05000364/LER-1917-001, Regarding 28 Emergency Diesel Generator Rendered Inoperable Due to a Jacket Water Leak Without Makeup Capability
| ML17233A354 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 08/21/2017 |
| From: | Wheat J Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NL-17-1420 LER 17-001-00 | |
| Download: ML17233A354 (5) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) |
| 3641917001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
-A Southern Nuclear Justin T. Wheat Nuclear Licensing Manager August 21, 2017 40 Inverness Center Parkway Post Office Box 1295 Birmingham, AL 35242 205 992 5998 tel 205 992 7601 fax jtwheat@ southernco.com Docket Nos.: 50-364 NL-17-1420 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATTN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 2017-001-00 28 Emergency Diesel Generator Rendered Inoperable Due to a Jacket Water Leak without Makeup Capability Ladies and Gentlemen:
In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Southern Nuclear Operating Company is submitting the enclosed Licensee Event Report for Unit 2.
This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions, please contact Gene Surber, Licensing Supervisor, at 334-814-5448.
Respectfully submitted,
~~
Justrn T. Wheat Nuclear Licensing Manager DRM/KMO/cbg Enclosure: Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 2017-001-00 cc:
Regional Administrator, Region II NRR Project Manager-Farley Senior Resident Inspector-Farley RTYPE: CFA04.054
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant-Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 2017-001-00 28 Emergency Diesel Generator Rendered Inoperable Due to a Jacket Water Leak without Makeup Capability Enclosure Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 2017-001-00
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULA TORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150*0104 EXPIRES: 03/31/2020 (04-2017) http://www.nrc"gov/reading-rm/doc.::.collections/nuregs/staff/sr1 0221r3/)
the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
- 3. PAGE Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 05000 364 1 OF 3
- 4. TITLE 28 Emergency Diesel Generator Rendered Inoperable Due to a Jacket Water Leak without Makeup Capability
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LER NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED I
SEQUENTIAL I REV FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO 05000 08 21 2017 FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 06 23 2017 2017 -
001 -
00 05000
- 9. OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check all that apply)
D 2o.22o1(b)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 1 D 20.2201 (d)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)
D 20.2203(a)(1)
D 20.2203(a)(4)
D 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(i)
D 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(x)
- 10. POWER LEVEL D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.36(c)(1 )(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A)
D 73.71(a)(4)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
D 50.36(c)(2)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B) 0 73.71(a)(5)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
D 50.46(a)(3)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
D 73.77(a)(1) 100 D 20.2203(a)(2)(v)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
D 73.77(a)(2)(i)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi)
[{] 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(vii)
D 73.77(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
D OTHER Specify in Abstract below or '"
Even though SW was not available at the time, the safety significance of the JW leak is considered minimal, as other methods of making up to the JW expansion tank were available.
In reviewing the past operability of the 1-2A and 1C EDGs from March 3rd until April 21st, two instances occurred where the 1 C EDG was inoperable and unavailable due to being tagged out for barring the engine. Barring the diesel engine is a short duration activity that is performed after the diesel operates. These two instances of 1 C EDG inoperability to bar the engine were concurrent with the 2B EDG being unable to meet its mission time. However, there is reasonable assurance that if a design basis accident had occurred during this time period, the 2B EDG would have started and provided emergency AC power to B train engineered safety feature systems. If the JW leak that was experienced on April 21st had developed during this period of postulated operation, there would have been adequate time to restore 1 C EDG to OPERABLE status while the 2B EDG powered B train systems (i.e., the leak on 2B EDG would not have prevented it from performing the function while actions were taken to return 1 C EDG to service).
Furthermore, there were alternate means of providing makeup to the JW expansion tank (even though the SW makeup line was clogged) and there was sufficient time to perform those non-complex actions based upon the calculated leak rate (i.e., reinitiating Demin water makeup during a loss of offsite power via electrical bus realignments or makeup to the tank using temporary hose connections in the 2B EDG room). Therefore, the past inoperability of the 1 C EDG did not result in a condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.
CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Actions necessary to address inadequate Maintenance practices and behaviors encompass enhanced training activities for Maintenance managers and supervisors targeted at improving conservative decision making and understanding the events surrounding the 2B EDG JW leak. The station will also develop a job aide to enhance the preparation, review, and conduct of Maintenance work. This job aide will highlight work on safety-related components, and the availability of materials and contingency materials.
The station took additional actions to address the inability to makeup to the JW expansion tank from SW. Of the various actions entered into the Corrective Action Program, the most significant incorporated ancillary sources of makeup water to the JW expansion tank into existing procedural guidance. This change provides operators with the guidance necessary to makeup to the tank in the event the primary and backup sources of makeup water are unavailable.
PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS
None OTHER SYSTEMS AFFECTED:
No systems other than those mentioned in this report were affected by this event. Page 3
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