IR 05000029/1981016

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IE Insp Rept 50-029/81-16 on 810818-21 & 0908-1005. Noncompliance Noted:Failure to Verify That Penetrations Closed by Manual Containment Isolation Valves Were Closed. Two Pages Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790)
ML20033A384
Person / Time
Site: Yankee Rowe
Issue date: 10/23/1981
From: Foley T, Gallo R
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML20033A368 List:
References
TASK-2.B.1, TASK-2.B.4, TASK-2.E.1.2, TASK-2.E.4.2, TASK-2.F.1, TASK-3.A.1.2, TASK-3.D.3.4, TASK-TM 50-029-81-16, 50-29-81-16, NUDOCS 8111250285
Download: ML20033A384 (17)


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w U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMISSION 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT Region I Report No. 50-29/81-16 Docket No.

50-29 License No.

DPR - 3 Priority Category C

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Licensee: Yankee At'omic Electric Company 1671 Worcester Roa'd

"THIS DOCUMENT IS NOT TO BE REPRODUCED mitivu t we.QnG AFFROVAL OF REGION 'T'

Framingham, Massachusetts 01701 Facility Name: Yankee Nuclear Power Station (Yankee Rowe)

Inspection at: Rowe, Massachusetts Inspection Conducted: August 18-21 and September 8-October 5, 1981 Inspectors: 01 Fort io /2<3/s /

T. Foley, Senior Resident Inspector date signed date signed date signed Approved by:

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R. Gallo, Chief, F PS No. l A date'sigrfed Div. of Residert and Project Insp.

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Inspection Sunnary:

l Inspection on August 18-21 and September 8-October 5,1981(Report No.

l 50-29/81-16)

l Areas Inspected: Routine onsite inspection by the resident inspector of plant operations including tours of the facility; log and record reviews;

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operational safety verification; review of maintenance activities; review of TMI Action Plan items; review of Licensee Event Reports; followup of operational events; surveillance testing and observation of physical security.

The inspection involved 98 inspector hours by the resident NRC inspector.

Results: No items of noncompliance were identified in seven areas; one apparent item of noncompliance identified in'one area, paragraph 5.

i THE INFORMATION ON THIS PAGE IS DEEMED TO BE APPROPRIATE S-F1 -81 -118 FOR PUBLIC DISC'.0SURE PURSUANT T010 CFR 2.790 CopygofgCopies

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2 Pages (2.790

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THE REPORT DETAILS CONTAIN 10 CER 2.790 IMORMATION 8111250205 811023%

(pages 17 & 18 onM PDR ADOCK 05000029-G PDR

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f DETAILS

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Persons Contacted 2 -

H. Autio, Plant Superintendent W. Billings, Chemistry Supervisor E. Chatfield, Training Supervisor T. Danek, Senior Advisor - Operations

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L. French, Technical Assistant T. Henderson, Plant Reactor Engineer L. Laffond, Technical Assistant W. McGee, Manager of Public Information F. McWilliams, Engineering Assistant-R. Mitchell, Technical Assistant

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L. Reed, Operational Quality Assurance Coordinator.

N. St. Laurent, Assistant Plant Superintendent R. Sedgwick, Security Supervisor J. Staub, Technical Assistant to. Plant Superintendent

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J. Trejo, Health Physicist Supervisor D. Vassar, Operations Supervisor

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The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees during the inspection, including members of the Operations, Health Physics, Instrument and Control Maintenance, Reactor Engineering, Security and General Office Staffs'.

2.

Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Items

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a.

(closed)

InspectorFollowItem(29/79-04-02) The inspector-4 -

reviewed OP-4203 Monthly Valve check revision no.17 and determined that the licensee has revised the valve list to incorporate the aaplicable containment manual isolation valves into the procedure.

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T11s item'is closed.

theVaporContainer(VC)pliance(29/81-06-01)

(closed)

Item of Noncom During a tour of b.

the inspector observed that the Het Spot of concern was blanketed with lead and the-dose rate was reduced to acceptable. limits. Additionally, the 'inspectorfobserved that Health Physics Technicians had performed additional surveys, and reduced the dose rates of several other Hot Spots within _the VC area.

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Discussions with Health Physics Technicians indicate that the technicians were briefed on this event and instructed to provide shielding or restrict access to similar areas. This is consistent with the licensee's response FYR 81-121 to the NRC dated August 7, 1981 and provides adequate corrective action.

This item is closed i

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3.

Shift Logs and Operating Records

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a.

The inspector reviewed the following plant procedures to determine the licensee estabiished administrative requirements in this area in preparation for review of various logs and records.

AP-0001, Plant Procedures and Instructions, Revision 8

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AP-2002, Operations Department Personnel Shift: Relief, Revision

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AP-2009, Control Room Area Limits for Control Room Operators

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AP-2010, Control Room Access During Accidents and Operations

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Transients, Original AP-0017, Switching and Tagging of Plant Equiprent, Revision 6

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-- AP-0318, Bypass of Safety Function and Jumper Control Log, Revision 8 AP-2007,' Maintenance of Operations Department Logs, Revision 7

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AP-0216. Housekeeping and Cleanliness Control, Revision 2

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AP-0042, Housekeeping for Maintenance and Modificaticns, Revision

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Rules Governing In-Plant Tagging Procedures Local Control Rules,

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Revision 3 The above procedures, Technical Specifications, ANSI N18.7-1972

" Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants" and 10 CFR 50.59 were used by the inspector to determine the acceptability of the logs and records reviewed.

b.

Shift logs and operating recordt were reviewed to verify that:

--- Control Room-logs and shift surveillance sheets are properly completed and that selected Technical Specification limits were met.

Control Rocm log entries involving abnormal conditions provide

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sufficient detail to communicate equipment status, lockout status, correction, and restoration.

Log book reviews are being conducted by the r' arf.

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Operating and Special Orders do not conflict with Technical

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Specification requirements.

Jumper (Bypass) log does not contain bypassing discrepancies

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with Technical Specification requirements and that jumpers are properly approved and_ installed.

c.

The inspector reviewed, on a san.pling basis, the following logs and records during the inspection period.

Switching and Tagging tog

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Maintenance Request Log

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-- Refueling Coordinators Log Bypass of Safety Function and Jumper Control Log

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Control Room Prints

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Operating Log

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Rowe Station tog Sheets

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Primary A.O.-

Log Sheets

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Shift Relief Checklist

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. Primary Chemistry Log Secondary Chemistry Log

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Radioactive Gaseous Release Permits

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No inadequacies were identified except as noted below.

On September 8,.1981, the inspector reviewed the Control Room " con-trolled" drawings of the plant structures and systems to verify that the recent 31 ant modifications were incorporated into the controlled

copies of tie drawings, that the control room maintained the latest j

revision, that the prints were up to date and accurately reflected l

the plant configuration and system status.

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The inspector interviewed Control. Room operators and determined that neither the operators or the inspector could readily determine

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whether the drawings were accurate, up to date, or what revisions were supposed to be incorporated into the drawings.

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.The-licensee's method of controlling these drawings was to staple =

a revision nottce with a brief description of the change to the controlled drawing and stamp the drawing " REVISION.IN PROGRESS",

until such time that'a new official drawing was drafted and approved -

by the corporate office. Several revision notices were removed-from drawings. Other drawings had several revision notices with insuffi-cient detail in the brief description to determine if the drawing accurately reflected system status.

The inspector reviewed drawings; 9699-FM-83A Flow Diagram, Low Pressure Safety Injection High Pressure Safety Injection and Nitrogen'

Revision 16; 9699-FM-8A Flow Diagram, Charging and Bleed and Chemical Shutdown System, and 9699-FM-60A Flow Diagram Primary Pump Sealing-System. These-drawings, were marked up-in pencil and ink showing'

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some changes-in the system status.

Some of these changes were defaced and some parts of the official drawing were also defaced. No changes

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indicated any approval or authority to make the change.

Some drawings had revision in progress stamped on the drawing while in another

" controlled" set of drawings the same drawing had "No revision in progress" written on it.

The inspector discussed the status and significance of Control Room drawings with the Assistant Plant Superintendent on September 8, 1981. The licensee's representative took immediate and decisive measures to correct the method by which the ' drawings were being-controlled.

The inspector reviewed the Control Room drawings on September 22, 1981 and detennined that the method of controlling the drawings appeared acceptable. The drawings appeared to accurately reflect the latest modification to each system and had a verification signa-ture and reference accompanying each hand drawn change.

The inspector was also informed that the Corporate Office has con-tracted an Architect / Engineering firm to update the plant's drawings.

Pending revision to procedure AP 0225. " Plant Drawings", this matter is considered unresolved.

(29/81-16-01)

4.

Plant Tour The inspector conducted a tour of accessible areas of the plant in-cluding the Primary Auxiliary Building, Turbine Building, Safety Injection Building, Vapor Container, Switchgear Room, Diesel Rooms, Control Room, Spent Fuel Building, and HP Control Point Areas.

Details and findings are noted below;

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a.

Monitoring Instrumentation and Annunciators On several occasions during the inspection, control board annunciators were checked for abnormal alarms. The following monitoring instrumenta--

tion was checked to verify operability and where applicable, values indicated were verified to be in accordance with Technical Specification requirements:

Pressurizer pressure, level and temperature

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Charging flow path

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RCS temperature, pressure and flow

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SI tank level and temperature

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PWST, DWST and BAMT levels

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-- Vapor container drain tank level Primary vent stack radiation monitors

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Containment air particulate radiation monitor

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Nuclear instrumentation

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No abnormal annunciators were energized. One inadequacy was identified as noted below:

The inspector noted that the Reactor Coolant Loop Flow meter indicated 10.8 E+6 pounds per hour for loops 1, 3 and 4, and that loop 2 flow meter indicated 9.4 E+6 pounds per hour. Technical Specification T/S 3.2.4. (c) only addresses total core flow for DNB parameters which requires 38.3 E+6 pounds per hour total flow.

The inspector discussed the loop flows with the Reactor Engineering Department Supervisor who stated that the different flow observed in loop 2 is the result of the recent Reactor Coolant Pump replace-ment. The overhauled No. 2 Reactor Coolant was installed during the May - July 1981 refueling outage. The licensee's representa-tive stated that the pump dimensional characteristics are within tolerance and the core total flow meets the Technical Specification limit.

The inspector stated that although the total flow meets the T/S limit, loop flows can effect core performance parameters such as flux tilt and power peaking factors.

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The licensee's representative acknowledged the inspector's comments and stated that he would discuss the matter with corporate office personnel.

The licensee's reptiasentative informed the inspector that the

. licensee had been aware of the different flows and had been plotting pump trends on a daily basis;. Main Coolant Pump. current, Bearing Tem 3eratures, loop flow, S/G differential pressure are plotted for eac1 loop.

Prior to the completion of the inspection period, the licensee rovided the inspector with two memorandums dated July 30, 1981 p(NED 81-516) concerning the " impact on Yankee Rowe Plant Safety Analysis of Measured Core Flowrate Reduction Attributable to No.2 MCP Performance Degradation", and (NED 81-611) dated September 15,1981 concerning the " Affect of Reduced Loop 2 Flowrate on Power Distribution for Yankee Rowe Core XV".

These memorandums concluded that each fuel assembly flow rate in the north quadrant was conservatively reduced by 15% which resulted in a core flux tilt of approximately 0.5% lower in the affected quadrant, and that an 8% margin to the design flowrate still exists. The memorandum

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states that no adverse impact is expected due to the reduction in total vessel flow and that the Yankee Engineering group will continue to evaluate the situation. The inspector had no further ques.ti.ons in this area at this time.

b.

Radiological Controls Radiation controls established by the licensee, including posting of radiation areas, radiological surveys, condition of step-off pads, and disposal of protective clothing were observed for conformance with the requirements of 10 CFR 20 and OP-8100, " Establishing and Posting Controlled Areas," and OP-8101, " Plant Radiological Surveys."

No inadequacies were identified.

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Plant Housekeeping Plant housekppeing conditions, including general cleanliness and storage of materials to prevent fire hazards were observed in t.il areas toured.

Hou.:ekeeping and cleanliness were acceptable.

No inadequacies were identified.

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d.

Fluid Leaks and Piping Vibrations.

Systems and equipment in_all areas toured were observed for'the existence of fluid leaks and abnormal piping vibration.

No inadequacies were identified.

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Pipe Hangers / Seismic Restraints

Pipe hangers and restraints installed on previous piping systems through the plant were observed for proper installation and tension.

No inadequacies were identified.

f.

Control Room Manning / Shift Turnover i

Control Room manning was reviewed for conformance with the requirements-

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of 10 CFR 50.54 (k) and Technical Specifications. The inspector

verified, several times-during the inspection, that appropriate licensed operators were on shift. Manning requirements were met at all times. Several shift turnovers were observed during the course of the inspection. All were'noted to be thorough and orderly.

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l No inadequacies were identified.

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Surveillance Testing l

The inspector observed portions of the following surveillance tests to verify that testing was performed in accordance with technically adequate procedures, that results were in conformance with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements, that the results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test,

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and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly i

reviewed and resolved by management personnel. The following surveillances were reviewed by the inspector:

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OP-4217 Charging System Operability Test

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OP-4202 Control Rod Operability Check i

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i OP-4238 Test of the Control Room Ventilation Emergency Shutdown

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OP-4203 Monthly Valve Check

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OP-4654 Calibration of the Non-Return Valve Automatic Control System

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OP-4630 Accumulator Time Delay Actuation Verification

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OP-4637 Containment Isolation Valve Operability Check

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-9 OP-4702. Vapor Container Type B&C Penetration Test'

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OP-4504 Weekly Check of the Diesel Generator System

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OP-4216 ' Testing of the Post Accident Hydrogen Venting System

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The inspector noted that OP-4203 Monthly Valve Check, is performed to-satisfy theLTechnical Specification 4.6.1.1 that ensures _ Primary Con-tainment' integrity will be maintained. On September 23,1981, the in-spector compared the valves listed in OP-4203:to the containment Iso.

. lation Valve list in the Technical Specifications and determined that five valves; MS-V-627, MS-V-628, MS-Y-629, MS-V-630 and AS-V-720 were not listed in OP-4203. The. inspector and licensee representatives -

checked the position of the above l'isted valves and found one valve, AS-V-720 was in the open position, however, two valves in series up-stream of valve AS-V-720 were verified-to be closed and the licensee-immediately closed AS-V-720. The other valves listed were closed, Further investigation revealed that the subject valves had.recently become Containment Isolation Valves as a result of the Main Steam Isolation Valve Automatic Closure Modification performed during the last refueling May-July,1961. The valves were incorporated into the-Technical Specifications, however, were not vicorporated into the licensee's procedure OP-4203 and as a-result have not been verified closed as required by Technical Specification 4.6.1.1(a)l.

The failure to verify these valves closed at least once per 31 days while in modes 1 thru 4 to demonstrate Primary Containment Integrity.

i.s' contrary to Technical Specification 4.6.1.1 and is an item of noncompliance.

(50-29/81-11-02)

The inspector and licensee completed a review of the Containment. Iso-lation Valve list to ensure that all Containment Isolation Valves were being checked as required by the Technical Specifications. No futher discrepancies were identified.

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On September 23, 1981, the licensee locked closed the aforementioned valves and on September 25,1981, issued an advance change notice to incorporate these valves into the OP-4203 procedure. Corrective' action for this item has been verified and no response to this item is required.

6.

Operational Safety Verification A detailed review of the Containment Isolation System was conducted to verify that the system was properly aligned and fully operational in the standby mode. This review was performed utilizing drawings M-8 VC Penetrations, OP-4203 Monthly Valve Check, OP-2652 Preparation of

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the Emergency Core Cooling System for Normal Operation and OP-4702 Vapor Container Type B&C Penetration Test.

Review of the above system include the following:

verification that each accessible valve in the flow path was in the

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correct position by either visual observation of the valve or remote position indication.

verification that power supplies and breakers were properly aligned

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for components that are required to actuate upon receipt of a safety injection signal.

visual inspection of major components for leakage, proper

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lubrication, cooling water supply, general condition and other factors that might prevent fulfillment of their functional requirements.

-- verification by observation that the instrumentation essential for system actuation and performance was operational.

Inadequacies i.dentified are noted in paragraph 5 of this report.

7.

Onsite Licensee Event Followup For those LER's selected for the onsite followup, the inspector verified that details of the events were clearly reported including the accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action. The inspector also detennined whether further infomation was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were identified, and that reporting requirements for Technical Specifications and Regulatory Guide 1.16 had been met, that appropriate corrective action had been taken, that the event was reviewed by the licensee as required, and that continued operation of the facility was conducted within Technical Specification limits. The review included discussions with licensee p(ersonnel, review of PORC meeting minutes, Plant Information Reports in-house reports), and applicable logs. The following LER's were reviewed onsite.

81-18 Failure of Vapor Container Isolation Trip Valve VD-TV-202

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to Seat 81-19 PR-S0V-90 Removed From Service

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81-20 SI Accumulator Time Delay Releys 1&2 Setpoint Drift

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81-21 No. 3 Non-Return Valve Closure - Not Issued

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81-22 Primary Vent Stack Noble Gas Monitor Failure

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1 81-23 Failure to Perfom Radioactive Source Inventory and Leak

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Testing At Required Frequency 81-24 Failure of EBF-MOV-557 to Operate Electrically

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-- 81-25 Primary Vent Stack Menitor Failure During the review of LER-81-23 the inspector noted that the licensee failed to meet the technical specification 4.7.6.2 frequency requirement for perfoming a surveillance on the sealed sources. This constitutes a licensee identified item of noncompliance. The inspector reviewed the licensee procedures OP-4820 Radioactive Source _ Inventory and Leak Test, AP-0041 Plant Surveillance Schedule, and the licensee's list of sealed sources. The licensee has incorporated an additional departmental surveillance schedule which is redundant to the AP-0041 Plant Surveillance Schedule. Corrective action i_n addition to that reported in the LER 81-23 has been verified.

i The inspector also noted that LER's 81-22 and 81-25 appear to be related.

Investigation revealed that both LER's resulted from moisture accumulation in the air dryer drain line associated with the Primary Vent Stack Radiation Monitor. The inspector interviewed personnel responsible for the maintenance of these units, and detemined that the licensee has installed a new more efficient dryer which is separating more water than the capacity of the old drain line. The corrective action for this problem will be to modify the air dryer drain line.

This modification is currently in progress.

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The inspector had no further concerns in this area.

8.

Review of TMI Action Plan ~ Items

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The inspector interviewed licensee personnel, reviewed NUREG 0737, NUREG 0660, licensee and NRC documents and witnessed installation of those modifications as appitcable,-in order to determine the status of those TMI Action Items required to be complete by October 1981 or before this date.

The following items were reviewed:

Action Item No.

Subject

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II. B. 1.

Reactor Coolant System Vents The inspector has witnessed the installation and testing of the Reactor Coolant System Head Vent. The system is fully operational, however, has been tagged out of service until such time that the licensee receives h

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512 written approval for use from the NRC and the licensee is awaiting

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the arrival of new contactors for the automatically controlled valves.

The system appears to be in good agreement with the NUREG 0737 guidance, however procedures for use of the system have not yet been established.

II.B.4.

Training For Mitigating' Core Damage The licensee has completed the formal classroom series of lectures in mitigating core' damage. The, inspector attended a few of these lectures and interviewed attendees to determine what topics were covered by the training. The training covered all the topics provided by the NUREG 0737 guidance and all shift technical advisors, operating personnel, managers and technical supervisors received the training. The inspector noted that technicians in the HP and I&C

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departments had not received training comensurate with their

responsibilities. The licensee is presently determining to what extent should training be given to these technicians.

i This item will be considered complete when the applicable technicians receive the appropriate training.

II.E.1.2.

Auxiliary Feedwater System Initiation & Flow The licensee has taken excep(AFW) and the NRC is reviewing the licensee's tion to automatically initiating the Auxiliary Feedwater System position as stated in an NRC Order to Yankee Atomic Electric Company

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dated July 10, 1981.

The licensee has upgraded the AFW system with two additional motor

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. driven auxiliary feed pumps and associated piping. This is documented in NRC inspection ~ report 50-29/81-13, paragraph 9.b.

The inspector reviewed Yankee Atomic Electric Company letter FYR 81-50 dated March 31,1981 to the NRC which details the equipment qualifications for the AFW flow indication. The inferination presented in the letter indicates that the flow indicators are " safety grade".

The information 3 resented in the letter is accurate and appears to be in agreement with the guidance of NUREG 0737.

II.E.4.2.

Containment Isolation Decendability

(5) Containment Pressure Setcoint The inspector reviewed Yankee Atomic Electric Ccmpany FYR 81-50 dated March 31, 1981 to the NRC which states Yankee's position in regard to lowering the containment CIS Trip Setpoint to less that 5 psig, the current setpoint for Yankee.

The NRC licensing branch has not determined the acceptability of this position as yet. The licensee-wy-

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13-states that a technical specification lower than 5 psig would be unduly restrictive considering that the nomal containment )ressure is maintained at.75 to 3.0.psig to accomodate the continuous lea ( monitoring system.

This will be reviewed further after a determination has been made on the acceptability of the YAEC position.

II.F.1.

~ Accident Monitoring This topic has been discussed in inspection report 50-29/80-16 paragraph 8, however in addition the inspector has witnessed the installation of two independent - high range (10 E+7 rads) radiation monitors in the Vapor Container with indication in the Control Room and a new system of area radiation monitors at strategic locations throughout the

' facility. The inspector will continue to follow the licensee's.

progress in regard to implementing the use of silver zeolite as an iodine collecting media as discussed in inspection report 50-29/80-16.

III.A.l.2.

Upgrade Emergency Support Facilities The inspector reviewed YAEC letter FYR 81-88 dated June 12,1981 to the NRC. This letter states the conditions regarding the upgrade of the Technical Support Center (TSC). The inspector has witnessed the operation of the TSC and determined that the conditions stated in the aforementioned letter are accurate.

The inspector has examined the TSC and reviewed the requirements as stated in NUREG 0578 2.2.2.b. and determined that the TSC is in good agreement with the NUREG.

The inspector also reviewed NRC Generic letter 81-10 and the YAEC.

response FYR 81-88. The licensee takes exception to installing a filtration system in the' Emergency Operation Facility (EOF). This is being reviewed by NRC licensing branch. This will be updated during a subsequent inspection.

III.D.3.4 Control Room Habitability The inspector reviewed the guidance in NUREG 0660, 0737 and the-licensee's submittal YAEC FYR 81-127 dated August 31, 1981. The licensee acknowledges that a filtration system is required to be installed in the Control Room in order to meet General Design Criteria 19 however, takes exception to the NRC defined source term, and based on the assumptions documented in the above referenced letter, plan to install a control room ventilation system which is presently under NRC review. The inspector will review this item during a future inspection.

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9.

Inspector Followup of Events The inspector responded to events that occurred during the inspection to verify continued safe operation of the reactor in accordance with the Technical Specifications and Regulatory requirements. The following items, as applicable, were considered during the inspector's review of operational events:

observations of plant parameters and systems important to

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safety to confirm operation within normal operational limits;

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description of event including cause, systems involved, safety

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significance, facility status and status of engineered safety features equipment; details relating to personnel injury, release of radioactive

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material and exposure to radioactive material;

-- verification of correct operation of auto-atic equipment; verifiestion of proper manual actions by plant personnel;

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verification of adherence to plant procedures;

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verification of conformance to Technical Specification LCO

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requirements; determination that root causal factors were identified and that

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corrective actions, taken or planned, were appropriate to correct the cause;

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verification that corrective action taken was appropriate to prevent recurrence; determination whether the event involved operation of the facility

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in a manner which constituted an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59 (a) (2), or in such a manner as to represent an unusual hazard to health and safety of the public and environment; determination whether the event involved continued operation of the

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facility in violation of Regulatory requirements or license conditions; and,

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evaluation of whether applicr51e reporting requirements were

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met.

' The operational events reviewed.during this inspection period are j

discussed below.

l (a) On August 20,1981 at 1:00 A.M. the reactor operators manually-

. scrammed the plant from ninety-eight percent power after a feed--

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water pump tripped due to low suction pressure. The low feedwater

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. suction pressure resulted from the failure of the number one

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heater drain pump. The heater drain pump stopped running after i

a bearing seized within'. the pump.

The inspector-reviewed this' event, by interviewing those operators at the controls at the time of the' event and by reviewing logs

and chart recordings of-the operating parameters at the time of the event. The inspector noted that all primary systems functioned as designed. Additionally the inspector witnessed the repairs i

associated with the heater drain pump. The facility resumed

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power operation at 7:00 P.M. on August 20, 1981. The inspector identified no inadequacies.

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(b) On September 12, 1981 during a thunderstorm,'the plant automatically i

scramed due to a Reactor Coolant Pump Overcurrent/ Undercurrent.

relay trip accompanied by a loss of one offsite power supply. The l

relay tripped due to large voltage' fluctuations on the grid. The event automatically deenergized three of. the Reactor Coolant Pumps,

<and the licensee deenergized the fourth pump and went on natural

  • circulation as required by procedure. All primary systems functioned as designed. There was no need to use the Auxiliary Feedwater

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i System. The inspector reviewed the conditions surrounding the event and identified no inadequacies,

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i (c) During the inspection period the inspector noted that the steam

i jet air _ ejector radiation monitor was indicating twenty thousand counts per minute. The inspector compared this reading with-l previous operating parameters and determined that this reading

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was about three times nomal. The inspector discussed this with l

the plant chemist and determined that a Steam Generator tube i

leak now exists in the number one Steam Generator. Further j

investigation revealed that the leak rate is approximately ten i

gallons per day, based on a Tritium analysis. The Technical

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Specification limit is one gallon per minute through all four

steam generators. The inspector noted that the plant chemist is

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l tracking the leak rate on a daily basis and that the operations

department has issued Special Orders for all operators to review the Steam Generator Tube Rupture emergency procedure. The

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}

inspector will continue to follow this as part of his routine-inspection activities.

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10. ~ Maintenance

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The inspector observed and/or reviewed station' maintenance activities

'of safety-related systems and components:to ascertain that these activities were conducted in accordance with approved procedures,

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industry codes, regulatory,, guides and technical-specifications.

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.The following items were considered.during this review:

limiting conditions for operation were met while-the component

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was removed from service; theactivitywasaccomplish$dusingapprovedproceduresiandwas:

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inspected,.as applicable; functional testing and/or calibrations were performed prior to

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returning-the components.to service;-

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. quality control records were maintained;

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. activities were accomplished by qualified personnel;

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raciological controlsLwere implemented;

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housekeepin~g controls were' implemented;

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-- fire prevention controls were implemented;

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l The following maintenance activities were observed and/or reviewed; repair of No. 3 charging pump;

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overhaul of No. 1 heater drain pump.

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i Ne inadequacies were identified.

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12.

Unresolved Items Unresolved'itsus 6re matters. about which more information is required in order to ascertain whether they;are acceptable items, items of noncompliance, or~ deviations. Unresolved items disclosed during the inspection are discussed in Paragraphs 3.C and 11.

13.

Management Meetings

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At-periodic. intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings

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were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope'and preliminary findings of the resident inspector.

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