05000354/FIN-2014003-03
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Follow Procedure Resulting in the Loss of a Vital 4kV Bus |
| Description | A self-revealing Green NCV of Technical Specification (TS) 6.8.1.a, Procedures and Programs, was identified for PSEGs failure to follow procedure MA-AA-1000, Maintenance Standards and Practices, during the replacement of Bailey logic modules (LM) associated with the D vital bus (10A404). Specifically, during the spring 2009 refueling outage (1R15), PSEG failed to follow a work order (WO) requiring the replacement of all Bailey logic modules listed in WO 60061175 with new logic modules. As a result, a logic module (H1PB-1PBXIS-DC652010302) for the D vital bus was not replaced during 1R15, and failed due to age on December 19, 2013, causing a loss of the vital bus and an entry into the associated 8 hour9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> Technical Specification Action Statement (TSAS) 3.8.3.1 for Onsite Power Distribution Systems. PSEGs corrective actions included replacement of the failed logic module, performance of an extent of condition inspection to ensure other similar logic modules and relays were replaced, and reinforcement of proper maintenance practices with the individuals involved in the completion of WO 60061175. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. Specifically, not following the work order instructions resulted in an extended service duration and failure of a component that resulted in a loss of power to the D vital bus on December 19, 2013. Similarly, this performance deficiency was also similar to examples 2.g and 4.b of NRC IMC 0612, Appendix E, in that PSEG is required to follow their procedures per TS 6.8.1, and ultimately led to a safety impact given the failure of the logic module causing a loss of power to the 10A404 vital bus. The inspectors determined the finding to be of very low safety significance (Green) in accordance with Exhibit 1 of NRC IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, because the finding involved the loss of a support system that contributes to the likelihood of an initiating event (Loss of an AC Bus), but did not affect mitigation equipment. The inspectors determined that there was no cross-cutting aspect associated with this finding because the cause of the performance deficiency occurred more than three years ago, and was not representative of present plant performance. |
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
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| Report | IR 05000354/2014003 Section 1R13 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2014 (2014Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.13 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Dentel H Gray J Hawkins S Ibarrola |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Hope Creek - IR 05000354/2014003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Hope Creek) @ 2014Q2
Self-Identified List (Hope Creek)
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