insector observed a bent oiler bottle and sight glass piping extensionon the Unit 2 High Pressure Safety Injection Pump P01 'The pping extension was abent 1 downward, and thus indicated a false normal ilevel.. The actual oiillevel was approximately a half an inch below, normal. The licensee initiated a maintenance order to
.str'aighten the. pipin The'inspector observed deficiency tags'oneach of the auxiliary feedwater pump motor emergency gravity feed oil drain tanks due to oil in the tank.-1 The inspector determined that.the deficiency tags were initiated as a result of the performance of the monthly surveillance' on the drain tanks required by procedure S023-3-3.1 Procedure'S023-3-3.16 requires that the tanks be maintained empt The inspector noted that a weakness exists in the procedure in that it does not state the drain tank oil level which would make the emergency lube oil system inoperable. The oil level in the tank was observed to be two-and a half inche The licedisee' stated that the tanks were designed such that oil level could be as high as the top of the sight glass (about 3"inches) without. affecting operatio The licensee took prompt action to drain both tanks and was revising
the procedure to require prompt draining when oil is observed in the tank The gravity lube oil system was added to the AFPs to environmentally qualify the AFW pump motor bearings for a high energy line break accident (HELBA) in the pump room. The inspector noted that the lube oil system addition, a commitment required by License Condition 2.C.(25) is not addressed in the plant technical specifications and therefore, there are currently no technical specification surveillance requirements associated with the gravity oil syste When questioned by the inspector, an operations shift superintendent stated that the motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps would not be considered inoperable if the emergency lube oil system was declared inoperable. This appeared to be inconsistent with the equipment qualification requirements for the pum The licensee subsequently modified procedure SO-23-3-3.16 to require the auxiliary feedwater pumps to be declared inoperable whenever the emergency lube oil system is determined to be inoperabl No violations or deviations were identifie.
Engineered Safety Feature Walkdown During the inspection period, the inspector walked down the safety injection, emergency boration/charging and auxiliary feedwater systems for Unit 1. The systems were aligned as required by the Unit 1 Technical Specifications, Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR), and Station Procedure No violations or deviations were identifie.
Refueling Activities The inspector performed a partial review of preliminary Unit 1 refueling procedures to ensure that these procedures included adequate controls to preclude recurrence of the type of rigging deficiencies which recently resulted in the loss of control of a major lift over irradiated fuel at St. Luci The following concerns were noted: The procedures, as written, did not include adequate controls to ensure that major refueling lifts are properly performed. In particular, the procedures did not provide adequate weight lift limit restrictions to prevent overloading of lifting equipment, nor did the procedures provide adequate verification of proper rigging assembly and installatio Units 2/3 refueling procedures include numerous precautions and requirements (including ones applicable to the types of problems noted in a. above) which had not yet been factored into Unit 1 procedure The licensee acknowledged the above mentioned procedure deficiencies and emphasized that action was in progress to correct these problems and
factor in applicable Unit 2/3 refueling experience. The licensee stated that an aggressive procedure review and checkout program has been initiated and all required procedures will be available prior to start of Mode 6.operation *No violations or deviations were identifie.
Independent Inspection Deficient Condition of Unit 1 Electrical Conduit
'The inspector noted several instances in which deficient conditions existed in electrical conduit:,associated with Unit 1 safety related equipment. Exampfes of observed deficiencies were. as follows:
(1)
The flexible conduit was broken off a position limit switch on the fety injection.suction valve (HV-853A).to.the east main feedwater ppm (2) The flexible conduit was broken off the terminal box for the Woodward governor on diesel generator # (3 The. conduit was not properly connected to the vent solenoid on air start valve (DSN-SV-405). of diesel generator # (4) -The I gasket was broken off the terminal box in the conduit for air:start valve (DSN-SV-404) of diesel generator # (5) The conduit was broken off feedwater bypass valve (FWS-SV-150).
This valve had a deficiency tag (DT #14716) addressing this deficiency, dated June 5, 1985; however, the deficiency had not (been ;correcte The licensee.acknowledged that the above deficiencies demonstrated
- the need for additional attention to this type of material condition deficiency. The licensee emphasized that they.recognized the need for improvement in this area and noted that action was already in progress to implement an area monitoring program, as discussed in a November 6, 1985, letter from H. B. Ray to J. B. Marti No violations or deviations were identifie Control of Anticontamination Clothing The inspector noted: several instances of improper control of clean and used anticontamination clothing during tours of Units 2 and For example:
(1) Clean anticontamination coveralls and rubber gloves were observed adrift in Unit 2, room 20 (2) Clean anticontamination coveralls and rubber gloves were observed adrift in the area of the step off pad adjacent to the Unit 3 safety injection pump (3) Used anticontaminationcirothing was observed adrift in several locations on the 9-fobt'elevation of the radwaste buildin The inspector discussed these items with the Unit 2/3.health physics supervisor. The deficiencies were corrected and the licensee committed to reemphasize proper control of anticontamination clothing as specified -b" ite procedures.,
No-violationsor'6deviations were identifie.
Review of Licensee Event Reports Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, or review of the records, the following Licensee Event Reports.(LERs) were closed:
Unit 1 85-014 Reactor Trip ;in Response to a Turbine Trip Unit 2 85-039 Toxic Gas Isolation System (TGIS) Hydrocarbon Analyzer Malfunction 85-040 Spurious Control Room-Isolation System (CRIS) Train "B"
Actuation 85-041 Reactor Trip - Non-lE instrument Bus Transient 85-042 Improper Level Detection for Spray Chemical Storage Tank T105 85-044 Containment Purge Isolation System (CPIS) Spurious Actuations85-045 Missed Control*Element Assembly Position Verification 85-046 Reactor Trip Caused by a Generator Exciter Fire 85-048 Delinquent Purge Sample 85-049 Pacific Scientific Snubber Failures on the Shutdown'Cooling System Unit 3 85-023 Fuel Handling Isolation System (FHIS) Actuations85-024 Spurious FHISActuations MS-025 Containment Purge Isolation System (CPIS) Spurious Actuations85-027 Containment Purge Isolation System (CPIS) Actuation 85-028 Fuel Handling Isolation System (FHIS) Actuation 85-029 18 Month Snubber Surveillance' Deficiencies 1 RFollow-Up of Previously Identified Items (Closed) Violation (50-361/82-15-03).Appendix B -Bypass Valves Missing from Drawings andProcedures This violation was due to an inadequate drawing which did not describe two bypass valves in the Safety Injection Syste The licensee's corrective.action included the addition of the missing bypass valves to the :Piping and Instrumentation Drawing (P&ID)
40112. The licensee also compared P&IDs with the appropriate
isometric drawings to determine whether or not other existing bypass valves had been omitted. As a result 168 bypass valves were added to P&IDs and appropriate procedures were revised to identify the bypass valves. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (50-361/82-23-03) S023-5-2.9 Loop 2.,Hot Leg Injection Check Valve Leakage Pressure High The.inspectors had previously observed that the operators were responding to this alarm on a frequent basis, when in fact the actual check valve leakage was less than five percent of. the allowable leakage. The licensee revised Procedure S023-5-2.9 and S023-5-2.10 "ESF - Alarm Response Procedure" to eliminate unnecessary operator attention'before the development of excessive check valve leakage.. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (50-361/82-25-05) Position Indication Inservice Test Upgrade During the review of test procedures the inspectors noted that actual valve travel had not been timed. The inspector reviewed Procedure S02-3-3.30 Revision.8 and verified that step 6.3 requires that local valve position indication be checked with remote position indication. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (50-361/82-25-06) Position Indication -
Test Retest-Requirements Following maintenance on a safety related valve, the valve failed to travel to the full open position when the operator attempted to open the valve. Post maintenance testing did not identify that the valve failed to go to the full open position. The.licensee's commitment fo upgrade equipment retest requirements was completed with the issuance of a retest requirements procedure SO23-XV-1.0, which is used by maintenanc planners.,
This item is close e'.
(Closed) Violation (50-361/82-30-01) Overtime Repeat Violation The licensee failed to comply with the technical specification to have overtime exceeding the required guidelines approved by :Station
..
Management. Based upon the inspector's review of the licensee's program.for the tracking and approval of overtime, the'inspector determined that except-for isolated minor deviations the program has been' effectively implemented during the last four month This item is close (C1osed) Open.Item (50-361/83-03-01) Annunciator Problems During startup testing of Unit 2, the inspectors observed excessive plant alarms and locked in alarms for operable systems. The licensee's program to reduce nuisance alarms and correct other annunciator problems has been essentially completed. Based on the inspector's observation of the reduced number of alarms during power operations, this item is close (Closed) Open Item (50-361/83-06-01) Revised Calibration Procedure to Reflect Actual Practice An inspector observed earlier that.a technician failed to use the test equipment specified during the performance of a system surveillance. The inspector determined that the licensee had revised the procedure to reflect the actual practice performed by the technician. This item is close (Closed) Open Item (50-361/83-10-02) No Procedure for Spurious Alarm Form Log The inspectors observed that a Spurious Alarm Log Sheet being used by operators was not described in a procedure. The licensee changed procedure S023-6-29 "Operation of Annunciators and Indicators" to'
give guidance to operators in the use of the Spurious Alarm Form Log. This' item is close (Closed) Open Item (50-361/83-10-03) Alarm Clear Buzzer The inspector observed that the control room audible annunciator, which indicates that an alarm has "cleared" was inoperable. The licensee repaired this deficiency. This item is close j. (Closed) Open' Item (50-361/83-12-01) Ineffective Corrective Action for Repetitiv e LER During the period 1982-1983, the inspectors noted that repetitive LERs 'were occurring..as 'a result of spurious Toxic Gas Isolatio System, (TGIS),
Coftainment Purge Isolation System (CPIS) and Fuel Handling Is latioh System (FHIS) actuations. The inspector reviewe licensee co'rrective actions and noted that design changes had been implemented 'improving quipment reliabilit The. reduction.of LERs invXiving the TGIS is: a result of these corrective action Additionali,'design changes were under review to reduce spurious 'CPIS and:FHIS'actuations- *This item i close k... (Closed) 'Open Item (50-361/83 15-05) Review Nuclear Safety Group k(NSG) 'Action on Identifying Repetitive. Problems The licensee had' committed to having the NSG review nonconformance reports (NCR) o a qua te'rly basis. The inspector reviewed the monthly Nuclear -Safety Reports for the 'months of June and August, 198 The 'ispector determined that the Nuclear Safety Group was reviewing NCRs for problem trending on a quarterly basis as previously committed. This item is close. (Closed) Open Item (50-361/83-16-01 and 50-362/83-15-01) Discrepancy Between Technical Specification-Requirements for CPIS (TS 4.6.3'and 4.3.2.1)
This item involved a misunderstanding of.the functions of airborne activity monitors RT-7804 and RT-7807 and area radiation monitors
.15 RT-7804 and RT 7807 The iset review concluded that this, itemis closed.;T-.
. losed) Open Item (50 361/8329 01) Failure to Provide Procedure for Evaluating Overdue Preventive Maintenance A.licensee scram breaker report issued on April 15, 1983, committed to.implement 'a program fori reporting and evaluating overdue preventive maintenance. The inspector determined that licensee maintenance department management has been reviewing overdue.
preventive maintenance for the last 30 months on a weekly basi This item is close (Closed) Open'Item (50-361/84-11-03) Procedure Review to Determine if a Second Operability Verification Test is Required The licensee had completed the.review of all required procedures and revised procedures which required independent verification or a system operability check. This item is close.
(Closed) Violation (84-14-01) Failure to Declare an Unusual Event This violation, for failure to declare an unusual event, occurred due to operator failure to properly monitor or evaluate radiation monitor indication. The inspector noted that alarm response procedure S023-5-2.24 section 61AO9 was revised such that meter count rate output is compared to Emergency Plan Implementing Procedure values and requires the -operator to inform the shift WII supervisor when levels are exceede In addition, the licensee also revised S023-0-25 to reflect revised.changes in the ODCM. The licensee also completed training of operators and chemistry technicians on proper evaluation of radiation monitor readings and alarm The inspector questiohed reactor operators, senior reactor operators and a shift superintendent concerning their actions per procedure 30123-0-14 "Notification and Reporting Significant Events" and emergency implementing procedure S023-VIII-1 during potential offsite releases. *The inspector.determined that raising the alarm and technical specification-related setpoints has improved the alertness of the operators in responding' to the alarms. The setpoints had previously been set considerably below any level 'which would have required making a notification to the NRC or initiating corrective action. This item is close p. (Closed) Open Item (50-361/84-35-03) Foreign Material Exclusion (FME) Practices on Refueling Machine Need Improvements The inspectors observed several weaknesses in the licensee's implementation of the FME Program during the Unit 2 first refuelin Based on several observations by the inspector of refuelin operations'during the first Unit 3 refueling, the inspectornoted that the licensee FME program had significantly improved. This item is considered close (Open) Violation (50-362/84-14-01) Radiation Monitor Response The inspector examined the.licensee's training program and found the lesson plans to be satisfactory. The aspect of this issue that remains open is verification that the control operators have received the required trainin.
Exit Meeting On November 15, 1985, an exit meeting was conducted with the licensee repriesentatives' identified in Paragraph 1. The inspectors summarized the inspection scope and findings as described in this report.