IR 05000206/1982006
| ML20050B819 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | San Onofre  |
| Issue date: | 03/19/1982 |
| From: | Miller L, Zwetzig G NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20050B817 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-206-82-06, 50-206-82-6, NUDOCS 8204070449 | |
| Download: ML20050B819 (8) | |
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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-P.EGION V Report No.
50-206/82-06 (OPS)
Docket No.
50-206 License No.
DPR-13~
Safeguards Group Licensee:
Southern California Edison Company P.O. Box 805 Rosemead, California 91770 Facility Name:
San Onofre Unit 1 Inspection at:
San Onofre, Califorhia Inspection conducted:
February 1-26, 1982 h
M46dd /1, / QfA Inspector:
Li min er, Shnlo8 Resident Inspector, Unit 1 Date Sigr(ed
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///44dd / 9, /9/h Approved by:
Gi B.Q wetzN, thief, Reactor Projects Section 1 Date Sig6ed J
Reactor Operations Projects Branch Inspection on February 1-26,1982 (Report No. 50-206/82-06 (OPS))
Areas Inspected:
Routine, resident operational safety verification; monthly
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surveillance and maintenance observations; follow-up on licensee event reports, and inspector identified items and independent inspection.
The inspection involved 65 inspector-hours by one NRC inspector.
Results: Of the six areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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RV Form 219(2)
8204070449 820319 PDR ADOCK 05000206 G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted
- W. Moody, Deputy Station Manager
- J. Curran, Manager, Quality Assurance
- H. Mathis, Manager, Nuclear Training
- P. Croy, Manager, Compliance and Configuration Control
- G. McD:nald, Quality Assurance / Control Supervisor
- J. Dunn, Project' Quality Assurance Supervisor J. Reeder, Superintendent, Unit 1
- F. Briggs, Compliance Engineer The inspector also interviewed other licensee personnel during this inspection, particularly operations and station ' engineering staff.
- Denotes those attending the Exit Interview on February 26, 1982.
2.
Operational Safety Verification The inspector observed Control Room operations frequently for proper shift manning, for adherence to procedures and limiting conditions for operation, and appropriate recorder and instrument indications.
Control room valve position. indications appeared correct for power operation.
The inspector discus 3ed the status of annunciators with Control Room operators to determine the reasons for abnormal indications, and to determine the operators' awareness of plant status.
Shift turnovers were observed.
The Control Operator's Log was reviewed frequently to obtain information on plant conditions, and to determine whether regula-tory requirements had been met. The Watch Engineer's Log, Tagout,
- quipment Control, and Chemistry Logs were also reviewed.
Audits of the Tagout and Equipment Control Logs were performed.
Clearance tags on the service water pumps and electric auxiliary feedwateri pump were verified to have been properly hung.
Radioactive effluent complete.
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were checked and appeared release permits for February 1-22, 1982, Frequent tours of the facility were performed.
Plant housekeeping was good in most areas.
Fire barriers appeared intact, and fire watches were posted when required.
The north turbine building extension appeared to' vibrate more than normal, but the source of the vibration was not apparent. The inspector discussed this condition with licensee representatives who stated that an engineering evaluation was in progress. This item, remains open (OI 50-206/82-06-01).
Radiation restricted area access points were'generall'y safe and clean.
Several radiation work permits were ' examined'and found to
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have been completed correctly.
In addition, several radiation friskers and portal monitors were observed to be operating pro-
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perly.
Radiation areas observed in the Auniliary Building were correctly posted.
The inspector observed that selected security posts were properly l
manned, isolation zones were clear, personnel and equipment searches were performed regularly, vehicles were controlled within the protected area, and personnel were badged and escorted, as neces-sary.
Protected area barriers did not appear to be degraded.
The alignment of the containment isolation valve system associated with the containment purge valves, POV-9 and 10, was verified.
Also, the valve alignment for the electric auxiliary feedwater
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pump, No. 2 diesel generator starting system, and south saltwater pump was checked.
One discrepancy ~in the containment isolation system was observed.
The inspector noted that six containment pressure transmitters (PT 1120 A, B, C and PT 1121. A, B, C) and their six associated drain valves were not shown on the piping drawing of the contain-ment ventilation system (Dwg. 568782-20).
The,. drain valves are
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manual containment isolation valves when the' pressure transmitters are in service. The inspector determined that these transmitters were installed during the 1980-81 outage as part of Design Change 79-33 and TMI Work Package 2.1.4. 1The transmitters and valves were shown on installation drawing 5159699-l', as well_ as on the related electrical elementary wiring drawings. 'The ' inspector noted that the transmitters and drain valves were also addressed in the licensee's transmitter! calibration procedures, but not in the integrated leak rate test valve alignment nor the ~ safety-related valve alignment procedures.
Licensee representatives stated that this drawing err'or had oc-curred because the engineer responsible for this work had not revised all affected drawings.
The inspector observed that the licenser's drawing control procedure (E & C 28-4-7, " Drawings and Drawing Revisions") did not clearly define this responsibility.
In addition, licensee personnel stated that they were not aware of any
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clear procedural definition of this responsibility.
As part of the follow-up inspection of this discrepancy, the inspector learned of a similar situation.
In this instance, lice, see personnel identified an inconsistency between two drawings of the safety injection system sequencer wiring (Dwg. 5149181 Rev. 8 DCN 21, "No. 2 Sequencer Load Sequence Schedele," and Dwg. 5150875-9, "No. 2 Sequencer Elementary Wiring Diagram").
At the time this was reported to the inspector, no action to resolve this inconsistency had been taken by the licensee. The inspector
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-3-determined that the elementary wiring-diagram had not been updated following the safety injection system modification project of September-October, - 1981.
A meeting was held with licensee representatives on February 24, 1982, to discuss the licensee's proposed corrective action for these and other similar deficiencies identified since October 1981 by the inspector.
(See previous Inspection Reports 50-206/80-16, 81-15, 81-40, 81-42, and 82-04. ) The inspector emphasized the im %.'t3nm of having accurate drawings in order to be able to control plant status. The licensee representatives concurred, and outlined a program with three elements:
First, the Control Room drawing files would be reviewed within two weeks to determine whether the most current revisions of drawings were in the Control Room files and corree ny identified deficiencies. This repeats a commitmeni, made in May 1980 and completed by April 1981.
Second, all modification work performed by the licensee since January 1980 will be reviewed by June 1,1982, to ensure that all drawings affected by modifications have been properly updated.
If the results of this review show that proper updating of drawings is not generally occurring, further changes in the licensee's drawing controls will be made.
The results of this review will be made available to the inspec-
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tor.
This commitment acceptably addresses the two deficiencies identified above.
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Third, a drawing verification program to establish accurate piping, elementary, logic, and wiring diagrams has commenced.
This program will begin.with'a walkdown of mechanical drawings inside containment during the March-April 1982 outage, to be followed b'y walkdown's of mechanical drawings 'outside con-tainment. All valves and pipes will receive unique identifi-ers.
The method to be, used for electrical ' drawing verification has not yet been developed by the licensee, but it is expected'
t a requiro more time to complete-than the mechanical drawing verification.
Ten to 20 contractor personnel will be engaged in this program.
The inspector stated that the above commitments provided an acceptable outline of the program of corrective action for the discrepancies identified (01 50-206/81-42-01).
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
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Follow-up on Inspector Identified Items a.
OI 50-206/81-42-02:
Possible Waste Gas System Leakage (Closed)
The inspector reviewed the licensee's Memorandum for File dated January 29,.1982, which summarized the pressure decay test of all three' waste, gas tanks performed by the licensee.
The inspector stated -that the. licensee's test and corrective
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action appeared acceptable. -This item is closed.
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01 50-206/81-42-05:
Seismic Supports _for Needwater Recirculation Valves (0 pen).
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The inspector requested that the licensee complete their evaluation of these= valves and the associated lines prior to resuming power operation. A licensee ~ representative agreed to attempt to complete the evaluation by that~ time.
This item
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remains open pending review of the licensee's analysis.
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01 50-206/81-37-01:
Control Measures for Safety Injection Hydraulic Valve Actuator Control Valve D (Closed)7 The inspector vtcified that Control Valve D on each safety injection hyde:ulically actuated valve had been added to the
" Safety Injection System Safety-Related Valve Alignment," S01-12.3-6.
This item is closed.
No items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.
4.
Follow-up on Licensee Event Reports (LERs)
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LER 81-022 (Closed)
The inspector verified that the licensee's preventive main-tenance program had been modified to require replacement of hydraulic snubber reservoir seal gaskets every five years.
This item is closed.
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5.
Independent Inspection
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a.
Steam Generator Tube Rupture Procedure In response to the Ginna steam generator tube rupture event, the San Onofre Unit 1 Loss of Coolant / Steam Generator Tube Failure Emergency Procedure (Operating Procedure 501-1.2-1) was reviewed.
In view of the preliminary information available concerning the Ginna transient, the procedure was compared with the generic Westinghouse procedure.
Discussions of the interpretation of the licensee's and the generic procedure were held with the Unit 1 Superintendent, a simulator instructor, other licensed operators, and with a former MRC operator
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licensing examiner.
The inspector' concluded from these discussions that the station procedure was adequate pending a more complete review. Two potential technical c:ncerns with the procedure were identified, however.
These involved failure to address the possibility of steam void formation in the reactor vessel head area, and a statement relating plant cooldown to 10 CFR 20 radiological limits.
This item remains open pending further NRC and vendor analysis and evaluation of the Ginna event (0I 50-206/82-06-02),
b.
Mixed Bed Demineralizer Operation The inspector reviewed the Final Safety As alysis Report (FSAR)
for the facility and determined that the ixed bed deminerali-zers used to maintain reactor coolant puilty were designed to reduce ionic isotope concentration by a minimum factor of 10 with a maximum pressure drop of 35 psi.
This capability is sufficient to maintain acceptable reactor coolant purity for one core cycle with one percent defective fuel rods, and to assist in maintaining personnel exposure as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).
The above values were incorporated in the licensee's procedure 501-4-11 " Mixed-Bed Demineralizer System."
Precaution and Limitation 4.2.3 of this procedure states that the demineralizer in service should be backflushed whenever the differential pressure across the demineralizer c pproaches or reaches 35 psig.
The inspector observed on February 10, 1982, that there was a 46-47 psig differential pressure across the inservice (north) demineralizer, as indicated by the upstream and downstream pressure gauges, PI 1107A and 1107B.
Several Senior Reactor Operators were interviewed and indicated that for several years the mixed bed demineralizers have.been operated at up to 85 psi differential pressure (dp) with no apparent negative results.
Chemistry supervisors stated that i
the minimum decontamination factor (DF) of 10 had generally not been attained in-the past.
In response to these findings, the inspector requested the licensee to determine whether the high dp or low DF conditions indicated reduced demineralizer capability to meet design or ALARA criteria.
The inspector discuss'.d with the Unit 1 Superintendent the reason for the apparent prolonged disregard for the procedural limit on dp across the demineralizer. The Superintendent explained that the procedure in question was used for startup, shutdown and maintenance operations on the system, but was not considered to apply during periods when the demineralizer status was not being changed.
Thus, it did not appear that there was a procedure governing steady state operation of the system.
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This item is unresolved pending a review of the licensee's safety analysis of the effect of high dp, low DF conditions in the' mixed bed demineralizer system (0I 50-706/82-06-03).
6.
Monthly Surveillance Observations The inspector witnessed portions of the following surveillances:
a.
Functional Test of the Safety Injection System-(SPE-516),
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Sequencer Functional Test (S01-12.3-7),
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EFCOMATIC Valve Exercise (501-12.3-25),
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Reactor Coolant System Subcooling and Pressurizer Level Channel Checks, and e.
No. 2 Diesel Generator MonU y Load Test (501-12.3-10).
The inspector verified that the procedures used were consistent with applicable Limiting Conditions for Operation, that test instrumentation used had been calibrated, and that test results were acceptable. The systems tested were properly removed from and returned to service.
Pretest b'riefings.of test personnel were held
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as appropriate.: Test personnel identified :. test ~ discrepancies, and the inspector verified that.these discrepancies had not invalidated the tests.
At the Exit Interview, the inspector requested the licensee to consider more formal specification of: acceptance criteria for channel checks, to whit.h a license ~e representative r
agreed.
No items of noncompliance or deviations 'were ' identified.
7.
Monthly Maintenance Observations The inspector observed the troubleshooting and replacement of a defective pressure switch for the south saltwater pump, and routine packing replacement for the electric auxiliary feedwater pump.
These activities did not violate' Limiting Conditions for Operation, required tagouts were obtained prior to initiating the work, and the equipment was tested satisfactorily prior to returning to service.
During a tour of the facility, the inspector noted that the instruments used to measure feedwater flow for the secondary system calorimetric determination did not have a current calibration..The calibration stickers indicated that the instruments were due for calibration in Cecember 1981.
The inspector determined that no calibration procedure existed for these instruments, nor were there any calibration records for December 1981.
There was a record, however, which indicated that a calibration had been performed on one of the instruments at that time. At the Exit Interview, a licensee representative
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stated that a calibration of these indicators'had been performed on February 24, 1982, and that these measurements indicated that the instruments were still in calibration.
Further, the licensee representative stated that a calibration procedure for these instruments would be developed to reduce the likelihood that periodic calibration could be overlooked The inspector stated that this was acceptable. This item is closed.
Finally, the inspector noted that the auxiliary control panel had numerous deficiencies identified with maintenance requests.
These deficiencies involved several instruments that did not remain calibrated over the calibration interval, including instruments indicating: cold leg temperatures, steam'generatue levels, pres-surizer level, and log power indicators. At the Exit Interview, the inspector expressed concern that with these deficiencies, the operability of the auxiliary control panel was questionable.
The panel is required by the Fire Protection Program Plan to be available to assist in shutting down the facility from power to hot shutdown.
A licensee representative stated that the licensee would attempt to repair or replace these indicators prior to the completion of the outage which began at the close of this inspection period. This item remains opea (0! 50-206/82-06-04).
8.
Unresolved Items Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or deviations. An unresolved item dis-closed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 5.
9.
Exit Interview The inspector met with the licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on February 26, 1982, to summarize the scope and findings of this inspection.
The findings and licensee commitments concerning drawings received particular emphasis (Paragraph 2).
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