05000364/LER-2014-001, Regarding Inoperable S-Train Solid State Protection System Results in Technical Specification Required Shutdown
| ML14072A281 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Farley  |
| Issue date: | 03/12/2014 |
| From: | Gayheart C Southern Nuclear Operating Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NL-14-0309 LER 14-001-00 | |
| Download: ML14072A281 (6) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| Reporting criterion: | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iii) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(x) 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
| 3642014001R00 - NRC Website | |
text
Charyl A. Gayheart Vita President
- F~rl~y March 12, 2014 Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
Farley Nuclear P!ant Post Offtce Drawer 470 Ashford, Alabama 36312 Tel 334.814.451 1 h;x 334.814.4575 Docket Nos.: 50-364 U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATIN: Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555-0001 Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 Ucensee Event Report 2014-001-00 SOUTHERN COMPANY NL-14-0309 Inoperable 8-Train Solid State Protection System Results in Technical Specification Reouired Shutdown Ladies and Gentlemen:
This Licensee Event Report, "Inoperable 8-Train Solid State Protection System Results in Technical Specification Required Shutdown," is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of the Code of Federal Regulations, 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A).
This letter contains no NRC commitments. If you have any questions regarding the submittal, please contact Mr. Bill Arens at (334) 814-4765.
Sincerely, Ms. c.
ayheart Vice President - Farley CAG/VVNA Enclosure: Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 2014-D01-00
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission NL-14-0309 Page2 cc:
Southern Nuclear Operating Company Mr. S. E. Kuczynski, Chairman, President & CEO Mr. D. G. Bost, Executive Vice President & Chief Nuclear Officer Mr. B. L. lvey, Vice President - Regulatory Affairs Mr. C. R. Pierce, Regulatory Affairs Director Mr. D. R. Madison, Vice President-Fleet Operations Mr. J. G. Horn, Regulatory Affairs Manager - Farley Mr. J. E. Purcell, Nuclear Technical Specialist-Farley Ms. K. A. Walker, Senior Engineer-Farley RTYPE: CFA04.054 U. S. Nuclear Reaulatorv Commission Mr. V. M. McCree, Regional Administrator Mr. G. E. Miller, NRR Project Manager-Farley Mr. P. K. Niebaum, Senior Resident Inspector-Farley Mr. J. A. Sowa, Resident Inspector-Farley Mr. R. E. Martin, Senior Project Manager-Farley
Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 NL-14-0309 Inoperable B-Train Solid State Protection System Results in Technical Specification Required Shutdown Enclosure Unit 2 Licensee Event Report 2014-001-00
IRC FORM 366 01-2014)
U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 01/31/2017 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection.
. FACILITY NAME Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, Unit 2 t TITLE
- 2. DOCKET NUMBER 05000 364
- 13. PAGE I
1 OF 3 Inoperable S-Train Solid State Protection System Results in Technical Specification Required Shutdown
- 5. EVENT DATE
- 6. LEA NUMBER
- 7. REPORT DATE
- 8. OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED YEAR SEQUENTIAL REV MONTH FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER MONTH DAY YEAR NUMBER NO.
DAY YEAR FACILITY NAME DOCKET NUMBER 01 11 2014 2014 - 001 -
00 03 12 2014 t OPERATING MODE
- 11. THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR§: (Check all that apply)
D 20.2201(b)
D 20.2203(a)(3)(i)
D 50.73(a)(2)(i)(C)
D 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 3 0 20.2201(d) 0 20.2203(a)(3)(ii) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A) 0 20.2203(a)(1) 0 20.2203(a)(4) 0 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) 0 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 0 50.36(c)(1)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(iii)
D 50.73(a)(2)(ix)(A). P_O_W_E_R_L_E-VE_L _ _,..D 20.2203(a)(2)(ii)
D 50.36(c)(1)(ii)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A)
D 50.73(a)(2)(x)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iii)
D 50.36(c)(2)
D 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(A)
D 73.71 (a)(4)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(iv)
D 50.46(a)(3)(ii) 0 50. 73(a)(2)(v)(B)
D 73.71 (a)(S)
D 20.2203(a)(2)(v) 181 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A) 0 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C)
D OTHER 000 D 20.2203(a)(2)(vi) o* 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B)
D 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D)
Specify in Abstract below or in
Safety Assessment
- 6. LER NUMBER I
SEQUENTIAL I REVISION NUMBER NUMBER 001 00 3
3.PAGE OF 3
The intermittent short caused by the stray termi-point clip may have resulted in numerous 8-Train component actuations not occurring in the event of an automatic safety injection. However the manual 8-Train safety injection actuation capability remained unaffected by the short. Initiation of manual safety injection is an immediate operator action in the emergency response procedures that is directed by procedure and performed by a single action from the main control board. Both automatic and manual reactor trip functions of B-Train SSPS were unaffected by the short.
The redundant A-Train SSPS and A-Train components actuated by SSPS remained operable for the duration of declared inoperability of the B-Train SSPS. Additionally there was no plant event during the inoperability period that called for an SSPS actuation. Unit 2 remained within Technical Specification limits at all times.
Corrective Action
To address the extent of condition from this event, non-intrusive foreign material inspections of the Unit 2 A* Train SSPS cabinet and both trains of Unit 1 SSPS cabinets are being performed at the next opportunity (when each train of SSPS is disabled during scheduled surveillance testing) and more thorough and intrusive foreign material inspections of the SSPS cabinets will be performed during the next refueling outage for each unit.
FNP implemented FME controls for electrical cabinets in 2003 and strengthened these procedures in 2007 with the inclusion of a checklist to document FME breeches and closeout inspections.
During the root cause investigation, the FME procedure (NMP-MA-009} and completed FME breech checklists for work in SSPS cabinets were reviewed. This review determined* that current FME practices are sufficient to preclude uncontrolled introduction of FME *during work activities.
To prevent reoccurrence. troubleshooting procedures will be revised to establish a practice of performing component validation during troubleshooting and to establish a practice to address timely issue resolution when the direct cause of a failure was not validated during initial troubleshooting.
Additional Information
Previous FNP Licensee Event Reports were reviewed from 2008 to present with no reports being identified related to failures of the SSPS of either train on either unit.
NRC FORM 386A (01*2014)