05000458/FIN-2012003-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Follow Procedure to Protect Sensitive Plant Areas |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding for failure to follow Operating System Procedure OSP-0048, Switchyard, Transformer Yard, and Sensitive Equipment Controls. Specifically, the licensee failed to appropriately consider the plant impact when planning and approving work in the main transformer yard and switchyard potentially introducing unacceptable risk to plant operations contrary to Procedure OSP-0048 administrative controls. This issue was entered into the licensees corrective action program as Condition Reports CR-RBS-2012-02479, CR-RBS-2012-02821, and CR-RBS-2012-04129. The finding was more than minor in accordance with Appendix B, Issue Screening, of Inspection Manual Chapter 0612, Power Reactor Inspection Reports, because the finding was associated with the protection against external events attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone and affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of those events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, the routine failure to integrate switchyard and transformer yard work into the River Bend work process increased the likelihood that unintended, uncoordinated maintenance and test activities could reduce the diversity of electrical power and cause inadvertent reductions in nuclear plant defense-in-depth. The inspectors performed a Phase 1 significance determination process review of this finding per Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4, Initial Screening and Characterization of Findings. The finding was determined to be of very low safety significance (Green) since the finding did not contribute to the likelihood of a primary or secondary system loss of coolant accident initiator, nor did it contribute to both the likelihood of a reactor trip and the likelihood that mitigation equipment or functions would not be available, and the finding did not increase the likelihood of a fire or internal or external flooding. The inspectors determined the apparent cause of this finding was a lack of management oversight of station work activities. Therefore, this finding has a cross-cutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component because station management failed to provide proper oversight of the process to protect sensitive areas of the plant |
| Site: | River Bend  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000458/2012003 Section 1R01 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.01 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | K Clayton G George L Carson S Garchow J Melfi A Barrett G Larkin V Gaddy M Runyan R Latta C Alldredge |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - River Bend - IR 05000458/2012003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (River Bend) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (River Bend)
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