IR 05000029/1981011
| ML20009G003 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Yankee Rowe |
| Issue date: | 07/15/1981 |
| From: | Foley T, Gallo R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20009F998 | List: |
| References | |
| 50-029-81-11, 50-29-81-11, NUDOCS 8108030228 | |
| Download: ML20009G003 (13) | |
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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY CO MISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT l
50-29/80-12-27 Region I 50-29/81-02-11 50-29/81-04-16 Report No.
50-29/81-11 50-29/81-05-21 50-29/81-05-02 Docket No.
50-29 50-29/81-05-27 Category C
License No. DPR - 3 Priority
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Licensee:
Yankee Atomic Electric Company 1671 Worcester Road Framingham, Massachusetts 01701 Facility Name:
Yankee Nuclear Power Station (Yankee Rowe)
Inspection at:
Rowe, Massachusetts Inspection Conducted:
June 1 - 30, 1981 Inspectors:
h YA y $ 8-
'7f(5'f9)
T.
Foley, Resident Inspector dat6 signed date signed date signed b
~7/IN 9i Approved by:
R. Gallo, Chief, RPS No. lA date signed Div. of Resident and Project Insp.
Inspection Sumary:
Inspection on June 1 - 30, 1981 (Report No. 50-29/81-11)
Areas Inspected:
Routine onsite inspection by the resident inspector of plant operations including tours of the facility; log and record reviews; operational safety verification; followup of selected IE Bulletins and Circulars; review of Licensee Event Reports; Followup of operational Events; surveillance testing and observation of Physical Security. The inspection involved 65 inspector hours by the resident NRC inspector.
Results: No items of noncompliance were identified in this inspection.
8108030228 810716 PDR ADOCK 05000029 G
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DETAILS 1.
Persons Contacted H. Autio,' Plant Superintendent W. Billings, Chemistry Supervisor i
T, Danek, Senior Advisor - Operations j
L. French, Technical Assistant T. Henderson, Plant Reactor Engineer L. Laffond, Technical Assistant W. McGee, Manager of Public Information F. McWilliams, Engineering Assistant R. Mitchell, Technical Assistant i
L. Reed, Operational quality Assurance Coordinator
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i N. St. Laurent, Assistant Plant Superintendent J. Staub, Technical Assistant to Plant Superintendent
J. Trejo, Health Physicist Supervisor D. Vassar, Operations Supervisor
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The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees during the inspection, including members of the Operations Health Physics, Instrument and Control
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Maintenance, Reactor Engineering, Security and General Office Staffs.
2.
Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Items i
a.
(closed) Inspector follow Item (29/79-10-02) The inspector observed
the volumetric testing results and repair of those welds that were identified to have code defects, as a result of the required examinations pursuant to IE Bulletin 79-13. The inspector noted that all welds on the feedwater lines inside of containment including all welds in the loop seal area were examined and repaired if necessary. This item is closed.
b.
(closed)UnresolvedItem(29/79-16-02) The licensee has instituted a new procedure OP-3341, Emergency Preparedness Exercise and Drills which requires that drill critique coments be evaluated and incorporated into future drills if deemed necessary. The inspector also witnessed i
the 1980 annual emettency drill and noted that notification by the
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licensee appeared adequate. This item is closed.
c.
(closed)InspectorFollowItem(29/79-16-03) The inspector reviewed the annual emergency drill critique minutes from the 1979 and 1980 annual emergency drills and noted that both critiques had been reviewed by the Plant Operations P.eview Comittee in a timely fashion.
The inspector noted that the corrective action required for each item listed on the critique had assigned responsibility and a scheduled completion date. This item is closed.
d.
(closed) Inspector Follow Item (29/80-10-03) The inspector reviewed Yankee Atomic Electric Company (YAEC) Memorandum from K. Willens to i
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Distribution dated November 18, 1980, concerning Metallurgical Report on Cooper Alloy Gate Valves Removed from Yankee Rowe Chemical Injection System, and YAEC Memorandum from K. Willens to D. Moody dated March 9, 1981, concerning the results of the metallurgical evaluation and recommendations to resolve the problem. The metallurgical report stated that the linear indications were caused by the casting process and/or tecniques used during manufacturing. The reports also emphasized that the cause was not attributed to the problems identified in IE Bulletin 79-17. This item is closed, e.
(closed)UnresolvedItem(29/80-14-02) The inspector reviewed a NRC memorandum from E. Blackwood to E. Brunner dated May 14,1981, containing the latest revision to 10 CFR 50.72 which proposed that the licensee be required to report only those uncontrolled or un-planned releases that exceed 25% of the Technical Specification instantaneous release limit or results in the evacuation of a building.
Regarding the resin spill in September 1980, the licensee did not exceed these limits. This item is closed, f.
(closed)InspectorFollowItem(29/80-16-02) The inspector reviewed OP-4718 Continuous Leakage Identification Revision 1.
This procedure formally incorporates the Quarterly Leak Rate procedure and together with AP-7009 System Leak Reduction Program appear to address the concerns of item III D.l.2. of NUREG 0660. This item is closed.
g.
(closed) Inspector Follow Item (29/80-20-02) The inspector reviewed OP-3000 Emergency Shutdown From Power Revision 16. The revised procedure appears to adequately address the concerns for an anticipated
Transient Without Scram (ATWS) event. This item is closed.
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h.
(closed) Inspector Follow Item (29/80-20-03) The inspector reviewed i
the licensee's formal response to IE Bulletin 80-24 FYR-81-7 dated January 5, 1981 and discussed the adequacy of the response with NRC Nuclear Reactor Regulati e personnel. NRC personnel determined that further action is required in order to provide sufficient assurance that the detection of water inside containment will be timely. The licensee has implemented the required additional action in regard to the above. T,his item is closed.
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(closed) Noncompliance (29/81-02-01) The inspector reviewed the licensee's resconse FYR 81-60 dated April 9, 1981 and noted that the corrective action taken was adequate.
Procedures requiring radio-logical controb are being reviewed for potential hazards and engi-neering or process controls are being instituted to preclude future events of this nature. This item is ' closed.
j.
(closed) Noncompliance (29/81-O'- 01 The inspector reviewed the licensee's response FYR 81-76 cated April 29, 1981. The inspector interviewed several members of the Health Physics department personnel and determined that the importance of frequency and
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adequacy of surveys was stressed in the Health Physics Training Program. This item is closed.
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(closed) Unresolved item (29/81-04-03) The licensee has submitted proposed change No. 139 Supplement No. 4 to the Yankee Rowe Technical Specifications. This change accurately reflects the operating staff organization. This item is closed.
1.
(closed) Noncompliance (29/81-04-04) The inspector reviewed the licensee's response FYR 81-76 dated April 29, 1981. The inspector noted that the immediate corrective action taken was accurate and effective and that the corrective action to avoid further violations was adequate and that this action had been implemented. This item is closed.
3.
Shift Logs and Operating Records a.
The inspector reviewed the following plant procedures to determine the licensee established administrative requirements in this area in preparation for review of various logs and records.
AP-0001, Plant Procedures and Instructions, Revision 8
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AP-2002, Operations Department Personnel Shift Relief, Revision
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AP-2009, Control Room Area Limits for Control Room Operators
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AP-2010, Control Room Access During Accidents and Operations
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Transients, Original AP-0017, Switching and Tagging of Plant Equipment, Revision 6
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AF-0016, Bypass of Safety Function and Jumper Control Log,
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Revision 8 AP-2007, Maintenance of Operations Department Logs, Revision 7
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AP-0216, Housekeeping and Cleanliness Control, Revision 2
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AP-0042, Housekeeping for Maintenance and Modifications, Revision
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l Rules Governing In-Plant Tagging Procedures Local Control Rules, l
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Revision 3 The above procedures, Technical Specifications, ANSI N18.7-1972
" Quality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants" and 10 CFR 50.59 were used by the inspector to determine the acceptability of the logs and records reviewed.
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b.
Shift logs and operating records were reviewed to verify that:
Control Room lcgs and shift surveillance sheets are properly
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completed and that selected Technical Specification limits were met.
Control Room log entries involving abnormal conditions provide
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sufficient detail to comunicate equipment status, lockout status, correction, and restoration.
Log book reviews are being conducted by the staff.
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Operating and Special Orders do not conflict with Technical
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Specification requirements.
Jumper (Bypass) log do,. not contain bypassing discrepancies
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with Technical Specification requirements and that jumpers are properly approved and installed.
c.
ine inspector reviewed, on a sampling basis, the following logs and records for the period June 1 to June 30, 1981.
Switching and Tagging Log
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Maintenance Request Log
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Bypass of Safety Function and Jumper Control Log
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Operating Log
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Rowe Station Log Sheets
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Pritrary A.O. Log Sheets
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Shift Relief Checklist
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Primary Chemistry Log
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Secondary Chemistry Log
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Radioactive Gaseous Release Permits
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l Radioactive Liquid Release Permits
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No inadequacies were identified.
4.
Plant Tour The inspector conducted a tour of accessible areas of the plant including the Primary Auxiliary Building, Turbine Building, Safety Injection Building, Vapor container, Switchgear Room, Diesel Rooms, Control Room, Spent Fuel l
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Building, and HP control Point Areas. Details and findings are noted below:
a.
Monitoring Instrumentation and Annunciators On several occasions during the inspection, control board annunciators were checked for abnormal alarms. The following monitoring instrumenia-tion was checked to verify operability and where applicable, values indicated were verified to be in accordance with Technical Specification requirements:
Pressurizer pressure, level and temperature
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Charging flow path
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RCS temperature
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SI tank level
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PWST and DWST levels
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Vapor Container Drain Tink level
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Primary Vent Stack radiation monitors
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Containment air particulate radiation monitor
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l No abnormal annunciators were energized. No inadequacies were identified.
b.
Radiological Controls Radiation controls established by the licensee, including posting of
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l radiation areas, radiological surveys, condition of step-off pads, and disposal of protective clothing were observed for conformance with the requirements of 10 CFR 20 and OP-8103, " Establishing and Posting Controlled Areas," and OP-8101, " Plant Radiological Surveys."
No inadequacies were identified.
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c.
Plant Housekeeping
Plant housekeeping conditions, including general cleanliness and storage
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of materials to prevent fire hazards were observed in all areas toured.
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Housekeeping and cleanliness were acceptable.
No inadeq acies were identified.
d.
Fluid Leaks and Piping Vibrations S> items and equipment in all areas toured were observed for the existence of fluid leaks and abnormal piping vibration.
f No inadequacies were identified.
e.
Pipe Hangers / Seismic Restraints
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Pipe hangers and restraints installed on previous piping systems through the plant were observed for proper installation and tension.
No inadequacies were identified.
f.
Control Room Manning / Shift Turnover Control Room manning was reviewed for conformance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.54 (k) and Technical Specifications.
The inspector verified, several times during the inspection, that appropriate licensed operators were on shift. Manning requirements were met at all times. Several shift turnovers were observed during the course of the inspection. All were noted to be thorough and orderly.
No inadequacies were identified.
5.
Surveillance Testing The inspector observed portions of the following surveillance tests to verify that testing was performed in accordance with technically adequate procedures, that results were in conformance with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements, that the results were reviewed by personnel other than the iridividual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by management personnel. The following surveillances were reviewed by the inspector:
OP-4215, Surveillance of Boron Injection Flow Path
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OP-7203, Eddy Current Examination and/or Repair of Steam Generator
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No. 2 OP-4217, Test of No. 2 Charging Pump for Surveillance Operability
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Check OP-4207, Surveillance of the Station Power System and Emergency
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Diesel Generators OP-4203, Monthly Valve Check
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No inadequacies were identified.
6.
IE Bulletin Followup For the IE Bulletins listed below, the inspector verified the following:
that the written response was within the tima period stated in the bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action connitments based on information presented in the bulletin and
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the licensee's response, that licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate onsite management representatives, that infonnation discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the licensee was as described in the written response. The following bulletins were reviewed:
IEB 77-08, Safeguards During an Emergency-Locking Systems.
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's response WYR-78-13 dated February 15, 1978. The response indicated that the emergency power supply has b en upgraded and that the security system complies with the applicable fire regulations and life safety codes. The inspector has noted on several occasions that the emergency power supply is routinely ~ tested andzthat additional redundant sources of. power are available to the system.
IEB 78-12, Atypical Weld Material In Reactor Pressure Vessel ',;alds
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's responses WYR-78-97 dated November 13, 1978 and WYR-79-23 dated February 28, 1979. The inspector determined that the licensee made an adequate search through archival records to provide the irformation requested by the bulletin and
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that the response adequately addressed the bulletin requirements.
IEB 78-14, Deterioration of BUNA-N Components in ASCO Solenoids.
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's historical records and determined that the licensee received and routed this bulletin. The inspector noted that no response was required to the bulletin.
IEB 79-02, Pipe Support Design Using Concrete Expansion Anchor Bolts.
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's response to IEB 79-02 dated March 20, 1979, July 20, 1979, August 13, 1979, October 31, 1979 and January 9, 1980. The inspector noted that this bulletin was addressed in inspection reports 50-29/79-06 and 50-29/79-10. The inspector also noted that the licensee has tested 100% of the Phillips Red Head and an estimated 85% of the other expansion anchor bolts in the plant. The design and construction of the Yankee Nuclear Power Station was completed before the NRC requirement for seismic design was established. The licensee has diverted the seismic rartion of the bulletin requirements to the Systematic Evaluation Program.
IEB 79-13, Cracking in Feedwater System Piping.
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This bulletin was addressed in inspection report 50-29/79-11.
Subsequently the inspector has reviewed the completed volumetric
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examination documents for the repaired / replaced welds and identified
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no inadequacies.
IEB 79-14, Seismic Analysis of As-Built Safety Related Piping Systems.
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This bulletin was reviewed in inspection report 50-29/79-11.
Subsequently the inspector has determined that the intent of the Earthquake Engineering Services (EES) procedure was to process the EES paper work only :nd that plant superintendent approval was not required.
IEB 79-17, Cracks in Stagnant Borated Water Lines.
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This bulletin was addressed in inspection report 50-29/79-11. The inspector subsequently observed the Low Pressure Safety Injection Piping end the Shutdown Cooling System piping and reviewed the results cf ultrasonic examination and repair of deficient welds.
The licensee identified no cracking caused by intergranular or trans-granular stress corrosion in the piping of concern.-
IEB 81-02, Failure of Gate Type Valves to Close Against Differential
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Pressure.
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The inspector reviewed the licensee's response FYR-81-77 dated May 8,1981 and observed the installed Power Operated Relief Valve.
The inspector identified no inadequacies.
IEB 81-03, Flow Blockage of Cooling Water to Safety System Components
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by Corbicula sp. and Mytilus sp.
The inspector reviewed the licensee's response FYR-81-78 dated May 26, 1981 and Leld discussions with environmental sampling personnel and determined that neither the asiatic clam or the mussel are of a concern in the Yankee Rowe environment. The inspector identified no inadequacies in this area.
7.
IE Circular Followup For the IE Circulars listed below, the inspector verified the circular e s received by the licensee management, that a review for applicability was performed, and that if the circular was applicable to the facility, appropriate corrective actions were taken or were scheduled to be taken.
The following e.irculars were reviewed:
IEC 78-19 Manual Override of Safety Systems Actuation Signals
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IEC 79-19 Loose Locking Devices on Ingersall-Rand Pumps
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IEC 81-01 Design Problems Involving Indicating Pushbutton Switches
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Manufactured by Honeywell Incorporated.
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The inspector identified no inadequacies.
8.
Operational Safety Verification A detailed review of the Chemical Shutdown System was corducted to verify that the system was properly aligned and fully operational in the standby mode. This review was performed utilizing system Flow Diagram 9699-FM-83A, OP-4203 Monthly Valve Check, and OP-2652 Preparation of the Emergency core tooling System for Normal Operation.
Review of the above system include the folleging:
verification that each accessible valve in the flow path was in the
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correct position by either visual observation of the valve or remote position indication.
verification that power supplies and breakers were properly aligned
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for components that are required to actuate upon receipt of a safety injection signal.
visual inspection of major components for leakage, proper lubrication,
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cooling water supply, general condition and other factors that might prevent fulfillment of their functional requirements.
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verification by observation that the instrumentation essential for
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system actuation and performance was operational.
The inspector identified no inadequacies.
9.
Onsite Licensee Event Followup For those LER's selected for the onsite followup, the inspector verified that details of the events were clearly reported including the accuracy of the description of cause and adequacy of corrective action. The inspector also determined whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were identified, and that reporting requirements for Technical Specifications and Regulatory Guide 1.16 had been met, that appropriate corrective action had been taken, that the event was reveiwed by the licensee as required, and that continued ope. ion of the facility was conducted within Technical Specification limits. The review included discussions with licensee personnel, review of PORC meeting minutes, Plant Information Reports (in-house reports),
and applicable logs. The following LER's were reviewed onsite.
80-23, Nitrogen Regulator (SI-PR-59) Outlet Pressure High
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81-02, Failure of the Cable Tray House Fire Detectors
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81-04, Number 3 Steam Generator Narrow Range Level Trip System
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Bistable Contact Failure 81-07, Manhole Number 3 CO2 System Out of Service
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81-08, Mechanical Damage of Fuel Cladding
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The inspector identified no inadequacies.
10.
Inspector Followup of Events The inspector responded to events that occurred during the inspection to verify continued safe operation of the reactor in accordance with the Technical Specifications and Regulatory requirements. The following items, as applicable, were considered during the inspector's review of operational events:
observations of plant parameters and systems important to safety
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to confirm operation within normal operational limits; description of event, including cause, systems involved, safety
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significance, facility status and status of engineered safety features equipment; details relating to personnel injury, release of radioactive
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material and exposure to radioactive material; verification of correct operation of automatic equipment;
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verification of proper manual actions by plant personnel;
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t verification of adherence to plant procedures;
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l verification of conformance to Technical Specification LCO
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requirements;
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determination that root causal factors were identified and that
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corrective actions, taken or planned, were appropriate to correct the cruse; verification tha* corrective action taken was appropriate to
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prevent recurrence; determination whether the event involved operation of the facility
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in a manner which constituted an unreviewed safety question as i
defined in 10 CFR 50.59 (a) (2), or in such a manner as to represent an unusual hazard to health and safety of the public and environment; determination whether the event involved continued operation of the
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facility in violation of Regulatory requirements or license conditions; and, evaluation of whether applicable reporting requirements were met.
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The operational event reviewed during this inspection period is discussed below.
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On May 2, 1981 _during a controlled shutdown, control rod number 17 became inoperable. This subject was addressed in inspection report 50-29/81-06 and reported as Licensee Event Report LER 50-29/81-05.
The licensee's investigation in regard to this event determined that the control rod follower was bent five tenths of an inch. The licensee's corrective action to prever.t re-occurence was to remove the additional control rods of the same vintage and same material (hafnium), and replace the rods with spare silver-indium-cadmium rods of a.later vintage.
Subsequently: the licensee visually inspected six additional silver indium cadmium control rods as part of the routine refueling inspection program, in accordance with OP-1700 Cycle XV Reactor Refueling and Component Inspection.
During this inspection the licensee identified additional control rods whose followers were bent as much as three tenths of an inch. The licensee decided to visually inspect all control rods to determine the extent of the problem. The results of this inspection indicated that a total of seven silver indium-cadmium control rod followers
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were bent as much as three tenths of an inch. The licensee has replaced all control rods that have apparent bends equal to or greater than three tenths of an inch with new silver-indium-cadmium control rods. The inspector discussed the credibility of the results of the procedure for
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visual inspection of the control rods with the Reactor Engineering Su' ervisor and the Assistant Plant Superintendent. The inspector noted p
that the minimum observable tolerance was two tenths of an inch due to (scatter), the water / atmosphere interface when viewing an object under-water through a transit mounted above the surface. The licensee's representative stated that a bow / bend of three tenths of an inch (three hundred mils), was definitely discernable however, distinguishing between three hundred mils and three hundred and fifty mils would be difficult. The inspector stated that; if a rod becomes inoperable at five hundred mils, and the minimum observsole tolerance is two hundred mils, and a fifty mil deviation is not discernable, then the licensee should provide additional assurance that the results of tecting the control rods for straightness are accurate.
This information was transmitted to the NRR Licensing Project Manager (LPM) and to the NRC Core Performance Branch who discussed this matter ~
with the licensee corporate office personnel to determine whether the licensee's corrective action is adequate. This item will be followed by the inspector.
(50-29/81-11-01)
11. Observations of Physical Security The inspector made observations, witnessed and/or verified during the regular and offshift hours that selected aspects of plant physical security were in accordance with regulatory requirements, the physical security plan and approved procedures.
a.
Physical Protection Security Organization inspector observations indicated that a full time member of
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the security organization with authority to direct physical security actions was present as required.
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manning of all shifts on various days was observed to be as
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required.
b.
Physical Barriers selected barriers in the protected area and vital area were
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observed and random monitoring of isolated zones was performed.
c.
Access Control Observations of the following items were made; identification, authorization and badging;
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access control searches, including the use of compensatory
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measures during periods when equipnent was inoperable; and,
escorting
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The inspector identified no inadequacies in this area 12. Management Meetings At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings
were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and preliminary findings of the resident inspector.
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