05000458/FIN-2012010-04
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Finding | |
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Title | Failue to Implement Effective Corrective Actions for Lockout Relay Failures |
Description | The inspectors identified a non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, for the licensees failure to identify and correct a condition adverse to quality. Specifically, after a lockout relay mechanically bound in 2011, causing a fire, the licensee failed to identify and correct other susceptible relays. In response, the licensee tested other susceptible relays and replaced those that failed the test. The licensee entered the finding into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-RBS-2012-05894. This performance deficiency was more than minor because it was associated with the equipment performance attribute of the initiating events cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of limiting the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. In accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings, and NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, Exhibit 1, Section B, this finding screened to a detailed risk evaluation because it had caused a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment such as loss of main feedwater and normal service water. The detailed risk evaluation included a quantitative bounding analysis and a qualitative evaluation in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix M, Significance Determination Process Using Qualitative Criteria, to determine that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green). Because the most significant causal factor of the performance deficiency was that the licensee had failed to recognize the potential risk to the plant when performing the evaluations for the failed lockout relays, this finding has a human performance cross-cutting aspect associated with the work control component in that licensee did not plan and coordinate work activities by incorporating risk insights, consistent with nuclear safety. |
Site: | River Bend |
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Report | IR 05000458/2012010 Section 4OA5 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Initiating Events |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 93800 |
Inspectors (proximate) | A Barrett B Tindell E Uribe B Hagar |
Violation of: | 10 CFR 50 Appendix B 10 CFR 50 Appendix B Criterion XVI |
CCA | H.5, Work Management |
INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - River Bend - IR 05000458/2012010 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (River Bend) @ 2012Q3
Self-Identified List (River Bend)
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