BSEP-97-0538, Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-324/97-12 & 50-325/97-12 on 970928-1108.Corrective Actions:Review Performed to Determine If Other Potential Areas Existed Where Water Could Be Introduced

Responds to NRC Re Violations Noted in Insp Repts 50-324/97-12 & 50-325/97-12 on 970928-1108.Corrective Actions:Review Performed to Determine If Other Potential Areas Existed Where Water Could Be Introduced

ML20198E813
Person / Time
Site:	Brunswick
Issue date:	01/07/1998
From:	Lyash J CAROLINA POWER & LIGHT CO.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM)
References
50-324-97-12, 50-325-97-12, BSEP-97-0538, BSEP-97-538, NUDOCS 9801090228
Download: ML20198E813 (15)

Text

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Jn; he. tw.. ,.,2M.. .-. ENCI.OSIJRE 1 "1

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BRUNSWd$f$AM ELECTRIC Pl. ANT, UNIT NOS.1 AND 2

". ' . jQMMOCKET-NOS. 50 325 AND 50 324

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c S*Pp.[6,.i WENSE Pd.TO NOTICE NOS.DPR OF VIOLATION71 AND DPR 62 . .

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lDuring a,nNRCinpctiM(@Aw, hoted frcm September 28 through November 8,1997, five ,

,s violations ~of NRCquir,erpents were identified. 1

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,. .VIOllATION N ;_., y % . y s . kb '

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Teihnical Specifl(Micri .l Uoq.ilfes t that procedurer shall be established, implemented, and

' maintained c6verih[UifsM,$threcommended in Appendix A of Regalatory Guide 1.33,'

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.N.ovember 1972.f Paru.,g 'p.h.m.n.f Appendix A of Regulatery Guide 133, requires specifle (

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procedure) for equiptn .coptro p y

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..~'Ihe w Conduct w;,,.. ofOperstlops cy.g, G .g$pue,nOperating Instruction 001 1.09, Equipmen .

Section 5.1.2, requWiineRq@pmint tagging provide high degree ofpersormel and equipment safety as well as mWintald th'O,tatus and integrity ofimpotunt plant componente arid systems.

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Contrary to the Ab,ov,e, nt tapging requirements were not correctly implemented as. , J evidenced by'th' e foUo " -

3 . ,15 * ' '. . .' . .U.$ -M@[9 7-7-1) '

- On SepietnW preventMining q (j997,'tlis EaGr'thto'the torus Unit 2 torus. Waterrnatter drained ontoclearance,2-97 electrical power cords 555, war,

.. and weld (idedufrh.~eN,.irth s I . area where weldmg actmties were scheduled.

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-On Oct6ber 14,,$97,d**j) correctly linplhnint'o ,, tien an operstor did not fol'ow the clearance by racking out the nit 2s 2B recirculation pump clearance,2

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bus'instead of the 2B recirculation pump motor breaker.

. m;. . 4160 volt feed'to the 2)N *

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- On' October'16,IPSh nit 2,2B

- recirculation pump clearance 2-9716~.1 was not ndequate Men's41 c reactor c,ool.s.

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ithestweae ta'nd "h!(hg 500 degieen w'ater Fiduenixh, flow rentting was isolated in exceeding the to the re

,, * / design 16,  ;

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This is a SeVeN)yMel%f<.ljt)fti(Supplement 1) This is applicable to 1.' nit 2.

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4',- l The 'causes of examplesfoni 2 idhis violation are attributed to human performance errors.

,,, , With respectWendsnple 1,dindlyiduals responsible for the preparation of the torus master ' ' ~['h, l 7C 'elearanes 2 97-00{55. ~ ~that any water con'alnod within the thrus sysicm piping would bc :

dralned Nited on'the " " ' ' blint cor, fit,aratkan prior to torus draining. Based on this -  : j inap;nopriately determined that administrative controls were ' t~ i

~

[assumpti6ni

. net needed to ensive#dnsin the'cl6irinek@}rg of inMation of a nectin, of piping le '

,! 'du'eto operati6rdi seipiliementi[escoustered during shutdown, the plant configuration prior to

.Ltoru(drai ning ng chssgel.9 , f1Jaiu ., +

P88f .'UR.I.sg the typtop,i Q ~ (gc lu configuradou was not takt luto accouri *

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Thetrolppa.rntor (CO) respontihfe foilmplementing the 2R ', <

recirculation pump 9%epfldt'o' adequately verify that he was operating the correct ,

" brealter : Pilofto clia^ralMi@ld(itE(se condidoin at tlie 2B imtur i tw*

selected for clearandelis .

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< Doe Ethe hevner'r$oks$desperItation~and yt'ipitied ahd the need to sign off the completed then removed "eps, the CO kneltthe contiol ,/pow  !

4 down to perfdtni t$isitalisks4'hllein the kneeling position, the CO lost his balance. While . q

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' " regaining his bala6t%h5iMikrtently, repositioned himselfin front of the Unit Auxiliary -

transformir inetimligfbed fisp tolhe 2B 4160 volt breaker. Without re. verifying his location,

the CO tacked ouuhe1ische64Neaker, .  !

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'The cause of exaniple 3 to ddiflo4 tion is attributed to the faliure to establish a comprehensive : x , .

" plan to con, trol tiiegroMidf$iehculation pu np rr sair activity, and an inadequate review of the

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' 28 reactoi rocliculaqlde* "efsmnce prior to cicarance implementatien. i

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On Octobee 16,1997lths(beys 3fplant bperation shifted froir the stanup of Unit No. 2 following a [ >

erefbolinaleMage 14the p'sentialperformance i of a reacter shutdown which may be needed to -

facilitate the repair of.is41s eft 4ne problems and a water.to-oilleak on the 2B reactor recirculati6n , l y pump. In,anticipationofMi ibi '

- th'e water toWillee6fr(the th't @nhutdown, an outage ti recirculationpumpwerediscussed. meeting was conduit' Althoughvarious

. - approachestoimplementli(W,tn2B hactor recirculationpump repair were rev!ewed,

' ' coKw.1.siviplaris andiscshNinnMe'unt formallred. nor were direct.vtions and milettores .- l .

oftablished fbrlesich effeciadgrMs6itation. Consequently, the individuals attending this meetir g did

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gg y~ gym m.e of tho'couroc of action in the event a shutdown was

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' ~ MterslMt$ is niquirNif6di dOEcielon was made to shutdown Unit No. 2, additional reviews ~

" of the plan were net perfoMio detennine the activities that could occur during HOT a SHUTDOWN versus ac Mties that required COLD SHUTDOWN.

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ng didoniddilioh Operations had developed a clearance ta faellitate the 28 l reactor recleculattenpujp,'sepah datumlog that platit c.onditions would support isolating the .

- cooling water supplies to the pisiip'6fals! Once the declaion to shutdown Unit No. 2 was finalized, l the oletrance was irnplementsid as written. The reviews performed by Operations personnel prior to ,

clearancdmpletnentathafkiled Io' determine that the clearance could not be implemented as ~

j written with the plain in HOT SHUTJ0WN. A detailed questioning review of the clearance and  !

work plan prior td i!safaise lciplehieu.attvu w vuld lwva identlflod that a cooling flow path was not ,

• available t6 the pum) taels aM that pump *eal failure could occur as a resuh of hanging the ~[ '

c degreesfahrenheit  ;

, ~ learancewhilethe

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Cartective AetM Wkla,h Ma,ve Been Taren and Results khleved:

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The skgnificance ofthl's irve;ni und lessons learned were discuued with the clearance prep wh.Oj$$% ... ~

'A mvlow 'was perfottOiltoil@ttnin't if 6ther potential areas existed where waar could be l

Introduced lato primary iiontahrri'entl the condenser hotwell, or circulating water piping areas -

during the remainder of the. U.rit.t N..,6.'2 ' refuel outage. Additional actions were not needed to

. . prevent a similar. eviottos. c p ,. a n g 6 9[eesuning. 3.jh. . .. -

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• skpectationslegar'di6g55(sGf tdfSiop-1hink.Act Review (STAR) self checking techniques were reinforced with Ogvil6as Shift Superintendents.

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tyent have been included in the outage lenons learned database.

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The root cause'analyslM thli event'has been included in the first quarter 1998 Licensed

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The responsible,Q CD@p was  ; ,,Eotinseled)oh the need to verify intended actio  !

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' Individuals involved wit &thidtsuiha've been counseled on the need to ensure evolutions are ~

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. ' cannedve S**a Whteh Will se Taken to Avoid Further Violations: '

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af- [

Prior to the' Unit No. 'l 1998 reibel outage, a review will be performed to ensure that clearances . ', .  ;

administratively'addrvss appropriate venting and draining evolutions.

 : .m p. . -

An evaluation of procedure OPSWOGC 1301. " Equipment Clearance," will be performed to ' .. ,

' determine whether additionM guidance for ensuring effective system venting and draining during clearance implementation activities is needed and the procedure will be revised as needed. ,

m . ~: e .f ,

,' 1 The need to ensure that m'compshensive plan for emergent work is developed and the lessons, .

loamed from the lasue identifled in emnple 3 to this violation will be included in the outage '

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lessons leamed database.Y . ..

n .

37 e, ..

i l A discussion of significant eYen, ts resulting from improper control of operational activities will

• 1

' be presented by Operations management to licensed operstors prior to the next refuel outage. ..

' ~

A'ppropriate procedures will bNevised to provide additional guidance on isolating the reactoi <  ;

recirculation pumps'.? : O T "

,' 4

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Training will'bc provided to' appropYiate licensed persormel on reactor recirculation pump seal -

Operation. , ,,

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Date When Full Comollarice Will Be ' Achieved:

l Full compliance with th*e requirernents,of TS 6.8.1 has been achieved. 7' -

- VIOLATION Bi- ,

' ~

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10 CFR $0'AppendlEB,,Celterion XVI, Conective Action, requires that measures shall be .

i~ established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly !dentified and corrected, in the case of sig'nificant condiilons adverse to quality, the measures shall assure that the cause of the condition is determined ahd' corrective action taken to preclude repetitlott. .

, v ,7 p '

Contrary to 'the Abon, when an irror was discovered in the Unit 1 Cycle 11 minimum critical . 1 power ratio datebase ovi ApM124,1997, adequate measures were not taken to assure that no other arrors existed in the database'.~ Additional errors were identified on September 25,1997. Both 1

i.

errors were identified to have been) resent since the database was developed.

This is a Severity LevellV violation (Supplement 1). This is appil able to both Units. l RESPONSE TO VIOLATION Bf ' ' 1 hominion or Dantal of Vioiado'rb " '

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l The failure k kk 5tifyMdi 'eErbrs in the Unit No.1 Cycle 11 minimum critical power ratio ,

(MCPR) databh ilwher@ hon,itial database enor was ;Jentified in April 1997, was caused by l inatterttlonto'de til ttd by ' ,

The Individuals; OdiciliW sfumihd, of thetithildre csitical powcoatiu to follow luput data, thefollowing intemal the guideline for )t .

[

- Identification of nitlal'databWerror, did r.ot apply the level of attention nuded to identify the other enor whiclt was subsequsintlyl identified in September 1997. The enors were present in the  !

datahane #nce it i.cN5tigrt lit d)ghst 1996 bec.nuse the indivWal performmg the database ~

wrification did not blioW tlN internal guideline for this work. i'

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• Corrective A'ceMMKNAEU;.: Taken and Results Achievgd: t

. .s >; c e.g.

Nuclear Fuels SeNMeN, r'sviewed the Inums leamed from this event with their staff, emphasizing that attentlori'to detail during the preparation and verification of design calculations r

is the best defense'against hiWnas eno's. r '

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The B1011 and B2Cl3towe,rple'x MCPR values have been reviewed for errors and identified errors ruo.lved.

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w-i Corrective Steos'WhichWillBe'faken to Avoid Further Violations:

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Investigation into th,e~ oanse of thli' event iden*lfled that possible enhancements to the MCPR database developnient piticeshould be made to ptovide aJditional bairless and pievent .

recunerice of similar hdinan'p'erf9dnance errors. Such enhancernents include a review to determine which potloris'of the database generation process can be Wemated and the

~

' development of ass $cip'ted'to4Mndp' re adures. Development of this type of tool led to identification of the MCWeridr in September 1997. In ~ don, an investigation into revising '

~

. the MCPR lhalt dataM10 reslui;i the number of significant digits and/ur tlx numler of total '

data sets in each databan wilite pbeformed.

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,. . .as The intemal' guideline w ' hichAlpects reviews of the Powerplex database will be converted to a Nuclear Generation Osupyro'cedure, which will address the concem that the guideline was not

explicitly fbliowed.i .. r ? P. Ji.

' a.

o g +ypt Date When Fuil Camallne WillBe Achieved: '

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4 Full compliance with the aquirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI has been achieved. - - .< ;,@:Qi W.

VIOLATION C1 WW d); . .;Q*

j);,

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10 CFR $0, Appendix *II,'n. , -Criteiridn'XVI requires that measures shall be establishsd to assure

" conditions adverse to quality, subh as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipident? had tipoconformances are promptly identified and corrected.

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. 10 CFR 50, A'ppendbiB,' Criterion.V. requires activities affecting quality be prescribed by documented instructions or procedures, and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions or procedures',1 ' ,,

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Carolina Power and Ligh CcEmpany Plant Program Procedure PLP.04,Conective Action Management" implements the requirements of Criterion XVI at the Brunswick Nucle,v Plant. . ,

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Contrary to the above, as of the dates indicated, the licensee failed to assure th , >

conditions adverse to quality were prompt:; identified and conected and failed to follew Procedure PLP-04 no etidenced by the following: ,.

.'.. .i . .

1) Paragraph 4.2.7 of CP&L Procedure PLP 04, Revisions 19 through 23, dated .

October 21,1996, through October 23,1997, requires managers to ensure that ,

corrective Mlons requited to resolve condition reports are implemented.

As of October $21997,' managers in the EQ Organization in the Design Control Unit failed to. ensure corrective actions were implemented for 18 Action items associated with il Co:Tective Actions (CRs). These CRs documented safety related EQ components for whleh environmental qualification under 10 CFR 50.49 was indeterminate.' .

2) ~ Paragraph 5.4'of CP&L Piocedure PLP 04 requires that corrective actions shall be tracked per CP&L Procedure PLP.04.1. Section 5.2 of CPAL Procedure ,

PLP.04 8, Revision 7, dated September 12,1997, requires the responsible units to ,

complete assigned actioriitem responses by the assigned due dates, orjustify - ,

deviations from,the specified actions. Paragraph 4.2 of Procedure PLP 04.1 requires manageis to assure that extensions to completion of action item responses beyond the due dates are justifiable and documented .

.  ; y .. -

As of October 8, }P97 the responsible units failed to complete the assigned action responses and Managers failed to ensure that requests for extensions were justified and documented for 11 CRs.

.  ; 3 - -

3) Paragraphs 4'.2.2'and'6.2.2 of CP&L Procedure PLP.04, Revisions 19 through 21 dated October 21,1996, through April 21,1997, requires managers and personnel to ensure CRs are initiated when they became aware of adverse conditions or conditions nn meeting expectations.

Managers arid person ti he EQ group of the Design Control Unit did not initiate CRs or ensure CRs were initiated for more than two months after they became aware of conditions not meeting expectations such as lack of weep holes in EQ junction bones [' damaged gaskets on junction boxes, and potential adverse '

effects of moisture on operability of EO equipment. These conditions were '

identified during EQ equipment walkdowns completed between February I and , .

March 15,1997. CRs were not initiated to document and disposition these

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01/07/1990 19:11 9104373014 PWI CV l

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problems until May 23 th' rough July 9,1997.

4) CP&L Procedure PLP 04, Revisions 19 through 22, dated October 21,1996, through Augost 29,1997, requires conective actions be effective to resolve and correct adverse conditions and conditions not meeting expectations.

Condition Reports numbers CR 96 03693,97 01436, and CR 97 01904 document i

assignment ofnon qualified individuals to perform engineering work act vities.

The corrective actions to resolve the conditions where unqualified individuals were perfonning engineering work activities were not effective. The lack of effective corrective actiom was again documented in CR 97 03305 which concerned assigrumnt of unqualified individuals to perform engineering work activities.

This 1s a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement 1). This is applicable to both units.

RESPONSE TO VIOL 4 HON.C Admission or Dgnial of Violatictn CP&L admits the violation.

Esason for Violation:

The failure to maintain action item due dates avdentif ird in examples one and two of the violation occurred because the newly assigned Environmental Qualification (EQ) program management madejudgment errors. Specifically,EQ management decided that it was more important to focus on ensuring that the full scope of EQ related work items had been identified, properly prioritized, and scheduled. Upon comp letion of this effort, achievable due dates could be estabhshed fo: the actionitems assignedto tre :ompletion of the work activities. This decision was inappropriate because it resulted in the fallute to comply with Corrective Action Program (CAP) procedaral requirements and Indicates that EQ program management personnel did not possess the proper sensitivity to compliance with CAP procedural requirements for the extension of action item due dates.

The failure to initiate action items as identified in example three of the violation occurred because a culture fostering the implementationof the CAP was not established within the EQ organization and because EQ personnel were not sudiciently trained on CAP requirements.

The ineiTeetive corrective actions associated with example four of the violation occurred beeause EQ rrogram managementhad not placed sufilcient emphrsis on ensuring EQ program supervisors and engineers complied with the qualification requirements of the Engineering Support Per:,onnel training program. Increased emphasis was especially necessary as a result of recent changes in EQ supervision. - +

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01/07/1998- 19:11 9064573014 PAE 10

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l. The ' common cause of these issineils that the EQ program reeovery project was inadequately '

managed with respect to' ensuring compliance with standard engineering practices, includng the -

8

" implementation of the CAP..;lhanagement expectations with respect io at 5 program were not L

E adequately established and cammunicated to the staff, -

. . .. + - ~

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Qurective doti == 44h lieve Been Taken and Results Achieved:

^

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~

l The EQ related overduinction items were pnontized, scheduled, and extended r.s needed.

..- )

lQ s.

. Based on a communiistion from the Site Vice President, the EQ supervisor, EQ managers, and ~

< the Chief Enginee lospensitale foi the EQ program weic counseled on the importance of meeting corrective actiou ltem duc dat's. e -

i

'm ,

.. ,.3 Undocumented F.Q coneems were identified and a wndition report (CR) initiated to address l- .,

- those concems that were determined to be an r.dverse con'dition. Each CR was reviewed to detennine whethsr a potential vperability !>>ue cxidied. No opetubility couccius wete identined.

.c EQ personnel were trained on CSFfrequirements in July 1997. Subsequently, a self assessment was performed in November 1997 by the CAP organization to determine the effectiveness of this training. This assessment concluded that the threshold for the initiation of a condition repoit within the EQ organizatirn was adequate, the awareness training provided to EQ personnelin July 1997, appeam to ha"e been effective, cnd EQ personnel ctarrently comply with CAP requirements forCRinitiation y J. v .

. L .. ' -

The engineering products developed by unqualified individuals have been reviewed by qualified '

- individuals and the affected engineering documents revised to reflect that qualified individuhls

, reviewed the documents. f.

1 G?

Supervisors and individual contiributors within the EQ organization were counseled on the -

importance of ensuring that qualified individuals perform engineeringwork activities.

. Corrective Steps'Which Will Be Take,n lo Avoid Further Violations: l 7

The appropriate Engineering Support Personnel (ESP) training program documents and procedures will be reviewed by EQ personnel to ensure the appropriate level of awareness of ESP training and qualification requirestats.

1 . . .

pate When Full Comn11Eme Will Be Achieved.

~

Full compliar.ce Yith thOequikments of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B has been achieved.

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, , _ PAGE la 61/87/1998~ 19:11 9184973014

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VIOLATION Di N y, t" .e.

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10 CFR 50, Appendix B; CrithioriV, requires that activities affecting qur.lity shall be prescribed 3 l

by documented in~ s tructiori, pr'oce^dures or drawings of a type appropriate to the circumstances anu shall be accomplisheld h1 accordance with these instructions, procedures or drawings.

. Paragraph 9.3,7,4.g of CP&L Pro'cedure EGR NGGC-0005, Engineering Service Requests, .

Revisions 1 through 6, dated %ugust 2,1996 through , September 5,1997, requires an engineering service request (BSR) to be initiated for evaluations in support of systan operability l-(operability assessments >. Paragraph 9.3.2.3 of CP&L Procedure EGR NGOC-0156, Environments! Qualification of Electric Equipment important to Safety, Revisions 2 through 4, dated July 10,1997.th' rough Octbber 8,1997, requires preparation of an engineering senice

- request to document operability determinations and justificadons for continued operation for any

- item in the EQ program found to be in a degraded or nonconforming condition.

-  ?; , v+,

n. v . *a

. ;V .

Comrary to the aboys, as'of October 8,1997, ESRs had n'ot been prepared to document

-operability and justification for con'tinued operation for EQ equipment found in a

- degraded or nonconfonistris coridition,(i.e., equipment important to safety for which

~ environmental qualification was indeterminate) for the deficiencies / nonconforming

- conditions ~ doc'.unented'in'seven Condition Reports.

- m, , 3 N S .c . .

This is a Severity L ~eNIVYdati3n (Supplement 1). This is applicable to both units.

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i RESPONSE TO VIOLATION D6

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Adm3== ton or Denlil of Violation: ,

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CP&L admits the.yviolation.;

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Re==an for Viol =*Ina:M ' i "

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The failure to document operability determinations and/orjustifications for continued operation

,of environmentally qual) fled squipment in a timely manner is attributed to ineffective nianage' ment of the EQ program l: Causal factors contributing to diis issue include poor comn,unicatio_ns and ' corrective action culture within the EQ organization.

Corrective ActionsMi H' ave BeenTaken and Resuhs Achieved:

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OrganizationAlchatiges to hindove EQ programmatic oversight and direction have been implementedJ# W:& J

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' Engineeringevaluationsb., _ 3 4 ben completed to document the qualifications

! deficiencies /nonconformingconditions addressed in this violation. In addition, a review of the EQ j.

related issues identified in the CAP was completed in Novetnbet 1997 to identify those issues requiring fbrther action (eLg.; operability determinations and justifications for continued operation)

Those actions identified.have been taken.

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.g The EQ staff'was counseled on~the importance of adhering to proceduralrequirements for

- documenting operabilipdeterminationsand justificatiors for condaued operation in a timely -

, manner. - - ~ ~f r%

. . :( . . .

Gerwtive t== %a Takendhk.O L :Violations:

M Will Be to Avoid Further

n. .

m. i WA No additional acti.oni,are_needed to avoid further violations,

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.w Qags %%m Full f%=h;p;gWill Be Achieved:

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Full compilance Mt$ tN~requ' uwments of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V has been achieved. ' . * ' l t 1.

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s ;t, VIOLATEO. tier ' : ?V. ij. ' .

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. . Tecluilcal Specificutlan 6.8.1.d tequires that written procedures shall be established,

' implemented, and mainiained' covering implementation of the Security Plan.

. .s . , .

a , , ,,g *l g . ag Physical Security Plan,' Revision 1, August 1997, cates that a Member of the Security Force ,

located within'a Imllei rohistirit 'stmeture is responsible for the final access control function.

pn: .

. .o ., . :.~. . .

Security Instructiod OSI 0$, Security Post Duties, Responsibilities and Patrol Procedures, defines

. the responsibilities'of the Access Control Person (ACP). -

, e;. . , , . ' 7 ll ~

Contrary to the above, OSI.05 failed to adequately define those actions required for the ACP to control the final access function into the protected area to prevent unauthorized access.

Specifically, no g$ lance existed for controlling a condition on October 3 and again on October 7,1997 whetelhthe ACP failed to lock down the Protected Area turnstiles or remove the

- second inoividual from%e area during a condition which could have allowed an unauthorized individi.:J to gain accessinto the PA.

, :n.

This is a Severity LenliV viblation (Supplement III). This is applicable to both Units.

a. w .

RESPONSE TO VIOLATION E:

s. r.

Admimmion of ban'lal ofViolatikrj '.

I ,

, .g CPAL denies thn.. iola' tion. .

' Ramin Fne Denial- $,l'

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. m' ? : . .C .

'Ihe ntabil61md proceilural conuvls and the unining and qualifications of the security personnel

, monitoring the' Central Access Point at the time of the events identified in this violation were 1 adequate to detect'an unauthorized access into the protected area. The responsible security  ;

.  : " 3 ;;

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01/07/1999 19:38 9104573034 PAGE 83

• t '

personnel would ha've responded t'o an atternpted breech of the protected area barrier if the individuals had attempted to gain unauthorized access on those occasions.

l Security procedures, OSI 09,' Revision 76," Personnel Access Authorization, Control, And Identification," and OSI 05 delineated the duties, responsibilities, and capabilities of the Final Access Control (PAC) operator at the time the events identifled in this violation occurred.

Procedure OSI 09 statesf "Ihe individual in the bullet-resistant structure associated with the tumstiles has the capability to prevent the use of each or all tumstiles by activation of an override causing the signal km rhimrd ruder to be ignored." in addition, procedure OSI 05 states: "A FAC Operator is responsible for the control of access to the Protected Area."

During the events identified in this violation, no attempt was made to gain access into the protected area by an unauthodzed individual. On each occasion two individuals had entered the area between the half turnstiles and the electronically controlled full length tumstiles. However, at the time there was no guidance indicating access to this area was prohibited. Based on interviews with security, personnel, it was determined that the responsible FAC operators were knowledgeable of the requirements contained in procedures 05109 and OSI 05 related to their responsibility to control acc'ess into the protected area. The FAC operators attested that they' would have locksd the full-length turnstiles or requested response by a member of the security force had one of the individuals located between the tumstiles attempted to gain unauthorized access.

Additionally, FAC operator' qualification requirements include training on procedural requirements related to personnel access and demonstrating an understanding of those requirements. As' a result of recent industry issues involving access by unauthorized individuals, additional training of security personnel was conducted in November 1996. This training addressed multiple scenarios in which unauthorized individuals could gain access into the protected area. This training reinforced the responsibilities of the FAC, including their responsibility to prcycnt the use of the locked full length turnstiles in the event an indisidual

- attempts to gain unauthorized access into the protected area.

Based on the above, CP&T. helieves that procedural contmls are adequate to prevent unauthorized access and that FAC operators will appropriately respond to attempted unautherle.ed access. Therefore, CP&L derdes dat a violation of TS 6.8.1.d exists.

6 9

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4 El-11

et/e7/1999 19:11 91049730t4 PAGE 14 e /'

~'

- ENCLOSURE 2 BRUNSWICK S7IAM ELECTRIC PLANT, UNIT NOS 1 AND 2

. DOCKET NOS,50 325 AND 50 324

' LICENSE NOS. DPR-71 AND DPR-62 l REPLY TO NOTICE OF VIOLATION LIST OF REGULATORY COMMITMENTS

~

The following table identifies t$ose actions committed to by Carolina Power & Light (CP&L)

Company in this document.1 A~ny other actions discussed in the submittal represent intended or planned actions by CP&L; 'They are described for the NRC's information and are not regulatory commitments. Please notify the Manager - Regulatory Affairs of cny questions regarding this document or any associated regulatory commitments.

Committed

'

• Commitment

~, date or outage

~

Prior to the Unit No.1 1998 refuel outage, a review will be performed to March 15,1998 ensure that clearances administratively address appropriate venting and draining evolutions.

An evaluation of procedure OPS:NGGC-1301, " Equipment clearance," will April 30,1998 be perfonned to determine whether additional guidance for ensuring effective system venting and draining'during clearance implementation activities is needed and the procedun revised as needed.

The need to ensure that a compr'ebensive plan for emergent work is developed January 30,1998 and the lessons leamed from the~ issue identified in example 3 to violation A

~

will be included in the outage lessons learned database.

A discussion of significant events resulting from improper control of May 21,1998 operational activities will be presented by Operations management to licensed operators prior to the next refbel outage.

Appropriate procedures will be revised to provide additional guidance on March 27,1998 isolating the reactor recirculation pumps.

- Training will be provided to appropriate licensed personnel on reactor May 21,1998 recirculation pump se .1 operation.

a P

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~ ~ ~

e1/07/1990 19:11- 91e4573014 "PedE'13

.s i f- E A review to determine which portioris of the Minimum Critical Power Ratio June 15,1998 (MCPR) database generation process can be automated will be performed and the development of associated tools and procedures completed, in addition, an investigation into revising the MCPR limit sets to reduce the number of significant digits And/or tlie number of total data sets in each database will be

~

performed. ,

The internal guideline which directs reviews of the Powerplex database will April 15,1998 be converted to a Nuclear Generation Group procedure, which will address the concern that the guidelirie was not explicitly followed.

The appropriate Engineering Support Personnel (ESP) training program Januay 30,1998 documents and procedures will be reviewed by EQ personnel to ensure the appropriate level of aw'areness of ESP training and qualification requirements.

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