IR 05000029/1981002

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IE Insp Rept 50-029/81-02 on 810101-31.Noncompliance Noted: Failure to Use Process or Other Controls or Precautionary Procedures to Limit Concentrations of Radioactive Matls in Air in Primary Auxiliary Bldg
ML19352A825
Person / Time
Site: Yankee Rowe
Issue date: 03/17/1981
From: Foley T, Martin T
NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I)
To:
Shared Package
ML19352A820 List:
References
50-029-81-02, 50-29-81-2, NUDOCS 8106020187
Download: ML19352A825 (13)


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p U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 50-29/81-01-31 V

0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT 50-29/81-01-20

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Region I-

' Report No. 50-29/81-02 Docket No.

50-29 r

License No.

DPR-3 Priority Category C

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Licersee:

Yankee Atomic Electric Company

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1671 Worcester Road

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Framingham, Massachusetts 01701 Facility Name:

Yankee Nuclear Power Station (Yankee Rowe)

Inspection at:

Rowe, Massachusetts

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Inspection conducted:

January '.-31,1981

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Inspectors:

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317)Ql

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T. Foley, Resident Inspector date signed date signed

date signed

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I Approved by:

A f:o/t T. T. Martin, Chief, Reactor Projects date signed Section No. 3, RO&NS Branch

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Inspection Summary:

Inspection on January 1-31,19C1 (Report No. 50-29/81-02J Areas Inspected:

Routine :nsite inspection by the resident inspector of plant operations including tours of the facility; log and record reviews; review of operational r ents; operational safety verification; followup of selected IE Bulletins; :Clowup of selected IE Circulars and observation of Phy:;ical Security.

l The inspection involved 67 inspector hours by the resident NRC inspector.

Restits :

No items of noncompliance were ioentified in five areas; one ite... of noncoW11ance was identified in one area, failure to prepare and maintain pro-

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cedures pursuant to 10 CFR'20, Paraqraph 9.(1).

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8106020 N Region I Form 12

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(Rev. April 77)

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DETAILS-1.

-Persons Contacted H. Autio Plant Superintendent W. Billings, Chemistry Supervisor T. Danek, Senior Advisor Operations B. Darcy, Instrument and Control Foreman L. French, Technical Assistant

.T. Henderson, Reactor Engineer K.:Jurentkuff, ~ Assistant Operations Supervisor L. Laffond, Assistant Training Coordinator P. Laird, Maintenance Manager W. Loomis, Instrument and Control Supervisor N. St. Laurent, Assistant Plant Superintendent

R.-Randall, Engineering Assistant J. Staub, Technical Assistant to Plant Superintendent J. Trejo, Plant Health Physicist The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees during the inspection, including members of the Operations, Health Physics, Instrument and Control

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Maintenance, Reactor Engineering, Security and General Office staffs.

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Status of Previous Inspection Findings (Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-29/80-01-01): The inspector has on numerous occasions toured the control room and examined the meteorological tower instrumentation.

The inspector noted that all meteorological para-

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meters were being recorded satisfactorily, including those oeriods when the

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outside ambient temperatures were below zero degrees farenheit.

The inspector also observed electrical current flow thrcugh the anemometer heaters as

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indicated on ameters located in the building below the meteorological tower.

This item is closed.

.(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-29/80-16-01)-

The inspector reviewed OP 4610 "PS-CI-230 and PS-CI-231 Calibration and Containment Isolation System Operability Test", and OP-6000.121, " Installation and Testing of the CIS Switch Replacement (Electrical Reset)" and fou1d that the procedures have been reviewed by the cognizant department supervisor.

This item is closed.

(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-29/80-18-02): The licensee has submitted Licensee Event Reports 50-29/80-17/03X, Supplemental Number 2 Steam Generator Narrow Range Trip Setpoint, and 50-29/80-18/03X, Supplemental Number 1 Steam Generator Narrow Range Trip Setpoint.

The inspector reviewed the above reports and determined that the licensee provided further explanation of the cause and circumstances surrounding each event and addressed the generic implications of the initial reports. This item is closed.

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(Closed) Unresolved Item.(50-29/80-18-01): The inspector reviewed the Monthly Statistical Report for Yankee Atomic Nuclear Power Station for the month of November 1980 and noted that appropriate information was provided annotating power level restrictions caused by the installation of baffel plates in the turbine. Additionally, the inspector discussed the monthly reporting requirements with the NRR Licensing Project Manager who determined that changing the Maximum Dependable Capacity ratings is not required until such time that the licensee confirms that modifications upgrading the capacity of the turbine will not be made. This item is closed.

(Closed) Noncompliance (50-29/79-08-03): The inspector reviewed OP-2381 " Con-centrating and Drumming Evaporator Bottoms" and noted that (1) each drum

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is required to dry for at least five days at room temperature, (2) at least one drum of each batch snould be sampled and inspected for free standing water and (3) a Health Pnysics Supervisor should inspect each drum and verify it

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contains no free standing water. Additionally, the inspector has on several occasions inspected barrels of solidified waste and found no free standing liquid. This item is closed.

(Closed) Noncompliance (50-29/79-08-01):

The inspector has toured the plant chemistry laboratories on several occasions noting that all dosimetry was properly placed on the upper torso of each individual observed.

The inspector also observed a Notice to All Plant Personnel from the Health Physics Super-visor at several locations throughout the. plant re-emphasizing the oroper manner in which to wear dosimetry. This item is closed.

(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-29/80-12-03): The inspector reviewed com-pleted test procedure OP 4610, " Calibration and Containment Isolation System Operability Test", and witnessed portions of the testing activities associated with the test procedure.

No inadequacies were identified. This item is closed.

(Closed) Inspector Follow Item (50-29/80-12-02): The inspector has made several backshift tours of the Central Alarm Station (CAS) and the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) and noted on each occasion that security officers were attentive of their duties. This item is closed.

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(Closed) Noncompliance (50-29/79-05-02): The "NRC Staff Guidelines for Ex-cluding Exercising (Cycling) Tests of Certain Valves During Plant Operations",

were sent with a generic letter dated November 30, 1976, to all operating reactor licensees including Yankee Rowe to provide guidance on acceptable methods for complying with the ASME Code Section XI reouirements for testing selected pumps and valves pursuant to 10 CFR 50.55(a)(g). Based on these guidelines, such valves as OW-V-608 are not considered " testable", during operation in accordance with Technical Specification 4.7.2.1.2.a.

For these valves the required surveillance (once per 18 months during shutdown) is speci-fied in the Yankee Rowe Technical Specifications 4.7.1.2.b.1.

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By letter to the licensee dated January 31, 1981,_ the item of noncom-

.pliance(50-29/79-05-02) was rescinded. This item is closed.

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- Shift LogsLand Operating Records a.

.The inspector reviewed the following plant procedures to determine the licensee established administrative requirements in.this area

.in preparation for review of various logs and records-.

- AP,0001, Plant Procedures and Instructions,. Revision 8

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' AP-2002, Operations Departme'nt Personnel Shift Relief, Revision 10

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AP-2009, Control Room Area Limits for Control Room Operators,

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-Original AP-2010, Control Room Access During Accidents and Operations

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Transients, Original AP-0017, Switching and Tagging of Plant Equipment, Revision 5

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AP-0018, Bypass of Safety Function and Jumper Control Log,

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Revision 7 AP-2007, Maintenance of Operations Department Logs, Revision 7

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AP-0216, Housekeeping and Cleanliness Control, Revision 1

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AP-0042, Housekeeping for Maintenance and Modifications, Revision 1

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Rules Governing In-Plant Tagging Procedures Local Control Rules,

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Revision 3

.I The above procedures, Technical Specifications, ANSI N18.7-1972 "Ouality Assurance Requirements for Nuclear Power Plants" and 10 CFR 50.59 were used by the inspector to determine the acceptability of the 109., and j

records reviewed.

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Shift logs and operating records were reviewed to verify that:

i Control Room logs and shift surveillance sheets are properly com-

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i pleted and that selected Technical Specification limits were met.

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Control Room log entries involving abnormal conditions provide

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sufficient detail to communicate equipment status, lockout status, correction, and restoration.

Log book reviews are being conducted by the staff.

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Operating and Special Orders do not conflict with Technical

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Specification. requirements-Jumper (Bypass) log does not contain bypassing discrepancies with

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Technical Specification require:nents and that jumpers are pro-perly approved and installed c.

.The following plant logs and operating records were reviewed:

. Shift Supervisor's Control Room Log: January 1-29, 1981

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Plant Operations Review Committee Minutes: 80-63 thru 80-65

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Coecia! Orders: 489, 494, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500

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Daily Plant Status Reports: January 5-16, 1981

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Safety Related Maintenance Requests: 81-113,81-111, 81-109,

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81-93, 81-84, 81-85, 81-87, 81-88 Primary Cht tistry Log Sheets: January 1-29, 1981

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Radioactive Gaseous Release Permits:

81-1, 81-6, 81-7, 81-8,

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81-9, 81-10, 81-12, 81-13 Radioactive Liquid Release Permits:

81-2, 81-3, 81-4, 81-5, 81-11

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No inadequacies were identified.

4.

Plant Tour The inspector conducted a tour of accessible areas of the plant including the Primary Auxiliary Building, Turbine Building, Safety Injection Building, Switchgear Room, Diesel Rooms, Control Room, Spent Fuel Building, and HP Control Point Areas.

Details and findings are noted below:

a.

Monitoring Instrumentation and Annunciators On several occasions during the inspection, control board annunciators were checked for abnormal alarms. The following monitoring instrumenta-tion was checked to verify operability and where applicable, values indicated were verified to be in accordance with Technical Specifica-tion requirements:

Pressurizer pressure, level and temperature

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Charging flow path

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i NCS temperature j

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SI tank level

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PWST and DWST levels

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Batteries 1, 2 and 3 bus voltage

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Megawatt electrical output

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Stack gas radiation monitor

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Containment air particulate radiation monitor

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No abnormal annunciators were energized.

No inadequacies were identified.

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Radiological Contrc1s Radiation controls established by the licensee, including posting of radiation areas, radiological surveys, condition of step-off pads, and disposal of protective clothing were observed for conformance with the requirements of 10_CFR 20 and OP-8100, " Establishing and Posting Con-trolled Areas," and OP-8101, " Plant Radiological Surveys".

No inadequacies were identified.

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Plant Housekeeping Plant housekeeping conditions, including general cleanliness and storage of materials to prevent fire hazards were observed in all areas toured.

Housekeeping and cleanliness were acceptable.

No inadequacies were identified.

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Fluid Leaks and Piping Vibrations Systems and equipment in all areas toured were observed for the existence of fluid leaks and abnormal piping vibration.

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Pipe Hangers /Scismic Restraints Pipe hangers and restraints installed on previous piping systems through

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the plant were observed for proper installation and tension.

No inadequacies were identified.

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Control Room Manning / Shift Turnover l

Control room manning was reviewed for conformance with tne requirements l

of 10 CFR 50.54(k) and Technical Specifications.

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The inspector verified, several times during the inspection, that appropriate licensed operators were on shift. Manning requirements were met at all times.

Several shift turnovers were observed during the course of the inspection. All were noted to be thorough and orderly.

No inadequacies were identified.

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Surveillance Testing The inspector observed portions of the following surveillance tests to verify that testing was performed in accordance with technically adequate procedures, that results were in conformance with Technical Specifications and procedure requirements, that the results were reviewed by personnel other than the individual directing the test, and that any deficiencies identified during the testing were properly reviewed and resolved by management personnel. The fol. lowing surveillances were reviewed by the inspector:

OP-4238, Test of the Control Room Ventilation Emergency Shutdown

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-System OP-4204, Monthly Test or Special Test Operations of the Safety In-

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jection Pumps OP-4225, Turbine Throttle and Control Valve Surveillance

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OP-4223, No. 2 Service Water Pump Operability Test

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OP-4217, Test of No. 2 Charging Pump for Surveillance Operability Check

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OP-4210, Fire System Weekly Operability Check

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OP-4207, Surveillance of the Station Power System and Emergency

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Diesel Generators No inadequacies were identified.

6.

IE Bulletin Followup For the IE Bulletins listed below, the inspector verified the following:

that the written response was within the time period stated in the bulletin, that the written response included the information required to be reported, that the written response included adequate corrective action commitments based on information presented in the bulletin and the licensee's response, that licensee management forwarded copies of the written response to the appropriate

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onsite management representatives that information discussed in the licensee's written response was accurate, and that corrective action taken by the~ licensee was as described in the written response. The following bulletins were reviewed:

.IEB 80-02, Inadequate Quality Assurance for Nuclear Supplied

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Equipment IEB 80-03, Loss of Charcoal From Standard Type II, 2 inch Tray Ab-

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sorber Cells IEB 80-09, Hydramotor Actuator Deficiencies

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IEB 8b-10, Contamination of Non-Radioactive Systems and Resulting

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Potential for Unmonitored, Uncontrolled Release to Environment IEB 80-21, Valve Yokes Supplied by Malcolm Foundry Company, Inc.

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The inspector identified no inadequacies in this area.

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IE Circular Followup For the IE Circulars listed below, the inspector verified the circular was received by the licensee management, that a review for applicability was

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performed, and that if the circular was applicable to the facility, appro-priate corrective actions were taken or were scheduled to be taken. The following circulars were reviewed:

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IEC 80-01, Service Advice for General Electric Induction Disc Relays IEC 80-02, Nuclear Pcwer Plant Staff Work surs

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IEC 80-03, Protection From Toxic Gases

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IEC 80-04, Securing of Threaded Locking Devices on Safety-Related

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Equipment IEC 80-05, Emergency Diesel-Generator Lubricating Oil Addition and

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Onsite Supply IEC 80-07, Problems with HPCI Turbine Oil System

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IEC 80-09, Plant Internal Communications Systems

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IEC 80-10, Failure to Maintain Environmental qualification of Equip-

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IEC 80-11, fmergency Diesel Generator Lube Oil Cooler Failures

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IEC 80-12, Valve-Shaft-to-Actuator Key May Fall Out of Place When

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. Mounted Below Horizontal Axis IEC 80-13, Grid Strap Damage in Westinghcuse Fuel Assemblies

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IEC 80-15, Loss of Reactor Coolant Pump Cooling and Natural Circu-

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lation Cooldown IEC 80-17, Fuel Pin Damage Due' to Water Jet from Baffle Plate Corner

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IEC 80-18,10 CFR 50.59 Safety Evaluations for Changes to Radioactive

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Waste Treatment Systems-The inspector identified no inadequacies in this area.

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Operational Safety Verification A detailed review of the Low Pressure Safety Injection System was conducted to verify that the system was properly aligned and fully operational in the standby mode.

Review of the above system include,the following:

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verification that each accessible valve in the flow path was in the

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correct position by either visual observation of the valve or remote position indication verification that power supplies and breakers were properly aligned

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for components that are required to actuate upon receipt of a safety injection signal visual inspection of major components for leakage, proper lubrication,

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cooling water supply, general condition and other factors that might prevent fulfillment of their functional requirements verification by observation that the instrumentation essential for

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system actuation and performance was operational The inspector identified no inadequacies.

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Inspector Followup Events The inspector responded to events that occurred during the inspection to verify continued safe operation of the reactor in accordance with the Technical Specifications and regulatory requirements. The following items, as applicable, were considered during the inspector's review of operational events:

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observations of plant parameters and systems important to safety

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to confirm operation within normal operational limits;

' description of event, including cause, systems involved, safety-

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significance, facility status and status of engineered safety features equipment; details relating to personnel ' injury, release of radioactive material

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and exposure to radioactive material;

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verification of correct operation of automatic equipment;

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verification of adherence to plant procedures;

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determination that root causal factors were identified and that corrective

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actions, taken or planned, were appropriate to correct the cause; verification that corrective action taken was appropriate to prevent

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recurrence; determination whether the event involved operation of the facility

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in a manner which constituted an unreviewed safety question as-defined in 10 CFR 50.59(4)(2), or in such a manner as to. represent an unusual hazard to health and safety of the public and environment;

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determination whether the event involved continued operation of the

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facility in violation of regulatory requirements or license conditions; and, evaluation of whether applicable reporting requirements were met.

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The operational events reviewed during this inspection period are discussed below:

(1) On January 20, 1981, during the performance of a pneumatic test of the Shutdown Cooling System, suspected as a highly contaminated systen (pri-mary system water) an isolation valve to the vented Shutdown Cooler leaked, causing a contaminated mist to spray into the Primary Auxiliary Building Atmosphere. The work was performed under Radiation Work Per-mit (RWP) No. 0054.

The description of the work was to " Fill, flush and pressure test SCS (Safety Valves)" and the work location was the "PAB Cubicle and Valve Room".

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Three individuals who were in the process of inspecting the Shutdown Cooling System for leakage detected the leak and evacuated the area.

.These individuals were only wearing coveralls. They were not utilizing respiratory protection because the RWP only required lab coats to work in the area. Three other licensee employees were sent into the area I

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-11 to take airborne samples and to isolate the leak.

These employees

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. wore appropriate protective clothing and respiratory protection.. An 1 area of approximately ten feet by ten feet near the cooler was con-taminated to_ levels between 100,000 and 300,000 disintegrations per minute (DPM).

The~ initial airborne samples taken in the cooler area

. ere about 2 x 10-7 microcuries/cc.

The primary. vent stack monitor w

indicated an eight microcurie /sec release to the environment for about ten minutes following the spill.

Nasal swipes taken of six individuals i

who' were in the area' varied between two and three thousand DPM and one individual had hair contamination at one thcusand DPM. All indivi-duals were successfully decontaminated.'

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Whole body count isotopic analysis of the individuals _ involved revealed

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one employee'with some internal deposition.

The principal isotope was insoluble Cobalt-60 and the data indicated a deposition of four percent of the maximum permissible body burden.

The inspector reviewed RWP No. 0054, the Radiation Work Permit Pro-

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cedure No. OP-8415, Revision 7, and Procedure No. OP-2000.51, Revision i

1, " Alterations and Testing of the Shutdown Cooling Relief Valve 1.ine", and held discussions with the personnel involved with the t

incident.

i The inspector noted that Step No. 7 of Procedure No. LP-2000.51, Revi-sion 1, requires that a nitrogen purge path be established thru the

Shutdown Cooling lines and vents the nitrogen to the atmosphere of the i

Primary Auxiliary Building (PAB) without filtering the gas or-directing the gas to a waste gas system. The inspector was informed by a licensee representative that they were aware of the requirement to vent the highly contaminated system to the atmosphere.

Knowing that this

pressurized system was being vented to the PAB atmosphere the licensee

did not make a determination of the need for process or engineering i

controls aor did the licensee require the employees to use respiratory

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protection.

l 10 CFR 20.103, " Exposure of individuals to concentrations of radioactive matarials in air in restricted areas" states in Paragraph (b), in l

part, "The licensee shall, as a precautionary procedure, use process

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or other engineering controls, to the extent applicable, to limit r

concentrations of radioactive materials in air to levels below those

which delimit an airborne radioactivity area as defined in 20.203(d)

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(1)(ii)... When it is impracticable to apply process or other engineering I

controls... other precautionary procedures, such as the provision of

respiratory protective equipment, shall be used.. ".

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The inspector noted that failure to detemine the need for process or engineering controls and failure to require the use of respiratory protective equipment in the pneumatic test of the Shutdown Cooling System, a highly contaminated. system, represents noncompliance with 10 CFR 20.103.

(50-29/81-02-01)

(2) On January 25, 1981, at about 11:30 a.m. the licensee comenced a gradual load reduction to investigate why the Turbine Governor Oil pressure had been decreasing during the past several days.

This procedure was recommended by the vendor of the turbine. At approxi-mately 2:30 p.m. and 140 MWe while initiating a small incremental de-crease in the load changer, an apparent rapid rejection of all generator load took place initiating a turbine trip which'in turn tripped the

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reactor.

All nuclear systems functioned as designed.

An investigation was initiated to determine and correct the cause of the turbine trip and Governor Oil problem.

The licensee detennined that the turbine 7, rip sequence memory circuit indicated that the Turbine Solenoid Trip Circuit initiated the event, and that the " Solenoid Trip" could have been caused by either closure of the Turbine Control Valves, loss of Governor Oil pressure or by high Moisture Separator water level, which occurs on loss of load.

The licensee subsequently disassembled the Turbine Governor Oil Pump and found excessive clearance between the oil pump impeller and the pump sleeve.

A new sleeve was replaced on the impeller, and the pump was reassembled.

After the turbine / reactor trip and during the repair of the Governor 011 problem the licensee attempted to return the reactor to criticality in order to maintain heat in the reactor vessel. While withdrawing Group A control rods, number one rod unlatched and fell approximately forty inches. The licensee determined that the Gripper Coil associated with number one control rod had an open circuit in the coil.

The Gripper Coil was replaced with a new coil.

The rod was tested for operability and scram time tested.

The licensee subsequently brought the reactor critical and performed Turbine Governor Control Oil testing prior to placing the generator to the grid. Th. inspector witness the testing of the Turbine and Governor Control Oil, and reviewed the completed test procedure, OP-4703, Control Rod Drop Time Measurement, Revision 7.

The inspector identified no inadequacies in regard to this item.

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Observations of Physical Security _.

The inspector made observations, witnessed and/or verified during the regular and offshift hours that selected aspects of plant physical r_curity were in accordance with regulatory requirements, the physical

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sec :rity plan and approved procedures.

a.

Physical Protection Security Organization inspector observations indicated that a full time member _ of the

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security organization with authority to direct physical security actions was present as required.

i manning of all shifts on various days was observed to be as

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required.

b.

Physical Barriers selected barriers in the prctected area and vital area were

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observed and random monitoring of isolated zones was per-

formed.

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Access Control o

Observations of the following items were made:

identification, authorization and badging;

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access control searches, including the use of compensatory measures

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during periods when equipment was inoperable; and, escorting

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The inspector identified no inadequacies in this area.

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Management Meetings

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At periodic intervals during the course of the inspection, meetings were held with senior facility management to discuss the inspection scope and pre-liminary findings of the _rcsident inspector.

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