05000369/LER-2007-001, Re Completion Time of Technical Specification 3.8.4 Condition a Was Exceeded on May 12, 2005

Re Completion Time of Technical Specification 3.8.4 Condition a Was Exceeded on May 12, 2005

ML070860761
Person / Time
Site:	McGuire, Mcguire
Issue date:	03/16/2007
From:	Gordon Peterson Duke Power Co
To:	Document Control Desk, NRC/NRR/ADRO
References
LER 07-001-00
Download: ML070860761 (8)

LER-2007-001, Re Completion Time of Technical Specification 3.8.4 Condition a Was Exceeded on May 12, 2005

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)
3692007001R00 - NRC Website

text

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Duke GARY R.

PETERSON

oEPower, Vice President McGuire Nuclear Station 41 A Duke Energy Company Duke Power MG01VP / 12700 Hagers Ferry Rd.

Huntersville, NC 28078-9340 704 875 5333 704 875 4809 fax grpeters@duke-energy. com March 16, 2007 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Document Control Desk

Subject:

McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos. 50-369, 50-370 Licensee Event Report 369/2007-01, Revision 0 Problem Investigation Process (PIP) M-07-00393 Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73, Sections (a)(1) and (d), attached is Licensee Event Report (LER) 369/2007-01, Revision 0.

On January 17, 2007, McGuire Engineering identified that a value recorded during performance of Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.4.5 on May 12, 2005 for vital battery EVCC did not meet the acceptance criteria of the SR. Corrective actions for the failed TS SR were not performed within the completion time allowed by TS 3.8.4 Condition A. This historical event, which constitutes a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications, is being reported per 10CFR50.73 (a)(2)(i)(B).

This event has been determined to be of no significance to the health and safety of the public. There are no regulatory commitments contained in this LER.

G. R. Peterson Attachment www.duke power. comr

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission March 16, 2007 Page 2 of 2 cc:

W. D. Travers U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regional Administrator, Region II Atlanta Federal Center 61 Forsyth St., SW, Suite 23T85 Atlanta, GA 30303 J. F. Stang, Jr. (Addressee Only)

NRC Project Manager (McGuire)

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 8-H4A Washington, DC 20555-0001 J. B. Brady Senior Resident Inspector U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission McGuire Nuclear Site Beverly 0. Hall, Section Chief Radiation Protection Section 1645 Mail Service Center Raleigh, NC 27699-1645

bxc:

G. R. Peterson R. T. Repko S. W. Brown S. L. Bradshaw K. L. Ashe K. L. Crane B. G. Davenport R. L. Gill R. D. Hart M. S. Kitlan J. J. Nolin S. M. Snider S. B. Thomas L. F. Vaughn (NSRB Support Staff)

INPO Paper Distribution:

Master File (3.3.7)

ELL (EC050)

RGC File (MG01VP)

(MG01VP)

(MG01VP)

(MG01VP)

(MG01 RC)

(MG01 RC)

(ON03RC)

(EC05P)

(CN01 RC)

(EC081)

(MG05SE)

(MG05EE)

(EC08G)

(EC11X)

(EC05N)

Abstract

Unit Status: At the time this historical condition was identified, Unit 1 and Unit 2 were in Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 100 percent power.

Event Description

On January 17,

2007, Engineering identified that a value recorded during performance of Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.8.4.5 on May 12, 2005 for vital battery EVCC did not meet the acceptance criteria of the SR.

Corrective actions for the failed TS SR were not performed within the COMPLETION TIME allowed by TS 3.8.4 CONDITION A.

This historical event, which constitutes a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications, is reportable per 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (i)

(B). This event was determined to be of no significance to the health and safety of the public.

Event Cause

The cause for the failure to recognize and report not meeting the TS SR acceptance criteria was human error.

The in-plant investigation determined that the value was recorded in error and was not truly outside the TS SR acceptance criteria.

Corrective Actions

The importance of reporting any data that does not met an acceptance criteria has been conveyed to Maintenance personnel.

Affected procedures will be reviewed and enhanced to clearly delineate that the procedure affects TS or Selected Licensee Commitments (SLC) and require a signature certifying acceptance criteria are met.

NRC FORM 366 (6-2004)

(If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (if more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)

2.

Review and revise all Maintenance Procedures which document TS and SLC compliance to require a Acceptance Criteria Met verification by documented signature.

3.

Operations, Chemistry, Radiation Protection and Engineering will review procedures that take TS or SLC data to evaluate if applicable signoffs for criteria met are required.

SAFETY ANALYSIS

The battery's ability to perform its safety function is conducted in TS SR 3.8.4.7 -

the battery service (duty cycle) test, which is conducted every 18 months. This test was completed successfully on battery EVCC on October 19, 2004 and August, 21, 2006. Both tests demonstrated a battery terminal voltage margin in excess of 4.0 VDC following the most limiting portion of the duty cycle.

This voltage margin along with total battery resistance was used to determine the amount of additional battery degradation (increased resistance) required before the battery would be considered inoperable. The Operability analysis revealed that the "TOTAL" EVCC battery inter-cell, inter-tier, and inter-rack connection resistance would have to increase by 2.048E-3 ohms for the available battery terminal voltage margin to decrease to zero.

The average battery inter-cell connection resistance measurement during the May 12, 2005 surveillance was 4.37E-5 ohms.

The number of battery inter-cell terminal connections required to reach 1.7E-4 ohms and eliminate all available margin (2.048E-3 ohms) would have been 16 connectors.

16 connectors would have had to be at the 1.7E-4ohm value for the battery operability to be in question [(1.7E 4.37E-5) x 16]

2.021E-3 ohms.

Even though it was determined that the resistance value was recorded in error and was not truly outside the acceptance criteria, the above evaluation determined that vital battery EVCC would have been operable and completely capable of meeting its design and safety function requirements.

Therefore, it has been determined that there is no impact on either the estimated core damage frequency (CDF) or large early release frequency (LERF) due to this event such that the event described in this LER was not significant with respect to the health and safety of the public.

ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

A review of the McGuire corrective action database did not identify any other events within the past three years having similar circumstances, cause, and corrective actions.

Therefore, the event described in this LER is not considered a recurring event.