05000483/FIN-2011005-05
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Finding | |
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Title | Improper Ground and Test Device Damages Residual Heat Removal Pump Switchgear |
Description | The inspectors reviewed a Green self-revealing non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix B, Criterion V, Procedures, involving the licensees failure to correctly install a ground test device for the train A safety-related 4160 volt switchgear, NB01. During maintenance on the train A safety related bus, workers improperly placed a ground test device with 2000 ampere stab adapters into the 1200 ampere breaker cubicle (for the residual heat removal pump). This damaged the switchgear connection point and caused the breaker to fail, rendering the pump inoperable. The reactor was defueled so the residual heat removal system was not required by technical specifications at the time, but the bus was required to be removed from service for repairs. The licensee repaired the bus connection point, and the pump was retested satisfactorily. This finding was entered into the licensee\'s corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 201109122. Failure to install the correctly configured ground and test device into the NB0101 cubicle of the NB01 switchgear was a performance deficiency. This is more than minor because it is associated with the human performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone and affects the associated cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, improper maintenance caused the residual heat removal pump to become unavailable. Because no fuel was in the vessel at the time of the event, the inspectors referred the issue to a Region IV senior reactor analyst for the significance determination. The analyst used NRC Inspection Manual 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, to evaluate the significance of the finding. Since all of the fuel had been removed from the vessel there was no potential for core damage (the delta core damage frequency was zero). Therefore, the finding is of very low safety significance (Green). The finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the resources component in that the licensee failed to ensure training of maintenance personnel was adequate to assure nuclear safety H.2(b). |
Site: | Callaway |
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Report | IR 05000483/2011005 Section 1R19 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2011 (2011Q4) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Self-revealing |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.19 |
Inspectors (proximate) | S Hedger C Alldredge Z Hollcraft G Apgar L Ricketson K Clayton D Dumbacher L Willoughby N O'Keefe C Long A Fairbanks T Buchanan D Reinert |
CCA | H.9, Training |
INPO aspect | CL.4 |
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Finding - Callaway - IR 05000483/2011005 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Callaway) @ 2011Q4
Self-Identified List (Callaway)
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