05000416/FIN-2012008-05
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Follow Operability Determination Process Procedure |
| Description | The team identified a Green non-cited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix 8, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings which states, in part, that Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings. Specifically, from July 19, 2012, to July 29, 2012, the licensee failed correctly evaluate the operability of the standby service water system with a degraded or nonconforming condition and failed to document a sound basis for a reasonable expectation of operability of the standby service water system as required by Procedure EN-OP-104, Operability Determination Process. The finding was entered into the licensee\'s corrective action program as Condition Report CR-GGN-2012-09356. The team determined that the failure to implement the requirements of the operability determination process procedure was a performance deficiency. The finding was more than minor because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, the standby service water system was incapable of performing its specified safety function for the entire 30-day mission time without compensatory measures. Using the Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, the team determined that the finding represented a loss of system safety function in that the standby service water system could not meet its 3D-day mission time to provide decay heat removal. Therefore, a Detailed Risk Evaluation was necessary. In accordance with Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix A, Section 6, Detailed Risk Evaluation, the senior reactor analyst evaluated the risk of the degraded condition that resulted from the finding. According to the Risk Assessment of Operational Events Handbook, Volume 1 - Internal Events, Section 4.1, Mission Time Modeling, in most events, 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> is sufficient time to bring numerous resources to bear on core cooling. In some events, the choice is conservative and the analysis results are overestimates Additionally, that, the analyst determined that Section 4.2 on increasing mission time was not applicable to the subject finding because the decrease in standby service water system water inventory would be obvious and there would be days to respond with makeup sources. Therefore, the analyst determined that the finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because the standby service water system could would have been able to complete its 24-hour risk significant mission time although it could not provide 30 days of decay heat removal without operator action to provide makeup water to the system. This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance, decision making component, because the licensee did not make decisions that demonstrated that nuclear safety was an overriding priority. Specifically, the licensee did not make safety significant decisions using a systematic process to ensure safety is maintained. |
| Site: | Grand Gulf  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000416/2012008 Section 1R21 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.21 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | I Anchondo N Okonkwo J Braisted |
| CCA | H.13, Consistent Process |
| INPO aspect | DM.1 |
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Finding - Grand Gulf - IR 05000416/2012008 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Grand Gulf) @ 2012Q3
Self-Identified List (Grand Gulf)
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