| 05-31-2007 | This report is submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 73.71(d) for a 60-day written report and contains no Safeguards Information ( SI).
On April 5, 2007 the Maine Yankee Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation (ISFSI) management discovered an uncompensated degradation in a security system located in the isolation zone for the protected area.
The contract security force had bypassed security equipment in constant alarm due to environmental conditions. Compensatory measures were established in accordance with Physical Security Plan and procedural requirements. The method of compensatory measures for the bypassed security equipment was subsequently modified due to concerns of hazardous weather conditions. The alternate compensatory measures established did not fully meet Physical Security Plan or procedural requirements. The time line for the event on Thursday April 5, 2007 is as follows:
0502 - Completed the normal compensatory measures for the bypassed security system zones in accordance with the Physical Security Plan and implementing procedure requirements. At this time a decision was made to change the method of compensatory measures due to environmental conditions.
0532 - Safeguards Event Log was filled out for bypassed security system zones in accordance with 73.71(C) as described in Appendix G paragraph II(a) which is required within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> of discovery.
0628 to 0643 - Maine Yankee management review conducted to access the compensatory measures in place against the Physical Security Plan and implementing procedures. The alternate compensatory measures were determined to be not fully compliant.
0643 to 0656 - Maine Yankee Management discussed event with on shift crew 0701 - Commenced performing the original compensatory measures for the bypassed security system zones in accordance with the Physical Security Plan and implementing procedures.
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LER-2007-001, Uncompensated Degradation in a Security System| Docket Number |
| Event date: |
04-05-2007 |
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| Report date: |
05-31-2007 |
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| 3092007001R00 - NRC Website |
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0702 to 0730 - Safeguards Event Analysis was performed by the duty Shift Supervisor and Maine Yankee management. This event was determined to be reportable.
0759 - The duty Shift Supervisor made a one (1) hour report to the NRC Operations Center under 73.71(b)(1) for the safeguards event as described in Appendix G paragraph 1(c).
The total time in noncompliance of required comnpensatory measures was 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and 59 minutes. Although alternate compensatory measures were taken during this time, they were subsequently determined to be not fully compliant.
The security equipment which protects the Dry Fuel Storage Casks was functioning correctly as designed, however the constant alarms necessitated operator action placing the affected zones in bypass. The security equipment is sensitive to certain environmental conditions which were being experienced at that time.
When discovered by Maine Yankee management during routine oversight inspections of the Primary Alarm Station (PAS), the correct compensatory measures were immediately established and a one (1) hour report made to the NRC Operations Center pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 73.71 (b)(1).
This event was entered into the Maine Yankee Corrective Action Program and a Barrier Screen initiated to determine failed or missing barriers and to provide corrective actions to prevent recurrence.
Failed or Missing Barriers 1)Maine Yankee Physical Security Plan not correctly implemented.
2) Maine Yankee procedures not correctly implemented.
3)Procedures could contain more specific guidance.
4) Knowledge retention of critical task response to a loss or degradation of a security system contained in the Security Training and Qualification Plan was inadequate for the on shift crew.
5) Shift Turnover did not meet managements expectations.
6) Crew communications did not meet managements expectations.
7)Procedural adherence did not meet managements expectations.
8) Crew dynamics did not foster questioning attitude.
9)Maine Yankee management oversight of the training conducted by the contract security force was minimal.
Corrective Actions
1)All Security Force Members have been retrained on the Physical Security Plan and applicable procedures.
2)Procedure enhancements have been made to provide the Security Force Members with more specific guidance..
3) Security Force Members have been retrained in accordance with the Security Training and Qualification Plan. Included was a self assessment of the programs effectiveness.
4) The ISFSI Manager has issued his expectations for conduct of operations including turnovers, communications, and procedural adherence.
5)Discussed Teamwork approach and all lessons learned with Security Force Members.
6)Realigned crew makeup.
7) Shift Supervisors commenced new schedule which is offset from the security crew rotation.
8) Maine Yankee management is scheduled to participate in the Security Training and Qualification Program in 2007.
Information concerning this event has been discussed with the Maine State Nuclear Safety Inspector and NRC Resident Inspector. There has been no media interest or press releases made. There have been no similar events in recent years since the Maine Yankee Plant was decommissioned.
Contact Person for further information:
James Connell Site Vice President Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company 321 Old Ferry Road Wiscasset, ME 04578 Phone: (207) 882-1312 E-Mail: connell@maineyankee.com �
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| 05000346/LER-2007-001 | Station Vent Radiation Monitor in Bypass due to Faulty Optical Isolation Board | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000309/LER-2007-001 | Uncompensated Degradation in a Security System | | | 05000315/LER-2007-002 | Failure to Declare Essential Service Water Inoperable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000266/LER-2007-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000335/LER-2007-003 | Floor Penetration Seals Outside Appendix R Design Basis | | | 05000529/LER-2007-004 | APS A subsidiary of Pinnacle West Capital Corporation Dwight C. Mims Mail Station 7605 Palo Verde Nuclear Vice President Tel. 623-393-5403 P. 0. Box 52034 Generating Station Regulatory Affairs and Plant Improvement Fax 623-393-6077 Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034 102-05786-DCM/REB December 26, 2007 ATTN: Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555-0001 Dear Sirs: Subject: P Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 2 Docket No. STN 50-529 License No. NPF_51 Licensee Event Report 2007-004-00 Attached please find Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-529/2007-004-00 which reports operation in a condition prohibited by Technical Specifications due to inadequate post maintenance testing on the hydraulic actuator for a Unit 2 Main Steam Isolation Valve. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.4, copies of this LER are being forwarded to the NRC Regional Office, NRC Region IV and the Senior Resident Inspector. If you have questions regarding this submittal, please contact Ray E. Buzard, Section Leader, Regulatory Affairs, at (623) 393-5317. Arizona Public Service Company makes no commitments in this letter. Sincerely, DCM/REB/gat Attachment cc:N E. E. Collins Jr.N NRC Region IV Regional Administrator M. T. MarkleyN NRC NRR Project Manager - (send electronic and paper) G. G. WarnickN NRC Senior Resident Inspector for PVNGS A member of the STARS (Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing) Alliance Callaway • Comanche Peak • Diablo Canyon • Palo Verde • South Texas Project • Wolf Creek NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/30/2007 (6-2004) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 50 hours. Reported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information(See reverse for required number of collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, thedigits/characters for each block) information collection. 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER 3. PAGE Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 2 05000529 1 OF 5 4. TITLE Inoperable Main Steam Isolation Valve Actuator Train "A" Due to Inadequate Post Maintenance Testing | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000413/LER-2007-004 | Control Room Area Chilled Water System Inoperable in Excess of Technical Specification Requirements due to Unanticipated Component Interactions | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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