Text

Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request 03-06, Revision to Technical Specification 3.8.1, 'Ac Sources - Operating
	ML033210233
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	11/05/2003
From:	Becker J; Pacific Gas & Electric Co
To:	; Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
	DCL-03-142
	Download: ML033210233 (151)
	v • d • e

mi Gas and F5 gPacific lElectricCompany James R.Becker Diablo Canyon Power Plant Vice President-Diablo Canyon PO. Box 56 Operations and Station Director Avila Beach, CA 93424 November 5, 2003 F805.5453462 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555-0001 Docket No. 50-275, OL-DPR-80 Docket No. 50-323, OL-DPR-82 Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2 Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request 03-06. "Revision to Technical Specification 3.8.1,

'AC Sources - Operating"'

Dear Commissioners and Staff:

Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) Letter DCL-03-060, dated May 29, 2003, submitted License Amendment Request (LAR) 03-06, "Revision to Technical Specification 3.8.1, 'AC Sources - Operating,"' which would extend the completion time for restoring an inoperable diesel generator from 7 days to 14 days.

On August 25, 2003, the NRC staff requested additional information required to complete their review of LAR 03-06. PG&E's responses to the staffs questions are provided in Enclosures 1, 2, 3, and 4.

This additional information does not affect the results of the technical evaluation and no significant hazards consideration determination previously transmitted in PG&E Letter DCL-03-060.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact Stan Ketelsen at (805) 545-4720.

Sincerely, James Bce jer/3664 Enclosures

Document Control Desk PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 November 5, 2003 Page 2 cc: Edgar Bailey, DHS Bruce S. Mallett David L. ProuIx Diablo Distribution cc/enc: Girija S. Shukla

PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Docket No. 50-275 In the Matter of ) Facility Operating License PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY) No. DPR-80

)

Diablo Canyon Power Plant ) Docket No. 50-323 Units 1 and2 ) Facility Operating License

) No. DPR-82 AFFIDAVIT James R. Becker, of lawful age, first being duly sworn upon oath states that he is Vice President Operations and Station Director - Diablo Canyon of Pacific Gas and Electric Company; that he has executed this supplement to License Amendment Request 03-06 on behalf of said company with full power and authority to do so; that he is familiar with the content thereof; and that the facts stated therein are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief.

James . Becker~

Vice President Operationsand Station Director- Diablo Canyon Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of November 2003.

CHUCKMN1CY Notary Publicfni N tyot ubi - 7 54 7m~

County of San Luis 0 1~ ~ ~ SnLl bsoCut State of California I- - M- ~O E- S ~ b .2 0

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 PG&E Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request 03-06, "Revision to Technical Specification 3.8.1,

'AC Sources - Operating"'

NRC Question 1 Discuss and provide information on the reliability and availability of offsite power sources relating to the proposed change. The discussion should include duration, cause, date and time of each loss-of-offsite power (partial or complete) event. In addition, discuss the current reliability of all DGs at Diablo Canyon.

PG&E Response to Question 1 on Offsite Power Sources Summary Operating Procedure OP J-2:VIII, "Guidelines for Reliable Transmission Service for DCPP," includes the operating instructions for the transmission system contained in Pacific Gas and Electric (PG&E) Transmission System Operating Instruction 0-23, "Operating Instructions for Reliable Transmission Service for Diablo Canyon P. P." The boundaries of jurisdiction and extent of control of these procedures are the same as listed in the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP) Final Safety Analysis Report Update (FSARU) Section 8.2, "Offsite Power System." See attached Figures 1 and 2. In the figures, the boundary of procedural control is at the Midway and Gates Substations and includes:

500 kV transmission lines from DCPP to Midway and Gates, and

230 kV transmission lines from DCPP to Midway and Gates. In the year 2000 the Morro Bay-Gates No. 1 Line was renamed Morro Bay-Templeton, and Templeton-Gates.

Table 1, 'Availability History," summarizes the number of minutes and percentage of time that each line was available each year. Table 2, 'Maintenance Outage History,"

provides the maintenance outage summary for October 2000 to September 9, 2003.

Availability is not calculated for 1999 or January through August 2000 because of the lack of maintenance data in the PG&E Outage Coordination Database. Table 3, "Forced Outage History," lists the forced outage summary from January 1, 1999, through September 9, 2003.

For the period from January 1, 1999, through September 9, 2003, there have been no events that caused a complete loss of offsite power from the transmission systems supplying DCPP. During that period there was one incident on the 500 kV system and two incidents on the 230 kV system where power was interrupted from the transmission system. One event at DCPP Unit 1 on May 15, 2000, is characterized as a complete loss of offsite power to that unit. This event was due to an internal 12 kV bus fault that resulted in a loss of both offsite power connections to the 4 kV safety loads for 1

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 33.6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months . During this time both the 500 kV and 230 kV transmission systems were available and Unit 2 remained in operation. (Reference PG&E Letter DCL-00-1 15, "Licensee Event Report 1-2000-004-01, Unit 1 Unusual Event Due to a 12kV Bus Fault," dated August 30, 2000).

500 kV System On September 22, 1999, lightning struck the static ground wire protecting the tie line from Unit 1 to the 500 kV switchyard. No damage was sustained. The tie line remained deenergized for 8.2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . (Reference PG&E Letter DCL-99-118, "Licensee Event Report 1-1999-006-00, Reactor Trip Due to Lightning Strike," dated October 15, 1999). A follow-on event occurred on September 23, 1999, when the tie line was reenergized and tripped due to a cut-in 500 kV overvoltage protective relay with a trip signal picked up. (Reference PG&E Letter DCL-99-131, "Licensee Event Report 1-1 999-008-00, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation - Auxiliary Feedwater Pump 1-1 Started on 12 kV Undervoltage Due to Personnel Error," dated October 22, 1999). The tie line remained deenergized for 6.1 hours1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months while the event was analyzed. Unit 2 was not affected by this event.

230 kV System On April 5, 2001, a prescribed burn in Diablo Canyon, east of the plant, generated heavy smoke that caused both 230 kV lines to trip. Offsite power from the 230 kV system was restored after 1.2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months . Both units remained in operation during this event. (Reference PG&E Letter.DCL-01-065, "Licensee Event Report 1-2001-001-00, Automatic Emergency Diesel Generator Start Upon Loss of Startup Power Due to 230 kV Line Arcing in Heavy Smoke from Escaped Fire Caused by Inadequate Administrative Controls," dated June 4, 2001).

On August 4, 2001, a fault on the grounding transformer fuse box for the 230/12 kV Startup Transformer 1-1 caused a loss of startup (230 kV) power to both units. Power was restored to the Unit 2 startup bus on August 5, 2001 (13.8 hour9.259259e-5 days 0.00222 hours 1.322751e-5 weeks 3.044e-6 months outage). Power was restored to the Unit 1 startup bus on August 6, 2001 by a crosstie to Unit 2 (44.0 hour0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months outage). Full restoration was completed on August 22, 2001. Both units remained in operation during this event. (Reference PG&E Letter DCL-01-099, "Licensee Event Report 1-2001-002-00, System Actuation: Unplanned Diesel Start Due to Loss of Startup Power," dated October 4, 2001).

Discussion Forced outage data for offsite power sources has been collected and reported for 5 years: 1999-2003. The five-year period is based on the following considerations.

In 1996 PG&E discovered that there were 47 past instances where the 230 kV system may have been degraded. (PG&E Letter DCL-96-158, "Licensee Event Report 2

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 1-95-007-01, 230 kV System May Not Be Able to Meet its Design Requirements for All Conditions Due to Personnel Error," dated August 6, 1996.) Corrective actions were taken over the next several years to improve the 230 kV system. On April 29, 1999, the NRC issued License Amendments No. 132 (Unit 1) and No. 130 (Unit 2) to incorporate modifications to the 230 kV offsite power system. The changes included installation of two new 230/12 kV startup transformers with automatic load tap changers, and capacitor banks at Diablo 230 kV and Mesa 115 kV switchyards. Figure 1 shows a single line diagram of the 230 kV system. The purpose of these changes was to improve the reliability of the 230 kV offsite power system and prepare for deregulation in California. By starting the reporting in 1999, this encompasses the period of implementation of the 230 kV system improvements, the California energy crisis years of 2000 and 2001, and the initial period of PG&E bankruptcy.

Table 4, "Transmission Forced Outage Data," lists the detailed outage data. Note that the reported forced outage data includes an entry for Outage Class = "N" (None) - "zero outage." This is an entry for a transmission line that had zero outages for that year.

Table 5, "Primary and Secondary Outage Cause Codes, Outage Class Codes," lists the outage class and cause codes.

DCPP FSARU Section 8.2, "Offsite Power System," states that the minimum requirements for operable 500 kV and 230 kV offsite systems are:

. Either 230 kV circuit feeding DCPP, and

One 500 kV circuit feeding DCPP.

In addition, the capacitors at DCPP and Mesa, along with the 230/12 kV startup transformers with automatic load tap changers enable the 230 kV transmission system to be independent of Morro Bay generation. FSARU Section 8.2.1.1, "230-kV System,'

identifies the occurrences that could result in a loss of power to the 230/12 kV startup transformers.

The only forced outage event related to the 230/12 kV startup transformers is discussed above under the 230 kV System. Routine maintenance of the transformers and their automatic load tap changers is performed during unit outages and controlled under the outage safety plan issued for each outage.

There were no forced outages of the capacitors at the Diablo 230 kV switchyard. There were two forced outage events involving the capacitors at the Mesa 115 kV substation.

On September 16,1999, at 13:20 PDT, a single capacitor faulted on a string of capacitors in C phase at Mesa. The single capacitor was replaced and returned to service in approximately 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months .

3

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 On October 13, 1999, at 18:49 PDT, a fault in C phase caused severe damage to 3 capacitors (out of 20), a potential transformer, a resistor pack and collateral damage to bus and conductors. The capacitors were returned to service after a 36 day outage.

Both faults were limited to one-half of the installed 50 megavolt-ampere reactive (MVAR) capacity. Although 25 MVAR remained in service, procedurally the entire capacitor bank is considered out of service during this event. During these forced outages, the 230 kV supply to DCPP remained operable. Detailed data on the forced and maintenance outages of the capacitors at Mesa and Diablo are listed at the end of Tables 4 and 5.

The PG&E Transmission Operations Center in conjunction with the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) controls the operability of the transmission lines serving DCPP. The Diablo Canyon Control Center (Switchyard) personnel use common procedures with DCPP Operations to administer the operability of the transmission lines. PG&E and CAISO criteria control the periods for maintenance.

Maintenance is typically performed when the system can allow the maintenance outage and the next contingency. Table 6, "Transmission Line Maintenance Outage Data," lists the maintenance outage data from November 1, 2000, through September 9, 2003.

Maintenance data for 1999 and for January through October 2000 is not available in the PG&E Outage Coordination database.

It is important to note that during the 'California energy crisis' of 2000 and 2001, the offsite power supplies into Diablo Canyon remained stable and reliable. Even when generation reserves dropped below the 7 percent level 1 , the transmission systems serving DCPP remained stable due to system load control and selective load shedding.

The CAISO did not allow elective maintenance during these years. Any transmission line maintenance was performed with the lines energized.

Since August of 1996, when problems in Oregon set off a chain of events that caused outages throughout California and other western states, PG&E has made many improvements to its electric transmission system. They include:

Transmission substation equipment that boosts voltage and prevents oscillation,

Sophisticated computer-based systems that sense abnormalities and disturbances and instantly correct for them,

Major upgrades to and reinforcement of the transmission system - PG&E has invested about $1.4 billion since 1996 to expand capacity and improve reliability of the grid, and CAISO declares a Stage 1 Emergency when reserves drop to 7 percent, Stage 2 at 5 percent, and Stage 3 at 1.5 percent.

4

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142

Greater coordination of load shedding plans with the 14 western states, two Canadian provinces and the parts of northern Mexico under the Western Electricity Coordinating Council regional transmission umbrella.

The Oregon event discussed above occurred on August 10, 1996, and caused a 500 kV system transient that resulted in both DCPP units tripping off-line. However, the 230 kV system was available to safely shutdown the units. Subsequent to the 1996 event, PG&E installed generator out-of-step protection for each unit. The purpose is to protect the turbine-generator during severe grid transients. This protective function increases the likelihood of tripping the units and transferring to the 230 kV system during severe grid transients. However, the 230 kV and 500 kV switchyards are not inter-connected at DCPP. Consequently the loss of DCPP generation has negligible impact on the 230 kV voltage.

5

I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Enclosure Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 Figure 1 Geographic Layout Of 500 And 230 kV Transmission Lines & Substations To Southern California Single Line Diagram of 230 kV System F-- - - - - - - - - - - - - -

l to Gates to Midway I

I I

I 230 kV I

I Diablo I

I Morro Bay Power Plant I.+v I I -. - - - - - - j-- - -

6

(

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 Figure 2 Electrical Distribution Overview 500kV Switchyard 230kV Switchyard Bus 2 yy y y .f//..

Bus 1 _C<< To Midway 2- I T 642 1 i '_ 282 Midway 3 - 632 _ iTrOET--\ From a-) T~~~2 6~2 M orro Gates 1 - 722 T 622 Bus I ank Xfmr 500kV

~i,-i

_ -*_"I 1 212-

> U2 Main Bank Xfmr SOIkV/25kV Bus2s Bay Aux Xfmr 125W _ Aux Xfrnr , I r ,1, ~AUYXfmr. - I * <V 1 ,AYXm 1-i T1 111,V Ak'J 'T'Y""'r 1-2 i C-BusE E I I II I I I I I I I I I I I I ~~ ~~I I~~~ I ~ ~I ~ ~~I Bus E Htr 2 Drn Pp ) ) > ) )< ) l) E) ( ( ( ( ( C (( (IC Htr2Drn Pp Cnd Bstr Pp 1-2 ~~~ ~ ~ . 1 1 1. J 1 L ~~~~~~~~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~IC I I ndBstr Pp2-2 Cnd Bstr Pp 1-3 Bus D Bus H (A&B) Bus G (B) Bus F (A) Bus F (A) Bus G (B) Bus H (A&B) Bus D Cnd Bstr Pp 2-3 rt3 Nash Vac Pp AFW Pp 1-2 (B) ASW Pp 1-2 ASW Pp 1-1 ASW Pp 2-1 ASW Pp 2-2 AFW Pp 2-2 (B) Cnd Bstr Pp 2-1 NV-tal 480V NVitas 48OV: Cnd Bstr Pp 1-1 CS Pp 1-2 (A) CS Pp 1-1 AFW Pp 1-3 AFW Pp 2-3 CS Pp 2-1 CS Pp 2-2 (A) E 85'T 112.851'B RHR Pp 1-2 (A) RHR Pp 1-1 CCP 1-1 CCP 2-1 RHR Pp 2-1 RHR Pp 2-2 (A) NVital 480V: 21. 857B 122. 100'Aux NVital 480V: Si Pp 1-2 (B) CCP 1-2 CCW Pp 1-1 CCW Pp 2-1 CCP 2-2 Si Pp 2-2 (B) 210. 857B 221, 100'Aux 121. 100'Aux 110,. 85'TB CCW Pp 1-3 PDP SI Pp 1-1 SI Pp 2-1 PDP CCW Pp 2-3 22D, 100'Aux 221, 100'Aux 12N, 73'Aux 12, 100'Aux (A&B) CCW Pp 1-2 Vital 480V F Vital 480V F CCW Pp 2-2 (A&B) 22J, 100'Aux 232, 73Aux 13E. 100'Aux 12J. 100Aux Vital 480V H Vital 480V G Vital 480V G Vital 480V H 22M 73'Aux 23i,117'Cnt 131. 117'Cnt 12M. 73'Aux 23D. 100'Aux 231, 117'Cnt 14E, Intake 130, 100'Aux 23J, 117'Cnt 24E, Intake ISE: II 9TB 13J. 117'Cnt 24D. Intake 252, 119P B 140D. Intake ijfn II.. 251. Polisher 150. 119'TB 15J, Polisher 7

{ (S Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 Table I Availability History 1999

2000

2001 2002 2003**

Voltage Line-ID minutes % of yr minutes % of yr minutes % of yr minutes % of yr minutes % of yr 500 Diablo-GatesNol N/A N/A 525600 100.000% 525600 100.000% 525600 100.000%

500 Diablo-MidwayNo2 N/A N/A 525600 100.000% 524866 99.860% 525180 99.920%

500 Diablo-MidwayNo3 N/A N/A 525561 99.993% 524719 99.832% 524880 99.863%

230 Diablo-Mesa N/A N/A 525554 99.991% 524773 99.843% 523380 99.578%

230 MorroBay-Diablo N/A N/A 525555 99.991% 525600 100.000% 525600 100.000%

230 MorroBay-GatesNol N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 230 MorroBay-GatesNo2 N/A N/A 525600 100.000% 524027 99.701% 525360 99.954%

230 MorroBay-Mesa N/A N/A 525600 100.000% 524700 99.829% 524099 99.714%

230 MorroBay-MidwayNol N/A N/A 525585 99.997% 523860 99.669% 524819 99.851%

230 MorroBay-MidwayNo2 N/A N/A 523925 99.681% 523019 99.509% 524879 99.863%

230 MorroBay-Templeton NN/A N/A 525600 100.000%° 525600 100.000% 525600 100.000%

230 Templeton-Gates N/A I N/A 525600 100.000% 525600 100.000%° 522599 99.429%

Availability History is not calculated for 1999 or 2000 because of the lack of maintenance data in the PG&E Outage Coordination Database

- For 2003, data covers the period through September 9, 2003.

8

( Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 Table 2 Maintenance Outage History 1999

2000

2001 2002 2003**

Voltage Line-ID minutes % of yr minutes % of yr minutes % of yr minutes % of yr minutes % of yr 500 Diablo-GatesNol N/A 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000%

500 Diablo-MidwayNo2 N/A 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000% 360 0.0685% 420 0.0799%

500 Diablo-MidwayNo3 N/A 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000% 720 0.1370%

230 Diablo-Mesa N/A 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000% 660 0.1256% 2220 0.4224%

230 MorroBay-Diablo N/A 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000%

230 MorroBay-GatesNol N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 230 MorroBay-GatesNo2 N/A 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000% 1320 0.2511% 240 0.0457%

230 MorroBay-Mesa N/A 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000% 900 0.1712% 1500 0.2854%

230 MorroBay-MidwayNol N/A 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000% 1740 0.3311% 780 0.1484%

230 MorroBay-MidwayNo2 N/A 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000% 2580 0.4909% 720 0.1370%

230 MorroBay-Templeton N/A 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000% 0 0.00% 0000%

230 Templeton-Gates N/A 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000% 3001 0.5710%

Data for 1999 and January through August 2000 was not available in the PG&E Outage Coordination Database

- For 2003, data covers the period through September 9, 2003.

9

(

Enclosure I PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 Table 3 Forced Outage History 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003*

Voltage Line ID minutes % of yr minutes % of yr minutes % of yr minutes % of yr minutes % of yr 500 Diablo-GatesNol 48 0.0091% 429 0.0814% 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000%

500 Diablo-MidwayNo2 43 0.0082% 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000% 374 0.0712% 0 0.0000%

500 Diablo-MidwayNo3 161 0.0306% 160 0.0304% 39 0.0074% 881 0.1676% 0 0.0000%

230 Diablo-Mesa 0 0.0000% 29 0.0055% 46 0.0088% 167 0.0318% 0 0.0000%

230 MorroBay-Diablo 144 0.0274% 0 0.0000% 45 0.0086% 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000%

230 MorroBay-GatesNol 0 0.0000% N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 230 MorroBay-GatesNo2 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000% 253 0.0481% 0 0.0000%

230 MorroBay-Mesa 360 0.0685% 1 0.0002% 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000% 1 0.0002%

230 MorroBay-MidwayNol 359 0.0683% 58 0.0110% 15 0.0029% 0 0.0000% 1 0.0002%

230 MorroBay-MidwayNo2 0 0.0000% 805 0.1527% 1675 0.3187% 1 0.0002% 1 0.0002%

230 MorroBay-Templeton N/A N/A 303 0.0575% 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000%

230 Templeton-Gates N/A N/A 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000% 0 0.0000%

For 2003, data covers the period through September 9, 2003.

10

I ( Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 Table 4 Transmission Forced Outage Data 1/1/1999 through 9/9/2003 Voltage LineID Outage Outage DUR Outage End Outage Outage Primary Secondary Comments Class Start Date Start (Mmn) Date End Class Cause Cause Time Time 500 Diablo-GatesNol 1/13/1999 23:35 46 1/14/1999 0:21 F PROT NONE Diablo CBs 622 & 722 relayed by transfer trip - cutout channel "C" transfer trip relays.

500 Diablo-GatesNol 9/22/1999 12:41 2 9/22/1999 12:43 F LIGT NONE Unknown - lightning.

500 Diablo-GatesNol 1/15/2000 9:39 429 1/15/2000 16:48 F CNTM INSL De-energized wash of contaminated 'V' string insulators on towers 67/176 to 72/297.

500 Diablo-GatesNol 1/1/2001 0:00 0 1/1/2001 0:00 N NONE NONE zero outage 500 IDiablo-GatesNol 1/1/2002 0:001 0 1/1/2002 0:00 N NONE NONE zero outage 500 Diablo-MidwayNo2 1/7/1999 9:53 43 1/7/1999 10:36 F OPER NONE Relay test error while working on Midway CB 912 breaker failure

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ __________ ~~~la~~y~~~re 500 Diablo-MidwayNo2 1/1/2000 0:00 0 1/1/2000 0:00 N NONE NONE zero outage 500 Diablo-MidwayNo2 1/1/2001 0:00 0 1/1/2001 0:00 N NONE NONE zero outage 500 Diablo-MidwayNo2 2/9/2002 3:37 374 2/9/2002 9:51 F SEQP NONE Open ended when feed pump regulator valve unexpectedly

______ _ _____ __ ______ lo sed .

500 Diablo-MidwayNo3 8/19/1999 13:44 161 8/19/1999 16:25 F FIRE COND Structure fire started grass fire that burned through conductor between 17/66 and 17/67 - CDF delayed restoration.

500 Diablo-MidwayNo3 1/13/2000 5:23 98 1/13/2000 7:01 F CB NONE To remove Midway CB 802 from service due to loss of all air p ressure.

500 Diablo-MidwayNo3 11/25/2000 6:38 62 11/25/2000 7:40 F DIST NONE Out of section trip (Midway-Vincent #3-500kV line trouble).

11

( Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 Table 4 Transmission Forced Outage Data 111/1999 through 9/9/2003 Voltage LineID Outage Outage DUR Outage End Outage Outage Primary Secondary Comments Class Start Date Start (Mmn) Date End Class Cause Cause Time Time 500 Diablo-MidwayNo3 5/31/2001 20:48 39 5/31/2001 21:27 F SEQP ARRS Trip occurred when Midway #11-500/230 kV bank failed.

500 Diablo-MidwayNo3 7/24/2002 14:48 97 7/24/2002 16:25 F CB NONE Open ended when Midway CB 902 was forced out to repair the compressor regulator.

500 Diablo-MidwayNo3 11/15/2002 10:10 784 11/15/2002 23:14 F LEQP NONE Forced out due to failure of PT insulator column.

230 Diablo-Mesa 1/1/1999 0:00 0 1/1/1999 0:00 N NONE NONE ZERO OUTAGE 230 Diablo-Mesa 3/24/2000 12:22 1 3/24/2000 12:23 F CB NONE Mesa CB 212 forced out of service to adjust hydraulic pump control governor.

230 Diablo-Mesa 3/24/2000 13:07 28 3/24/2000 13:35 F CB NONE Mesa 212 out of service to adjust I_____ _____________ hydraulic pump control governor..

230 Diablo-Mesa 4/5/2001 15:10 46 4/5/2001 15:56 F FIRE NONE Control burn under line.

230 Diablo-Mesa 12/16/2002 9:36 1 12/16/2002 9:37 F OPER NONE Relayed when conductor came out of fitting, contacted CT cover on GB 212 "A" Phase.

230 Diablo-Mesa 12/16/2002 12:37 166 12/16/2002 15:23 F OPER NONE Forced out to repair conductor that came out of fitting, contacted CT cover on CB 212 "A" Phase.

230 MorroBay-Diablo 5/3/1999 22:49 143 5/411999 1:12 F LATE INSL Applied additional silicone to CB 612 at MB, washing and replace upport insulators.

230 MorroBay-Diablo 9/22/1999 12:41 1 9/22/1999 12:42 F PROT RELY Diablo Canyon CB 262 relayed and reclosed OK with power remaining on line.

230 MorroBay-Diablo 1/1/2000 0:00 0 1/1/2000 0:00 N NONE NONE zero outage 12

I ( Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 Table 4 Transmission Forced Outage Data 1/111999 through 91912003 Voltage LineID Outage Outage DUR Outage End Outage Outage Primary Secondary Comments Class Start Date Start (Min) Date End Class Cause Cause Time Time 230 MorroBay-Diablo 4/5/2001 15:10 45 4/5/2001 15:55 F FIRE NONE Control burn under line.

230 MorroBay-Diablo 1/1/2002 0:00 0 1/1/2002 0:00 N NONE NONE zero outage 230 MorroBay-GatesNol 1/1/1999 0:00 0 1/1/1999 0:00 N NONE NONE zero outage 230 MorroBay-GatesNo2 1/1/1999 0:00 0 1/1/1999 0:00 N NONE NONE zero outage 230 MorroBay-GatesNo2 1/1/2000 0:00 0 1/1/2000 0:00 N NONE NONE zero outage 230 MorroBay-GatesNo2 1/1/2001 0:00 0 1/1/2001 0:00 N NONE NONE zero outage 230 MorroBay-GatesNo2 1/24/2002 7:03 253 1/24/2002 11:16 F LEQP NONE Forced out to permanently jumper out Sw 247 that was burning 230 MorroBay-Mesa 5/1/1999 6:19 41 5/1/1999 7:00 F UNKN NONE Line relayed, 0700 started pre-scheduled line work. 1512 tested OK (temp jumpers at MB).

230 MorroBay-Mesa 5/7/1999 7:48 318 5/7/1999 13:06 F UNKN INSL Replaced flashed and broken insulators due to trouble 5/1/99 -

Temp Jumpers MB.

230 MorroBay-Mesa 12/4/1999 11:17 1 12/4/1999 11:18 F OPER NONE Mesa CB's 172,182, 202, 222 relayed, reclosed OK by breaker failure during work on CB 212.

230 MorroBay-Mesa 2/11/2000 22:12 1 2/11/2000 22:13 F PROT RELY Mesa CB 222 relayed due to out of section fault.

230 MorroBay-Mesa 1/1/2001 0:00 0 1/1/2001 0:00 N NONE NONE zero outage 230 MorroBay-Mesa 1/1/2002 0:00 0 1/1/2002 0:00 N NONE NONE zero outage 230 MorroBay-Mesa 7/30/2003 5:45 1 7/30/2003 5:46 F LIGT NONE Relayed, tested OK; no I_____ ______________ ______ interruptions, lightning in area.

230 MorroBay-MidwayNol 5/1/1999 6:19 41 5/1/1999 7:00 F UNKN NONE Line relayed, 0700 started pre-scheduled line work. 1512 tested OK temp jumpers at MB.

13

( Enclosure I PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 Table 4 Transmission Forced Outage Data 1/1/1999 through 919/2003 Voltage LineID Outage Outage DUR Outage End Outage Outage Primary Secondary Comments Class Start Date Start (Mmn) Date End Class Cause Cause Time Time 230 MorroBay-MidwayNol 5/7/1999 7:48 318 5/7/1999 13:06 F UNKN INSL Replaced flashed and broken insulators due to trouble of 5/1/99 -

temp. jumper MB.

230 MorroBay-MidwayNol 11/26/2000 7:57 58 11/26/2000 8:55 F PROT NONE Open ended at Midway due to CB 572 breaker failure relay

.________ ____________ _____misoperation.

230 MorroBay-MidwayNol 1/11/2001 10:12 1 1/11/2001 10:13 F LIGT NONE Unknown - lightning.

230 MorroBay-MidwayNol 2/13/2001 9:32 14 2/13/2001 9:46 F CB NONE Unusual snow & Morro Bay CB 522 failed to close by autos 230 MorroBay-MidwayNol 1/1/2002 0:00 0 1/1/2002 0:00 N NONE NONE zero outage 230 MorroBay-MidwayNol 7/30/2003 5:17 1 7/30/2003 5:18 F LIGT+J2 None Relayed, tested OK; no I_____ _ _ _ l I_____ interruptions, lightning in area 230 MorroBay-MidwayNo2 1/1/1999 0:00 0 1/1/1999 0:00 N NONE NONE zero outage 230 MorroBay-MidwayNo2 12/21/2000 19:02 805 12/22/2000 8:27 F CB RELY Open ended at Morro Bay to repair hydraulic leak on CB 522.

230 MorroBay-MidwayNo2 2/13/2001 9:40 237 2/13/2001 13:37 F CB CB Snow; repaired Morro Bay CB 522.

230 MorroBay-MidwayNo2 10/23/2001 19:56 1438 10/24/2001 19:54 F SEQP INSL Gleaned flashed insulators and adjusted Midway switch 545.

230 MorroBay-MidwayNo2 2/11/2002 16:42 1 2/11/2002 16:43 F CB NONE Momentarily open ended at Morro Bay when Midway #11-500/230 Bk

_________ __relayed, did not test.

230 MorroBay-MidwayNo2 7/30/2003 5:17 1 7/30/2003 5:18 F LIGT None Relayed, tested OK; no I________________interruptions,

______________ lightning in area.

230 MorroBay-Templeton 2/11/2000 22:12 117 2/12/2000 0:09 F WEAT GOND Patrol found 115 kV undercrossing top phase conductor contacted bottom phase 230 kV.

14

( (

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 Table 4 Transmission Forced Outage Data 1/111999 through 9/9/2003 Voltage LineID Outage Outage DUR Outage End Outage Outage Primary Secondary Comments Class Start Date Start (Mmn) Date End Class Cause Cause Time Time 230 MorroBay-Templeton 6/14/2000 9:26 186 6/14/2000 12:32 F LEQP HDWR Cleared to replace compression sleeve at tower 0/1.

230 MorroBay-Templeton 1/1/2001 0:00 0 1/1/2001 0:00 N NONE NONE zero outage 230 MorroBay-Templeton 1/1/2002 0:00 0 1/1/2002 0:00 N NONE NONE zero outage 230 Templeton-Gates 1/1/2000 0:00 0 1/1/2000 0:00 N NONE NONE zero outage 230 Templeton-Gates 1/1/2001 0:00 0 1/1/2001 0:00 N NONE NONE zero outage 230 Templeton-Gates 1/1/2002 0:00 0 1/1/2002 0:00 N NONE NONE zero outage 15

( ( Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 Table 5 Primary and Secondary Outage Cause Codes, Outage Class Codes PRIMARY CAUSE TRANSLATION TABLE SECONDARY CAUSE PG&E Outage CAISO Outage CAISO Outage CAISO & PG&E Outage CAISO & PG&E Outage Root Cause Detail Primary Cause Primary Cause Code Secondary Cause Secondary Cause Code Description Code* Description Code*

Animal-bird ANIM Animal Contact ARRS Arrestor Animal-ground ANIM Animal Contact AUX Station auxiliary equip (e.g., CT, PT, CCVT)

Contamination-agriculture CNTM Contamination BATT Battery system Contamination-animal waste CNTM Contamination BUSH Bushing Contamination-environmental CNTM Contamination CB Circuit breakerlCircuit switch Contamination-industrial waste CNTM Contamination COMM Communication facility (no relay)

Disaster-earthquake ND Natural Disasters COND Conductorishield wire/splice Disaster-fire FIRE Fire DISC Disconnect Disaster-flood ND Natural Disasters ENCR Encroachment Disaster-other ND Natural Disasters GUYS Guylanchor Equipment Failure-arrestor SEOP Other Substation Equip HDWR Hardware, fittings, accessories Trouble Equipment Failure-bus SEQP Other Substation Equip INSL Insulator (stationllne)

Trouble Equipment Failure-bushing SEQP Other Substation Equip LS Line switch Trouble Equipment Failure-ccvt SEQP Other Substation Equip NONE None Trouble Equipment Failure-circuit breaker CB Circuit Breaker Trouble REAC Reactive device (e.g., capacitors, condensers)

Equipment Failure-conductor LEQP Line Equipment Failure REG Regulator Equipment Failure-connectorlhardware LEQP Line Equipment Failure RELY Relaylcommunications for relay Equipment Failure-CT SEQP Other Substation Equip STRU Structurelfoundatlon Trouble Equipment Failure-insulator-line LEQP Line Equipment Failure XFRM TransformerlLTC Equipment Failure-insulator-station SEQP Other Substation Equip UG Underground transmission component Trouble Equipment Failure-other-line LEQP Line Equipment Failure PROC Work ProcedurelHuman error Equipment Failure-other-station SEQP Other Substation Equip Trouble Equipment Failure-PT SEQP Other Substation Equip *NOTE: Reference Is the California ISO Maintenance Procedure Trouble No. 2 entitled "Outage Data File Format for the CAISO-Availability Equipment Failure-reactive equipment SEQP Other Substation Equip Performance Monitoring System", effective date 5127199, pages 2-8 Trouble through 2-11.

Equipment Failure-regulator/LTC SEQP Other Substation Equip TIrouble Equipment Failure-relay PROT Protection 16

C Enclotsure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 Table 5 Primary and Secondary Outage Cause Codes, Outage Class Codes PRIMARY CAUSE TRANSLATION TABLE SECONDARY CAUSE PG&E Outage CAISO Outage jCAISO Outage CAISO & PG&E Outage CAISO & PG&E Outage Root Cause Detall Primary Cause Primary Cause Code Secondary Cause Secondary Cause Code Description ICode' Description Code Equipment Failure-structure-line LEOP Line Equipment Failure Equipment Failure-structure-station SEQP Other Substation Equip OUTAGE CLASS Trouble Equipment Failure-switch-line LEQP Line Equjpment Failure C Capped (at a 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months outage)

Equipment Failure-switch-station SEQP Other Substation Equip F Forced Outage Trouble N None (Zero Outage for that Year)

Equipment Failure-transformer SEQP Other Substation Equip Trouble External Contact-aircraft AIR Aircraft External Contact-car pole VEH Vehicles External Contact-foreign object OTHR Other External Contact-system disturbance DIST System Disturbance External Contact-vandalism OTHR Other Other-customer/lPP caused OTHR Other Other-distribution caused UC Utility Contact Other-generation caused GEN Generation Trouble Other-overload situation DIST System Disturbance Other-safety clearance OTHR Other Scheduled-approved SCHD Scheduled Outage Scheduled-disapproved LATE Late Notification Scheduled-extended LATE Late Notification Tree-3rd party OTHR Other Tree-failure VEGA Vegetation Tree-tree contact VEGA Vegetation Unknown-no patrol conducted UNKN Unknown Unknown-patrol found nothing UNKN Unknown Weather-lightning LIGT Lightning Weather-rain WEAT Weather Weather-snow/ice WEAT Weather Weather-wind WEAT Weather Work Procedure-design error OPER Operation Error Work Procedure-equipment incorrectly set OPER Operation Error Work Procedure-inattention or carelessness OPER Operation Error Work Procedure-miscommunications or unclear OPER Operation Error expectations Work Procedure-not following prescribed OPER Operation Error procedures 17

I if: Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 Table 6 Transmission Line Maintenance Outage Data 11/112000 through 919/2003 Line Name Voltage Clearance Boundary Actual Out Time Actual Return Duration Time (minutes)

Diablo-Midway #2 500 Midway 813, 913; Diablo 643, 741 03/14/2002 04:03 03/14/2002 10:03 360 Diablo-Midway #2 500 911, 913 06/03/2003 08:06 06/03/2003 15:06 420 Diablo-Midway #3 500 Midway 801, 901; Diablo 633,733 0310612003 06:03 0310612003 18:03 720 Morro Bay-Gates #2 230 Morro Bay 483, 485; Gates 223, 225 05/15/2002 07:05 05/15/2002 12:05 300 Morro Bay-Gates #2 230 Morro Bay 483, 485; Gates 223, 225 07/23/2002 07:07 07/23/2002 16:07 540 Morro Bay-Gates #2 230 Morro Bay 483, 485; Gates 223, 225 07/24/2002 07:07 07/24/2002 15:07 480 Morro Bay-Gates #2 230 Morro Bay 483, 485; Gates 223, 225 06/11/2003 09:06 06/11/2003 13:06 240 Morro Bay-Mesa 230 Morro Bay 543, 545; Mesa 223, 225 05/22/2002 07:05 05/22/2002 15:05 480 Morro Bay-Mesa 230 Morro Bay 543, 545; Mesa 223, 225. 12/03/2002 07:12 12/03/2002 14:12 420 Morro Bay-Mesa 230 Mesa 223, 225; Morro Bay 543, 545 05/21/2003 08:05 05/21/2003 17:05 540 Morro Bay-Mesa 230 Mesa 223, 225; Morro Bay 543, 545 05/22/2003 08:05 05/22/2003 16:05 480 Morro Bay-Mesa 230 Morro Bay 223, 225; Mesa 543, 545 06/03/2003 07:06 06/03/2003 15:06 480 Morro Bay-Midway #1 230 Morro Bay 513, 515; Midway 533, 535 06/24/2002 07:06 06/24/2002 17:06 600 Morro Bay-Midway #1 230 Morro Bay 513, 515; Midway 533, 535 06/25/2002 07:06 06/25/2002 16:06 540 Morro Bay-Midway #1 230 Morro Bay 513, 515; Midway 533, 535 06/26/2002 10:06 06/26/2002 14:06 240 Morro Bay-Midway #1 230 Morro Bay 513, 515; Midway 533, 535 11/18/2002 08:11 11/18/2002 14:11 360 Morro Bay-Midway #1 230 Morro Bay 513, 515; Midway 537, 539 07/15/2003 00:07 07/15/2003 07:07 420 Morro Bay-Midway #1 230 Morro Bay 513, 515; Midway 537, 539 07/15/2003 23:07 07/16/2003 05:07 360 Morro Bay-Midway #2 230 Morro Bay 525, 523; Midway 543, 545 03/18/2002 07:03 03/18/2002 15:03 480 Morro Bay-Midway #2 230 Morro Bay 523, 525; Midway 547, 549, CB 542 and T-Tap 06/18/2002 07:06 06/18/2002 16:06 540 Morro Bay-Midway #2 230 Morro Bay 523, 525; Midway 547, 549, CB 542 and T-Tap 06/19/2002 07:06 06/19/2002 16:06 540 Morro Bay-Midway #2 230 Morro Bay 523, 525; Midway 547, 549, CB 542 and T-Tap 06/20/2002 07:06 06/20/2002 16:06 540 Morro Bay-Midway #2 230 Morro Bay 523, 525; Midway 547, 549, CB 542 and T-Tap 06/21/2002 07:06 06/21/2002 15:06 480 Morro Bay-Midway #2 230 Morro Bay 523, 525; Midway 547, 549 107/15/2003 00:07 07/15/2003 07:07 420 Morro Bay-Midway #2 230 Morro Bay 523, 525; Midway 547, 549 07/16/2003 00:07 07/16/2003 05:07 300 18

( Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 Table 6 Transmission Line Maintenance Outage Data 1111/2000 through 9/912003 Line Name Voltage Clearance Boundary Actual Out Time Actual Return Duration Time (minutes)

Diablo-Mesa 230 Diablo 283, 285; Mesa 213, 215 10/17_2002 07:10 10/17/2002 15:10 480 Diablo-Mesa 230 Diablo 283, 285; Mesa 277, 201, 287 12/16/2002 12:12 12/16/2002 15:12 180 Diablo-Mesa 230 Diablo 283, 285; Mesa 213, 215. 08/26/2003 09:08 08/27/2003 15:08 1800 Diablo-Mesa 230 Diablo 283, 285; Mesa 213, 215 09/19/2003 08:09 09/19/2003 15:09 420 Templeton-Gates 230 Gates 217, 219; Templeton 293 03/25/2003 08:03 03/25/2003 20:03 720 Templeton-Gates 230 Gates 217, 219; Templeton 293 04/30/2003 11:04 05/01/2003 16:05 1741 Templeton-Gates 230 Templeton 293; Gates 213, 215 06/12/2003 08:06 06/12/2003 17:06 540 19

Enclosure I PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 PG&E Response to Question I on Diesel Generator Reliability Reliability of the DCPP diesel generator (DGs) can be addressed inthree ways; (1) DG hours unavailable due to planned and unplanned events, (2) DG failures to meet starting requirements on demand, and (3) maintenance related failures requiring a DG or related system to be placed in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) (Maintenance rule goal setting) status. DG hours unavailable is addressed in the regulatory assessment performance indicator (PI) data reported quarterly to the NRC in accordance with NEI 99-02, "Regulatory Assessment Performance Indicator Guideline," Revision 2, dated November 2001. The PI values for the DCPP IDGs for the period from the third quarter, 2001 through the second quarter, 2003 range from 0.7 percent to 0.9 percent for Unit I and from 0.5 percent to 0.6 percent for Unit 2. Actual planned and unplanned unavailable hours and PI values for the last eight quarters are shown in Table 7, uMUnit I Safety System Unavailability, Emergency AC Power," and Table 8, "Unit 2 Safety System Unavailability, Emergency AC Power." The PI values are well below "Increased Regulatory Response Band" threshold of 2.5 percent specified by NEI 99-02. The DG PI values are calculated each quarter based on data from the previous 12 quarters.

They reflect system unavailability due to both planned and unplanned unavailability and are calculated for each unit by summing the quarterly unavailability for all three trains and dividing by three, the number of trains in each unit.

Table 7 Unit I Safety System Unavailability, Emergency AC Power

- 3Q/O~~~~~1 [ 4Q/O1F Q/2Q02 2 il:

1 3Q102[ 4Q02[ 1Q13 2Q/03

FTraIln ... . F771 ... I .. . .. I.......77f unavailable hours 16____ .90 .m. [.4 32 lu~npianneO unavailable hours. [..0..0... o...

I~aulteposurehours o F. F.76

[Effecti. Re. .......

r.... 01.. 0. .. p. ........ T[ __

I-T~aln .... _ . . . .. ~ i~

Jlnoanneqtunavailable hours II~~~~........ . .ou.. ...

13.01 0

.01.PI f

21 I.ii~I.o~p.~ :. .[ 0 l!ffe'ctive Rese~thours of o.__________

_ __efq

[euired hours_______ 2280120.02160.012800 _1~01 2208.0 I 208.0_ _

22:0t7. 0[ 2 160.0 [Oc:_0~

2183.0 IF!lrned unavailable hours _2.2110f7

[Junplanned unavailable hours :f . 0 f oF .o0 2.4.0F1..poqF

- ol10.

[Futexposure hours _ o F F ~-- F F=o -- 2 o 1lEffective Reset hours 1 of I . of.I . F p.1 . 9].

li~~eq4Li.red hours 02i~P1208 83 00 F 00 2L209.001 -2160.001J_2183.00 I~equired hours

. I ________ _________

~~~~~~~~~~..... .... F__ ..... F I...F.

F.1~F.1.

1F....~.

[md~ao~vlue R.1. .00 .00 .0aF8 108 20

Enclosure I PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 Table 8 Unit 2 Safety System Unavailability, Emergency AC Power

_ _ __ __ _ __ __ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 3 Q10 [4 Q/ O1 1 I Z [

Q 0 [ Q 4 Q/ O2 1Q 10 3;I Q~/0 3 I~~ralni . .~~~~~~ ii .4. 17771 ___ 1.. [..~~~~~~~~~F. yF7.7- -

PIlanned unavailable hours . .0I29.90 Fo F 6.801 0 [7 6.90q -- ----

,(Unplanne unavailable hours j o 7 6 [ 0 01 .50[ 2.Ff FOi

F'auit exp-osure hours I .. 1 0 o 05[ F I .[.F o(F

'~Ffetieestous

~e~quiired hours 112208.6120 9.

2209.0 100 JF.

13.

2160.0.218160.0 2208.0 [ __.rOF 2209.0[ 21600 2130 2130 jl)lanrned unavailable hours j 03f 00 9 q, io1 0f f .. K Y Ilunplanned unavailable hours .i o___ . J :o1 o . .0..9 i Faylt exposure hours . I .qF -. -P ~~F o . .T777 F - -Li~i IjwEctiye Reset hours . . L. 1 9764 o .. L7F71.

~~Requiredhours~~~~~~1 2208.0 2209.0.1 2160.0: 2183.0 1 2208.0 [20. 2160.0j 2183.0 Iplannked hunaalal hous 1 0 0' .1 r2 9oF7o of of 91 0 Ilunplanned unavailable hours I f p .9 ~ 1 9f . ~ ~ j 0

$ayl expo~sure hours - :j oF - or .o~f776 F.~F of - .o....01. o KfqheReset hou rs o-o----779 -- OF 77 ----.----

~~Requiredhours~~~~~~2208.0 2209.0~2160.0 2183.0[ 2208.[20.0 ~ f 260.0 F2183.0 1l1ndicator value 1. [~7-7 DG failures to meet starting or surveillance test requirements is tracked by PG&E for each DG start. Such requirements include accelerating to 900 rpm within 10 seconds or less, reaching rated voltage and frequency in 13 seconds or less, and maintaining rated voltage and loading for the duration of the test or event. Provided below is a table showing DG failures for the last 20, 50, and 100 starts for each DG.

Failure to meet starting or loading requirements in last number of starts (reliability* shown in parentheses)

DG Last 20 starts Last 50 starts Last 100 starts 1-1 0 (1.00) 0 (1.00) 2 (0.980) 1-2 0 (1.00) 1 (0.980) 1 (0.990) 1-3 2 (0.909) -3 (0.943) 4 (0.962) 2-1 0 (1.00) 1 (0.980) 2 (0.980) 2-2 1 (0.952) 1 (0.980) 1 (0.990) 2-3 0 (1.00) 0 (1.00) 0 (1.00) 21

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 The DG failure data presented above is consistent with the DG target reliability of 0.950 assumed for the DCPP station blackout (SBO) analysis submitted by PG&E Letter DCL-92-084, dated April 13, 1992, and approved by the NRC in a supplemental safety evaluation dated May 29, 1992. The DCPP SBO analysis was performed in accordance with NUMARC 87-00, Revision 1, "Guidelines and Technical Bases for NUMARC Initiatives Addressing Station Blackout at Light Water Reactors," dated August 1991. NUMARC 87-00 prescribes allowed target reliabilities to be:

Evaluation Criteria Last 20 demands > 0.90 reliability Last 50 demands > 0.94 reliability Last 100 demands > 0.95 reliability

Where total reliability = total valid tests total valid tests + total valid failures (This reliability equation is used in PG&E Letter DCL-85-375, "License Amendment Request 85-15, Technical Specification 3.8.1.1, Electrical Power Systems, A.C.

Sources," dated December 26, 1985, approved by License Amendments No. 9 (Unit 1) and No. 7 (Unit 2), dated June 20, 1986.)

NUMARC 87-00 further prescribes that for the class of plants to which DCPP is assigned, if any of the above three criteria are met; the unit may select a DG reliability target of 0.95 for determining the required SBO coping period. Therefore the current DG reliability status is consistent with previous analyses.

Finally, since 2001, there have been two DG or related systems placed in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) status. On March 28, 2001, Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump No. 1 was placed in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) status due to age related degradation of the motor thermal overload relay. It was removed from 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) status on October 1, 2002, following revision of the preventive maintenance procedure and successful testing for three quarters. On April 17, 2003, DG 1-2 was placed in 10 CFR 50.65(a)(1) status due to maintenance activities that allowed the lubricating oil to cool to an unacceptably low temperature.

NRC Question 2 It is the staffs understanding that the purpose of the requested amendment is to allow an increased outage time during plant power operation for performing DG inspection, maintenance, and overhaul, which would include disassembly of the DG. DG operability verification after a major maintenance or overhaul may require a full load rejection test. If a full load rejection test is performed at power, please address the following:

22

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 (a) What would be the typical and worse-case voltage transients on the 4160-V safety buses as a result of a full-load rejection?

(b) If a full-load rejection test is used to test the DG governor after maintenance, what assurance would there be that an unsafe transient condition on the safety bus (i.e., load swing or voltage transient) due to improperly performed maintenance or repair of a governor would not occur?

(c) Using maintenance and testing experience on the DG, identify possible transient conditions caused by improperly performed maintenance on the DG governor and voltage regulator. Discuss the electrical system response to these transients.

(d) Provide the tests to be performed after the overhaul to declare the DG operable and provide justification for performing those tests at power.

PG&E Response 2(a) The typical voltage response recorded on the 4 kV busses during full load rejection testing in accordance with Surveillance Test Procedure (STP) M-9D1, "Diesel Generator Load Rejection Test," is a small drop from the DG supported voltage to the off-site power source voltage. The largest drop yet recorded is 54 volts.

2(b) Maintenance testing that PG&E performs following any DG governor or voltage regulator maintenance is designed to preclude creating any transient conditions that would challenge a safety bus with the DG loaded. Normally, maintenance is not performed on the DG governors that would necessitate full load rejection testing. In cases where full load rejection testing is necessary, such as following replacement or tune-up of the governor, the governor's response is first verified during an idle run prior to paralleling the DG to the bus. This is performed by "bumping" the fuel rack and causing a speed transient. The transient is observed both visually using attached instruments and physically by observing the fuel rack's return to a stable state. This ensures that prior to paralleling, the governor is working correctly. Electrical Maintenance Procedure MP E-21.6, "Diesel Generator Governor and Voltage Regulator Adjustment," is used for governor tune-up. It directs the technician to ask the operator in the control room to raise the DG frequency to 61 Hz, then to lower it to 59 Hz and then to raise it back to 60 Hz to ensure proper operation of the motor-operated potentiometer.

This procedure also verifies proper null voltage, stability and gain of the electronic governor with the engine idling. Each of these items could cause load swings during parallel operation and therefore they are set and verified prior to parallel operation.

23

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 2(c) Except for tune-up maintenance per MP E-21.6, there is no maintenance performed on the DG electronic governors. Unless governor replacement is required due to failure, usually no adjustments are necessary and MP E-21.6 is followed to verify proper governor response (stability, amplifier gain) and proper set-up values for droop and load gain. Based on experience, once the values of droop and load gain are set, no adjustments are needed unless the governor is replaced.

The only maintenance performed on the mechanical governor is oil change-out.

This maintenance does not affect the performance of the mechanical governor.

If the mechanical governor is replaced, then set-up of governor linkages and electronic governor null voltage is performed in accordance with MP E-21.6.

Proper operation of the governor is verified prior to paralleling the DG to the bus.

Except for periodic inspection of the solder joints on the automatic voltage regulator card there is no maintenance involved on the voltage regulator. After the voltage regulator is initially set for stability and voltage range, it does not require any adjustments.

Since proper operation of the governors is verified prior to paralleling the DG to the bus, no electrical transients are expected, nor have been experienced, as a result of maintenance.

2(d) Normally, after maintenance is completed, the DG is started manually and is run to ensure proper operation and control of the voltage regulator and the governor.

During this run, voltage regulator and governor tune-up verification is performed.

Post maintenance testing to determine DG operability is performed using monthly test STP M-9A, 'Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test."

The DG is paralleled and loaded to 2600 kW and run for one hour. If the governor or voltage regulator was replaced, or tune-up was required, then full load rejection testing would be performed at the end of the STP M-9A test by opening of the emergency diesel generator (EDG) output breaker in accordance with STP M-9D1. Historically, no problems have been encountered resulting in unacceptable plant transients due to DG full load rejection testing, including performance of the test at power.

Copies of STP M-9A and STP M-9D1 are provided in Enclosure 4.

NRC Question 3 What type of communication has been established between the control room operator at Diablo Canyon Plant and the System Load Dispatcher? Is the System Load Dispatcher notified in advance that the DG is going to be out for extended period of time?

24

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 PG&E Response DCPP Operating Procedure OP J-6B:VII, "Diesel Generator - Clearing," Prerequisite 4.2 provides the following guidance:

'The potential for a loss of off-site power should be minimized during a Diesel Generator out-of-service time. The Diablo Switchyard Operator should be notified as far in advance as reasonable prior to clearing a Diesel Generator for planned maintenance work and again when a Diesel Generator has been made available. This will limit the instances of simultaneous maintenance on off-site transmission equipment and the diesel generators."

NRC Question 4 Other licensees who requested for DG AOT extension provided the following Regulatory Commitments in their requests:

A. Weather conditions will be evaluated prior to entering the extended DG AOT for voluntary planned maintenance. An extended DG AOT will not be entered for voluntary planned maintenance purposes if official weather forecasts are predicting severe conditions (tornado or thunderstorm warnings).

B. The condition of the offsite power supply and switchyard will be evaluated prior to entering the extended AOT.

C. No discretionary switchyard maintenance will be allowed. In addition, no discretionary maintenance will be allowed on the main, auxiliary or startup transformers associated with the unit.

D. No maintenance or testing that affects the reliability of the train associated with the OPERABLE DG will be scheduled during the extended AOT. If any testing and maintenance activities must be performed while the extended AOT is in effect, a 10CFR50.65 (a)(4) evaluation will be performed.

E. The steam driven emergency feedwater pump will not be taken out of service for planned maintenance activities and will be treated as protected equipment.

F The system dispatcher will be contacted once per day and informed of the DG status along with the power needs of the facility.

G. The on-shift Operations crews will discuss and review appropriate normal and emergency operating procedures upon or prior to assuming the Watch for the first time after having scheduled days off while the AOT is in effect.

25

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 H. The Operations crews will be briefed concerning the unit activities, including compensatory measures established and the importance of the alternate ac source following instruction of the Shift Manager upon the loss of power event.

This briefing will be performed upon or prior to assuming the Watch for the first time after having scheduled days off while the AOTis in effect.

Please provide the provisions, limitations and compensatory actions that you will be committing to implement to assure adequate defense in depth, during the extended DG AOT.

PG&E Response On-line DG maintenance utilizing the extended completion time proposed by LAR 03-06 will be controlled in accordance DCPP Administrative Procedure AD7.DC6, "On-Line Maintenance Risk Management." AD7.DC6 guidance includes evaluating risk in accordance with 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) (maintenance rule), establishing compensatory measures, and assuring the work is scheduled in the appropriate trainlbus/set workweek. A copy of AD7.DC6 is provided in Enclosure 2.

In addition, as has been done for past for major DG on-line maintenance, operational instructions and contingency plans will be provided by a temporary procedure (TP) or other appropriate procedure. The procedure will include prerequisites, precautions and limitations, and compensatory measures similar in scope to the examples provided in the NRC question above. An example TP is provided in Enclosure 3 (TP TO-01 05, "Diesel Generator 2-1 On-Line Maintenance").

Rather than prescribing a specific set of provisions, limitations, and compensatory measures in advance for future extended DG maintenance periods, such limitations will be evaluated based on the plant and grid conditions present at the time of each extended DG maintenance period, and will comply with AD7.DC6 and will be similar in scope to those identified in TP TO-0105.

NRC Question 5 On Page 22, Item 3, it is stated that only one major overhaul (in excess of 7 days) will be performed per DG per refueling. It is also stated that the increase in "at-power" DG unavailability given the extension in completion time is 2.2 days peryear. It is not clear to the staff how with the performance of one major overhaul per DG, per refueling (which takes in excess of seven days), the increase in unavailability will only be 2.2 days. Please explain.

PG&E Response The discussion of the approach for calculating the change in the annual average core damage frequency due to the change in the DG completion time starts on page 19 of 26

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 PG&E Letter DCL-03-060, dated May 29, 2003. On page 20 of DCL-03-060, the following definition is provided for T., (e.g. T.-,):

"Additionaltime peryear (TYEAR) that DG 1-1 is out of service (OOS) as a result of extending the completion time."

The important word in the definition is "additional."

Starting on page 21 and continuing on page 22, DCL-03-060 addresses the predicted additional time, not the total time, due to the proposed change in the DG completion time. For example, on page 21 (bottom of the page), it is stated that:

"The amount of time to be added to future on-line unavailability due to moving preventative maintenance work out of refueling outages is approximately 29 hours3.356481e-4 days 0.00806 hours 4.794974e-5 weeks 1.10345e-5 months per year. Currently, a significant portion of the DG preventative maintenance is already performed on-line."

Therefore, 2.2 days is PG&E's prediction of the average additional unavailability time per year (note that one major overhaul will be per refueling outage (i.e. once per 18-21 months). Currently, on average, a DG OOS time is 5 days annually (under the current 7-day Technical Specification completion time). With the proposed 14-day completion time, PG&E expects this yearly average OOS time to increase to 7.2 days.

It is also noted that the incremental conditional core damage probability, which is the incremental probability of a core damage event over a period of time equal to the proposed extended completion time (14 days), is discussed on pages 23-25 of DCL-03-060.

NRC Question 6 Page 8 of yoursubmittalprovides a discussion of SBO. Please provide additional information as to what is considered a SBO and how SBO is modeled.

PG&E Response Page 8 of DCL-03-060, under "Station Blackout Capacity," presents the prescriptive definition of SBO at DCPP, and the prescriptive basis for being able to cope with such a SBO condition.

In the DCPP probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) model, consistent with the industry PRA practices, SBO is treated as the loss of all onsite and offsite AC power. In a SBO sequence, the operators are instructed to depressurize the steam generators using the 10 percent steam dump valves or the 40 percent steam dump valves to limit reactor coolant pump (RCP) seal leakage. The turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump is credited to cool the reactor coolant system (RCS). These actions reduce RCS 27

Enclosure 1 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 temperatures and pressures sufficiently to allow the accumulators to inject their contents into the RCS. The accumulator inventories provide additional RCS inventory, which must also leak out if the core is to be uncovered. The reduced RCS temperatures and pressures limit the rate of seal degradation and minimize the rate of subsequent leakage.

Failure of these actions reduce the time available for recovery of electric power because the RCP seal leak rate would be higher. These actions are all considered in the determination of success criteria for the electric power recovery factors.

During SBO scenarios, the PRA assumes that operators take action to (1) restore AC power to at least two vital buses by restoring offsite power, recovering DGs, or cross-tying vital buses, (2) maintain and control auxiliary feedwater flow from an auxiliary feedwater pump, (3) monitor core subcooling and reactor coolant inventory, and (4) monitor DC power availability and take action to extend battery life.

The following should be noted relative to SBO scenarios:

No electric power recovery action is credited for the SBO scenarios in which a pressurizer power operated relief valve or safety valve fails to reseat, resulting in a loss-of-coolant accident path.

Following recovery of a DG during a SBO, operator action is credited to cross-tie two vital buses.

28

Enclosure 2 PG&E Letter DCL-03-142 Diablo Canyon Power Plant Administrative Procedure AD7.DC6, "On-Line Maintenance Risk Management"

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER. AD7.DC6 NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION REVISION 7 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT PAGE 1 OF 15.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE TITLE: On-Line Maintenance Risk Management

'10/24/02 EFFECTIVE DATE PROCEDURE CLASSIFICATION: QUALITY RELATED SPONSORING ORGANIZATION: OPERATIONS REVIEW LEVEL: "A" TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION PAGE SCOPE ................ I DISCUSSION.2 RESPONSIBILITIES ................ 3 DEFINITIONS.4 .................. .... 4 Compensatory Measures.4 Core Damage Frequency (CDF).4 Core Damage Probability (CDP).5 Degraded .... :5 External Risk .;;5 .........

Internal Risk.'6 Key Safety Function (KSF)............................. .... 6 Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) .: 7 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Allowable Outage Time (PRA AOT) .7 Risk Significant.7 Threshold PRA AOT ............................ ;. : .7 Train Level SSC.8 Trip Mitigation SSC.8 TripRisk.8 PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS ;;.;8 INSTRUCTIONS .............. 8 D eveloping the 12 Week Rolling Matrix . .. .................................... ;.8 8 Managing Risk in the Maintenance Planning Phase .10 Managing Risk in the Maintenance Execution Phase (Real Time) ............................................... ;.1. 1 Plant Trip Risk Assessment.11 Probabilistic Risk Assessment .................... 12 Safety Function Degradation Assessment .............................. 13 REFERENCES.14 RECORDS ................................. 15 ATTAACHMENTS .............................. 15 SPONSOR.11.

1. SCOPE 1.1 This procedure provides guidance for managing plant trip, probabilistic, and safety function degradation risk from on-line maintenance, external or internal conditions, as required by 10 CFR 50.65(a)(4) of the Maintenance Rule.

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PRO SET PEFOR WOK&USEUFOR PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER AD7.DC6 DIABLO CANYON POVER PLANT REVISION 7 PAGE 2 OF 15 TITLE: On-Line Maintenance Risk Management 1.2 These instructions shall be used for risk management when the unit is in MODES 1, 2, 3 and 4. Risk management in MODES 5 and 6 is addressed in AD8.DC50 through AD8.DC55.

1.3 Risk in the transitional MODE 4 will be controlled as follows:

1.3.1 Any maintenance on risk significant Systems, Structures, or Components (SSCs) in MODE 4 will require specific authorization of the operations manager.

1.3.2 Risk significant equipment removed from service in accordance with Tech Spec requirements (e.g., isolating a CCP and the SIPs per SR 3.4.12.1 and SR 3.4.12.2) does not require special authorization.

1.3.3 Qualitative evaluation based on Key Safety Function degradation should be performed for risk significant equipment removed from service in MODE 4.

No quantitative core damage frequency values should be used since the probabilistic risk analysis is based on a full power model.

1.4 Certain risk significant components cannot be taken out of service for on-line maintenance or result in very short Tech Spec action statements. In these cases, risk insights provide limited value. Therefore, this procedure will limit itself to assessing probabilistic and safety function degradation risk on SSCs listed in Attachment 9.1. See also reference 7.7 for bases.

2. DISCUSSION 2.1 Risk from performing maintenance on-line is minimized by-2.1.1 Performing only those preventative and corrective maintenance items on-line required to maintain the reliability of the structure, system, or component (SSC).

2.1.2 Minimizing cumulative unavailability of safety-related and risk significant SSCs by limiting the number of at-power maintenance outage windows (MOW) per cycle per train/component. Refer to AD7.lD4.

2.1.3 Minimizing the total number of SSCs out-of-service (OOS) at the same time.

2.1.4 Minimizing the risk of initiating plant transients (trips) that could challenge safety systems by implementing compensatory measures.

2.1.5 Avoiding higher risk combinations of OOS SSCs using Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) insights.

2.1.6 Maintaining "defense in depth" by avoiding combinations of OOS SSCs that are related to similar safety functions or that affect multiple safety functions.

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UNCONTROL PERFORM WOR PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER AD7.DC6 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 7 PAGE 3 OF 15 TITLE: On-Line Maintenance Risk Management 2.2 Scheduling the SSCs in the 12 week rolling matrix according to their Train/Bus/Set relationship minimizes a large part of the Tech Spec conflict and risk factor. Refer also to AD7.ID4.

2.3 ' Risk is managed as follows:

2.3.1 Plant trip risk activities or conditions are evaluated qualitatively and mitigated

,* .. .: by:

a. Taking appropriate compensatory measures- and/or

b. Ensuring defense-in-depth for safety systems that are challenged by a plant trip.

2.3.2 Risk significant equipment OOS configurations (singles and pairs of components) affecting Core Damage Frequency (CDF) have been quantitatively pre-analyzed by probabilistic risk methods.

2.3.3 The ability of SSCs to support Key Safety Functions (KSFs) that protect the fission product barriers (clad, RCS, and containment) is evaluated qualitatively.

. . 2.3.4 Compensatory measures and management authorization may be required to allow higher risk configurations for planned maintenance. Management notification may be required for emergent higher risk situations.

3. RESPONSIBILITIE S ' '. I ..

3.1 The engineering director is responsible for overall administration of the Maintenance Rule per MAI.ID17.

3.2 The scheduling supervisor is responsible for overall coordination of scheduling on-line maintenance in accordance with this instruction and AD7.ID4.

3.3 The cognizant manager is responsible for identifying and proposing compensatory measures for HIGH or VERY HIGH risk activities performed by their groups per MAL.DC1O and MAL.DCI 1. I' 3.4 The operations manager is responsible for approving higher risk OOS configurations as identified by this instruction.

3.5 The operations work control supervisor and the daily scheduling supervisor are responsible for overall implementation of the on-line risk management program.

3.6 The operations work week manager (or, in his absence, an OPS Shift Manager) is responsible for ensuring risk assessments for planned maintenance are completed in accordance with this instruction and AD7.1D4.

3.7 The operations shift foreman is responsible for:

Verifying risk assessments for planned activities are valid; and for

Performing risk assessments for emergent conditions affecting the plant in accordance with this instruction and AD7.ID4.

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5STROU>NOT USA4 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER AD7.DC6 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 7 PAGE 4 OF 15 TITLE: On-Line Maintenance Risk Management 3.8 The PRA supervisor is responsible for:

Providing the risk insights and numerical risk values for this procedure; and for

Maintaining the ORAM-Sentinel software.

4. DEFINITIONS 4.1 Compensatory Measures - Actions taken to mitigate the risk from planned or emergent plant equipment conditions or external or internal conditions. Examples include:

NOTE: Deferral of elective work to avoid unacceptable risk is an assumed option.

4.1.1 Risk Awareness

Tailboards, PA announcements, Plan of the Day, special notices, etc.

Direct supervisory oversight.

Upper Management authorization.

Abnormal or infrequent evolution briefings.

4.1.2 Minimize duration of the activity or condition

Pre-planning - Tailboards, pre-job walkdowns, pre-staging equipment and supplies, mock-up training.

Contingency planning - Canned tailboards, JIT simulator training, temporary procedures, call-out lists, back-out criteria, etc. (plan for failure).

Augmented coverage - Working two (2) shifts/day, around-the-clock coverage.

4.1.3 Mitigate Consequences

Protect redundant equipment - barricading OPERABLE DEGs during redundant DEG MOWs, offsite power outages, or grid instability; restricting activities in the 500kV and 230kV yards when DEGs are out of service.

4.2 Core Damage Frequency (CDF) - The instantaneous risk of a core damaging accident's occurrence expressed as occurrences per year.

4.2.1 The plant specific Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA) calculates CDF for various plant configurations and accident scenarios.

a. For example, the CDF for operating the plant with all safety systems available (no maintenance case) is about IE-5/yr, that is, a core damaging accident might be expected to occur about once every 100,000 years.

b. If startup power were to be removed from service for the whole year, the CDF would increase by about a factor of 10 to about IE-4/yr, or once every 10,000 years.

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER AD7.DC6 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT I, REVISION 7 PAGE 5 OF 15 TITLE: On-Line Maintenance Risk Management 4.2.2 Because the PRA model evaluates individual component failures, the CDF for Train Level SSCs in this procedure are sometimes composite values representative of the train vice specific components.

4.3 Core Damage Probability (CDP) - The product of the CDF and the out-of-service duration. This represents the actual risk of a core damaging event occurring during a given period of time.

4.3.1 From the above example, if startup power was to be out-of-service for six (6) hours, the core damage probability would be:

(IE - 4/yr) (6 hrs) 6.9E-8 8760 hrs/yr 4.4 Degraded - SSC condition or performance is below nominal. May still be considered OPERABLE, but operation may be curtailed or under increased monitoring. Examples include:

SSCs in Maintenance Rule (a)(l) (goal setting) status or approaching performance criteria limits.

SSCs on the Predictive Maintenance "Equipment Watch List."

SSCs on alert frequency Surveillance Testing (PX ALRT ARs).

SSCs requiring compensatory measures per Prompt Operability Assessments or Operability Evaluations (refer to OM7.ID8 and OM7.ID12).

SSCs with other significant existing deficiencies (CM or AT EQPR or EVAL ARs, operator workarounds, etc.).

4.5 External Risk - Trip Risks from factors originating outside the plant boundaries.

Severity of trip risk will be evaluated qualitatively on a case-by-case basis. The following examples should be classified as High Trip Risks:

4.5.1 Offsite power system induced trip risks:

NOTE: External risks affecting offsite power may also affect plant trip mitigation SSCs.

Peak power demand (i.e., CAISO stage 3 or higher grid emergencies).

Fires threatening offsite power source lines.

Storms (wind, rain, etc.).

4.5.2 Direct trip risk from storms:

High ocean swell warning. (Refer to OP 0-28, "Intake Management.")

Lightning strikes, etc.

4.5.3 Seismic risk factors.

Parkfield Level A earthquake prediction. (Refer to CP M-4, "Earthquake.")

Tsunami warning. (Refer to CP M-5, "Tsunami Warning.")

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER AD7.DC6 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 7 PAGE 6 OF 15 TITLE: On-Line Maintenance Risk Management 4.6 Internal Risk - Risks from operations, maintenance, and environment originating inside the plant boundaries.

4.6.1 Examples of environmental effects include fire, flooding, high and medium energy line breaks.

4.6.2 So long as compensatory measures are put in place per the Equipment Control Guideline actions for degraded engineered features, risk to adjacent components is considered insignificant.

4.6.3 Failure to implement ECG actions within the required time limits should require an after the fact risk assessment by the PRA Group. This includes:

Fire protection - Barriers, doors, detection, suppression, etc. (ECG 18).

Flooding - Doors, barriers, drains, etc. (ECG 80).

High and Medium Energy Line Breaks - Doors, blow-out panels, etc.

(ECG 80).

4.7 Key Safety Function (KSF) - A function required to protect the fission product barriers.

Degradation of "defense in depth," the ability to maintain the KSF, is evaluated by the use of logic trees when removing Risk Significant SSCs from service for maintenance. This assessment is independent of the PRA AOT method.

4.7.1 These KSFs correspond to the critical safety functions in the Emergency Operating Procedures (EOP) Function Restoration Guidelines (FRGs) that mitigate extreme - RED, or severe - MAGENTA, challenges to the barriers.

NOTE: The RCS inventory critical safety function in the FRGs was not included because there are no RED or MAGENTA paths in that series of procedures.

4.7.2 Two additional support functions, Component Cooling and Vital Electric Power, were created in addition to those in the FRGs. Many individual components can be affected by a degradation of these support systems. For ease of use, rather than evaluate the affect on each supported component, the new KSFs were created.

4.7.3 Similar to the FRGs, KSF defense in depth degradation is represented by a color.

a. GREEN KSF fully satisfied

b. YELLOW Moderate degradation

c. ORANGE Significant degradation

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.. t ! -t PAGE 7 OF 15 TITLE: On-Line Maintenance Risk Management -

4.8 Large Early Release Frequency (LERF) - The instantaneous risk to the public from releases via penetration failures three (3) inch diameter and larger before the plant's A emergency response plan has been implemented in an accident scenario. The only release pathway this large that could be affected by maintenance is the vacuum/pressure relief or containment purge and exhaust valves.

. 4.8.1 LERF risk is evaluated qualitatively under the Containment Key Safety

Function. - -

a. For example, venting of containment for pressure relief should be avoided if a Train Level SSC affecting CDF was OOS giving a yellow Core Cooling orContainment Key Safety Function color (e.g., RHRP give yellow for both).

b. Alternatively, the example above would be acceptable if compensatory measures to mitigate the risk were implemented such as increased risk awareness tailboards, contingency planning in the event of a leak, etc.

c. If an inoperable penetration is isolated to comply with Tech Spec 3.6.3 actions, those compensatory measures are sufficient to mitigate the LERF

-: risk. No other risk management actions would be required.

4.9 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Allowable Outage Time (PRA AOT) - The number of hours a single or combination of Risk Signiificant Train Level SSCs may be OOS before the time-integrated risk addition to the "no maintenance case" Core Damage Probability (CDP) exceeds 1E-6. Industry PRA guidelines define a change of less than IE-6 as "insignificant risk increase." The PRA'AOT is used as a "ruler" to compare the relative risk of removing Risk Significant Train Level SSCs from service.

4.10 Risk Significant - As defined by MALID17, a SSC is deemed to be risk significant if:

4.10.1 It is a significant contributor to the plant specific PRA; 4.10.2 If it provides or supports a Key Safety Function; or 4.10.3 It has been judged to be risk significant by the Maintenance Rule expert panel.

NOTE: Certain risk significant components cannot be taken out of service for on-line maintenance or result in very short Tech Spec action statements. In these cases, risk insights provide limited value. Therefore, this procedure will limit itself to assessing probabilistic and safety function degradation risk on SSCs listed in Attachment 9. -See also reference 7.7 for bases.

4.11 Threshold PRA AOT - The PRA AOT of the riskiest single Risk Significant Train Level SSC normally allowed to be removed from service for on-line maintenance. It is reasoned that any combination of Risk Significant Train Level SSCs may be removed from service as long as it is allowed by Tech Specs, OP1.DC17, and the combination is no riskier than the riskiest single Risk Significant Train Level SSC.

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER AD7.DC6 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 7 PAGE 8 OF 15 TITLE: On-Line Maintenance Risk Management 4.12 Train Level SSC (TLS) - Equipment name that represents the train affected by individual component maintenance or failure. For example:

OOS Component TLSSC FCV-95 AFWPI 8803A CCPl1 8807B SIP2 Opposite Unit ASW pp FCV-601 4.13 Trip Mitigation SSC - The primary SSCs that are immediately challenged during a normal plant trip (no safety injection). Loss of redundancy for these SSCs present significant complications in the event of a plant trip:

Offsite power sources (230kV initially, 500kV with delayed access)

Emergency Diesel Generators (backup to 230kV startup)

Auxiliary Feedwater trains

Auxiliary Saltwater trains 4.14 Trip Risk - Any activity that could lead to a reactor or turbine trip. Turbine and reactor trips represent the most likely transient initiators leading to core damaging and large early release events.

4.14.1 HIGH risk activities evaluated per MAL.DC10 or MAI.DCI I are considered Trip Risks by this procedure only if they might lead to a transient having a significant effect on reactor power (>2%RTP). See Reference 7.9.

5. PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 5.1 The 12 week rolling matrices shown in Attachment 9.2 are FOR INFORMATION ONLY. The Daily Work Coordination Group (DWC) keeps current versions of the matrices for each unit.

5.2 Current PRA AOT values are found using the on-line risk assessment computer program ORAM-Sentinel. PRA AOT values for single configurations are documented on Attachment 9.1.

5.3 The SFATs are based on the equipment importance in accident mitigation as described in the EOP background documents. SFATs are displayed using ORAM-Sentinel software.

6. INSTRUCTIONS 6.1 Developing the 12 Week Rolling Matrix 6.1.1 The 12 Week Rolling Matrix (Matrix) is based on the STPs performed in MODE 1 for all the major risk significant SSCs. (Refer to Attachment 9.1, List of Risk Significant Systems.)

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F77' UNCON TROLLED RCD D /OT-UifJSfa P~eR OR WdRkoISU 7§rfOR USd¶t PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER AD7.DC6 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 7 PAGE 9 OF 15 TITLE: On-Line Maintenance Risk Management 6.1.2 The weeks are categorized by 3 methods.

-^ a. SSPS Train relation - A, B, or A/B

b. Vital bus relation - F, G, H, or Non-bus

c. Protection Set relation - I, I, III, IV

d. Thus, the 4 week sub-cycle within the 12 week cycle is:

l1. ] TrainA/B lBusH l 2.2jTrain B I1BusG

13. I TrainiA I BusF

4. j Train A/B Non-bus

e. Protection set weeks are spread over the full 12 week cycle.

6.1.3 Each week is further subdivided into two work windows; Tuesday-Wednesday, Thursday-Friday - each 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months long.

a. This is consistent with the AD7.1D4 requirement that T.S. SSCs out-of-service (OOS) duration be scheduled not to exceed 1/2 the Tech Spec Action Allowable Outage Time (AOT). For most ESF components, this is 1/2 of 72 hour8.333333e-4 days 0.02 hours 1.190476e-4 weeks 2.7396e-5 months s: 36 hours4.166667e-4 days 0.01 hours 5.952381e-5 weeks 1.3698e-5 months .

b. This also provides time separation for working two safety related SSCs in the same week.

6.1.4 Compile a listing of the quarterly and monthly STPs for the major SSCs.

6.1.5 Classify the SSCs by SSPS train, vital bus and protection set as described above and spread out the STPs through the 12 week cycle in their appropriate train/bus/set weeks (refer to Attachment 9.2, Sample 12 Week Rolling Matrix).

a. Group the STPs at the train level if possible, for example slave relay test with pump test and associated valve tests.

b. Levelize for daily work loading, cross-discipline support required for test performance, opposite unit testing schedule, test instrumentation requirements. etc.

6.1.6 Analyze weeks for possible trip risks, train level probabilistic risk, and safety function degradation conflicts as described below and correct as required.

6.1.7 Revisions to the matrix should be minimized.

a. If changes are found to be necessary, follow above guidance and analyze for risk similarly.

b. ST? performance should be short cycled as required to avoid use of surveillance interval grace period during transition to the revised matrix.

(Refer to AD13.DC1.)

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER AD7.DC6 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 7 PAGE 10 OF 15 TITLE: On-Line Maintenance Risk Management 6.1.8 The Matrix Coordinator should mark up a long-term matrix spreadsheet (example: Attachment 9.3) or schedule with planned MOWs from the PIMS PM RTS due dates and other Daily Work Coordination (DWC) reports.

a. Identify all MOWs on the spreadsheet to help visualize the SSCs OOS at the same time for risk assessment and workload levelization.

b. Verify Risk Significant SSC MOWs are correctly scheduled in their train/bus/set week to align with the component STP. Correct the PIMS/P3 schedule if necessary or obtain Work Week Manager (WWM) approval for deviation.

c. Schedule so that the STP provides the PMT for the maintenance on the SSC.

6.2 Managing Risk in the Maintenance Planning Phase 6.2.1 The OPS work week managers shall ensure risk management actions are completed for planned work considering:

a. Expected plant conditions during the week.

b. Expected external conditions due to seasonal effects (e.g., storm or fire season, summer peak loads, etc.).

6.2.2 Determine the activities scheduled for the week that are Trip Risks.

6.2.3 Determine the Risk Significant SSCs that are scheduled to be OOS. Classify them at the train level (TLS). Refer to Attachment 9.1.

a. For each TLS, determine its current unavailability and health of its redundant train.

1. The cognizant system engineer and/or maintenance manager should give concurrence to schedule or consider deferral of maintenance.

a) If the TLS is approaching or will exceed 75% of its Maintenance Rule Availability Performance Criteria; or b) If the TLS's redundant train is Degraded.

6.2.4 If a Trip Risk is scheduled concurrently with OOS or degraded trip mitigation TLSs, attempt to separate the activities.

6.2.5 If two or moretLSs are scheduled to be OOS in the same week, attempt to r separate the to avoid overlap.

6.2.6 Determine the risk configurations during the week (unique plant states where one or a combination of trip risks or TLSs will be OOS).

6.2.7 Manage the trip risk, probabilistic risk, and/or safety function degradation associated with each configuration as described in Steps 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6.

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iEC8ST TROLLEMOCDU TUSERFOPERM'WOjSSU~fORUS MTS PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER AD7.DC6 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 7 PAGE 11 OF 15 TITLE: On-Line Maintenance Risk Management 6.2.8 Propose risk mitigation compensatory measures, as appropriate.

6.2.9 Document risk management actions for each configuration on a TS sheet per OPI.DCI7.

-63 Managing Risk in the Maintenance Execution Phase (Real Time) 6.3.1 The SFM shall evaluate and manage the risk of all activities or conditions based on the current plant state:

a. Before any planned OR emergent maintenance is to be performed.

b. As soon as possible when an emergent plant condition is discovered.

c. As soon as possible when an external or internal event or condition is recognized.

6.3.2 Verify if the activity or condition is a Trip Risk and manage per step 6.4.

6.3.3 Determine if the activity removes a TLS from service, and

a. Manage probabilistic risk per step 6.5.

b. Manage safety function degradation per step 6.6.

6.3.4 If the redundant train remaining in service is degraded, implement additional compensatory measures.

6.3.5 If the evaluation reveals unacceptable risk, determine course of action based on restoration of safety function first, PRA aspects second.

6.3.6 Document risk management'actions for each configuration on a TS sheet per OPL.DC17.

6.4 Plant Trip Risk Assessment 6.4.1 For pre-planned trip risk activities:

a. Ensure the work group proposing Trip Risk activities completes the appropriate authorization form from MAL.DCl0 or MAI.DCI 1.

b. Concur with or propose compensatory measures to mitigate the trip risk, as appropriate.

c. Check for concurrent OOS or degraded plant trip mitigation TLSs using ORAM-Sentinel or TS Sheet review (offsite power, DEGs, AFW, or ASW). Ifpresent:

l. Obtain OPS manager authorization for concurrent performance.

2. Implement additional compensatory actions, as appropriate

3. Document condition and basis for approval on the appropriate TS Sheet.

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER AD7.DC6 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 7 PAGE 12 OF 15 TITLE: On-Line Maintenance Risk Management 6.4.2 For emergent plant trip risk activities or conditions:

NOTE: Emergent External Conditions should be treated as Trip Risks.

a. Implement immediate compensatory measures, as appropriate.

b. Check for concurrent OOS or degraded plant trip mitigation TLSs using ORAM-Sentinel or TS Sheet review. If present:

1. Implement additional compensatory measures to mitigate risk, as appropriate.

2. Notify the operations manager.

3. Document condition in an Action Request.

6.5 Probabilistic Risk Assessment NOTE: If the OOS TLS is a Trip Mitigation TLS, also check for concurrent Trip Risk using ORAM-Sentinel or TS sheet review and evaluate per step 6.4.

6.5.1 Determine the PRA AOT for the single or combination of TLSs OOS by using ORAM-Sentinel. If ORAM-Sentinel is not available, determine PRA AOT as follows:

a. Use Attachment 9.1 to obtain PRA AOT values for a single TLS OOS.

b. Contact the PRA group for any multiple TLSs OOS.

6.5.2 If the scheduled duration of work is less than the PRA AOT, determine and implement appropriate compensatory measures.

6.5.3 If the PRA AOTis less than the threshold PRA AOT:

a. Verify operations manager approval (or notification for emergent conditions) regardless of the scheduled duration. Scheduled duration is a factor that will be of importance in the decision process.

b. Basis for approval should be documented.

c. Determine and implement additional compensatory measures, as appropriate

d. Document the higher risk configuration in on the TS sheet.

6.5.4 If the scheduled duration of work is greater than the PRA AOT, then:

NOTE: If the duration of work exceeds the PRA AOT then, by definition, the risk increase is no longer insignificant.

a. Verify operations manager approval (or notification for emergent conditions).

b. Document basis for approval.

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Am~~~LE R W ,EqC0RM

_yywPEF WO,99 or. USE.+4k PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER AD7.DC6 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 7 PAGE 13 OF 15 TITLE: On-Line Maintenance Risk Management

c. Determine and implement additional compensatory measures, as appropriate.

1. ,,f I . d. Document the higher risk configuration in an action request.

6.6' Safety Function Degradation Assessment - For each configuration determined above,

._. assess and manage the degradation of Key Safety Functions.

6.6.1 Determine the Key Safety Functions that are affected by the OOS TLS(s) by using the PC program 'ORAM-Sentinel. If ORAM-Sentinel is not available, use Attachment 9.1 to determine KSF score for a single SSC TLS, or contact the PRA group.

6.6.2 Determine the degree of degradation (color) of each affected Key Safety Function by selecting the affected TLS in ORAM-Sentinel.

6.6.3 If any TLS OOS combination results in a RED terminus.

a. The condition'is not normally allowed and may be a Tech Spec violation.

b. Prior PSRC approval (operations manager notification for emergent conditions) is required.

J:.L c. Document the RED KSF configuration in an Action Request.

6.6.4 If any TLS OOS combination results in an ORANGE terminus:

a. Verify operations manager approval (or notification for emergent conditions).

b. Document basis for approval.

c. Determine and implement additional compensatory measures, as appropriate.

d. Document emergent ORANGE configuration in an Action Request.

I.

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OTR ED U WJU SE.^-DO,^#O USEW IPSFETOWORK rISUE FOR USE; PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER AD7.DC6 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 7 PAGE 14 OF 15 TITLE: On-Line Maintenance Risk Management 6.6.5 If an OOS TLS or combination results in one or more YELLOW terminuses, evaluate as follows:

a. The Key Safety Functions yellow terminuses are assigned weighting factors in accordance with their importance IAW EOP FR F-0:

1. Subcriticality =5

2. Core Cooling =4

3. Heat Sink =3

4. RCS Integrity =2

5. Containment =1

6. Vital Power =5

7. Component Cig =5

b. If the sum of the weighting factors for the YELLOW terminuses is 8 or greater, then:

1. Verify operations manager approval (or notification for emergent conditions).

2. Document basis for approval.

3.. Determine and implement additional compensatory measures, as appropriate.

4. Document emergent configurations with KSF 2 8 in an Action Request.

c. If the sum of the weighting factors for the YELLOW terminuses is less than 8, determine and implement compensatory measures, as appropriate.

7. REFERENCES 7.1 10 CFR 50.65 "The Maintenance Rule."

7.2 ERIN Engineering, "Equipment Out -of -Service Monitoring for the Maintenance Rule at Diablo Canyon - Technical Basis Document," dated 10/95.

7.3 NUMARC 93-01, "Industry Guideline for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at Nuclear Power Plants," dated 7/2000.

7.4 NRC Inspection Manual, Inspection Procedure 62706, "Maintenance Rule," dated 8/31/95.

7.5 AD7.ID4, "On-Line Maintenance Scheduling."

7.6 OPI.DC17, "Control of Plant Equipment Required by the Technical Specifications or Other Designate Programs."

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TUNCONTROUE UTUSE RFORM WORKSSER USES PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER AD7.DC6 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 7 PAGE 15 OF 15 TITLE: On-Line Maintenance Risk Management 7.7 Procedure History Sheet for AD7.DC6 Rev 1, "Bases For Attachment 9.1, "Risk Significant Train Level SSCs."

.<,7.8 PG&E PRA Calculation File C13, Revision 1, "PRA Evaluation of Various Maintenance Configuration to Support the On-Line Maintenance Risk Assessment Procedure (AD7.DC6)," 08/31/01.

- 7.9 Action Request A0551882, "AD7.DC6, RISK MANAGEMENT VS. MAl.DCI 1, WORK RISK-ASSESSMENT". - -

I

8. RECORDS

-None

9. ATTACHMENTS 9.1 "Risk Significant Train Level SSCs," 11/08/01 9.2 "Sample 12 Week Rolling Matrix," 05/23/96

9.3 "Sample MOW Planning Spreadsheet," 05/23/96 z 9.4 "On-Line Risk Management Summary," 11/08/01

10. -'SPONSOR A.J. Chitwood mgetdoc.dII?Itemnld=-961 80001 5&,server=dcppI 10&system--dffsnpg~l&logi=General+User&-password= OI 01B ,. 10402 1024.0728

.- *+UNCONTROLLED e . a KNO O

NRCOR USE TOPERFORM WORK& SSUf OR USE I FORUE-*A 11/08/01 Page 1 of I DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT AD7.DC6 ATTACHMENT 9.1 TITLE: Risk Significant Train Level SSCs Sys Tm Bus Train Level Risk PC1 SFAT PRA PRA Sub Core Heat RCS Ctmt Vital Comp SF Train Level SSC Signif- AOT critical. Cool- Sink Integ- Power Cool. Score SSC ISee Notes) icant ity ing rity ing ISee Notes) 3 AIB Non AFWP I y y y y 993 3 - 3 AFWP 1 3 B H AFWP 2 y y y y 3432 3 3 AFWP 2 3 A F AFWP 3 y y y y 2559 - 3 - 3 AFWP 3 7 PCV-455C y y y y >8760 3 2 5 PCV-455C 7 PCVY456 y y y y > 8760 3 2 5 PCV-456 8 A F CCP1 y y y y 2770 5 4 3 2 14 CCP 1 8 B G CCP 2 y y y y 2459 5 4 3 22 14 CCP 2 9 A F SIPI y y y y > 8760 4 3 - = - 7 SIP 1P=

9 B H SIP 2 y y y y 8655 4 3 7 SIP 2 10 B G RHRP 1 y y y y.4704 4 - = 1 - 5 RHRP 1 10 A H RHRP 2 y y y y 4755 4 - 1 - 5 RHRP 2 12 B G CSP 1 y y y y >8760 1 1 CSP 1 12 A H CSP 2 y y y y > 8760 1 1 CSP 2 14 CCWHE1 y y y y 338 5 5 CCWHE 1 14 CCWHE2 y y y y 370 5 5 CCWHE2 14 A F CCWP 1 y y y Y 1144 _ 5 5 CCWP 1 14 B G CCWP 2 y y y y 1609 _5 5 CCWP 2 14 AIB H CCWP 3 y y y y 689 5 5 CCWP 3 17 A F ASPi y y y y 336 5 5 ASP 1 17 B G ASP 2 y y y y 370 5 5 ASP 2 17 FCV-601 y y y y 502 5 5 FCV-601 21 AIB H DEG 1(21 y y y y 823 5 5 DEG 1 21 B G DEG2(l) y y y y 457 5 5 DEG 2 21 A F OEG 3 y y y y 408 5 5 OEG 3 21 H- OFOTP1 y y y y 1150 5 5 OFOTP1 21 G- OFOTP2 y y y y 1023 _ 5 5 OFOTP2 23 CFCU X n n y y > 8760 _ 1 1 CFCU X 23 CRVS S-35 y y n y > 8760 0 CRVS S-35 23 CRVS S-36 y y n y > 8760 _ 0 CRVS S-36 38 A SSPSA y y y y 759 Orange NA SSPS A 38 B SSPSB y y y y 728 Orange = NA SSPS B 67 F BTC 1 y y y y 5000 _ 5 5 BTC 1 67 G BTC 2 y y y y 1398 = - 5 5 BTC_2 67 H BTC 32 y y y y 1541 - 5 55 BTC 32 69 _ SIU Pwr Y Y Y Y 119 _ 5 5 SIU Pwr 70 500kV OSP n n y y 990 _ 5 5 500kV OSP RS - Risk significant per Maintenance Rule AND can be worked On Line PCI - Unavailability hours tracked as performance criteria SFAT - Included inSafety Function logic trees PRA - Modeled in PRA AOT spreadsheet PRA AOT - Single component AOT to IE-6 additional COF NUdtS: Unly those Risk Significant SSG's that are modeled inthe DCPP PRA, have PCI availability AOT's assigned, AND can be removed from service for maintenance on-line are included inthis table. Examples of Risk Significant SSC's not inthe table include RCS, Pzr safeties, MSIV's, SIG's, RWST, CST, etc. See reference 7.7 for bases.

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05/23/96 Page I of I DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT I- ) AD7.DC6 'f' :I ATTACHMENT 9.2 TITLE: Sample 12 Week Rolling Matrix UNIT ONE TWEL YE WEEKROLLINGMA TRIX SZNDAl YIIKtUY WrnNFMnAY Timm-mly FRUnAY SATiRnDAY suiNYAy WEEK I TRAIN DAYSHIFT: U-sA 0G111 P138 FIREPP02 DAYSHIFT: P-AFW-12V-3PS Lc U-SI ALLCFCUsP-12Bs AIBBUSH U-67AFIREVALVES oP t-1 SEC.PLANT M-6sc F VY10-113 OFO PPO

' ItREEXT oArSHm1T

P-24 LTCWPPO1 WEEK 2TRAIN V-3H12 RCVi6 u-2s CtWHX12 P-CCP-1ZU-16E9 M-ISHB P-UUW-02 P-1F22DFOn 02 BBUSS oAYSHEF. *U-BA OG 12 PCSFII DAYSIln U-47AFIREVALVES v-3HII *V-3EII 8803A1S YV-313SOOIA P-24 LTCWPP02 Ltves a 1oAYSHIFT: DAYSHIFT:

CNTNT ENTRY SPS-312SsEC DG

'SEAL TABLE INSP. U-EBBCO2 WEEK 3 TRAIN DAYSHIFT: U-A oG13 U-54 SEAL FOW OAYS P-SIP-1I P-13BFIREPPo P-AFWi-13 P cC-I A BUSF *V-3R1ION 1 UMPSM-67A F HmFT: V-3tl0 823A&B SAYSHIPT: M-16K IREVALVES u-Bs ECCS YENTING V-3L2 S A A&B -I69AFIREEXT *F3s4 V-3t 3807A&B *Fs U-26CCW HX 11 OAYSHIFT:

2P-4 LTCWPP03 WEEK4TRAIN I-21A .- SIP-12 U-IBJBLONVLVS U-16P2 --AYSHIFT: -- 4 ABmS AilBBUSNON DAYSHIFT: DAYSHIFT: M-16NBLONIAFW PAINTYWELD RESTRICTION U7C IOSEREELS -S FHBVS U-67AFIREVALVES R-IA RODS *V-3s2 BtDN SC S 1-0A OFoST U4-E tRVS

P-AFW-I1 FORWEEKENO TESTING V-3P5LCV106-09 DAYSHI

. *V-3R5 FCV95 CNTNMTENTRY

V-3R6Ft-F37a36 *SP 1-10 WEEK 5 TRAIN DAYSHIFT U-BAOG11 P-13BFIREPPO02 AYSH-IFT: F-AFW-12 M-51 ALL FCUS AMS BUSH U-47AFIREVALVES DPC- SEC.PtANT DAYSNIT:

U-69CFIREfXT P-24 ITCWFP 1

_ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~M16HA

.P-CSP-12

V-31390018 WEEK 6 TRAIN V-3K08148.8147 P-F7ASWPP12 PAINTAVELORESTRICIIU-9ADG12 M-160 P-CCW-12 P-BAT-12 BBUS VF3KG I16EIST7 M-2s CCWHX12 ENSFORM-ISO V-3S8FCV361 *P-RHR 1F161 DAYSHIFT: V-3Ji BOCE9V~LS; DAYSHIFT: *FV-3SI PK AVVS

-E7AFIRSVALVES OAYSHIFT: SPS-312SSECDG FV-3S7 PK AVLVS CNTUNTENTRY-SEALTAB M-6sB CO2 V-3S3PrHAVLVS L .INSP. DAYSHIFT:

P-24 LTCWFF02 WEEK7TRAIN V-3P4AFW VtVS V-3GI GOTs 1-54 SEALFLOW U-2SCCWHXII P13B FIREFPF01 U-lE DAYSHIFT:

ABUSF AYSHIIFT:

n -sADG13 P-CCP-I1 P-F7ASW YPI I DYSHFT *F P-AFW-13 PF24 ITCWPP03 U-7A FIREVALVES DAYSHIFT: V-3FI FV4ss ., m-EBAFIREEXT UR89 ECtSVENTING V-3F2FcV496 V-3F3FCV6OI V-3F4FCVS02 V-3F5FCV803 I EEK 8 TRAIN U-21A U1U6P4 P-AFW-11 PAINTIrELO DAYSHIFT: U-4 AsVS DAYSHIFT:

AJBBUSNON DAYSHIFT: V-303DFOVLVS RESTRICTIONS FORTESTIN M-OA OFOST U-S FHsBVS P-1F 3 U-67AFIREVALVES DAYSHMFT: 6 U-E7CHOSEREELS U-6A CRVS PDRT.DFO n 1 R-IA RODS DAYSHIFT:

CNTUNTENTRY

_STPI-1 .

WEEX9TRAIN PAINTIWIIDRESIRICTIONS U-1SA P-138fIRtPPO2 *1EC U-16F U-SIALLCFCUs AIBBUSH FORTESTING FORSTP 1-1B *U-9A OG11 *P-RHR-12 *PFAFW-12 DAYSHIFTm U *V-3E9rBSOAaB DAYSHIFT: P-24 LTCW PY01 DAYSHIFT: IA-16= C-ISECANT UM-7AFIREVALVES *V-3SS PH.A M-69CFIREEXT VLVS.

PAINTwVELO RESTRICT!

ONSFOR U-iEC WEEK 10TRAI SAYSHIFT: U-26CCWHX12 STpP-MUl*-OI U-9A OG12 U-Esm P178 CP13 V-3EI FCVIIOA NBBUSS M-E7AFIREVALVES *V-3UIWITRVVS DAYSHIFT: 'V-3TI CVI RVVS V-3EFCVIIOB V-3U2WTSR VVS CNTMNT ENTRY TSEALTAB P-SFF-12 V-3ES8104.8445 LEINSP. AYSHIFT: V-3E6FEV128 SPS-312ssECDG DAYSHIFT:

MU-EB CO2 - F-24 LTCW PP 02 WEEK 11TRAI DAYSHIFT: M-1-68A M4-4 SEALFUO- O26 CCVW KXI M-164OUMPINTRLK P-AFW-13 P-BAT-11 NABUSF UM-7AFIREVALVES *U-SADG13 DAYSHlFT: P-139FIREFOl DAYSHIFT:

M-BsECCS VENTING DAYSHIFT PF24tTCWPP03 m-69AFIRE EXT WEEK 12TRAI U-21A DAYSHIFT: P-AFW-11 V-3H7&8CEWAVLS P-SFPI1 U-4 ABVS P-CCW-13 N AlSBUSNO DAYSHIFT: R-IA RODS V-3M1 .2.4RHRVYVS M-16P3 U-S FHBVS P1284 N U-E7AFIREVALVES PAINTIWELD RESTRICTION FV-3R3 BLONIC UM-ACRVS PORT DFO F 02 s FV-3R4 MSINBYP DAYSHIFT: DAYSHIFt:

CNTMNT ENTRY U-IOA OFDST

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05/23/96 Pagc I of I DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT AD7.DC6 ATTACHMENT 9.3 TITLE: Sample MOW Planning Spreadsheet 11112195 11119195 11126195 1213195 12110195 12117195 12124195 12/31195 117196 1114196 Date 10129195 1115195 Thksgvg _ Chrstms New Yrs Events 1R71111 _

9603 9546 9547 9548 9549 9550 9551 9552 9601 9602 DWC Week 9544 9545 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 12WMtxWk 1 2 3 A/B A/B B A AIB AIB B A A/B Train A18 B A F Non H G F Non H G F Non Bus H G Systen I-1 D I-ID 0O _ _ I-ID 03A AFWP3 . .

03B AFWP2 AFWPI _ AFWP1 AFWPI 03A/B

-- 04 R-1A M-54 R-IA M-54 R-1A 07 M-54 PDP3 08 CCP1 BATPI 08A 088 CCP2 BATP2 M89 M-89 M-89 09 . _

O9A SIPi 098 SIP2 1OA RHRP2 10B . RHRI 11 _ _ _ _ _

12A CSP2 12B CSPl SFP1

_ _ _ SFP2 13 ._ _

14A CCWP1 _

148I CCWP2 14AIB CCWP3 CCWHEI CCWHEI . CCWHE1 14HEA CCWHE2 CCWHE2 CCWHE2 14HEB 15 _

MUWTP2 _ _ _ MUWTP1 16 LTCWP2 LTCWP3 LTCWP 1 LTCWP2 LTCWP3 LTCWP1 LTCWP2 LTCWP3 16 LTCWPI 17 .

17A ASP1 178 CCWHX2 ASP2 FP1 FP2 FP1 FP2 FPI 18 FP2 19 _ I M-21A M-21A M-21A 20 PDFOP1 PDFDP2 21 DFOTP1 DFOTP2 SAClB DEG3 DEG3 OEG3 21A DEG2 DEG2 . DEG2 218 21AIB DEGI DEG1 DEG1 22 23 CFCS CFCS CFCS 23 M-4 M-4 M-4 23ABV M-5 _ _ M-5 M-5 23FHB M-6A M-6A M-6A 23CRV_

25 261 27 OWS1 28__

CTMT CTMT CTMT 45 CTMT CTMT CTMT UNIT 55 _ SECDEG SECDEG . SECDEG 67 01339207.DOC 01B 1024.0728

1// ag 1 o 11/08/01 Page I of I DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT AD7.DC6 ATTACHMENT 9.4 TITLE: On-Line Risk Management Summary Evaluate risk for all planned or emergent activities, equipment OOS, or external conditions as follows:

NOTE 1: For all steps below, deferring elective activities to avoid unacceptable risk is an assumed option.

NOTE 2: If-all steps are answered "NO," risk evaluation documentation is not required.

Step 1. Is the activity or condition a Trip Risk?

Emergent Trip Risk - implement compensatory measures; YES

Planned Trip Risk - concur with comp measures per MAI.DC10 or 11;

AND GO TO Step 2.

NO GO TO Step 3 Step 2. Is there a Trip Risk concurrent with degraded or out of service Trip Mitigation SSCs?

Verify OPS manager concurrence or notification to allow 1 and 2 concurrently; TES

ANDimplement compensatory measures;

ANDGOTOStep3.

NO GO TO Step3 N/A GO TO Step 3 Step 3. Is the SSC out of service Risk Significant for CDF or LERF?

Evaluate PRA and KSF; YES

Implement compensatory measures;

If the OOS SSC is a Trip Mitigation SSC, THEN verify Step 2 is complete;

AND GO TO Step 4.

NO GO TO Step 4 Step 4. Is the remaining in-service redundant train Degraded?

YES Implement additional compensatory measures.

NO Risk evaluation complete.

This checklist may be summarized as a lamicoid at the SFM desk for reference.

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Enclosure 3 PG&E Letter DCL-03-xxx Diablo Canyon Power Plant Temporary Procedure TP TO-0105, "Diesel Generator 2-1 On-Line Maintenance

I~ Ala_

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ROLDPOC0RLD NTUSE:f r_-J~*r$<~~6 TOPROMWRWrISSUE FOR USE-V ',

z~~vr1 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY - NUMBER TP TO-0105 NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION REVISION 0 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT PAGE 1 OF 5 TEMPORARY PROCEDURE UNIT TITLE: Diesel Generator 2-1 On-Line Maintenance 2 03/09/01 EFFECTIVE DATE PROCEDURE CLASSIFICATION: QUALITY RELATED I. SCOPE 1.1 This procedure is intended to provide operational guidance and contingency actions during the Diesel Generator (DG) 2-1 on line maintenance.

1.2 This procedure outlines various aspects of the project including the following:

1.2.1 Prerequisite checklist should be completed prior to clearing DG 2-1 from service (see Attachment 9.1).

1.2.2 Initial plant conditions for the start and duration of the MOW.

1.3 This procedures expires March 29, 2001 or upon completion of the DG 2-1 MOW.

2. DISCUSSION 2.1 The DG 2-1 routine maintenance is scheduled between March 20 and March 23, 2001.

The duration of the MOW is scheduled for approximately 61 hours7.060185e-4 days 0.0169 hours 1.008598e-4 weeks 2.32105e-5 months .

2.2 This procedure has been written to expect success while planning for failures. Specific initial plant operating conditions and restrictions should be in effect for the duration of the project.

2.3 This procedure will address those conditions that require backing out of the maintenance window and are listed in Attachment 9.2. Once inside the maintenance window the back out time should be limited to 1 shift.

3. RESPONSIBILITIES 3.1 The Turbine Building Asset ATL for all work associated with DG 2-1 MOW.

3.2 Operations Section for ensuring this procedure is performed, including shiftly checks and compensatory measures.

3.3 Turbine Building Assistant Team Leader and DG system engineer will give daily updates to the Operations Section management on project status.

3.4 The In Service Inspection Team for ensuring availability of inspection equipment prior to and throughout the DG 2-1 maintenance window.

3.5 Diesel Generator engineer and Assistant Team Leader to inform the Unit 2 SFM in the event a required prerequisite is not being met.

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a; r F+UNCDNTROLL£ED PROCED ffO SOT USgs TOPERFORM WOR7K NoISSU FOR U pt PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER TP TO-0105 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 0 PAGE 2 OF 5 TITLE: Diesel Generator 2-1 On-Line Maintenance UNIT 2

4. PREREQUISITES INIT / DATE 4.1 Prerequisites checklist (Attachment 9.1) is complete.

4.2 The following organizations have been tailboarded, discussing _____/-_______

work scope activities and contingency plans:

4.2.1 Operations 4.2.2 Turbine Asset Team 4.2.3 Engineering 4.2.4 In Service Inspection 4.2.5 Security 4.2.6 Safety 4.2.7 Warehouse 4.3 Maintenance Services has agreed to support the DG 2-1 maintenance window on a 24 hour2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months a day (two, 12 hour1.388889e-4 days 0.00333 hours 1.984127e-5 weeks 4.566e-6 months shifts per day) schedule. __________/____________

4.4 A clearance has been approved to support removal of DG 2-1 from service. __________/______________

5. PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 5.1 Ensure proper compensatory measures are in effect for the current project period, based on Attachment 9.1 and 9.2, as well as guidelines throughout the body of the procedure.

5.2 If, during the course of the project, a condition changes such that it no longer meets the initial condition requirements or project restrictions, an evaluation should be performed by Engineering and Operations, with a determination being made by the Manager of Operations as to the proper course of action.

5.3 No maintenance, other than that agreed upon prior to this MOW will be performed without Engineering and Operations review for PMT requirements. All work must require no more than an STP M-9A.

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. ICONTROWOED PROCED NOT WORK ISSUEFOR USE " J4 PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER TP TO-0105 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT ' REVISION 0 PAGE 3 OF 5 TITLE: Diesel Generator 2-1 On-Line Maintenance IUNIT 2

6. INSTRUCTIONS I

CAUTION: STP I-1C, Attachment 11 4 will be required to be performed in accordance with TS 3.8.1 for the duration of the DG 2-1 maintenance window.

*** ** ** *I* **** *** * *** *** *** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** ** *** *** ** ** ** **** ** ** * *** ** ** * ** * **** *** ** **

INIT / DATE 6.1 Notify the DCPP Switching Center at extension 3519 to inform them of project start. (reference OP J-6B:VII) _I NOTE: Some of the routine maintenance on DG 2-1 is normally performed during refueling outages. None of the corrective maintenance is considered a common cause failure. Hence starting of the remaining DGs (2-3 and 2-2) following removal of DG 2-1 from service has been determined to be not required.

6.2 Verify redundant safety related systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices for DG 2-3 operable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of declaring DG 2-1 inoperable.

6.3 Verify DG 2-3 Operable, 6.5 Verify redundant safety related systems, subsystems, trains, components and devices for DG 2-2 operable within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days 0.00667 hours 3.968254e-5 weeks 9.132e-6 months of declaring DG 2-1 inoperable. /__

6.5 Verify DG 2-2 Operable. l__________

NOTE: Ensure that steps 6.6 and 6.7 are performed within I hour of each' other to satisfy TS.

6.6 Declare DG 2-1 Inoperable and enter TS 3.8.1.

Time TS entered: -_- _________I_____________

6.7 Perform STP I-IC, Attachment 11.4, "Modes 1, 2 and 3 "As Required" Operability Checks of Independent Circuits." I____________

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. EF . .lOESrS FOR USE4, PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER TP TO-0105 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 0 PAGE 4 OF 5 TITLE: Diesel Generator 2-1 On-Line Maintenance UNIT 2 CAUTION: Performance of the following step places the project in the inoperable status. All applicable compensatory measures should be addressed in accordance with Attachment 9.2.

INIT / DATE 6.8 Hang clearance to support removing DG 2-1 from service.

(reference OP J-6B:VII) l 6.9 Turbine Asset Team reports on DG 2-1 clearance to begin maintenance. /_____________

6.10 Turbine Asset Team has completed work on DG 2-1 to support post maintenance testing. __________/______________

6.11 Operation removes clearance on DG 2-1. __________/______________

6.12 Engineering and Turbine Asset Team begin post maintenance testing on DG 2-1. __________/______________

6.13 Engineering and Turbine Asset Team turn DG 2-1 over to Operations and have reported OFF of the DG 241 clearance. __________/______________

6.14 Operations and Engineering has completed post maintenance testing on DG 2-1 to support returning DG 2-1 to service. __________/______________

NOTE: Completion of the following step returns the project to the "NORMAL" compensatory measure level. This means there are no compensatory measures in effect for the DG 2-1 maintenance.

6.15 Exit T.S. 3.8.1 Time TS exited: __________/______________

6.16 Notify the DCPP Switchyard Center at 3519 to inform them of project completion. (reference OP J-6B:VII) __________/______________

6.17 Remove CAUTION signs from the following locations; 6.17.1 DG2-3and2-2 __________/__________

6.17.2 Vital 4KV bus F, G and H _________I_________

6.17.3 Vital 480 V bus F, G and H __________I__________

6.17.4 Motor driven and turbine driven AFW Pp rooms. ___________I___________

6.18 Return the following equipment to SFM desired configuration; 6.18.1 Aux building ventilation supply/exhaust fans ___________/___________

6.18.2 Overall Aux building ventilation control room select ___________/___________

6.18.3 Fuel handling ventilation control room select ___________I___________

6.18.4 BA Transfer Pump and Primary Water Make-Up Pumps ____________/____________

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER TP TO-0105 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT ' A: , REVISION 0 PAGE 5 OF 5 TITLE: Diesel Generator 2-1 On-Line Maintenance-- UNIT 2

7. REFERENCES 7.1i EOP ECA-0.3, " Restore 4KV Busses."

7.2 AD7.ID4, " On-Line Maintenance Scheduling."

7.3 OP 0-13, "Transferring Equipment To/From Alternate Power Sources."

7.4 AR PK 17-17 " 4Kv Bus G or SU FDR UV" 7.5 AD7.1D6, " On-Line Maintenance Risk Management"

8. RECORDS None

9. ATTACHMENTS 9.1 "Prerequisite Checklist," 03/02/01 9.2 "Compensatory Measures," 03/02/01 9.3 "Support Information," 03/02/01 3WFK52ZZ.DOC 09A 03902 0309.0252

UNCONTROLLED PROCEDURE rOOTSETOPERFORM WORKor ISSUEFOR USE-03/02/01 Page I of 3 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TP TO-0105 ATTACHMENT 9.1 2 TITLE: Prerequisite Checklist

1. DG 2-1 MAINTENANCE PREREQUISITES INIT I DATE 1.1

A walkdown has been performed by DG system engineer or designee verifying DG 2-3 and associated area is clean and in good material condition with no work being performed which could jeopardize operation. ___________/___________

1.2

A walkdown has been performed by DG system engineer or designee verifying DG 2-2 and associated area is clean and in good material condition with no work being performed which could jeopardize operation. ____________/____________

1.3

Diablo Canyon Switching Center has been contacted to verify offsite power sources are not in danger of being lost due to wild land fires, other grid related transients, or scheduled work activities. ____________/____________

1.4

No elective maintenance or testing to be performed on Unit 1 or Unit 2 components required to crosstie vital 4kV bus' as required by DCPP Emergency Operating Procedures, Appendix X, "Crosstie of Vital Bus." See Attachment 9.3 for the list of effected Appendix X breakers. ___________/___________

1.5

No elective maintenance or testing to be performed on either unit 12kV startup bus. ___________/___________

These items are to be maintained current for the duration of the DG 2-1 maintenance project.

3WFK52ZZ.DOC 09A 0309.0252

U*!#-!! ___COUTRSEETO PERFOR WORK ISSU FOR UE 03/02/01 Page 2 of 3 TP TO-0105 (UNIT 2)

ATTACHMENT 9.1 TITLE: Prerequisite Checklist INIT I DATE 1.6 Contact Security to ensure adequate security support for DG 2-1 maintenance window. ___________/___________

1. Place 480 V equipment on alternate power supplies or select alternate 1.7..

equipment as described by Attachment 9.3. ___________/___________

1.8- Verify DG 2-3 Operable with STP M-9A, "Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test," current for duration of project. ________/____________

1.9 Verify DG 2-2 Operable with STP M-9A, "Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test," current for duration of project. /___________

1.10 Verify STP P-PDFOTP-01, 'Routine Surveillance of Portable Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 0-1," current for duration of project. I___________

1.11 Verify STP M-1OA, "Diesel Fuel Oil Storage Tank Inventory," current for duration of project. ________/____________

1.12 Verify STP V-303, "Exercising Valves LCV-85 Through LCV-90,"

current for duration of project. _________/_____________

1.X13 Verify STP P-DFO-01, "Routine Surveillance Test of Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 0-1," current for duration or project. /____________

1:14

_i...

Verify STP P-DFO-02, "Routine Surveillance Test of Diesel Fuel Oil Transfer Pump 0-2," current for duration of project. I____________

1.15 Turbine Asset team has verified all parts and equipment necessary for the project have been procured and meet quality related checks. I__________

1.16 Bio-fouling Group has performed an evaluation and had determined a High Swell Warning is not expected for the duration of the DG 2-1 maintenance project. ___________/___________

1.17 An assessment has been performed verifying there are no known maintenance related equipment problems that could result in the performance of the DG 2-1 maintenance project causing an unacceptable risk. I 3wAF;K52ZZ.DOC 09A 0309.0252

' . TUNCONTROLLED

PROCEDURE RK JiSSUEFOR USE,-;**'

03/02/01 Page 3 of 3 TP TO-0105 (UNIT 2)

ATTACHMENT 9.1 TITLE: Prerequisite Checklist INIT / DATE 1.18 CAUTION signs have been posted on the doors to the following rooms which require SFM permission to perform work within; 1.18.1 DG2-3,2-2, ___________/___________

1.18.2 Vital 4kV bus F, G and H (U-2) ____________/____________

1.18.3 Vital 480 V bus F, G and H (U-2) ___________/___________

1.18.4 Motor driven and turbine driven AFW Pp rooms (U-2) ____________/____________

1.19 Verify adequate diesel fuel oil is available to perform required project PMTs. __________I__________

1.20 Verify cold or hot wash of transformers is not required for the duration of the project. ___________/___________

Shift Foreman:

Signature Date 3WFK.52ZZ.DOC 09A 03902 0309.0252

'WOR NND F.-7X.-^_* NCOTROLNAPOCED PERF rI ISUEPRT R4 U L 03/02/01 Page I of 2 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TP TO-0105 :

ATTACHMENT 9.2 2 TITLE: Compensatory Measures Discussion: The table below summarizes the major project scope evolutions and the corresponding' compensatory measures. The terminology of Normal and Level I periods refer to the compensatory measures in place during specified project phases.

Page two of this attachment details the compensatory measures required, based on the "Level" defined by the project evolution in progress.

The project prerequisites and the compensatory measures mitigate the probabilistic risk presented by this project. For this reason, any deviation from'prerequisites and compensatory measures requires review and approval or Operations, Maintenance, Engineering and the Manager of Operations.

EVOLUTION Pre-start Project start Project End COMP MEASURE NORMAL LEVEL 1 NORMAL I LEVEL I . . .

Pre-start: This period is defined as prior to the start of the DG 2-1 maintenance project.

Project start: This period begins when clearance removing DG 2-1 from service is hung and the

'Turbine Asset Team reports on the DG 2-1 clearance.

Project End: This period begins when the DG 2-1 clearance is no longer hung and DG is Operable.

3WFK52ZZ.DOC 09A 0309.0252

' And*UNCONTROLLED PROCEDUREib-DO'NOT'USE TOPERFORM WORK' ilSSUEFOR USE

4' 03/02/01 Page 2 of 2 TP TO-0105 (UNIT 2)

ATTACHMENT 9.2 TITLE: Compensatory Measures COMPENSATORY MEASURES The following compensatory measures should be in effect unless reviewed by Operations, Maintenance, Engineering, and the Manager of Operations and determined to be unnecessary.

PROJECT PERIODS APPLICABLE COMPENSATORY MEASURES

1) Level 1 la. Work that may cause a trip hazard on Unit 1 or 2 should not be performed. Exceptions should be authorized in accordance with AD7.DC6 On-Line-Maintenance Risk Management.

lb. Wild land fire or other external events that may jeopardize offsite power sources need to be brought to the attention of; Operations, Maintenance, Engineering, and the Manager of Operations to determine if project postponement is warranted.

Ic. No elective maintenance or testing (other than normally scheduled surveillances) should be performed on operable Unit 1 or Unit 2 diesel generators.

Id. No elective maintenance or testing on the 230Kv and 500Kv offsite power sources should be performed. Exceptions may be authorized by the Operations Manager.

le. No testing or elective maintenance should be performed on Unit I or Unit 2 unless approved per the TI schedule. Exceptions approved by the Shift Manager and/or Work Week Manager may be performed.

If. Senior management will provide on shift support in the event conditions jeopardize plant operation (Wild land fires, High Swell Warning, electrical distribution problems.)

3WFK52ZZ.DOC 09A 0309.0252

L_

-;g-UNC^v_ CONTROLLEDROCEDURE; 5__ _ INOT USE TO PERFORM WORKor ISSUE FOR USE: >-

03/02/01 Page 1 of 1 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TP TO-0105 ATTACHMENT 9.3 2 TITLE: Support Information

1. BREAKERS USED TO CROSSTIE VITAL BUS' IN EOP APPENDIX X.

1.1 A 4KV auxiliary feeder breakers; 52-HH-13, 52-HG-13, and 52-HF-13.

1.2 4KV startup feeder breakers; 52-HH-14, 52-HG-14, and 52-HF-14.

1.3 : Startup feeder breaker to 4KV vital bus'; 52-HG-15.

2. ALTERNATE SOURCES OR EQUIPMENT FOR 480V BUS H BREAKERS/LOADS 2.1 SFM should direct the following equipment be placed in service for the duration of the DG 2-1 maintenance project.

2.1.1 Boric Acid Pump 2-1 supplying the blender.

2.1.2 Spent Fuel Pool Pump 2-2.

2.1.3 Fuel handling ventilation supply fan S-2 (w/selector switch in S-2 position).

K 2.1.4 Primary water pump 2-1.

2.1.5 Control Room ventilation selected to Bus 2H.

.2.1.6 Aux Bldg Supply Fan S-34 (w/selector switch in S-34 position).

3WFKS2ZZ.DOC 09A 0309.0252

Enclosure 4 PG&E Letter DCL-03-xxx Diablo Canyon Power Plant Surveillance Test Procedure STP M-9A, "Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test" Diablo Canyon Power Plant Surveillance Test Procedure STP M-9D1, "Diesel Generator Full Load Rejection Test"

ISSUED FOR USE BY: DATE: EXPIRES:____

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION REVISION 65 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT PAGE 1 OF 32 SURVEILLANCE TEST PROCEDURE UNITS TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test AND EF FECTIVE DATE PROCEDURE CLASSIFICATION: QUALITY RELATED I1. SCOPE 1.1 This procedure is used to perform the monthly test on diesel generator (D/G) 1-1, D/G 1-2, D/G 1-3, D/G 2-1, D/G 2-2, and D/G 2-3. It may be used as a post maintenance test (PMT).

1.2 Diesel fuel oil transfer systems train A and train B are tested.

1.3 The day tank is checked for water and verified to contain 2 250 gallons of diesel fuel.

2. DISCUSSION 2.1 To demonstrate the OPERABILITY of the D/G, the following checks are performed.

2.1.1 Prefiring Checks

a. Cooling system level and temperature.

b. Lube oil level and temperature.

c. Day and priming tanks fuel level.

d. Compressed air availability.

e. Governor oil level.

2.1.2 Checks During Starting

a. Starting circuit OPERABILITY.

b. D/G starts with one starting train.

c. During timed starts, cranking time to start.

d. D/G starts either from control room, solid state protection system, or on a simulated UV signal (only onie is provenieach test).

e. Fuel system OPERABILITY.

f. Governing and control system OPERABILITY.

g. OPERABILITY of SI auto start feature when run in conjunction with STP M-1 6A, STP M-] 6BA or STP M-1 6BB.

(I . --

,-4 I I,. I Or- V.-I

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 2 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS 1 AND 2 2.1.3 Checks during operation while loading and loaded

a. Fuel system OPERABILITY.

b. Governing and control system OPERABILITY.

c. Cooling system OPERABILITY.

d. Ability of unit to accept and carry a sustained load 2 2.45 MW and

< 2.50 MW (2 2340 KW and *2600 KW Tech Spec) for one hour without apparent malfunctions.

e. Ability of fuel oil transfer system to deliver fuel oil to DIG day tank.

f. Fuel oil level in the day tank remains above the low level alarm.

2.1.4 Checks After Power Run

a. Lube oil system.

b. Cooling system.

c. Compressed air system.

d. Fuel priming system.

e. D/G alignment to associated emergency bus.

f. Day tank water accumulation.

2.2 After the D/G has operated at 22.45 MW, the load will be reduced on the unit to about 0.50 MW and the unit will be allowed to cool before it is separated and shutdown.

2.3 Not all of the parameters observed during this test will indicate an inoperable D/G. Those variables which directly indicate OPERABILITY are marked on data sheets. Technical Specification (Tech Spec) 3.8.1, 3.8.2 or 3.8.3 actions must be taken, management notified without delay, and an action request (AR) initiated. Other variables, if out of limits, should be reported in a routine manner in an action request.

2.4 If one or both trains of the fuel oil transfer system are found to be inoperable, the appropriate Tech Spec 3.8.1 Action F.I or G.I for MODES I - 5 must be followed.

2.5 The diesel fuel oil transfer pumps 0-1 and 0-2 discharge check valves (DEG-0-35, DEG-0-36) and the fuel oil tanks 0-1 and 0-2 suction check valves (DEG-0-1 114, DEG-0-1 115 for DFOST 0-1 and DEG-0-1 117, DEG-0-1 118 for DFOST 0-2) will be checked by the operation of the diesel fuel oil transfer pumps 0-1 and 0-2.

2.6 If the D/G starts successfully, the starting air system and turbocharger air assist system solenoid valves will be considered acceptable. _

2.7 Sampling of a D/G fuel oil day tank for particulate contamination (STP M-10B2) should coincide with performance of this test.

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 3 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS I AND 2

3. RESPONSIBILITIES 3.1 Shift foreman (SFM), for scheduling test, operation of equipment, obtaining data and data reduction required by this procedure, evaluation of the results, and determination of D/G operability.

4. FREQUE NCY 4.1 The D/G testing frequency is once every 31 days.

4.2 Each D/G will be tested on a schedule developed for Mode I integrated daily schedule (MOIDS).

4.2.1 Even numbered months: A manual start from the control room should be performed. (Tech Spec SR 3.8.1.2 and Tech Spec SR 3.8.1.7) 4.2.2 During manual starts in the months of April, August and December, use starting train A. During manual starts in months of February, June and October, use starting train B.

4.2.3 Odd numbered months: A simulated loss of off-site power (undervoltage) should be performed. (Tech Spec SR 3.8.1.2). I 4.2.4 During the manual starts, the D/G is started from standby condition and accelerates to 900 rpm in

10 seconds and the D/G voltage is 2 3785 V and I ....

4400 V in

13 seconds after the D/G start signal (with gauge readability and instrument accuracy included, limit becomes 113 V to 121 V as read from the "Diesel Output Voltmeter" on VB4) and the D/G frequency is 60 +/- 1.2 HZ in <

13 seconds after the D/G start signal (with gauge readability and instrument accuracy included, limit becomes 59.5 HZ to 60.5 HZ). A timed start is required every 184 days but is performed more frequently for D/G performance monitoring. (Tech Spec SR 3.8.1.7) 4.2.5 If STP M-16A, M-16BA or M-16BB is being performed in conjunction with STP M-9A, the method of starting the D/G (i.e., with an SI signal) can be substituted for one of the methods in 4.2.1 or 4.2.3.

4.2.6 If plant conditions require a different starting method than that specified above, the starting method may be changed with SFM concurrence.

4.3 This test is required to be current in MODES I through 6.

0vu$tI.:'b5.D0A 06 I (R)/.03iII

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 4 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS 1 AND 2

5. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 5.1 Tech Spec SR 3.8.1.2: Verify each D/G starts from standby conditions and achieves speed 2 900 rpm, steady state voltage 2 3785 V and < 4400 V, and frequency 2 58.8 HZ and

61.2 HZ.

5.2 Tech Spec SR 3.8.1.3: Verify each DIG is synchronized and loaded and operates for 2 60 minutes at a load 29340 KW and *2600 KW.

5.3 Tech Spec SR 3.8.1.4: Verify each day tank contains 2 250 GAL of fuel oil.

5.4 Tech Spec SR 3.8.1.5: Check for and remove accumulated water from each day tank.

5.5 Tech Spec SR 3.8.1.6: Verify the fuel oil transfer system operates to transfer fuel oil from storage tanks to the day tank.

5.6 Tech Spec SR 3.3.1.7: Verify every 184 days each D/G starts from standby condition and achieves:

5.6.1 in < 10 seconds, speed 2 900 rpm; and 5.6.2 in

13 seconds, voltage 2 3785 V and *4400 V, and frequency 2 58.8 HZ and

61.2HZ.

5.7 Tech Spec SR 3.8.3.4: Either air receiver A shall be 2 180 PSIG or air receiver B shall be 2 180 PSIG.

5.8 Tech Spec Bases for Action 3.8.3.E.1 and SR 3.8.3.4 assumes starting train A or starting train B will start the D/G. A single starting train test periodically checks this assumption.

5.9 Tech Spec SR 3.8.3.6: Verify turbocharger air receiver shall be 2 180 PSIG.

5.10 ECG SR 21.3.1: Verify the D/G is aligned to provide standby power to the associated emergency bus.

5.11 ECG SR 21.3.2: Verify the D/G protective relay trip cutout switch is returned to the cutout position following each DIG test.

5.12 Tech Spec SR 3.8.2.1: Establishes which of the above requirements apply with the plant in MODES 5 or 6.

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 5 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS I AND 2

6. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 6.1 A D/G shall be considered OPERABLE if the following acceptance criteria are met:

- 6.1.1 The D/G is started by either manual, startup bus undervoltage, or SI signal.

(Tech Spec SR 3.8.1.2) v 6.1.2 The D/G starts from standby condition and accelerates to 2 900 rpm. (Tech Spec SR 3.8.1.2) 6.1.3 The D/G voltage is 2 3785 V and

4400 V (with gauge readability and instrument accuracy included, limit becomes 113 V to 121 V as read from the "Diesel Output Voltmeter" on VB4). (Tech Spec SR 3.8.1.2) 6.1.4 The D/G frequency is 2 58.8 HZ and

61.2 HZ after the D/G start signal (with gauge readability and instrument accuracy included, limit becomes 59.5 HZ to 60.5 HZ). (Tech Spec SR 3.8.1.2) 6.1.5 When the D/G is started and timed from standby condition it:

(Tech Spec SR 3.8.1.7)

a. Accelerates to 900 rpm in

10 seconds,

b. The D/G voltage in

13 seconds is 2 3785 V and

4400 V (with gauge readability and instrument accuracy included, limit becomes 113 V to 121 V as read from the "Diesel Output Voltmeter" on VB4), and

c. D/G is 2 58.8 HZ and *61.2 HZ in

13 seconds after the D/G start signal (with gauge readability and instrument accuracy included, limit becomes 59.5 HZ to 60.5 HZ).

6.1.6 When D/G is started with one starting train, the D/G shall meet the requirements of step 6.1.5.

6.1.7 Operate the D/G at a power level of 2 2340 KW and

2600 KW for 2 60 minutes. The assumed power uncertainty is +/- 71 KW and the power meter minor divisions are every 0.1 MW. Using these corrections the power out will be maintained 22.45 MW and

2.50 MW. Momentary transients outside the load range do not invalidate this test. (Tech Spec SR 3.8.1.3) 6.1.8 The D/G protective relay cutout switch is returned to the CUTOUT position following the test. (ECG SR 21.3.2) 6.1.9 The D/G is aligned to provide standby power to the associated emergency buses. (ECG SR 21.3.1) 6.1.10 D/G fuel oil day tank inventory is above the low level alarm (2 250 GAL).

(Tech Spec SR 3.8.1.4)

(003163,65.DOA (116 1007.0311

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 6 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS 1 ,AND 2 6.1.11 Each fuel transfer pump starts and transfers fuel from the storage system to the DIG engine-mounted tank via installed lines for the unit under test.

(Tech Spec SR 3.8.1.6) 6.1.12 Monthly check for removal of water from the day tank.

(Tech Spec SR 3.8.1.5) 6.1.13 Either air receiver A shall be 2 180 PSIG or air receiver B shall be 2 180 PSIG.

With instrument inaccuracy, at least one air receiver shall be 2 195 PSIG.

(Tech Spec SR 3.8.3.4) 6.1.14 Turbocharger air receiver shall be 2 180 PSIG. With instrument inaccuracy the air receiver shall be 2 195 PSIG. (Tech Spec SR 3.8.3.6) 6.2 Check valves and solenoid valves shall be considered acceptable as follows:

6.2.1 The diesel fuel oil transfer pumps 0-1 and 0-2 discharge check valve (DEG-0-35, DEG-0-36) shall be considered acceptable if the diesel fuel oil transfer pumps 0-1 and 0-2 deliver fuel into the day tank.

6.2.2 The fuel oil tanks 0-1 and 0-2 suction check valves (DEG-0-1 114, DEG-0-1 115 for DFOST 0-1 and DEG-0-1 117, DEG-0-1 118 for DFOST 0-2) shall be considered acceptable if the diesel fuel oil transfer pump delivers fuel into the day tank.

6.2.3 The starting air system and turbocharger air assist system solenoid valves shall be considered acceptable if the D/G starts and accelerates to at least 900 rpm in

< 10 seconds. Timing the D/G is required every 184 days (=z 6 months).

Administratively the D/Gs are timed on every manual start.

7. REFERENCES 7.1 PG&E Drawing No. 437579 Unit 1,4KV Diesel Generator Control No. 11 and 12.

7.2 PG&E Drawing No. 437667 Unit 1,4KV Diesel Generator Control No. 13.

7.3 PG&E Drawing No. 437546 Unit 1, 125 Volt DC System.

7.4 PG&E Drawing No. 106721 Unit 1.

7.5 PG&E Drawing No. 441357 Unit 2, 4KV Diesel Generator Control No. 21 and 22.

7.6 PG&E Drawing No. 496277 Unit 2, 4KV Diesel Generator Control No. 23.

7.7 PG&E Drawing No. 441240 Unit 2, 125 Volt DC System.

7.8 PG&E Drawing No. 107721 Unit 2.

7.9 NCR DCO-90-EN-N032.

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PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 7 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS 1 AND 2

8. APPENDICES 8.1 KW-KVAR, Power Factor Relations for Diesel Generators 8.2 - Combined Engine and Generator Operating Limits

9. A1TACHMENTS 9.1 "Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit l Diesel Generators," 10/07/03.

9.2 "Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit 2 Diesel Generators," 10/07/03 9.3 "Unit I Undervoltage Test at Switchgear Room," 10/07/03 9.4 "Unit 2 Undervoltage Test at Switchgear Room" 10/07/03

-1

( I i. 3i..i)OA I l}(0;.0)i i ;

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 8 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS 1 AND 2 START DATA SECTION OPERATING MODE DATEITIME I DIESEL GENERATOR NO.

10. PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS INITIALS (Some of the following are repeated in the OP J-6B series on D/G manual operations) 10.1 If the D/G is paralleled to the auxiliary transformer and the main unit trips, the aux bus feeder breaker will automatically open and the D/G will carry the bus load. Verify that the bus feeder breaker opened and place the D/G MODE SEL switch into AUTO.

10.2 If the D/G is paralleled to startup power and a loss of offsite power occurs, the startup feeder breaker will not automatically open. The

'D/G will attempt to supply power to loads connected to the grid.

Open the startup feeder breaker or verify the D/G breaker tripped.

Place the D/G MODE SEL switch into AUTO if the feeder breaker was opened.

10.3 When paralleling a D/G to any off-site power source or the D/G MODE SEL switch is in MANUAL and the D/G is not running, declare the D/G inoperable. In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, perform the actions required for Tech Spec 3.8.1. In MODES 5, 6, and irradiated fuel movement, perform the actions required for Tech Spec 3.8.2.

10.4 The D/G should not be operated for an extended period of time below 0.65 MW.

10.4.1 If a D/G is operated < 0.65 MW for < one hour, no action is necessary.

10.4.2 If a D/G is operated < 0.65 MW for 2 one hour but

< 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months , then the D/G should be operated 2 1.30 MW for> one hour.

10.4.3 If the D/G is to be operated for longer than 10 hours1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months

0.65 MW, the D/G should be loaded to 2 1.3 MW for

> one hour at the end of each 10 hour1.157407e-4 days 0.00278 hours 1.653439e-5 weeks 3.805e-6 months period.

NOTE: Operation of D/G < 0.65 MW for an extended period of time can expose the engine to undesirable conditions which may be detrimental to engine performance and component life.

00316365.DOA 06 1007.0311

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 9 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS 1 AND 2 INITIALS 10.5 Do not operate the D/G below rated speed with the field energized.

Excessive field currents and rotor temperatures may occur. l 10.6 When paralleling a'D/G, pick up load (0.50 MW) as soon as possible (< 15 seconds) after the breaker is closed. This will prevent the D/G breaker from tripping on directional power (DIR PWR).

10.7 There should be fuel oil in the priming tank. If there is not, the priming tank should be filled using the magnetic pump.

Document problem in an AR.

10.8 The fuel oil pressure should increase to above 40 PSIG within 60 seconds of engine start. Gauge response is about 15 seconds.

10.9 'Do not violate the following limits during normal steady-state operation:

10.9.1 Maximum continuous generator current is 451 amperes.

10.9.2 Maximum stator temperature is 240 0F.

10.9.3 Minimum lube oil pressure is 60 PSIG.

-~-- 10.9.4 Maximum lube oil temperature is 1950 F.

10.9.5 Power factor: 1.0 to 0.8 lag (see Appendix 8.1).

10.9.6 -Load: 2.60 MW at 0.8 PF (see Appendix 8.2 for maximum limits).

NOTE: The D/G may operate at > 2.5 and S 2.75 MW at 0.8 PF for up to 2000 hours0.0231 days 0.556 hours 0.00331 weeks 7.61e-4 months per year.

10.10 Normal shutdown of a D/G requires DC control power. If it becomes necessary to shutdown the D/G without control power, manually operate the trip lever on the north west corner of the engine, forward of the fuel oil filters.

10.11 Do not operate more than one D!G at a time paralleled to any transformer (startup or unit auxiliary) in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4 (SR 3.8.1.3 Note 3).

10.12 The applicable D/G MODE SEL switch on VB4 shall be in MANUAL prior to paralleling the DIG to the bus.

ub3 I 6365.D0A 1uu.0(I 1 10I{l;.031

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 10 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS 1 AND 2 INITIALS 10.13 EQD Panel, Control Power Selection 10.13.1 The D/G shall have its NORMAL DC source energized and selected in MODES 1-4. If the BACKUP source is selected in these MODES, the D/G is considered inoperable.

10.13.2 The preferred alignment in MODE 5, 6 or defueled is for the D/G to have its NORMAL DC source energized and selected.

10.13.3 The D/G may have its BACKUP source selected in MODE 5, 6 or defueled and still be considered OPERABLE, provided cross tie capability exists (i.e.,

capable to supply power to the battery charger aligned to the D/G's DC source.) _ _

10.14 Verification signoff spaces in this procedure may be for concurrent or independent verification. Concurrent verification is required when the letters "CV" are present between the "PERF" and "VERIF" signoff spaces. When no "CV" is present, independent verification is required.

10.15 Day tank level columns respond very slowly to a level change.

To avoid overflowing the day tank, use caution when manually filling the tank.

10.16 The procedure is written to test all 6 D/Gs which is further broken down into a series of Unit I and Unit 2 component IDs in steps which require clear and specific designations of the intended components. For example a listing for a Unit I relay may be 27HHU (27HGU) (27HFU). The first device (27HHU) is the applicable component when D/G 1-1 is being tested, 27HGU applies to D/G 1-2 testing, etc. Similar logic applies to Unit 2 devices.

10.17 Crankcase exhausters should be operating while engine is running.

If they are not operating, the D/G is still OPERABLE. An AR shall be initiated and repairs should be made in a timely fashion. The D/G may experience more oil leakage from the block than normal if crankcase exhausters are not running.

10.18 The D/G should not be started if the lubricating oil temperature is

< 950 F unless engineering has evaluated the condition.

10.19 Starting air header and turbo air pressure should be monitored as described in Attachments 9.1 and 9.2, step 1.13.

00316365.DOA 06 1007.0311

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 11-OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS I AND 2 PERF

11. PREREQUISITES 11.1 Shift foreman's permission given to perform the test.

Signature: - Date/Time I Shift Foreman 11.2 D/G CO2 fire protection system OPERABLE or portable dry powder fire extinguishers are available.

11.3 One of the following conditions is met:

11.3.1 The D/G is aligned for normal operation in accordance with OP J-6B.

OR 11.3.2 The D/G is aligned for normal operation in accordance with OP J-6B, except the EDQ panel is switched to

- backup and the battery charger aligned to the backup power supply is cross tied to the D/G bus. This option is available only in MODE 5, 6 or defueled.

.^ ~~~~~~~~~~N/A

[]

11.4 The bus to which the D/G is to be paralleled shall be energized.

11.5 Utilizing the information in the control room (i.e., clearance logs; annunciators, etc.), check to see if the other D/Gs for the unit are OPERABLE. -I 11.5.1 Verify the action requirements in Tech Spec 3.8.1, in MODES 1-4 or Tech Spec 3.8.2, in MODES 5, 6 and irradiated fuel movement are being followed.

00316165.DOA Ot' 0701 I 10n7n-3

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 12 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS 1 AND 2 PERF 11.6 The following test equipment is available and is in current calibration:

11.6.1 Three stopwatches if timing the start.

N/A[ ]

ID # Cal Due Date 11.6.2 Vibration meter and pickup with -fi 5% of full scale accuracy or better.

a. Vibration Meter ID No.

Cal Due Date__

11.7 When a vertical board recorder or instrument is not functioning properly, equivalent or more accurate M&TE equipment may be used. Install M&TE per CF4.1D7, "Temporary Modifications."

Record in REMARKS the meter or recorder number, the parameter measured, the M&TE equipment number, and the calibration due date.

N/A[ ]

11.8 If this test is being performed after work was conducted on the D/G, verify that no ground buggy is installed in the D/G output breaker switchgear cubicle.

N/A[ ]

11.9 If test is used to satisfy Tech Spec SR 3.8.1.2 or Tech Spec SR 3.8.1.7, jacket water and lubricating oil temperature must be 2 950 F and < 1700 F. If M&TE is used to satisfy Tech Spec, use 901F + M&TE uncertainty and 175 - M&TE uncertainty. (Reference Tech Spec Basis SR 3.8.1.2 and SR 3.8.1.7)

N/A[ ]

11.10 If the plant is in MODE 1, 2, 3 or4, obtain an issued for use copy of STP I-IC, Attachment 12.4.

N/A[ ]

00316365.DOA 06 1007.0311

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 13 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS 1 AND 2 PERF 11.11 Obtain an issued for use STP M-91. Every time a D/G starts or a

.: DIG start is attempted, STP M-91 shall be performed.

11.12 Communications are established between the control room, the D/G, switchgear rooms, and SSPS as appropriate.

11.13 During manual starts, isolate starting train A or starting train B per step below, or as directed by the shift foreman.

Isolate Starting Train A in: February June October [1 Isolate Starting Train B in: April August December [1 N/A[ ]

11.13.1 .Based on the month or shift foreman's direction, select the air supply valve to be closed. _

D/G 1-1 (2-1) 1-2 (2-2) 1-3 (2-3)

Train "A" Valve DEG-63 [ ] DEG-89 [ 1 DEG-1 15 [ ]

( Train "B" Valve I DEG-52 [ ] I :DEG-78 [ ] I DEG-104 [ ] I

11.13.2 Based on the month or shift foreman's direction, select the blow-down valve to be uncapped and opened in the table below. When the valve is opened, PK16-09, 17-09, or 18-09, will alarm.

D/G 1-1 (2-1) 2 (2-2) 1-3 (2-3)

Train "A" Valve DEG-227 [ ] DEG-249 [ ] DEG-271 [1 Train "B" Valve DEG-216 [ DEG-238 [ ] DEG-260 [1 NOTE 1: When train "A" valves are manipulated, starting train "B" is being tested. When train "B" valves are manipulated, train A is being tested.

NOTE 2: This testing schedule supports taking credit for one starting train being able to start the D/G in the required time.

See Tech Spec Bases B3.83.E.I. Tech Spec Bases B SR 3.8.3.4 assumes one D/G starting train will start the D/G.I i~~'~c~

iV:(~~.DOA 06 1(1(7.0 I11

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 14 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS 1 AND 2 PERF

12. PROCEDURE Diesel Generator No.

12.1 Notify the control operator that testing is ready to commence.

NOTE: Some steps within this procedure are for specific starting methods and loading. If the step does not apply to the starting method and loading, mark the step N/A.

12.2 Prestart Checks/Alignment 12.2.1 Have the field operator perform the "PRETEST DATA" section. If this is to be a single starting train start, refer to step 11.13 and inform the field operator which valves are to be manipulated.

12.2.2 Mw-Hr meter reading before test Mw-Hr 12.2.3 List alarms in prior to test 12.2.4 Record the appropriate D/G MODE SEL switch position.

-I 12.2.5 The following D/G protective relays are cutin:

RELAY FEATURE LOCATION

a. Differential on VB4 D/G PROT RELAYS CUT-IN, DIFF light on.

b. Directional power, Feature cutout switch Loss of field, and on VB4, CUT-IN, Overcurrent* directional power and loss of field lights are on.

c. 4KV bus on VB4 4KV BUS DIFF differential PROT RLY C/I light on.

These features are required by the Technical Specifications to be cutout for normal service; however, these features should be cutin for the duration of this test to provide protection to the D/G when paralleled to the bus. While the relays are cutin for testing the D/G is considered operable.

00316365.DOA 06 1007.0311

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65

. PAGE 15 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS 1 AND 2 PERF 12.2.6 Place the D/G stator temperature on PPC trend.

I D/G 1-1 T2802A D/G 2-1 T2802A D/G 1-2 T2803A D/G 2-2 T2803A D/G 1-3 T2804A D/G 2-3 T2804A 12.2.7 If the plant is in MODE 1,2; 3, or 4, perform visual check of offsite power supplies per standing orders.

,STP I-IC, Attachment 12.4 is required < 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months after D/G is inoperable. ,,

N/A [ ]

003 16365 DOA 10()7.031 1

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 16 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS I AND 2 PERF 12.3 Starting NOTE: The D/G will normally be started manually or on an undervoltage signal. This test may be performed in conjunction with STP M-1 6A, M-l 6BA or M- I 6BB and started on an SI signal. If plant conditions require a different starting method than specified, the starting method may be changed with SFM approval.

12.3.1 Refer to step 4.2 to determine the starting method.

MANUAL (Even Months) []

UNDERVOLTAGE (Odd Months) []

SI (With STP M-1 6xx) []

NOTE: On steps 12.3.7, 12.3.8, and 12.3.9, the times to reach speed, voltage, and frequency vary with each D/G. Likewise, the overshoot varies depending upon the individual D/G governor. On steps 12.3.8 and 12.3.9, be aware that there may or may not be an overshoot in voltage and frequency; therefore, it will be necessary to carefully monitor these parameters.

12.3.2 Designate a person to observe or time D/G speed while starting.

12.3.3 Before starting D/G, be in direct communication with the operator in the D/G area so start-up data can be taken within 60 seconds of D/G start.

a. If required, verify the D/G starting train valves have been closed and opened.

N/A[ ]

b. If M&TE is installed, inform maintenance so the M&TE may be started or monitored as necessary.

N/A [ ]

00316365.DOA 06 1007.0311

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 17 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS 1 AND 2 PERF NOTE 1: If the D/G was operated in manual mode and the frequency was not set to 2 60 HZ and < 60.25 HZ when the D/G was shutdown, the frequency may stabilize outside the frequency range of 2 59.5 HZ and < 60.5 HZ on the next manual start. If the speed attained 900 RPM in

10 seconds and the voltage stabilized in

13 seconds, the D/G is functioning as designed. (AR A0562732).

NOTE 2: A timed start is required every 184 days. Every manual start should be timed for trending purposes. Simulated undervoltage starts and safety injection start signals may be timed per shift foreman's direction.

12.3.4 If starting the D/G manually, perform the following:

N/A[]

a. Place the D/G appropriate D/G MODE SEL switch in MAN on VB4.

b. Declare D/G inoperable.

c. Simultaneously start the stopwatches and the D/G from the control room.

NOTE: If the undervoltage start is timed, there is an 0.8 second delay.

12.3.5 If starting the D/G on an undervoltage, perform the following:

N/A [

a. Station an operator in the appropriate vital 4KV switchgear room with Attachment 9.3 (9.4). l

b. Establish communications between the D/G, control room, and appropriate vital 4KV switchgear room.

c. Verify the appropriate D/G MODE SEL switch is in AUTO on VB4.

d. Cutout the appropriate startup bus undervoltage (UV) relay per Attachment 9.3 (9.4).

12.3.6 If starting the D/G on an SI signal, use STP M-16A, M-I 6BA or M-1 6BB to start the engine.

Procedure used N/A[ ]

NOTE: STP M-1 6A starts D/G 1-1 and 2-2, STP M-1 6BB starts D/G 1-2 and 2-1, and STP M-1 6BA starts D/G 1-3 and 2-3.

003 ]63t, .DOA 06 0.33

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 18 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS 1 AND 2 PERF NOTE: When timing any start, record the stopwatch time. Eight tenths of a second will be subtracted when evaluating UV start time in steps 12.3.10, 15.1.2, 15.1.3 and 15.1.4.

12.3.7 When the D/G starts, verify that the D/G speed reached

Ž900RPM. l

a. Record the no-load stable speed prior to operator adjustment: RPM NOTE: It is acceptable for the stable speed to be

900 RPM or 2 900 RPM so long as the frequency is within the required limits.

b. If applicable, record the starting time to reach 900 rpm.

seconds (must be

10 seconds).

N/A[ ]

Stop Watch ID 12.3.8 Verify that the D/G voltage is stable 2 113 V and

121 V.

a. If applicable, record the time for stable voltage 2 113 V and

121 V.

seconds (must be < 13 seconds).

N/A[ ]

Stop Watch ID 12.3.9 Verify that the D/G frequency is stable 2 59.5 HZ and

60.5 HZ.

a. If applicable, record the time for stable frequency 2 59.5 HZ and

60.5 HZ.

seconds (must be *13 seconds).

N/A[ ]

Stop Watch ID 00316365.DOA 06 1007.0311

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 19 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS 1 AND 2 PERF VERIF NOTE: When evaluating a UV timed start in step 12.3.10, subtract 0.8 seconds.

12.3.10 If speed and voltage did not reach their required values, evaluate the D/G for operability. Submit an action request and contact the system engineer for further review. Otherwise mark this step N/A.

N/A [ ]

AR# _

12.3.11 If frequency did not reach its value it may be due to a frequency setting error. Refer to AR A0562732.

Submit an action request and contact the system engineer for further review. It may be required to adjust the frequency and reperform the test. Otherwise mark this step N/A.

N/A __]

AR#

12.3.12 Have the field operator record data in the "STARTUP DATA" section of Attachment 9.1 (9.2).

12.3.13 If the D/G was started on an undervoltage signal, have the operator at the vital 4KV switchgear room cut-in the startup bus relay per Attachment 9.3 (9.4).

N/A[ ]

12.3.14 If the D/G was started on an undervoltage signal or an SI signal, record the D/G ISOC frequency as indicated by the frequency meter on VB4.

N/A __]

_HZ

a. Isoc frequency between 59.75 YES NO and 60.25 HZ. (Admin) [] 1

b. If the indicated frequency is outside the 59.75 to 60.25 HZ range, record the D/G ISOC frequency as indicated by the frequency meter at the D/G exciter cubicle.

N/At)

HZ (T3 10-(5.DCA 06 1O07.031_I

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 20 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS I AND 2 PERF 12.4 Paralleling 12.4.1 Verify the D/G MODE SEL switch in MANUAL. l 12.4.2 Verify the D/G has been declared inoperable. l 12.4.3 Check D/G output voltage on each phase. Otherwise, when synchroscope is turned ON (next step) the voltmeter will lock on to phase C.

12.4.4 Cut in the FEEDER SYNC Switch.

12.4.5 Verify synchroscope working.

a. Lights OFF at the 12 o'clock position.

b. Lights FULL BRIGHT at the 6 o'clock position.

12.4.6 Adjust engine speed up and down to verify manual governor control. _

12.4.7 *Adjust engine speed so the synchroscope is turning slowly in the clockwise (FAST) direction. This will allow the D/G to pick up load when paralleled to the bus.

12.4.8 Adjust DIG voltage to within +/-2 volts of bus voltage.

12.4.9 When the synchroscope pointer is slightly before the 12 o'clock position, turn generator breaker control switch to the CLOSE position. Pick up load (0.5MW) promptly after the breaker is closed. This will prevent the D/G breaker from tripping.

Clock time D/G paralleled: hrs.

12.4.10 Adjust voltage with voltage control switch to maintain VARS-OUT.

12.4.11 Cut out the FEEDER SYNC Switch.

12.4.12 Increase the load to 22.45 MW and *2.50 MW at a rate of

0.50 MW every 2 minutes and record clock time D/G reaches 22.45 MW load:

Date/Time /

12.4.13 If the plant is in MODE 1, 2, 3, or 4, perform STP I- IC, Attachment 12.4 within I hour of declaring D/G inoperable.

00316365.DOA 06 1007.0311

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 21 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS 1 AND 2 PERF 12.4.14 Mark the D/G MW/Freq recorder NOTE: The strip chart from the MWIFreq recorder will be used to monitor any power variation during the steady state load run period. -If recorder is not available, an equivalent or better M&TE recorder may be used.

Momentary transients outside the load range do not invalidate this test.

12.4.15 Periodically monitor the D/G real power output for any spurious load change 2 +/-0.1 OMW (0.20MW Peak to Peak, p-p) from steady state value. If exceeding

+/-0.I OMW (0.20MW p-p), generate an AR and route to system engineer.

AR #

003 1665.DOA 103

)~f~- I

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 22 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS 1 AND 2 PERF 12.5 Operation and Shutdown 12.5.1 Record D/G operating information as follows:

List alarms in Generator Current, Amperes A_ _ BO Co Load MW (22.45 and *2.50 required)

Freq. HZ MVAR 12.5.2 Operate the D/G loaded to 22.45 MW and

2.50 MW for 2 60 minutes. Momentary transients outside the load range do not invalidate this test. l 12.5.3 Have the field operator take the data specified in the "RUN DATA" section of Attachment 9.1 (9.2). l 12.5.4 Record steady state D/G stator temp (limit < 2401F)

OF NOTE: Per SFM discretion, the D/G alignment (D/G paralleled to bus) may be utilized for other testing. The shutdown sequence from another procedure may be used. If the D/G is shutdown by another procedure, N/A steps 12.5.6, 12.5.8, 12.5.9. Record applicable data in steps 12.5.5a, 12.5.7, 12.5.10a, 12.5.1Od and 12.5.11.

12.5.5 After all data has been recorded and the D/G has run loaded, 22.45 MW and

2.50 MW for 2 I hr, record the date and time below.

a. Date/Time /

12.5.6 Reduce the D/G load to 0.50 MW at < 0.50 MW every 2 minutes.

N/A[ ]

00316365.DOA 06 1007.0311

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 23 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS I AND 2 PERF 12.5.7 Calculate time D/G ran 2 2.45 MW for this test.

Clock time at end of test or when load was reduced

2.45 MW

-___________________ hrs. (Step 12.5.5a)

Clock time load reached 2 2.45 MW hrs. (Step 12.4.12)

Time D/G ran 2 2.45 MW: - minutes.

(Must be 2 60 minutes for surveillance testing to satisfy Tech Spec.)

12.5.8 Allow the D/G to operate at approximately 0.50 MW for about five minutes for cooldown.

AN/[] x 12.5.9 Reduce load on the D/G to

0.25 MW and 2 0.10 MW

and separate the unit by opening the D/G output breaker.

-IN/A[ ]

12.5.10 After the unit has been separated,

a. Record MW-HR:

b. Adjust the D/G speed so the frequency meter reads 60.0 to 60.25 HZ.'

c. Adjust the D/G voltage to 119 V indicated (4160 V on the bus).

d. Record the speed, frequency and voltage.

RPM _ HZ V 12.5.11 Calculate MW-hrs generated during this test.

MW-hr meter reading after test (Step 12.5.1 Oa)

MW-hr meter reading before test

. (Step 12.2.2)

MW-hrs generated

13. DATA REDUCTION AND EVALUATION None 00(- i t)'c: .I)A 06 u.3I l (mu .0 Iu l;

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMIPANY NUMBER STP Mv-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 24 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS 1 AND 2 PERF

14. RESTORATION 14.1 Shutdown the D/G from the control room by placing the MAN MODE STOP/START switch to stop. _

14.2 Return the D/G MODE SEL switch on VB4 to AUTO if required for the main unit operating mode.

D/G MODE SEL switch position 14.3 Cut out the D/G directional power, overcurrent, and loss of field protection relays at VB4 by placing the toggle switch in the CUTOUT position.

14.4 Verify STP M-91 was initiated.

14.5 If starting train air valves were manipulated, verify a field operator has restored the valves per Attachment 9.1 (9.2). When complete, reset the alarm.

N/A[ ]

14.6 After the unit has been shutdown for approximately 10 minutes, have the field operator record the data in the "SHUTDOWN DATA" section of Attachment 9.1 (9.2).

14.7 Verify that the D/G is aligned to provide standby power to its associated emergency bus by performing the following checks:

14.7.1 D/G breaker OPERABLE (i.e., power available).

14.7.2 For a Unit I D/G, verify the following alarms are not in alarm: N/A[ ]

a. Diesel on local control. (PK16-03, PK17-03 or PK1 8-03)

b. Diesel control UV. (PK 16-04, PK 17-04 or PK 18-04)

c. Diesel STRT-TURBO AIR PRESS. (PK16-09, PK 17-09 or PK 18-09)

d. Diesel engine trip. (PK16-13, PK17-13 or PK18-13)

e. Diesel generator breaker trip. (PK16-14, PK17-14 or PK18-14)

f. Diesel generator shutdown relay trip. (PK16-15, PK17-15 or PK18-15)

g. 4KV bus differential lockout. (PK]6-16, PK17-16 or PK]8-16)

h. Diesel voltage regulator on MANUAL.

(PK]6-25, PK17-25 orPK]8-25)

OMl1 6365 DOA 06 1007 0311

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 25 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS 1 AND 2 PERF 14.7.3 For a Unit 2 D/G, veri fy the following alarms are not in alarm: N/A[ ]

a. Diesel on local control. (PKI 7-03, PK1]6-03 or PK1I8-03)

b. Diesel control UV. (PK17-04, PK16-04 or PK18-04)

c. Diesel STRT-TURBO AIR PRESS. (PK17-09, PK16-09 or PK18-09)

d. Diesel engine trip. (PK17-13, PK1]6-13 or PK18-13)

e. Diesel generator breaker trip. (PK1(7-14, PK16-14 or PK1(8-14)

f. Diesel generator shutdown relay trip. (PK1]7-15, PK16-15 or PK18-15)_

g. 4KV bus differential lockout. -(PK1(7-16, PK16-16 orPK18-16)

h. Diesel voltage regulator on MANUAL.

(PK17-25, PK16-25 orPK18-25) 14.8 Remove the D/G stator temperature from PPC trend.

(Reference step 12.2.6) 14.9 Verify Attachment 9.1 (9.2), field data sheets have been completed by the field operator and attached to this procedure.

14.10 Verify D/G fuel oil level is above low level alarm. (LOA)

For Unit 1:

D/G 11, PK16-07 alarm clear or alarmn input 255 not in. [ ]

D/G 12, PK17-07 alarm clear or alarm input 182 not in.. [1 D/G 13, PK18-07 alarm clear or alarm input 101 not in. [1 For Unit 2:

DIG 21, PK17-07 alarm clear or alarm input 182 not in. [1 D/G22,P(6-07alarm clearoralarminput255notin.

D/G 23, PK18-07 alarm clear or alarm input 101 not in. [ ]

14.11 If this is a monthly surveillance test, notify chemistry to perform STP M-l OB2, "Diesel Generator Day Tanks Fuel Oil Analysis."

Otherwise mark this step N/A.

N/A[ ]

utc Iu.u5J-,).D0A 06I

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 26 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS 1 AND 2 PERF 14.12 Describe any malfunctions and list any discrepancies found.

Otherwise mark N/A.

N/A [ ]

REMARKS: -

14.13 Test performers and verifiers Name Signature Date/Time Init

/

Nn31I6165 DOA nO6 1007 0311

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 27 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS 1 AND 2 PERF

15. PRIMARY REVIEW 15.1 Verify the following acceptance criteria have been satisfied:

15.1.1 The D/G is started by either manual; startup bus undervoltage, or SI signal (steps 12.3.4, 12.3.5 or 12.3.6).

NOTE: When evaluating a UV timed start in steps 15.1.2, 15.1.3 and 15.1.4, subtract 0.8 seconds.

15.1.2 The D/G accelerates to 2 900 rpm. If performing a timed start, the D/G accelerated to 2 900 rpm in

ten (10) seconds. (Step 12.3.7).

15.1.3 The D/G voltage stabilized 2 113 V to

121 V after start. If performing a timed start, the D/G voltage stabilized 2 113 V to

121 V in

13 seconds.

(Step 12.3.8).

15.1.4 The D/G frequency stabilized between 2 59.5 HZ and

60.5 HZ after start. If performing a timed start, the

D/G frequency stabilized 2 59.5 HZ and

60.5 HZ in

13 seconds. (Step 12.3.9) 15.1.5 If starting the D/G on a single starting train, verify the D/G started within the required times. Indicate the train that was tested. (Steps 15.1.2, 15.1.3, and 15.1.4)

N/A[ ]

Starting train A (starting train B isolated, step 11.13) []

Starting train B (starting train A isolated, step 1.13) []

15.1.6 The D/G ran for 2 60 minutes at 2 2.45 MW and

2.50 MW. (Step 12.5.7).

15.1.7 The D/G protective relay cutout switch is returned to the CUTOUT position. (Step 14.3) 15.1.8 The D/G is aligned to provide standby power to the associated emergency buses. (Step 14.7) 15.1.9 The fuel level in the D/G fuel oil day tank is above low level alarm. (Step 14.10) 110- 16f-365.DOA 007.31 I no,1 0o I I

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMIBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 28 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS 1 AND 2 PERF 15.1.10 If the day tank low level alarm is out of service, verify the fuel level in the D/G fuel oil day tank is 2 300 gallons or DIG 1-3 is >1/2. (Attachment 9.1 (9.2) step 4.6).

N/A[ ]

15.1.11 Either air receiver A OR B is 2 195 PSIG.

(Attachments 9.1 (9.2), step 4.3, data points 34 and 40).

15.1.12 Turbocharger air receiver is 2 195 PSIG.

(Attachments 9.1 (9.2), step 4.3, data point 39).

15.1.13 Each diesel fuel oil transfer pump starts and transfers fuel from the storage system to the D/G engine-mounted tank via installed lines for the D/G under test (Attachment 9.1 (9.2), steps 3.1.1, 3.1.3, 3.1.6,3.1.8).

15.1.14 Monthly check for and removal of water from the day tank. (Attachment 9.1 (9.2), step 4.10)

NOTE: This NOTE applies to steps 15.1.15 and 15.1.16 below.

If the frequency bands in both steps were exceeded, generate an AR to adjust D/G ISOC frequency per MP E-21.6. If only the frequency band of step 15.1.15 was exceeded, generate an AR to calibrate the frequency meter on VB4.

15.1.15 If the D/G is started from the UV or SI signal, the D/G ISOC frequency was 2 59.75 and < 60.25 HZ as indicated by the frequency meter on VB4. (Admin Limit) (Step 12.3.14)

N/A[ ]

AR#

NOTE: Mark step 15.1.16 N/A if step 12.3.14b was marked N/A.

15.1.16 If the D/G is started from the UV or SI signal, the D/G ISOC frequency was 2 59.75 and < 60.25 HZ as indicated by the frequency meter at the D/G exciter cubicle. (Admin Limit) (Step 12.3.14.)

N/A[ ]

003 16365.DOA 06 1007.0311

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 29 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS 1 AND 2 PERF 15.2 Check valves and solenoid valves shall be considered acceptable if the following are met:

15.2.1 The starting air system and turbocharger air assist system solenoid valves stroking requirements are satisfied if the D/G started successfully. (Step 12.3.7 and Attachment 9.1 (9.2), step 2.1).

15.2.2 The diesel fuel oil transfer pumps 0-1 and 0-2 discharge check valve (DEG-0-35, DEG-0-36) shall be considered acceptable if the diesel fuel oil transfer pumps 0-1 and 0-2 delivers fuel into the day tank (Attachment 9.1 (9.2), steps 3.1.3 and 3.1.8).

,15.2.3 The fuel oil tanks 0-1 and 0-2 suction check valves (DEG-0-1 114, DEG-0-1 115 for DFOST 0-1 and DEG-0-11 17, DEG-0-1 118 for DFOST 0-2) shall be considered acceptable if diesel fuel oil transfer pumps 0-1 and 0-2 delivers fuel into the day tank (Attachment 9.1 (9.2), steps 3.1.3 and 3.1.8).

15.3 Verify M&TE usage recorded in PIMS.

15.4 Review completed procedure and based on test data, make determination of D/G OPERABILITY. If any malfunctions are noted, notify management promptly, submit an action request and refer to applicable LCO.

AR#_

REMARKS:

Signature: Date/Time Shift Foreman 00'1 6365.DOA 1 (7.0; 1,1

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 30 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS 1 AND 2 PERF

16. SECONDARY REVIEW 16.1 Review procedure for completeness and acceptability.

16.2 If this test was complete and the D/G are OPERABLE, then verify master schedule has been updated.

REMARKS:

16.3 Reviewed By: Date Second Reviewer 00316365.DOA 06 1007.0311

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 31 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS I AND 2 APPENDIX 8.1 I

KW-KVAR, POWER FACTOR RELATIONS FOR DIESEL GENERATORS I

-J 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 REAL LOAD, K1W 003 1 636.Do6 1.O0 1007.03l11

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9A DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 65 PAGE 32 OF 32 TITLE: Diesel Engine Generator Routine Surveillance Test UNITS 1 AND 2 APPENDIX 8.2 I

COMBINED ENGINE AND GENERATOR OPERATING LIMITS 3

MAXIMUM OPERATING _

LIMIT -1 NORIMALS-OPERATING LIMIT 1.8 PF 2

1

-I 0 )o 2

-J MWatts flO316365 PfA n 1007 0311

10/07/03 Page I of 19 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT STP M-9A ATTACHMENT 9.1 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit I Diesel Generators FIELD DATA D.G. NO. DATE TIME OPERATOR (AT DIESEL)

1. PRETEST DATA ACTUAL VALUE 1.1 Engine Hours:

1.2 Governor oil level (%)

(minimum level = oil visible in glass*).

(If below low level mark on sightglass, write an AR.)

AR#

1.3 Governor settings:

Speed Droop:

Load Limit:

Speed:

1:4 Record crankcase lubricating oil level, inches below high level mark on dipstick. If lubricating oil is > 2" below the high level mark, initiate an action request to add more lubricating oil.

(Minimum level is 7" below high level mark.)

AR#

1.5 Priming tank level (inches from bottom of sightglass) (minimum level = oil visible in glass).

If the level in the priming tank is less than minimum, refill by manual operation of the magnetic pump or with the manual priming pump. If insufficient magnetic pump run time is suspected write an action request to maintenance to adjust the magnetic pump timer. If priming tank level cannot be established declare D/G inoperable.

AR _

1.6 Day tank fuel oil level Fill tank if < 275 gallons (1/2 full for D/G 13).

- AR#

If out of limits, declare D/G inoperable.

- If out of limits, initiate an action request.

003 Itee3-.OA 0(0 1007.0' , I I

10107/03 Page 2 of 19 STP M-9A (UNIT 1)

ATTACHMENT 9.1 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit I Diesel Generators ACTUAL VALUE 1.7 Jacket cooling water level, inches above low point in glass.

(Minimum levelevater visible in glass*).

If the jacket cooling water level is less than the values listed below, refill the expansion tank to the appropriate fill level using demineralized water. Notify chemistry to test the jacket cooling water after D/G test.

Level Below Fill To Cold 12" 15" Hot (21607F) 14.5" 17.5" Chemistry Notified: Date/Time 1.8 West roll up fire doors are in the full up position.***

Record Door Position PERF 1.9 Connect the D/G fuel oil leak-off collection bottles as follows:

1.9.1 Obtain 2 five gallon poly bottles and tygon tubing from the storage box. l 1.9.2 Remove the pipe cap at the end of the fuel oil leak-off return lines on each side of the D/G.

1.9.3 Connect the tygon tubing to the fuel oil leak-off return lines and route each to a 5 gallon poly bottle.

1.9.4 Open the appropriate 1/2" whitey fuel oil leak-off drain valves to the poly bottle.

DIG 1-1 DEG-1-1055, DEG-1-1056 D/G 1-2 DEG-1-1053, DEG-1-1054 D/G 1-3 DEG-1-1057, DEG-1-1058

If out of limits, declare DIG inoperable.

- - ~ At least one west roll up fire door must be open to maintain the D/G OPERABLE. (AR A0330481-E04) 00316365 DOA 06 1007.0311

10/07/03 Page 3 of 19 STP M-9A (UNIT I)

ATTACHMENT 9.1 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit I Diesel Generators PERF 1.10 If directed by the control room operator or the shift foreman, isolate starting train A or starting train B. Mark the starting train where valves will be manipulated.

Isolate Starting TrainA [A Isolate Starting Train B []

N/A [_]

1.10.1 Select the air supply valve to be closed in the table below.

DIG I ll I 1-2 1-3 l Train "A" Valve DEG-1 -63[ DEG-1-89[ DEG- I -115[

Train"B" Valve DEG-1-52 [ DEG-1-78 ] DEG-1-104[ ]

1.10.2 Select the blow-down valve to be uncapped and opened 'II in the table below. When the valve is opened, PK window 16-09, 17-09, or i 8-09, will alarm.

I D/G I 1I 2 1 -3 Train "A" Valve DEG-1-227 [] DEG-1-249 [] DEG-1-211 []

Train "B" Valve DEG-1-216 DEG-1-238[ ] DEG-1-260[

NOTE: When train "A" valves are manipulated, starting train "B" will be tested. When train "B" valves are manipulated, train "A" will be tested.

i~~~~~~~~~~

003 16 65.DOA W0,.0 11

10/07/03 Page 4 of 19 STP M-9A (UNIT 1)

ATTACHMENT 9.1 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit I Diesel Generators PERF 1.11 Verify one of the following:

1.11.1 Verify the D/G control power transfer switch is in the NORMAL position with the NORMAL amber light lit on panel EQDxx, (Replace "xx" with the number of the D/G being tested for panel designation, e.g., EQD I I for D/G 11, etc.).

OR 1.11.2 (This option available only in MODE 5, 6 or defueled when step 11.3.2 is performed) Verify the D/G control power transfer switch is in the BACKUP position with the BACKUP amber light lit on panel EQDxx (Replace "xx" with the number of the D/G being tested for panel designation, e.g., EQDI I for D/G 11, etc.).

N/A[]

1.12 If test is used to satisfy Tech Spec SR 3.8.1.2 or SR 3.8.1.7, (Routine M-9A Test) record jacket water temperature and lubricating oil temperature. If either temperature is not 2 950 F and

167 0 F notify the shift foreman.

N/A[ ]

Water Temperature: Oil Temperature _ -_

DIESEL WATER OIL GENERATOR TEMPERATURE TEMPERATURE 1-1 TI-1030 TI-527 1-2 TI-1035 TI-504 1-3 TI-1036 TI-505 OR If M&TE is used, calculate the required temperature range by adding M&TE uncertainty to 90'F and subtracting M&TE uncertainty from 1750. M&TE I.D._

Required Temperature Range for M&TE Measured Water Temperature OF OF Oil Temperature -OF OF N/A [ ]

00316365 DOA 06 1007 0311

10/07/03 Page 5 of 19 STP M-9A (UNIT 1)

ATrACHMENT 9.1 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit I Diesel Generators 1.13 Record the following parameters:

DATA INSTRUMENT NO. FOR DIESEL ACTUAL POINT PARAMETER 11 12 13 LIMITS YALUE I Lubricating Oil P1-606 PI-629 P1-639 10-15**4 Pressure (PSIG) 2 Room Air 11-97 11-98 11-99 Temperature (0 F) 3 Turbo Air Header P1-843 PI-844 PI-845 Ž200**

Pressure (PSJG) t1952 4 AirHeaderB P1-598 P1-620 P1-640 Ž140' Pressure (PSIG) l60*

5 Air Header A PI-599 PI-621 PI-641 Ž140' Pressure (PSIG) *160*

6 Jacket Water T1-1030 11-1035 11-1036 95-120**3 Temperature (IF) (Ž95*)

7 -AirReceiverA P1-601 P1-623 P1-634 >210**

Pressure (PSIG) Ž1951 8 Lubricating Oil 11-527 T1-504 TI-505 95-120**3 Temperature (IF) (295*)

9 Turbo AirReceiver P1-840 P1-841 P1-842 >200**

Pressure (PSIG) Ž1952 10 AirReceiverB P1-600 P1-622 P1-633 2210**

Pressure (PSIG) 2195'

*AR#

NOTE: Either starting air receiver A must be 2 195 PSIG and starting air header A must be 2 140 PSIG OR starting air receiver B must be 2 195 PSIG and starting air header B must be 2 140 PSIG. If both starting air receivers are 2 165 PSIG and < 195 PSIG, restore one air receiver to 2 195 PSIG in

48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or declare the D/G inoperable. If both starting air receivers < 165 PSIG declare the D/G inoperable. If both air header A and air header B pressure is < 140 PSIG declare the D/G inoperable. If performing a single starting train start, either air header A or air header B will indicate 0 PSIG.

2 NOTE: If the turbocharger receiver is ; 165 PSIG and < 195 PSIG, restore the air receiver to 2 195 PSIG 5 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or declare the D/G inoperable. If the turbocharger< 165 PSIG, declare the D/G inoperable.

NOTE: If the D/G is still hot from a previous run and the oil or jacket water temperature is > 1201F, do not write an AR.

4NOTE: If the DIG lube oil is> 1200 F from a previous run, the lube oil pressure is > 3 psi, and the pre-lube pump is on, do NOT write an AR.

l* If out of limits, declare D/G inoperable.

- If out of limits, initiate an action request.

001 16364.D(A Of 10.01 I no-. (I I!

10/07/03 Page 6 of 19 STP M-9A (UNIT 1)

ATTACHMENT 9.1 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit I Diesel Generators PERF

2. STARTUP DATA NOTE 1: If it becomes necessary to shutdown the D/G without control power, manually operate the overspeed trip lever on the northwest corner of the engine, forward of the fuel oil filters.

I NOTE 2: The next four steps should be performed within 60 seconds of D/G start.

2.1 Verify D/G started.

2.2 Verify D/G lube oil pressure 2 60 PSIG within 60 seconds of starting.** (Instrument console, PI-606, PI-629 or PI-639) 2.3 Verify jacket water pressure increases within 60 seconds of starting.** (No pressure limit) (Instrument console, PI-612, PI-643 or PI-645) 2.4 -Verify D/G fuel oil pressure 2 40 PSIG within 60 seconds of starting.** (Instrument console, PI-604, PI-626 or PI-637)

(Gauge response is generally about 15 seconds.)

2.5 Verify the crankcase exhausters are operating.**

2.6 Verify governor oil is at or above the low level mark in sightglass.

If below the mark write an AR. If not visible, declare D/G inoperable.

- If out of limits, initiate an action request.

00316365 DOA 06 1007.0311

10/07/03 Page 7 of 19 STP M-9A (UNIT 1)

ATTACHMENT 9.1.

TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit I Diesel Generators PERF 2.7 Verify proper fuel oil flow to the priming system.

2.7.1 Verify magnetic priming pump is NOT running.

2.7.2 Verify SMALL amount of fuel flowing in overflow sightglass Fl-313 (314) (315)

NOTE: Fuel should NOT collect in the sightglass. If fuel is not flowing in the sightglass but the priming tank level is increasing, wait until the priming tank fills to the proper level. Valve DEG-1-530 (536) (542) should be approximately 1/4 turn open.

a. If there is no flow or too much flow in the sightglass, then adjust valve DEG-1-530 (536) (542) until a SMALL amount of fuel is flowing in'the overflow sightglass.

N/A[ ]

2.8 Monitor the level in the poly bottles connected to the D/G fuel leak-off valves as needed to prevent poly bottle overfill while the drain valve is open and D/G is running.

003 1(3I W)O 1007.0311

10/07/03 Page 8 of 19 STP M-9A (UNIT 1)

ATTACHMENT 9.1 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit I Diesel Generators PERF VERIF

3. RUN DATA NOTE: Steps 3.1 and 3.2 can be performed anytime after the D/G has started. The D/G does not need to have been running for at least 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

3.1 Verify OPERABILITY of the fuel oil transfer system in the following steps:

CAUTION: It is possible to overflow the fuel oil day tank in MANUAL control, and thus cause a fuel oil spill. Level column responds very slowly to a level change. Exercise caution when manually filling a day tank.

NOTE: The numbers given below are for D/G 1-1. The numbers in parentheses are for D/Gs 1-2 and 1-3 respectively.

3.1.1 Start fuel oil transfer pump 0- I from D/G I- I (I -2)

(1-3).

3.1.2 Open day tank fill valve LCV-88 (89) (90).

3.1.3 Observe an increase in day tank level. (Verifies foot valves DEG-0-1 114, DEG-0-1 115, and check valve DEG-0-35 are OPERABLE.)

3.1.4 Close LCV-88 (89) (90) and place in AUTO.

3.1.5 Stop fuel oil transfer pump 0-1 and place the switch in the AUTO position.

3.1.6 Start fuel oil transfer pump 0-2 from D/G 1-1 (1-2)

(1-3).

3.1.7 Open day tank fill valve LCV-85 (86) (87).

3.1.8 Observe an increase in day tank level. (Verifies foot valves DEG-0-1 117, DEG-0-1 118, and check valve DEG-0-36 are OPERABLE) 3.1.9 Close LCV-85 (86) (87) and place in AUTO.

3.1.10 Stop fuel oil transfer pump 0-2 and place the switch in the AUTO position.

3.2 Verify proper operation of the fuel oil priming system by performing the following:

3.2.1 Place magnetic priming pump control switch in MANUAL and verify pump operation by increase in fuel oil flow through overflow sightglass.

3.2.2 Place magnetic priming pump control switch in AUTO.

00316365.DOA 06 1007 0311

10/07/03 Page 9 of 19 STP M-9A (UNIT I)

ATTACHMENT 9.1 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit I Diesel Generators 3.3 Record the following Parameters after the D/G has run 2 60 minutes at 22.45 MW and *2.50 MW load.

DATA INSTRUMENT NO. FOR DIESEL ACTUAL POINT' PARAMETER 11 12 . 13 LIMITS VALUE

- NORTH SIDE OF DIESEL 11 Lube Oil Pressure PI-834 P1-836 P1-838

- Leaving Filter (PSIG) 12 Lube Oil Pressure PI-607 P1-627 PI-638 Entering Filter (PSIG) 13 Secondary Fuel Oil PI-603 P1-625. PI-636 Filter Inlet Press.

(PSIG) 14 Secondary Fuel Oil P1-829 P1-831 PI-833 Filter Outlet Press.

(PSIG) 15 Primary Fuel Oil PIS-1021 PIS-1022 P1 1023 Filter dp (In. Hg.)

INSTRUMENT CONSOLE 16 Lube Oil Pressure P1-606 P1-629 P1-639 260*

(PSIG) 17 Lube Oil Temperature 11-527 11-504 Tl-505 . *195***

Leaving Engine (IF) 18 Jacket Water PI-612 P1-643 P1-645 Pressure (PSIG) 19 Jacket Water TI-1030 TI-1035 11-1036 Temperature Entering Radiator (OF) 20 Fuel Oil PI-604 P1-626 P1-637 240 Pressure (PSIG)

If out of limits, declare D/G inoperable and the D/G should be shutdown for insufficient lube oil pressure.

- If out of limits, initiate an action request.

- - If out of limits, initiate an action request. Verify temperature is not increasing. If temperature can not be maintained below limit the D/G should be shutdown.

00 163'64.DOA ne Inn? 0n1

10/07/03 Page 10 of 19 STP M-9A (UNIT 1)

ATTACHMENT 9.1 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit I Diesel Generators DATA INSTRUMENT NO. FOR DIESEL ACTUAL POINT PARAMETER II 12 13 LIMITS VALUE 21 Radiator Discharge TI-528 TI-529 TI-540 *160**

Air Temperature ( 0F) 22 Turbo Air Discharge PI-822 PI-826 PI-827 Pressure (PSIG) 23 Room Air TI-97 TI-98 TI-99 <120 0F**

Temperature ( 0F) 24 No. of Crankcase => 1**, 0**

Exhausters in Operation EXCITER CUBICLE 25 Exciter Voltage, VDC VDC Generator Output Voltage, V => V 26 Exciter Current, Amps => AMP SOUTH SIDE OF DIESEL 27 Lube Oil Strainer P1-835 P1-837 P1-839 Inlet P (PSIG) 28 Lube Oil Strainer PI-608 P1-628 P1-644 Outlet P (PSIG) 29 Jacket Water TI-506 TI-507 TI-508 *185**

Temperature Leaving Radiator (IF) 30 Lube Oil Temperature TI-1028 TI-1032 TI-1034 Leaving L.O. HX (°F)

- If out of limits, initiate an action request.

fl0316365 DOA 06 1007.0311

10107/03 Page I I of 19 STP M-9A (UNIT 1)

ATTACHMENT 9.1 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit I Diesel Generators DATA INSTRUMENT NO. FOR DIESEL ACTUAL POINT PARAMETER II 12 13 LIMITS VALUE GENERATOR 31 Horizontal (x axis)

Vibration taken on blue dot on south side of generator bearing housing.

(Use Portable Vibration Meter set on IPS) 32 Vertical (y axis)

Vibration taken on blue dot on top of generator bearing housing. (Use Portable Vibration Meter set on IPS) 33 Axial (z axis)

Vibration taken on blue dot on end of generator bearing housing. (Use Portable Vibration Meter set on IPS)

Cylinder and Exhaust Temperatures - Inst. Console Cylinder- RI R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 UR LR Temperature 'F Cylinder LI L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L9 UL LL Temperature 'F PERF 3.4 Verify there is no continuous or intermittent jacket cooling water leakage from turbo aftercoolertattletale.**

3.5 Verify cooling water or lube oil leaks *2 drops per minute (DPM) out of the water pump tattletale.** If an AR is initiated, list the type of leakage.

- AR#____

3.6 Verify governor oil is at or above the low level mark in sightglass.

If below the mark write an AR. If not visible, declare D/G inoperable.

- If out of limits, initiate an action request.

(it I(o- .o :.

10/07/03 Page 12 of 19 STP M-9A (UNIT 1)

ATTACHMENT 9.1 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit I Diesel Generators

4. SHJUTDOWN DATA 4.1 Record engine hours: hrs.

4.2 If valves were manipulated in step 1.10, close and cap the blow-down valve and open the air supply valve.

N/A[ ]

4.2.1 Valve that was closed and capped:

4.2.2 Valve that was opened:

4.3 After the DIG has been shutdown for 10 minutes, record the following data:

DATA INSTRUMENT NO. FOR DIESEL ACTUAL POINT PARAMETER 11 12 13 LIMITS VALUE 34 Air Receiver A P1-601 PI-623 P1-634 2210**

Pressurq (PSIG) Ž195' 35 Lubricating Oil PI-606 P1-629 P1-639 22**

Pressure (PSIG) 36 Turbo Air Header P1-843 P1-844 P1-845 2200**

Pressure (PSIG) Ž1952 37 Air Header B P1-598 P1-620 P1-640 Ž140' Pressure (PSIG) <160*

38 Air Header A P1-599 P1-621 P1-641 Ž140' Pressure (PSIG) <160*

39 Turbo Air Receiver P1-840 P1-841 P1-842 2200**

Pressure (PSIG) Ž1952 40 Air Receiver B PI-600 PI-622 PI-633 2210**

Pressure (PSIG) Ž195' 1NOTE: Either starting air receiver A must be 2 195 PSIG and starting air header A must be 2 140 PSIG OR starting air receiver B must be 2 195 PSIG and starting air header B must be 2 140 PSIG. If both starting air receivers are 2 165 PSIG and < 195 PSIG, restore one air receiver to 2 195 PSIG in < 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or declare the DIG inoperable. If both starting air receivers < 165 PSIG declare the D/G inoperable.

2 NOTE: If the turbocharger receiver is 2 165 PSIG and < 195 PSIG, restore the air receiver to 2 195 PSIG

48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or declare the D/G inoperable. If the turbocharger < 165 PSIG, declare the D/G inoperable.

If out of limits declare D/G inoperable.

- If out of limits initiate an action request.

00316365 DOA 06 1007.0311

10/07/03 Page 13 of 19 STP M-9A (UNIT 1)

ATTACHMENT 9.1 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit I Diesel Generators ACTUAL VALUE 4.4 Record jacket cooling water level, inches above low point in glass.

(Minimum level = water visible in glass*.) (Normal level 2 14.5 inches and 5 17.5 inches.)

Did the level increase from step 1;7 YES [] NO [ 3 NOTE: This check is performed to allow detection of plugging jacket cooling water level indicator. PPE reviewing this data sheet should initiate an action request to investigate the jacket cooling water level indicator should the level indicate other than the trend stated below..

1. If the DIG is started cold, jacket cooling water level recorded in step 4.4 should increase after a normal 1 hour1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months run.

2. If the D/G is started cold for a less than 20 minute (nominal) run, the level recorded in step 4.4 should remain relatively unchanged.

3. If the D/G is started warm, the level recorded in step 4.4 should remain unchanged after the D/G run.

If the jacket cooling water level is below 14.5 inches, refill expansion tank to 16.5 inches with demineralized water and notify chemistry to conduct a chemical test on the jacket cooling water.

If chemistry was notified in step 1.7, no action is needed.

N/A[J Chemistry Notified: Date/Time NOTE: The numbers given below are for DIG 1-1. The numbers in parentheses are for DIG's 1-2 and 1-3 respectively.

4.5 If the day tank level is less than 500 gallons (fuel oil pump AUTO stop for DIG 1-3), fill the day tank to approximately 500 gallons (fuel oil pump AUTO stop for DIG 1-3) as follows:

NIA[

If out of limits, declare D/G inoperable.

- If out of limits, initiate an action request.

00, I631(5.DO.A I nn .01 II

10/07/03 Page 14 of 19 STP M-9A (UNIT 1)

ATTACHMENT 9.1 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit I Diesel Generators PERF VERIF CAUTION: It is possible to overflow the fuel oil day tank in MANUAL control, and thus cause a fuel oil spill. Level column responds very slowly to a level change. Exercise caution when manually filling a day tank.

4.5.1 If fuel oil transfer pump 0-1 is used perform the following:

N/A[]

a. Start fuel oil transfer pump 0-1.

b. Open day tank fill valve LCV-88 (89) (90).

c. When the day tank is filled to approximately 500 gallons (fuel oil pump AUTO stop for DIG 1-3), close day tank fill valve LCV-88 (89)

(90).

d. Place day tank fill valve control switch LCV-88 (39) (90) in AUTO.

e. Stop diesel fuel oil transfer pump 0-I and place in AUTO.

4.5.2 If fuel oil transfer pump 0-2 is used perform the following:

N/A[]

a. Start fuel oil transfer pump 0-2.

b. Open day tank fill valve LCV-85 (86) (87).

c. When the day tank is filled to approximately 500 gallons (fuel oil pump AUTO stop for D/G 1-3), close day tank fill valve LCV-85 (86)

(87).

d. Place day tank fill valve control switch LCV-85 (86) (87) in AUTO.

e. Stop diesel fuel oil transfer pump 0-2 and place in AUTO.

t(.':(-(--DOr 06 Ionn, II

10/07/03 Page 15 of 19 STP M-9A (UNIT 1)

ATTACIHMENT 9.1 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit I Diesel Generators PERF 4.6 Record day tank fuel level.

4.6.1 Fuel level for D/G 1-1 or D/G 1-2. N/A this step for D/G 1-3.

N/A [] -

gallons NOTE: If the day tank low level alarm (LOA) is out of service, day tank level shall be ;- 300 gallons.*

4.6.2 Fuel level for D/G 1-3.

N/A[ ]

Dial reading.

(>1/2, 3/4, AUTO stop level and etc.)

NOTE: If the day tank low level alarm (LOA) is out of service, day tank level should be 2 fuel oil pump AUTO stop level and shall be > 1/2 day tank level.*

4.7 Record actual priming tank level (inches from bottom of sightglass)

(minimum level = level of return line = approx. 5").

Level If the level in the primary tank is less than minimum, refill by manual operation of the magnetic pump or with the manual priming pump. If insufficient magnetic pump run time is suspected write an action request to maintenance to adjust the magnetic pump timer. If priming tank level cannot be established, declare D/G inoperable.

AR __

4.8 Record actual crankcase lubricating oil level, inches below full mark on dipstick. If lubricating oil is > 2" below the high level mark, initiate an action request to add more lubricating oil.

(Minimum level is 7" below high level mark.)

Level

$ If out of limits, declare D/G inoperable.

003. I 6 365.DOA Of I((}

00) 31 1

10/07/03 Page 16 of 19 STP M-9A (UNIT 1)

ATTACHMENT 9.1 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit I Diesel Generators PERF 4.9 Blowdown all three air receivers inline filters a small amount through their drain valves to check for water accumulation.

NOTE: To blowdown the filter units the screw on the bottom must be turned clockwise several turns when viewed from the bottom.

4.9.1 Air receiver systems blown down.

Prefilter Oil Filter After Filter Turbo [] [] []

StartingA [] [A []

StartingB [] [] []

4.9.2 If water is present, write an action request (A small amount of mist out of the prefilter is acceptable).

AR__

N/A[ ]

4.10 Perform the following to drain any accumulated water in the day tank.

4.10.1 Open drain valve(s) on D/G fuel oil day tank and check for the presence of water. Remove any accumulated water.

NOTE: For D/G with multiple drain valves, one or more of the following drain valves may be opened to remove any accumulated water.

4.10.2 Circle drain valve or valves opened below.

D/G Valve 1-1 DEG-] -1059/1060/1061/1062/1063/1064 1-2 DEG-I -1065/1066/1067/1068/1069/1070 1-3 DEG-1-520 4.10.3 Day tank checked for presence of water.***

[ ] Removed accumulated water***

[ ]No water found 4.10.4 Close the drain valve(s) opened in step 4.10.1.

- - If check is not done or if any accumulated water is found and not removed, declare D/G inoperable.

On!] 6365 DOA fl 1007 0311

10/07/03 Page 17 of 19 STP M-9A (UNIT 1)

ATTACHMENT 9.1 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit I Diesel Generators PERF VERIF 4.11 Disconnect the D/G fuel oil leak-off collection bottles:

4.11.1 Close the appropriate 1/2" whitey fuel oil leak-off drain valves to the poly bottle. (Reference step 1.9.4) 4.11.2 Remove the tygon tubing from the fuel oil leak-off return lines.

4.11.3 Reinstall the pipe cap at the end of the fuel oil leak-off return lines.

4.11.4 Empty the poly bottles into the protected area hazardous waste oil tank.

4.11.5 Return the poly bottles and tygon tubing to the storage box.

00 -16' 65 DO.' IW1.Nn I0I

10/07/03 Page 18of19 STP M-9A (UNIT 1)

ATTACHMENT 9.1 TITLE: Data Sheet- Routine Surveillance Test of Unit I Diesel Generators 4.12 REMARKS:

4.13 Test performers and verifiers:

Name Signature Date/Time Init l

l l

/

0o0I 9 rPOA (6 1007 n 1Il

10107/03 Page 19 of 19 STP M-9A (UNIT 1)

ATTACHMENT 9.1 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit I Diesel Generators

5. DATA REDUCTION 5.1 Record values out of limits by observation:

-a ..

5.2 Calculated values Data Point:

Lubricating oil filter AP 12 minus II psiid (maximum limit 15 psid**)

Secondary fuel oil filter AP 13 minus 14 psiid (maximum limit 35 psid**)

Calculated values: Data Point:

Lube oil strainer AP 27 minus 28 psi~d (maximum limit 9 psid**)

Radiator water AT 19 minus 29 OF DIG hours operated this test 4.1 minus 1.1 hrs

*AR #

5.3 Misc. Data:

(See page 11 of Attachment 9.1)

Maximum cylinder exhaust temperature, __ _ F in Cylinder No.

Minimum cylinder exhaust temperature, _F in Cylinder No.

Difference (maximum limit 150'F**)

- AR #

PERF 5.4 Transfer pump 0-1 increased day tank level. (Step 3.1.3)***

5.5 Transfer pump 0-2 increased day tank level. (Step 3.1.8)***

- If out of limits, initiate an action request.

- - An inoperable transfer pump puts the unit into an Action Statement.

00n1 63 .DOSA 100,,0O 1!

10/07/03 Page I of 18 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT STP M-9A ATTACHMENT 9.2 2 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit 2 Diesel Generators FIELD DATA D.G. NO. DATE TIME OPERATOR (AT DIESEL)

1. PRETEST DATA ACTUAL VALUE 1.1 Engine Hours:

1.2 Governor oil level (%)

(minimum level = oil visible in glass*).

(If below low level mark on sightglass, write an AR.)

AR#

1.3 Governor settings:

Speed Droop:

Load Limit:

Speed:

1.4 Record crankcase lubricating oil level, inches below high level mark on dipstick. If lubricating oil is > 2" below the high level mark, initiate an action request to add more lubricating oil.

(Minimum level is 7" below high level mark.)

1.5 Priming tank level (inches from bottom of sightglass) (Minimum level for D/G 2-1 and D/G 2-2 is oil visible in glass. Minimum level for D/G 2-3 is 6" from bottom of sightglass). -_ _

If the level in the priming tank is less than minimum, refill by manual operation of the magnetic pump or with the manual priming pump. If insufficient magnetic pump run time is suspected write an action request to maintenance to adjust the magnetic pump timer. If priming tank level cannot be established declare D/G inoperable.

AR#_

1.6 Day tank fuel oil level Fill tank if < 275 gallons.

*AR#

If out of limits, declare D/G inoperable.

- If out of limits, initiate an action request.

0031s I6'th'.DOA I(0 '0.3, I!.

10107/03 Page 2 of 18 STP M-9A (UNIT 2)

ATTACHMENT 9.2 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit 2 Diesel Generators ACTUAL VALUE 1.7 Jacket cooling water level, inches above low point in glass.

(Minimum levelevater visible in glass*).

If the jacket cooling water level is less than the values listed below, refill the expansion tank to the appropriate fill level using demineralized water. Notify chemistry to test the jacket cooling water after D/G test.

Level Below Fill To Cold 12" 15" Hot (Ž1600 F) 14.5" 17.5" Chemistry Notified: Date/Time 1.8 West roll up fire doors are in the full up position.***

Record Door Position PERF 1.9 Connect the D/G fuel oil leak-off collection bottles as follows:

1.9.1 Obtain 2 five gallon poly bottles and tygon tubing from the storage box. l 1.9.2 Remove the pipe cap at the end of the fuel oil leak-off return lines on each side of the DIG.

1.9.3 Connect the tygon tubing to the fuel oil leak-off return lines and route each to a 5 gallon poly bottle.

1.9.4 Open the appropriate 1/2" whitey fuel oil leak-off drain valves to the poly bottle.

D/G 2-1 DEG-2-1051, DEG-2-1052 D/G 2-2 DEG-2-1053, DEG-2-1054 D/G 2-3 DEG-2-1057, DEG-2-1058

If out of limits, declare D/G inoperable.

- - At least one west roll up fire door must be open to maintain the D/G OPERABLE. (AR A0330481-E04)

(' PQ..\

POAI

10/07103 Page 3 of 18 STP M-9A (UNIT 2)

ATTACHMENT 9.2 *.

TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit 2 Diesel Generators PERF 1.10 If directed by the control room operator or the shift foreman, isolate starting train A or starting train B. Mark the starting train where valves will be manipulated.

Isolate Starting Train A [1 Isolate Starting Train B [I N/A[ ]

1.10.1 Select the air supply valve to be closed in the table below.

Il D/G 2-1 2-2 2-3 Train "A" Valve DEG-2-63 [ DEG-2-89 [ ] DEG-2-115 [ ]

Train "B" Valve DEG-2-52 [ J DEG-2-78 [ ] DEG-2-104 [ ]

1.10.2 Select the blow-down valve to be uncapped and opened I in the table below. When the valve is opened, PK window 16-09, 17-09, or 18-09 will alarm.

D/G 2-1 2-2 2 -3 Train "A" Valve DEG-2-227 [ ] DEG-2-249 [1] DEG-2-271 [

Train "B" Valve DEG-2-216 [ ] DEG-2-238 [ DEG-2-260 []

NOTE: When train "A" valves are manipulated, starting train "B" will be tested. When train "B" valves are manipulated, train "A" will be tested.

Innr- r3

10/07/03 Page 4 of 18 STP M-9A (UNIT 2)

ATTACHMENT 9.2 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit 2 Diesel Generators PERF 1.11 Verify one of the following:

1.11.1 Verify the D/G control power transfer switch is in the NORMAL position with the NORMAL amber light lit on panel EQDxx, (Replace "xx" with the number of the D/G being tested for panel designation, e.g., EQD21 for D/G 21 etc.).

OR 1.11.2 (This option available only in MODE 5, 6 or defueled when step 11.3.2 is performed) Verify the D/G control power transfer switch is in the BACKUP position with the BACKUP amber light lit on panel EQDxx (Replace "xx" with the number of the D/G being tested for panel designation, e.g., EQD21 for D/G 21 etc.).

N/A[] l 1.12 If test is used to satisfy Tech Spec SR 3.8.1.2 or SR 3.8.1.7, routine M-9A test, record jacket water temperature and lubricating oil temperature. If either temperature is not 2 950 F and

1671F notify the shift foreman.

N/A __]

Water Temperature: Oil Temperature -

DIESEL . WATER OIL GENERATOR TEMPERATURE TEMPERATURE 2-1 TI-1035 TI-504 2-2 TI-1030 TI-527 2-3 TI-1036 TI-505 OR If M&TE is used, calculate the required temperature range by adding M&TE uncertainty to 90'F and subtracting M&TE uncertainty from 1750. M&TE I.D._

Required Temperature Range for M&TE Measured Water Temperature OF OF Oil Temperature OF OF N/A [ ] _

0C - I( I ( - DO., (6 i nn, n-! I I

10/07/03 Page 5 of 18 STP M-9A (UNIT 2)

ATTACHMENT 9.2 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit 2 Diesel Generators 1.13 Record the following parameters:

DATA INSTRUMENT NO. FOR DIESEL ACTUAL PONT PARAMETER 21 22 23 LIMITS VALUE I Lubricating Oil P1-629

PI-606 PI-639 10_15**4 Pressure (PSIG) 2 Room Air TI-98 TI-97 TI-99 Temperature ( 0F) 3 Turbo Air Header PI-844 PI-843 PI-845 Ž200**

Pressure (PSIG) Ž1952 4

Air Header B PI-620 PI-598 PI-640 Ž1401 Pressure (PSIG) *160*

5 Air Header A PI-621 PI-599 P1-641 Ž140' Pressure (PSIG) *160*

6 Cold Jacket Water TI-1035 11-1030 11-1036 95-120**3 Temperature ( 0 F) (Ž95*)

7 Air Receiver A P1-623 P1-601 *P1-634 Ž210**

Pressure (PSIG) Ž195' 8 Lubricating Oil 11-504 11-527 11-505 95-120**3 Temperature ( 0F) (Ž95*)

9 Turbo Air Receiver PI-841 P1-840 P1-842 Ž200**

Pressure (PSIG) Ž1952 10 Air Receiver B PI-622 P1-600 P1-633 Ž210**

Pressure (PSIG) Ž1951 INOTE: Either starting air receiver A must be 2 195 PSIG and starting air header A must be 2 140 PSIG OR starting air receiver B must be 2 195 PSIG and starting air header B must be 2 140 PSIG. If both starting air receivers are 2 165 PSIG and < 195 PSIG, restore one air receiver to 2 195 PSIG in

48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or declare the D/G inoperable. If both starting air receivers < 165 PSIG declare the D/G inoperable. If both air header A and air header B pressure is < 140 PSIG declare the D/G inoperable. If performing a single starting train start, either air header A or air header B will indicate 0 PSIG.

2 NOTE: If the turbocharger receiver is 2 165 PSIG and < 195 PSIG, restore the air receiver to 2 195 PSIG < 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or declare the D/G inoperable. If the turbocharger < 165 PSIG, declare the DIG inoperable.

3 NOTE: If the D/G is still hot from a previous run and the oil or jacket water temperature is > 120°F, do not write an AR.

4 NOTE: If the D/G lube oil is> 120°F from a previous run, the lube oil pressure is > 3 psi, and the pre-lube pump is on, do NOT write an AR.

X

If out of limits, declare D/G inoperable.

- If out of limits, initiate an action request.

(10'16365.DOA 1007.0< 11

10107/03 Page 6 of 18 STP M-9A (UNIT 2)

AT1TACHMENT 9.2 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit 2 Diesel Generators PERF

2. STARTUP DATA NOTE 1: If it becomes necessary to shutdown the DIG without control power, manually operate the overspeed trip lever on the northwest corner of the engine, forward of the fuel oil filters.

NOTE 2: The next four steps should be performed within 60 seconds of D/G start.

2.1 Verify D/G started.

2.2 Verify D/G lube oil pressure 2 60 PSIG within 60 seconds of starting.** (Instrument console, PI-629, PI-606 or PI-639) 2.3 Verify jacket water pressure increases within 60 seconds of starting.** (No pressure limit) (Instrument console, PI-643, PI-612 or PI-645) 2.4 Verify D/G fuel oil pressure 2 40 PSIG within 60 seconds of starting.** (Instrument console, PI-626, PI-604 or PI-637)

(Gauge response is generally about 15 seconds.)

2.5 Verify the crankcase exhauster or exhausters are operating.**

2.6 Verify governor oil is at or above the low level mark in sightglass.

If below the mark write an AR. If not visible, declare D/G inoperable.

- If out of limits, initiate an action request.

,4 D

- (- no, IAnn-I naI

10/07/03 Page 7 of 18 STP M-9A (UNIT 2)

ATTACHMENT 9.2 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit 2 Diesel Generators PERF 2.7 Verify proper fuel oil flow to the priming system.

2.7.1 Verify magnetic priming pump is NOT running.

.r 2.7.2 Verify SMALL amount of fuel flowing in overflow sightglass FI-314 (313) (315)

NOTE: Fuel should NOT collect in the sightglass. If fuel is not flowing in the sightglass but the priming tank level is increasing, wait until the priming tank fills to the proper level. Valve DEG-2-530 (536) should be approximately 1/4 turn open. Valve DEG-2-542 for D/G 2-3 should be approximately 1/8 turn open.

a. If there is no flow or too much flow in the sightglass, then adjust valve DEG-2-530 (536) (542) until a SMALL amount of fuel is flowing in the overflow sightglass.

N/A [_]

2.8 Monitor the level in the poly bottles connected to the D/G fuel

. leak-off valves as needed to prevent poly bottle overfill while the drain valve is open and D/G is running.

0o,. . }

0I.t-l1 IAre (A -

10/07/03 Pag-e 8 of 18 STP M-9A (UNIT 2)

ATTACHMENT 9.2 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit 2 Diesel Generators PERF VERIF

3. RUN DATA NOTE: Steps 3.1 and 3.2 can be performed anytime after the D/G has been started. The D/G does not need to have been running for at least I hour.

3.1 Verify OPERABILITY of the fuel oil transfer system in the following steps:

CAUTION: It is possible to overflow the fuel oil day tank in MANUAL control, and thus cause a fuel oil spill. Level column responds very slowly to a level change. Exercise caution when manually filling a day tank.

NOTE: The numbers given below are for DIG 2-1. The numbers in parentheses are for D/G's 2-2 and 2-3 respectively.

3.1.1 Start fuel oil transfer pump 0- I from D/G 2-1 (2-2)

(2-3).

3.1.2 Open day tank fill valve LCV-89 (88) (90).

3.1.3 Observe an increase in day tank level. (Verifies foot valves DEG 114, DEG-0-1 115, and check valve DEG-0-35 are OPERABLE.)

3.1.4 Close LCV-89 (88) (90) and place in AUTO.

3.1.5 Stop fuel oil transfer pump 0-1 and place the switch in the AUTO position.

3.1.6 Start fuel oil transfer pump 0-2 from D/G 2-1 (2-2)

(2-3).

3.1.7 Open day tank fill valve LCV-86 (85) (87).

3.1.8 Observe an increase in day tank level. (Verifies foot valves DEG-0-1 117, DEG-0-1 118, and check valve DEG-0-36 are OPERABLE) 3.1.9 Close LCV-86 (85) (87) and place in AUTO.

3.1.10 Stop fuel oil transfer pump 0-2 and place the switch in the AUTO position.

3.2 Verify proper operation of the fuel oil priming system by performing the following:

3.2.1 Place magnetic priming pump control switch in MANUAL and verify pump operation by increase in fuel oil flow through overflow sightglass.

3.2.2 Place magnetic priming pump control switch in AUTO.

o(1-,16-,6iD0A Of. I (107 0; I I

10/07/03 Page 9 of I18 STP M-9A (UNIT 2)

ATTACHMENT 9.2 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit 2 Diesel Generators 3.3 Record the following parameters after the D/G has run 2 60 minutes at 22.45 MW and

- s2.50MW load.

DATA A INSTRUMENT NO. FOR DIESEL ACTUAL POINT PARAMETER 21 22 23 LIMITS VALUE NORTH SIDE OF DIESEL 11 _Lube Oil Pressure PI-836 PI-834 PI-838 Leaving Filter (PSIG) 12 Lube Oil Pressure PI-627 PI-607 PI-638 Entering Filter (PSIG) 13 Secondary Fuel Oil PI-625 PI-603. PI-636 Filter Inlet Press.

(PSIG) 14 Secondiry Fuel Oil P1-831 PI-829 PI-833 Filter Outlet Press.

(PSIG) 15 PrimaryFuel Oil PIS-1021 PIS-1022 PIS-1023 _ _4.5**

Filter dp (In. Hg.)

INSTRUMENT CONSOLE 16 Lube Oil Pressure P1-629 P1-606 P1-639 Ž60*

(PSIG) 17 Lube Oil Temperature TI-504 TI-527 TI-505 _195***

Leaving Engine (IF) 18 Jacket Water PI-643 PI-612 PI-645 Pressure (PSIG) 19 Jacket Water TI-1035 TI-1030 TI-1036 Temperature Entering Radiator (IF) 20 Fuel Oil PI-626 P1-604 PI-637 240 - -

Pressure (PSIG)

If out of limits, declare D/G inoperable and the D/G should be shutdown for insufficient lube oil pressure.

- If out of limits, initiate an action request.

- - If out of limits, initiate an action request. Verify temperature is not increasing. If temperature cannot be maintained below limit, the D/G should be shutdown.

00('16365.DOA t7 10n7.0 1 !

10/07/03 Page IO of 18 STP M-9A (UNIT 2)

ATTACHMENT 9.2 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit 2 Diesel Generators DATA INSTRUMENT NO. FOR DIESEL ACTUAL POINT PARAMETER 21 22 23 LIMITS VALUE 21 Radiator Discharge TI-529 T1-528 Tl-540 *160**

Air Temperature (fF) 22 Turbo Air Discharge P1-826 P1-822 P1-827 Pressure (PSIG) 23 Room Air TI-98 TI-97 TI-99 *120 0F**

Temperature (fF) 24 No. of Crankcase =:, 1I**, 2**

Exhausters in Operation 0**(D/G 23)

(D/G 23 has only one exhauster)

EXCITER CUBICLE 25 Exciter Voltage, VDC VDC Generator Output Voltage, V V 26 Exciter Current, Amps AMP SOUTH SIDE OF DIESEL 27 Lube Oil Strainer P1-837 P1-835 P1-839 Inlet P (PSIG) 28 Lube Oil Strainer P1-628 PI-608 P1-644 Outlet P (PSIG) 29 Jacket Water TI-507 TI-506 TI-508 *185**

Temperature Leaving Radiator (fF) 30 Lube Oil Temperature TI-1032 TI-1028 TI-1034 Leaving L.O. HX (fF)

- If out of limits, initiate an action request.

(( I-I, f .- jI)

Iran,1 f..

n!

10/07/03 Page II of 18 STP M-9A (UNIT 2)

ATTACHMENT 9.2 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit 2 Diesel Generators DATA INSTRUMENT NO. FOR DIESEL ACTUAL POINT PARAMETER 21 22 23 LIMITS VALUE GENERATOR 31 Horizontal (x axis)

Vibration taken on blue dot on south side of generator bearing housing.

(Use Portable Vibration Meter set on IPS) 32 Vertical (y axis)

Vibration taken on blue dot on top of generator bearing housing. (Use Portable Vibration Meter set on IPS) 33 Axial (zaxis)

Vibration taken on blue' dot on end of generator bearing housing. (Use Portable Vibration Meter set on IPS)

Cylinder and Exhaust Temperatures - Inst. Console Cylinder RI R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 R9 UR LR Temperature 'F Cylinder LI L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 L7 L8 L9 UL LL Temperature °F PERF 3.4 Verify there is no continuous or intermittent jacket cooling water leakage from turbo aftercooler tattletale.*"

- AR#-

3.5 Verify cooling water or lube oil leaks S 2 drops per minute (DPM) out of the water pump tattletale.** If an AR is initiated, list the type of leakage.

- AR #_ _

3.6 Verify governor oil is at or above the low level mark in sightglass.

If below the mark write an AR. If not visible, declare D/G inoperable.

- If out of limits, initiate an action request.

100*16165DO.'A Of Iff1(0 .CS! I

10/07/03 Page 12 of 18 STP M-9A (UNIT 2)

ATTACHMENT 9.2 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit 2 Diesel Generators

4. SHUTDOWN DATA 4.1 Record engine hours: hrs.

4.2 If valves were manipulated in step 1.10, close and cap the blow-down valve and open the air supply valve.

N/A[ ]

4.2.1 Valve that was closed and capped:

4.2.2 Valve that was opened:

4.3 After the D/G has been shutdown for 10 minutes, record the following data:

DATA INSTRUMENT NO. FOR DIESEL ACTUAL POINT PARAMETER 21 22 23 LIMITS VALUE 34 Air Receiver A P1-623 PI-601 P1-634 Ž210**

Pressure (PSIG) Ž1951 35 Lubricating Oil P1-629 P1-606 P1-639 22**

Pressure (PSIG) 36 Turbo Air Header P1-844 P1-843 P1-845 2200**

Pressure (PSIG) Ž1952 37 Air Header B P1-620 P1-598 P1-640 140' Pressure (PSIG) *160*

38 Air Header A PI-621 P1-599 P1-641 Ž1401 Pressure (PSIG) <160*

39 Turbo Air Receiver P1-841 P1-840 P1-842 2200**

Pressure (PSIG) Ž1952 40 Air Receiver B PI-622 PI-600 PI-633 2210**

Pressure (PSIG) Ž195' NOTE: Either starting air receiver A must be Ž 195 PSIG and starting air header A must be

' 140 PSIG OR starting air receiver B must be 2 195 PSIG and starting air header B must be 2 140 PSIG. If both starting air receivers are 2 165 PSIG and < 195 PSIG, restore one air receiver to 2 195 PSIG in < 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or declare the D/G inoperable. If both starting air receivers < 165 PSIG declare the D/G inoperable.

2NOTE: If the turbocharger receiver is 2 165 PSIG and < 195 PSIG, restore the air receiver to 2 195 PSIG < 48 hours5.555556e-4 days 0.0133 hours 7.936508e-5 weeks 1.8264e-5 months or declare the D/G inoperable. If the turbocharger < 165 PSIG, declare the D/G inoperable.

If out of limits, declare D/G inoperable.

- If out of limits, initiate an action request.

W"I, h (If' )(). )(PA7 Ol II

10/07/03 Page 13 of 18 STP M-9A (UNIT 2)

ATTACHMENT 9.2 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit 2 Diesel Generators ACTUAL VALUE 4.4 Record jacket cooling water level, inches above low point in glass.

(Minimum level = water visible in'glass*.) (Normal level 2 14.5 inches and

17.5 inches.)

Did the level increase from step 1.7 YES [ ]NO [1 NOTE: This check is performed to allow detection of plugging jacket cooling water level indicator. PPE reviewing this data sheet should initiate an action request to investigate the jacket cooling water level indicator should the level indicate other than the trend stated below.

I. If the D/G is started cold, jacket cooling water level recorded in step 4.4 should increase after a normal I hour run.

2. If the D/G is started cold for a less than 20 minute (nominal) run, the level recorded in step 4.4 should remain relatively unchanged.

3. If the D/G is started warm, the level recorded in step 4.4 should remain unchanged after the D/G run.

If the jacket cooling water level is below 14.5 inches, refill expansion tank to 16.5 inches with demineralized water and notify chemistry to conduct a chemical test on the jacket cooling water.

If chemistry was notified in step 1.7, no action is needed.

N/A [ ]

Chemistry Notified: Date/Time NOTE: The numbers given below are for D/G 2-1. The numbers in parentheses are for D/G's 2-2 and 2-3 respectively.

4.5 If the day tank level is less than 500 gallons, fill the day tank to approximately 500 gallons as follows:

N/Al]

If out of limits, declare D/G inoperable.

- If out of limits, initiate an action request.

t:st*.Dn!

-:t ~~~~~(i Ion7 Pt I

I 10/07/03 Page 14 of IS STP M-9A (UNIT 2)

ATTACHMENT 9.2 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit 2 Diesel Generators PERF VERIF CAUTION: It is possible to overflow the fuel oil day tank in MANUAL control, and thus cause a fuel oil spill. Level column responds very slowly to a level change. Exercise caution when manually filling a day tank.

4.5.1 If fuel oil transfer pump 0-1 is used perform the following:

N/A []

a. Start fuel oil transfer pump 0-1.

b. Open day tank fill valve LCV-89 (88) (90).

c. When the day tank is filled to approximately 500 gallons, close day tank fill valve LCV-89 (88)

(90).

d. Place day tank fill valve control switch LCV-89 (88) (90) in AUTO.

e. Stop diesel fuel oil transfer pump 0-1 and place in AUTO.

4.5.2 If fuel oil transfer pump 0-2 is used perform the following:

N/A[]

a. Start fuel oil transfer pump 0-2.

b. Open day tank fill valve LCV-86 (85) (87).

c. When the day tank is filled to approximately 500 gallons, close day tank fill valve LCV-86 (85)

(87).

d. Place day tank fill valve control switch LCV-86 (85) (87) in AUTO.

e. Stop diesel fuel oil transfer pump 0-2 and place in AUTO.

4.6 Record day tank fuel level.

gallons NOTE: If the day tank low level alarm (LOA) is out of service, day tank level shall be 2 300 gallons.*

If out of limits, declare D/G inoperable.

003163651)0.n 1A 1007.03 11

10/07/03 Page 15 of 18 STP M-9A (UNIT 2)

ATTACHMENT 9.2 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit 2 Diesel Generators PERF 4.7 Record actual priming tank level (inches from bottom of sightglass)

(minimum level = level of return line = approx. 5").

Level If the level in the primary tank is less than minimum, refill by

' manual operation of the magnetic pump or with the manual priming pump. If insufficient magnetic pump run time is suspected write an action request to maintenance to adjust the magnetic pump timer. If priming tank level cannot be established, declare D/G inoperable.

AR_

4.8 Record actual crankcase lubricating oil level, inches below full

,mark on dipstick. If lubricating oil is > 2" below the high level mark, initiate an action request to add more lubricating oil.

(Minimum level is 7" below high level mark.)

Level ;__

4.9 Blowdown all three air receivers inline filters a small amount through their drain valves to check for water accumulation.

NOTE: To blowdown the filter units the screw on the bottom must be turned clockwise several turns when viewed from the bottom.

4.9.1 Air receiver systems blown down.

Prefilter Oil Filter After Filter Turbo [] [] [J StartingA [A [] [J StartingB [] [1 [ ]

4.9.2 If water is present, write an action request. .(A small amount of mist out of the prefilter is acceptable).

AR#_ _

N/A[ ]

If out of limits, declare D/G inoperable.

00' Of I (M.(--I i

10/07103 Page 16 of 18 STP M-9A (UNIT 2)

ATTACHMENT 9.2 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit 2 Diesel Generators PERF VERIF 4.10 Perform the following to drain any accumulated water in the day tank.

4.10.1 Open drain valve(s) on D/G fuel oil day tank and check for the presence of water. Remove any accumulated water.

NOTE: For D/G with multiple drain valves, one or more of the following drain valves may be opened to remove any accumulated water.

4.10.2 Circle drain valve or valves opened below.

D/G Valve 2-1 DEG-2-1059/1060/1061/1062/1063/1064 2-2 DEG-2-1065/1066/1067/1068/1069/1070 2-3 DEG-2-520/521/1078/1079/1080 4.10.3 Day tank checked for presence of water.***

[ ] Removed accumulated water***

[ ] No water found 4.10.4 Close the drain valve(s) opened in step 4.10.1.

4.11 Disconnect the D/G fuel oil leak-off collection bottles:

4.11.1 Close the appropriate 1/2" whitey fuel oil leak-off drain valves to the poly bottle.

(Reference step 1.9.4) 4.11.2 Remove the tygon tubing from the fuel oil leak-off return lines.

4.11.3 Reinstall the pipe cap at the end of the fuel oil leak-off return lines.

4.11.4 Empty the poly bottles into the protected area hazardous waste oil tank.

4.11.5 Return the poly bottles and tygon tubing to the storage box.

- If check is not done or if any accumulated water is found and not removed, declare D/G inoperable.

(07 T(-t( no.21 f16

10/07/03 Page 17 of 18 STP M-9A (UNIT 2)

ATTACHMENT 9.2 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit 2 Diesel Ge'nerators 4.12 REMARKS:

4.13 Test performers and verifiers:

Name Signature Date/Time Init I _

00- 16'-65.DO.^ rue1 . 01l0 ra

I I 10/07/03 Page 18 of 18 STP M-9A (UNIT 2)

ATTACHMENT 9.2 TITLE: Data Sheet - Routine Surveillance Test of Unit 2 Diesel Generators

5. DATA REDUCTION 5.1 Record values out of limits by observation:

5.2 Calculated values: Data Point:

Lubricating oil filter AP 12 minus II psid (maximum limit 15 psid**)

Secondary fuel oil filter AP 13 minus 14 psid l

(maximum limit 35 psid**)

Calculated values: Data Point:

Lube oil strainer AP . 27 minus 28 lpsid (maximum limit 9 psid**)

'Radiator water AT 19 minus 29 _

D/G hours operated this test 4.1 minus 1.1 1hrs.

- AR #

5.3 Misc. Data:

(See page 11 of Attachment 9.2)

Maximum cylinder exhaust temperature, _F in Cylinder No.

Minimum cylinder exhaust temperature, _F in Cylinder No.

Difference (maximum limit 1500F**)

- AR #

PERF 5.4 Transfer pump 0-1 increased day tank level. (Step 3.1.3)***

5.5 Transfer pump 0-2 increased day tank level. (Step 3.1.8)***

- If out of limits, initiate an action request.

- - An inoperable transfer pump puts the unit into an Action Statement.

00321C -- ! DOA 06 I ne- rw21 2t

10/07/03 Page 1 of 2 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT TITLE:

STP M-9A ATTACHMENT 9.3 Unit I Undervoltage Test at Switchgear Room 1

PROCEDURE STEPS PERFORMED AT SW]TCHGEAR D.G. NO. DATE TIME OPERATORNAT SWITCHGEAR I

1. Starting the D/G on an undervoltage, perform the following:

1.1 Establish communications between the D/G, control room, and appropriate vital 4KV switchgear room.

DIESEL SWITCHGEAR 1-1 HH 1-2 HG 1-3 HF NOTE: The UV relays are located at the safeguard relay board.

The cutout switches are labeled: -

"4KV BUS SECTION H (G) (F) STARTUP FEEDER UV AUTO-TRANSFER TEST SWITCH."

1.2 Cutout the appropriate startup bus undervoltage (UV) relay to simulate UV on the startup bus. 1CV DIESEL SAJ BUS UV 1-1 27HHU 1-2 27HGU 1-3 27HFU

2. When instructed by the control room operator:

2.1 Cut-in the appropriate startup bus UV relay 27HHU (27HGU)

(27HFU) at the safeguard relay board bus H (G) (F) by placing the appropriate auto transfer test switch labeled:

4KV BUS SECTION H (G) (F) START-UP FEEDER UV AUTO-TRANSFER TEST SWITCH in the CUT-IN position.

2.2 Reset the target drop flag on UV relay 27HHU (27HGU) (27HFU) at the safeguard relay board bus H (G) (F).

I fir- Ite1q, .ne). (It,, I.10o7.(o.I".

I 10/07/03 Page 2 of 2 STP M-9A (UNIT 1)

ATTACHMENT 9.3 TITLE: Unit 1 Undervoltage Test at Switchgear Room

3. REMARKS:

4. Test performers and verifiers:

Name Signature Date/Time Init

/

/,

/

003J3( (A6 1007.0 11

10/07/03 Page I of 2 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT STP M-9A ATTACHMENT 9.4 2

TITLE: Unit 2 Undervoltage Test at Switchgear Room PROCEDURE STEPS PERFORMED AT SWITCHGEAR D.G. NO. DATE TIME OPERATOR AT SWITCHGEAR _I

1. Starting the DIG on an undervoltage, perform the following:

N/AL]

1.1 Establish communications between the D/G, control room, and appropriate vital 4KV switchgear room.

DIESEL- SWITCHGEAR 2-1 HG 2-2. HH 2-3 HF NOTE: The UV relays are located at the safeguard relay board.

The cutout switches are labeled:

"4KV BUS G (H) (F) STARTUP TRANSF FEEDER UW TEST SWITCH."

1.2 Cutout the appropriate startup bus undervoltage (UV) relay to simulate UV on the startup bus. 1CV DIESEL S/U BUS UW 2-1 27HGU 2-2 27HHU 2-3 27HFU

2. When instructed by the control room operator:

2.1 Cut-in the appropriate startup bus LW relay 27HGU (27HHU)

(27HFU) at the safeguard relay board bus G (H) (F) by placing the appropriate auto transfer test switch labeled:

4KV BUS G (H) (F) STARTUP TRANSF FEEDER UW TEST SWITCH in the CUT-IN position.

2.2 Reset the target drop flag on UV relay 27HGU (27HHU) (27HFU) at the safeguard relay board bus G (H) (F).

on, I 6le6 DO.A (It lo(,7.ow

I 10/07/03 Page 2 of 2_

i STP M-9A (UNIT 2)

ATITACH-MENT 9.4 TITLE: Unit 2 Undervoltage Test at Switchgear Room

3. REMARKS:

4. .Test performers and verifiers:

Name Signature Date'Time Init I

/

I i.-

(,v'ltI.-(-~DOA06 I0fl70:1 I

- *ISSUED FOR USE BY: DATE: EXPIRES:_-_***

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9D1 NUCLEAR POWER GENERATION REVISION II DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT PAGE 1 OF 12 SURVEILLANCE TEST PROCEDURE UNITS TITLE: Diesel Generator Full Load Rejection Test 1 AND2 kFFEcTrVE DATE PROCEDURE CLASSIFICATION: QUALITY RELATED

1. SCOPE 1.1 This procedure is performed to test the full load rejection capability of the Diesel Generator (D/G). The D/G is paralleled to the grid and is then loaded to 2 2.45 MW and

2.50 MW with power factor of

0.87. The full load rejection is initiated by opening the D/G ouput breaker. The D/G is verified not to trip and the voltage remains

143.6V.

2. RESPONSIBILITIES 2.1 Power Production Engineer (PPE), for coordination of test, providing technical guidance during the test, final data reduction, reporting of results and determination of D/G OPERABILITY.

3. FREQUENCY 3.1 This test will be performed at least once per 24 months.

3.2 This test is required to be current in MODES 1, 2,3, 4, 5 and 6.

3.3 This test shall not be performed in MODES I or 2 unless required to demonstrate OPERABILITY following unplanned maintenance.

4. TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 4.1 Technical Specification (Tech Spec) SR 3.8.1.10 and part of SR 3.8.2.1 will be satisfied by this test.

5. ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA 5.1 Following a full load rejection of 2 2.45 MW and 5 2.50 MW (Tech Spec 2 2340 KW and

2600 KW) with a reactive load so the power factor is

0.87 + 128 KVARs (128 KVARs for inaccuracies) and 2 0.80, the D/G will remain running. See Attachment 8.2 for the reactive power setting for a given power out.

5.2 Following a full load rejection of 2 2.45 MW and

2.50 MW with enough reactive load so the power factor is

0.87 + 128 KVARs and 2 0.80, the D/G voltage will not exceed (Tech Spec

5075V) 143.6 volts.

0127561 I.DOA 06 1023.0619

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9D1 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 11 PAGE 2 OF 12 TITLE: Diesel Generator Full Load Rejection Test UNITS 1 AND 2

6. REFERENCES 6.1 Instruction Manual for ALCO Diesel DC663082-80.

7. APPENDICES None

8. ATTACHMENTS 8.1 "Data Sheet - Diesel Generator Full Load Rejection Test; Calibration of Test Recorder,"

07/12/01 8.2 "DIG Power Factor vs Real Power and Reactive Power," 02/12/02

9. SPONSOR C. Wheeler 0127561 1.DOA 06 1023.0619 t

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY - NUMBER STP M-9DI DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 11 PAGE 3 OF 12 TITLE: Diesel Generator Full Load Rejection Test UNITS I AND 2 START DATA SECTION UNIT OPERATING MODE DATE/TIME I DIESEL

10. PRECAUTIONS AND LIMITATIONS INITIALS 10.1 Observe the Precautions & Limitations of STP M-9A when performing this test.

10.2 During this test, equipment that is necessary for current plant operations should not be powered from the vital bus associated with the D/G to be tested.

10.3 Utilizing the information in the Control Room (i.e., clearance logs, annunciators, etc.), check to see if the other diesels for the unit are OPERABLE.

10.3.1 The directional power, overcurrent and loss of field relays for the diesel to be tested should be cutin to protect the diesel when it is paralleled to its bus. These relays shall be cutout following the test. While the relays are cutin for testing, the diesel is considered OPERABLE.

10.3.2 Declare the test diesel inoperable when paralleled to the 10.3.3 off-site power source.

If a diesel is inoperable, verify the action requirements I

in Tech Spec LCO 3.8.1 in MODES 1-4 or Tech Spec LCO 3.8.2 in MODES 5 and 6 are being followed.

10.4 In MODES 1, 2, 3, and 4, if paralleling a diesel to Startup Power, declare the diesel inoperable and perform the action required in Tech Spec LCO 3.8.1. -

0127561LDOA 06 1023.0619

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9D1 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 11 PAGE 4 OF 12 TITLE: Diesel Generator Full Load Rejection Test UNITS 1 AND 2 PERF VERIF I1. PREREQUISITES 11.1 Obtain Shift Foreman's approval to perform this test.

Signature: Date/Time /

Shift Foreman 11.2 Request maintenance to calibrate and setup test (M&TE) recorder per Attachment 8.1.

11.3 With SFM's permission, have an electrician install the calibrated recorder set across frequency meter terminals 3 and 5 of the frequency meter of the diesel being tested on VB4 with a I amp fused lead.

NOTE: The fused lead should be connected to the positive terminal of the diesel frequency meter which is terminal 3. The fused lead is used to protect the 6 Amp. potential transformer fuse upstream of the frequency meter if the connection to the recorder is accidentally grounded.

11.4 Verify the following main control board meters are in current calibration:

Diesel to be tested is MW/Freq recorder. Cal Due Date (IRW, 2RW, 3RW, or2-VB4-125)

Volt/MYAR recorder. Cal Due Date (IRVAR, 2RVAR, 1/2-VB4-129)

MVAR meter. Cal Due Date (1/2-VB4-58/59/60-VAR)

MWATI meter. Cal Due Date (I /2-VB4-52/53/54-W)

NOTE: To find Cal Due Dates, use PIMS search 3.2..1 1. Enter the instrument number and press enter. In the command line, type "PME' & press enter. A list of work orders will show on the screen. One of these work orders will be for calibration. Select this procedure W/O and check the due date. -

0127561 L.DOA 06 1023.0619

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9D1 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 11 PAGE 5 OF 12 TITLE: Diesel Generator Full Load Rejection Test UNITS 1 AND 2 PERF NOTE: Ifthe diesel is already running when this test is started, mark Steps 11.5 through 11.8 N/A.

11.5 The diesel to be tested is aligned for normal operation in accordance with OP J-6B.

N/A[ ]

11.6 Perform a prefiring check per STP M-9A for the DIG to be tested, or per the appropriate section(s) of the Turbine Building Round Sheet. ee__-_ [

! ~~~~N/A[]

11.7 Diesel CARDOX fire protection system for the Diesel to be tested should be OPERABLE or compensatory action taken.

N/A[ ]

11.8 Have STP M-9I data sheet(s) available to be fill out for any diesel start associated with this test.

-. -. N/A[ ]

01275611.DOA 06 1023.0619

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9D1 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 11 PAGE 6 OF 12 TITLE: Diesel Generator Full Load Rejection Test' UNITS 1 AND 2 PERF

12. PROCEDURE 12.1 Notify the control operator that testing is ready to commence.

NOTE: If the diesel was already running, mark Step 12.2 N/A.

12.2 Pre-test diesel run N/A[]

12.2.1 Cutin the Directional Power, Loss of Field and Overcurrent Protective features for the Diesel being tested with the FCO switch on VB4. -

12.2.2 Manually start the Diesel to be tested per OP J-6B.

12.2.3 Place/Verify the appropriate D/G MODE SEL switch in the MANUAL position.

12.2.4 Check diesel generator output voltage on each phase.

Otherwise, when synchroscope is turned ON (next step) the voltmeter will lock on to phase C.

12.2.5 Cut in the FEEDER SYNC Switch.

12.2.6 Verify synchroscope working.

a. Lights OFF at the 12 o'clock position.

b. Lights FULL BRIGHT at the 6 o'clock position.

12.2.7 Adjust engine speed up and down to verify the manual governor is in control.

12.2.8 Set engine speed so the synchroscope is turning slowly in the clockwise (FAST) direction. This will allow the diesel to pick up load when paralleled to the bus.

12.2.9 Adjust generator voltage to within +/-2 volts of bus voltage.

12.2.10 When the synchroscope pointer is slightly before the 12 o'clock position, turn generator breaker control switch to the CLOSE position. Pick up load (0.5MW) promptly after the breaker is closed. This will prevent the D/G breaker from tripping open due to actuation of the cut-in reverse power relay.

Clock time D/G paralleled: hrs.

01275611.DOA 06 1023.0619

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9D1 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 11 PAGE 7 OF 12 TITLE: Diesel Generator Full Load Rejection Test UNITS 1 AND 2 PERF 12.2.11 Adjust voltage with voltage control switch to maintain VARS-OUT.

12.2.12 Cut out the FEEDER SYNC Switch.

12.2.13 Increase the load to 22.45 MW and *2.50 MW at a rate of

0.50 MW every 2 minutes and record clock time DG reaches 242A5 MW load:

Date/Timer e -- - I ;

12.2.14 Complete applicable sections of STP M-91 for the start of the diesel for this test.,

N/A((]

12.3 Warmup or verify that the diesel has been warmed up for the test.

.: Run the diesel at 2.45 MW and

2.50 MW for 2 one hour.

[ The Diesel was considered warmed up due to previous testing per the discretion of the PPE.

01275611.DOA 06 1023.0619

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER. STP M-9DI DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 11 PAGE 8 OF 12 TITLE: Diesel Generator Full Load Rejection Test UNITS 1 AND 2 PERF 12.4 Full Load Rejection Test.

12.4.1 Verify diesel is paralleled to the grid. If not, parallel diesel per Steps 12.2.3 through 12.2.12.

12.4.2 Adjust diesel load to 2 2.45 MW and S 2.50 MW with a reactive load 2 1.6 MVAR and 5 1.75 MVAR. Change load at a rate 5 0.50 MW every 2 minutes.

12.4.3 Verify that the temporary M&TE recorder set is properly set up to record the diesel voltage.

12.4.4 Switch or verify switched the following Control Room recorders associated with the diesel being tested to High Speed and are inking properly.

Diesel MW/HZ recorder in High Speed.

Diesel MW/HZ recorder inking properly.

Diesel KVIMVAR recorder in High Speed.

Diesel KV/MVAR recorder inking properly.

12.4.5 Record the Load and Reactive Load.

Load MW Reactive Load MVARs Date/Time /

12.4.6 Start the temporary M&TE recorder.

12.4.7 Open the D/G output breaker associated with the diesel being tested.

12.4.8 Verify the diesel engine remains running and does not trip during this full load rejection transient. If the diesel engine trips, notify SFM, take immediate recovery action and discontinue the test.

12.4.9 Shutdown the M&TE recorder after the diesel is stabilized.

12.4.10 After the transient is settled, adjust the following:

a. D/G speed to approximately 900 RPM.

b. D/G voltage to approximately l19V.

12.4.11 Parallel the D/G to its vital bus and load the D/G to 0.50 MW. See Steps 12.2.4 through 12.2.12 for paralleling guidance.

01275611.DOA 06 1023.0619

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9D1 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 11 PAGE 9 OF 12 TITLE: Diesel Generator Full Load Rejection Test UNITS I1 AND 2 PERF VERIF 12.4.12 Make a quick preliminary evaluation of the voltage data recorded.

a. Peak Diesel Voltage _ (must be 5 143.6V) 12.4.13 If the limit is exceeded, make a detailed evaluation of the trace. -Ifthe problem is determined to be from the diesel, inform the SFM and generate an Action Request.

N/A[ ]

12.5 Post Test Alignment.

12.5.1 Have an electrician disconnect the recorder set from the diesel frequency meter.

12.5.2 Per PPE's discretion, evaluate the need to take advantage of equipment and diesel alignment to continue other tests. -_-_- _

[] Shutdown the diesel per this procedure, continue with Step 12.5.3.

[1] exit to other test_

Skip Steps 12.5.3 through 12.5.9; mark N/A and continue with the Post Test Alignment Section (Step 12.5.10).

12.5.3 Run the D/G at about 0.50 MW for approximately 5 minutes for cooldown. -_-_-

12.5.4 Reduce load on the diesel to 2 0.1 MW and S 0.25 MW.

Then separate the diesel from the bus.

12.5.5 Adjust the diesel speed so the frequency meter reads

>60 HZ and < 60.25 HZ.

HZ.

12.5.6 Adjust the diesel voltage to II 9V AC.

Volts.

12.5.7 Shutdown the D/G.

12.5.8 Align the diesel MAN/AUTO switch per SFM's direction.

[] AUTO

[]MAN 01275611.DOA 06 1023.0619

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-9D1 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 11 PAGE 10 OF 12 TITLE: Diesel Generator Full Load Rejection Test UNITS 1 AND 2 MMMM PERF 12.5.9 Cut out diesel LOSS OF FIELD, OVERCURRENT &

DIRECTIONAL POWER protective features using the toggle switch on VB4.

12.5.10 Place the MW/HZ recorders on Low Speed 12.5.11 Place the KV/MVAR recorders on Low Speed.

12.5.12 Mount the voltage trace from the M&TE recorder to regular size paper and attach it to this procedure.

12.6 Describe any malfunctions and list any discrepancies found.

Otherwise, mark N/A.

N/A[ ]

REMARKS:

12.7 Test performers and verifiers:

Name Signature Date/Time Init

/

13. DATA REDUCTION AND EVALUATION Incorporated as part of Section 12.

01275611.DOA 06 1023.0619

PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER - STP M-9D1 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 11 PAGE 11 OF 12 TITLE: Diesel Generator Full Load Rejection Test UNITS 1 AND 2 PERF

14. PRIMARY REVIEW 14.1 Verify if Step 12.4 was performed, the D/G Acceptance Criteria have been satisfied for Tech Spec SR 3.8.1.10 and part of Tech Spec SR 3.8.2.1.

14.1.1 Following a full load rejection of at least 2 2.45 MW and

2.50 MW with a reactive load so the power factor is

0.87 + 128 KVARs and 2 0.80, the diesel engine remained running and did not trip during and after the full load rejection transient. (Step 12.4.8) 14.1.2 Following a full load rejection of at least 2 2.45 MW and

2.50 MW with a reactive load so the power factor is

0.87 + 128 KVARs and 2 0.80, the D/G voltage during and after the transient is

143.6 volts.

- ~ (Step 12.4.12a) 14.2 - The acceptable limit for the peak diesel voltage is 143.6 volts based on the chart from the temporary recorder. If the limit is exceeded, make a detailed evaluation of the trace. If the problem is determined to be from the diesel, inform the SFM and generate an Action Request.

N/A [_]

14.3 Verify M&TE usage recorded in PIMS.

14.4 Review completed procedure and based on test data, make determination of D/G OPERABILITY. If any malfunctions are noted, notify management promptly and submit an ACTION REQUEST.

14.5 Describe any malfunction, explain any NO or N/A entries in any of the data and list any discrepancies found. Indicate if this test was performed due to modifications on the D/Gs and briefly describe modifications performed.

REMARKS:

Signature: Date/Time /

Power Production Engineer 01275611.DOA 06 1023.0619

I PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY NUMBER STP M-90D1 DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT REVISION 11 PAGE 12 OF 12 TITLE: Diesel Generator Full Load Rejection Test UNITS 1 AND 2 PERF

15. SECONDARY REVIEW 15.1 Review procedure for completeness and acceptability.

15.2 If this test was a complete test and the D/Gs are OPERABLE, then update Master Schedule.

RT W/O #

REMARKS:

15.3 Reviewed By: Date Second Reviewer 01275611.DOA 06 0.61 1023.0619

07/12/01 Page I of I DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT STP M-9D1I ATTACHMENT 8.1 AND TITLE: Data Sheet - Diesel Generator Full Load Rejection Test; Calibration of Test Recorder PERF 8.1 Obtain one recorder (high impedance input) such as the Gould Windograf with an AC RMS converter.

[ Gould Windograf (with AC RMS converter, preferred)

[Other type of recorder CO. ID. Cal. Due Date 8.2 If Windograf is to be used, the following instruments are required to calibrate the voltage scales.

N/A[ ]

8.2.1 One high accuracy digital voltmeter such as Fluke 8842A or HP 34401A.

CO. ID. Cal. Due Date 8.2.2 Calibrate the Windograf as follows:

NOTE: The following calibration steps are for general guideline only. The settings and steps may be modified per supervisor, maintenance or PPE's discretion.

Document the changes in the REMARK Section.

a. Calibrate the Windograf with the high accurate DVM to a span from 100 VAC to 150 VAC.

NOTE: The scale suggested here may be changed per PPE's discretion.

b. Mark the Windograf chart paper with the calibrated scale.

c. Set the Windograf speed to 50mm/sec.

8.3 REMARKS

8.4 Calibration and Recorder Setup performed by:

Date:

NOTE: Return this completed Attachment to the PPE associated with the STP M-9DI Test.

0127561 1.DOA 06 1023.0619

02/12/02 Page 1of I DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT STP M-9D1 ATTACHMENT 8.2 1 AND2 TITLE: DIG Power Factor vs Real Power and Reactive Power I 1.90

' 1.80

1.70 a . An 2.30 2.35 2.40 2.45 2.50 2.55 2.60 2.65 2.70 2.75 2.80 2.85 2.90 Real Power In Mw 01275601.XLS 012756l1I.DOA 06 1023.0619

DCL-03-142, Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request 03-06, Revision to Technical Specification 3.8.1, 'Ac Sources - Operating

Text

Dear Commissioners and Staff:

8.3 REMARKS

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DCL-03-142, Response to NRC Request for Additional Information Regarding License Amendment Request 03-06, Revision to Technical Specification 3.8.1, 'Ac Sources - Operating

Text

Dear Commissioners and Staff:

8.3 REMARKS

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