05000458/FIN-2012012-03
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Maintain Design Control of the Feedwater Control System |
Description | The inspector identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, associated with the licensees failure to ensure that design requirements were correctly translated into installed plant equipment. Specifically, the licensee failed to appropriately translate the feedwater control systems design of maintaining full feedwater capacity following a turbine trip with load rejection by avoiding loss of feedwater due to a high level isolation (Level 8) using the level set point modification module. The licensee entered this issue into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2012-02249 and CR-RBS-2012-07254. The failure to ensure that design requirements were correctly translated into installed plant equipment was a performance deficiency. This performance deficiency is more than minor, and is therefore a finding, because it affected the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone objective to ensure availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process For Findings At-Power, the inspector determined that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the finding: (1) was not a deficiency affecting the design or qualification of a mitigating structure, system or component, and did not result in a loss of operability or functionality; (2) did not represent a loss of system and/or function; (3) did not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time, or two separate safety systems out-of-service for longer than its technical specification allowed outage time; and (4) did not represent an actual loss of function of one or more nontechnical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significance in accordance with the licensees maintenance rule program. This finding did not have a cross-cutting aspect because the most significant contributor did not reflect current licensee performance |
Site: | River Bend |
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Report | IR 05000458/2012012 Section 4OA4 |
Date counted | Dec 31, 2012 (2012Q4) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 95001 |
Inspectors (proximate) | J Josey R Hagar |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion III, Design Control Technical Specification |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - River Bend - IR 05000458/2012012 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (River Bend) @ 2012Q4
Self-Identified List (River Bend)
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