05000458/FIN-2012009-08
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Finding | |
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| Title | Ability to Promptly Staff the Fire Brigade at All Times During Plant Operation |
| Description | The team identified an unresolved item concerning the licensees ability to promptly staff the full fire brigade in all situations. Specifically, the team identified the potential that the full fire brigade may not be able to respond to all fires in a timely manner during times with minimum shift staffing. During the May 21 event, the outside operator, a member of the fire brigade, was dispatched to the river to assist with flume control after the scram. Subsequent to the operators departure, the fire brigade was dispatched to investigate the fire in underground cable vault EMH1A. Because of the post-scram duties at the river, the outside operator was unable to respond to the fire in a timely fashion. During the May 21 event, the auxiliary control room operator also served as a member of the fire brigade. The conduct of operations procedure provided instructions for the auxiliary control room operator to abandon the auxiliary control room in the event the only operator present was required for the fire brigade. This procedure required that the auxiliary control room operator take several steps to secure equipment prior to abandoning the auxiliary control room. During interviews with the inspection team, operators indicated that these actions could take up to 20 minutes to complete. During the fire response on May 21, the licensee was able to utilize additional operators in their response. Specifically, the licensee utilized another qualified operator as a fire brigade member in lieu of the assigned outside operator. In addition, an additional operator was available to relieve the auxiliary control room operator so the auxiliary control room operator could leave to serve as a fire brigade member without abandoning the auxiliary control room. The team noted that the May 21 event occurred during the day shift when additional operators were present, and that the additional operators may not be present during the night shift or any time with minimum shift staffing. On May 24, prior to the event, the fire brigade leader was selected to take a random fitness for duty test. While the leader was waiting to take the test, the fire brigade was dispatched to respond to the fire event. The fire brigade leader was informed that leaving the fitness for duty testing area would be considered the same as failing to take the fitness for duty test. In the meantime, the other four fire brigade members responded to the fire. Two of the members responded to the fire brigade locker, while the other two fire brigade members, who were already located near the fire, remained near the feedwater pump to observe the conditions. During this time, one of the fire brigade members, who was also qualified as a fire brigade leader, served as a temporary fire brigade leader and maintained communication with the control room. Upon returning from the fitness for duty test, the fire brigade leader assumed the role of fire brigade leader for this event. By this time, the only remaining activities involved establishing a fire watch and disbanding the fire brigade. For this event, the team noted that no additional qualified fire brigade members responded to the fire, and the fire response consisted of the four assigned fire brigade members. Based on this event, the team identified a potential vulnerability in that the licensee did not have a formal process for operators to turn over their fire brigade responsibilities in the event their duties removed from the immediate area of the plant. Specifically, the team identified that the licensee did not have provisions for operators to respond to events if they were selected for a fitness for duty test, nor did they have provisions to ensure that alternate fire brigade members could be provided if one of the assigned fire brigade members was unable to perform their fire brigade function for any reason. This item is considered unresolved pending additional inspection of the approved fire protection program. |
| Site: | River Bend  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000458/2012009 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 93800 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | S Graves S Garchow G Miller S Alferink V Gaddya Barrettb Tindell E Uribe B Hagar |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - River Bend - IR 05000458/2012009 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (River Bend) @ 2012Q3
Self-Identified List (River Bend)
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