05000387/FIN-2012009-03
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Finding | |
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Title | Failure to Identify and Correct a CAQ Associated with Reactor Recirculation Valve Exercising Surveillance Procedure |
Description | The inspectors identified an NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Actions, because PPL did not identify an inadequate recirculation valve surveillance procedure when the licensee completed the extent of condition review that was performed as part of the root cause analysis for the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) ramp generator signal converter (RGSC) failure on June 29, 2011. Specifically, PPL did not adhere to the extent of condition determination standards established in PPL procedure NDAP-00-0752, Cause Analysis. The actions taken to address the extent of condition were not of a depth sufficient to identify the same deficiency that existed in the RCIC flow surveillance procedure in other applicable surveillance procedures. As a result, the inadequate recirculation valve surveillance procedure was not identified. PPL entered this performance deficiency into their CAP as CR 1596633. The inspectors determined that this performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the procedural quality attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and its objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. Specifically, PPL did not complete an evaluation of the extent of condition for the identified inadequate RCIC surveillance procedure to a depth that would have identified the same deficiency in other similar procedures. As a result, an independent review by inspectors identified a similar condition associated with the reactor recirculation valve exercising procedure. The inspectors determined that this procedure problem was a condition adverse to quality. The inspectors screened this issue to Green via Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Attachment 4 and Appendix A, because the finding does not represent a loss of system and/or function, does not represent an actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time or two separate safety systems out-of-service for greater than its technical specification allowed outage time, and does not represent an actual loss of function of one or more non-technical specification trains of equipment designated as high safety-significant in accordance with the licensees Maintenance Rule program for greater than 24 hrs. The inspectors determined that this finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, corrective action program, because, although the root cause analysis appropriately bounded and defined the necessary actions to address the extent of condition, the implementation of those actions was insufficient to ensure similar conditions did not exist in other site procedures |
Site: | Susquehanna |
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Report | IR 05000387/2012009 Section 4OA2 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2012 (2012Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | NRC identified |
Inspection Procedure: | IP 71152 |
Inspectors (proximate) | E Dipaolo C Bickett P Krohn J Greives |
CCA | P.3, Resolution |
INPO aspect | PI.3 |
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Finding - Susquehanna - IR 05000387/2012009 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Susquehanna) @ 2012Q3
Self-Identified List (Susquehanna)
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