05000483/FIN-2011005-07
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Correctly Implement Plant Maintenance Procedures |
| Description | The inspectors reviewed a self-revealing non-cited violation of Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, involving the failure to ensure compliance with relay test maintenance procedures associated with electrical switchyard work that affected the performance of safety related equipment. On October 21, 2011, Callaway Plant was in Mode 6 with switchyard activities in progress to test transfer trip and lockout relay devices. At 1:21 p.m. the control room operators received several annunciators indicating that diesel generator bus A and its safety related loads had become de-energized. An improperly operated lockout relay had cascaded a test signal onto other components in the plant electrical system. This issue was entered into the corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 201108691. Failure to establish the safe working conditions per the transfer trip procedure and failure to operate the lockout relay in the manner specified by the lockout relay procedure were performance deficiencies. This finding is more than minor because it is associated with the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, one of the two offsite power feeds to the plant was lost. Using Manual Chapter 0609 Appendix G Attachment 1, Checklist 4 PWR Refueling Operation: RCS level > 23 OR PWR Shutdown Operation with Time to Boil > 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> And Inventory in the Pressurizer, this finding was determined to be of very low safety significance because it did not increase the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system inventory, did not degrade the ability to terminate a leak path or add reactor coolant system inventory when needed, and did not degrade the ability to recover decay heat removal. This finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work controls component because the electrical relay test technicians, onsite engineering, and work control staff failed to adequately maintain interfaces to communicate and safely coordinate significant switchyard activities to ensure proper human performance H.3(b). |
| Site: | Callaway  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000483/2011005 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | S Hedger C Alldredge Z Hollcraft G Apgar L Ricketson K Clayton D Dumbacher L Willoughby N O'Keefe C Long A Fairbanks T Buchanan D Reinert |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Callaway - IR 05000483/2011005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Callaway) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Callaway)
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