05000483/FIN-2011003-03
From kanterella
Jump to navigation
Jump to search
Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Adequately Establish Test Program for Isolation Valves is Post-LOCA Recirculation Flowpath |
| Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XI, Test Control, for failure to adequately demonstrate that the seat leakage of centrifugal charging pump and safety injection pump suction isolation valves remained within acceptable limits. These valves have a combined allowable leakage rate of three gallons per minute to ensure that offsite thyroid and whole body doses remain within regulatory limits. Since the flowpaths have isolation valves for which seat leakage is limited to a specific maximum amount, the inspectors identified that they should be considered Category A valves as specified in ASME OM Code which requires the valves be tested at least once every two years. At the end of the inspection period, the licensee was planning a recurring surveillance test to verify seat leakage for these valves is within acceptable limits. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Callaway Action Request 201104577. This finding was greater than minor because it was associated with the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone attribute of configuration control and affects the associated cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, reactor coolant system, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. Using Manual Chapter 0609.04, Phase 1 Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings, the issue was determined to represent an actual open pathway in the physical integrity of reactor containment. Using Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix H, Containment Integrity Significance Determination Process, this finding was determined to be a Type B finding since it was related to a degraded condition that has potentially important implications for the integrity of containment, without affecting the likelihood of core damage. This finding was found to be of very low safety significance since the nontested flowpath would be comparable to small lines (less than 1-2 inches in diameter) and would not generally contribute to large early release frequency. This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect since the error associated with the inservice testing program was not reflective of current licensee performance (Section 1R22). |
| Site: | Callaway  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000483/2011003 Section 1R22 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2011 (2011Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.22 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | C Alldredge C Graves D Dumbacher G Guerra G Miller J Groom L Ricketson P Elkman R Latta |
| INPO aspect | |
| ' | |
Finding - Callaway - IR 05000483/2011003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Finding List (Callaway) @ 2011Q2
Self-Identified List (Callaway)
| ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||