05000354/FIN-2014003-04
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Finding | |
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| Title | Inadequate Implementation of Contingency Actions During Moisture Separator Emergency Level Controller Tuning |
| Description | A self-revealing finding of very low safety significance (Green) was identified when PSEG failed to ensure that appropriate contingency actions were in place prior to the performance of A MS emergency level controller tuning as required by WC-AA-105, Work Activity Risk Management. Specifically, the decision to tune the emergency level controller without appropriate contingencies in place led to a turbine trip on high A MS level and subsequent reactor scram on December 5, 2013. PSEGs corrective actions included conducting performance management with the individuals involved with the tuning evolution and revising the moisture separator drain tank level tuning procedure to require an individual at the normal and emergency controllers when performing emergency level controller tuning. This finding was more than minor because it was associated with the human performance attribute of the Initiating Events cornerstone, and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to limit the likelihood of events that upset plant stability and challenge critical safety functions during shutdown as well as power operations. The inspectors determined that this finding was of very low safety significance (Green) using Exhibit 1 of NRC IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, dated June 19, 2012, because the finding did not cause both a reactor trip and the loss of mitigation equipment relied upon to transition the plant from the onset of the trip to a stable shutdown condition (e.g. loss of condenser, loss of feed water). The inspectors determined that the finding had a cross cutting aspect in the Human Performance area associated with Work Management, because PSEG personnel did not implement a process of planning, controlling, and executing work activities such that nuclear safety is the overriding priority. Specifically, technicians were only stationed at the emergency level controller during the tuning, when having technicians at both controllers would have provided more time to recover from a high level condition in the A MS, and may have prevented the turbine trip and subsequent reactor scram on December 5, 2013. |
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
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| Report | IR 05000354/2014003 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2014 (2014Q2) |
| Type: | Finding: Green |
| cornerstone | Initiating Events |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | G Dentel H Gray J Hawkins S Ibarrola |
| CCA | H.5, Work Management |
| INPO aspect | WP.1 |
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Finding - Hope Creek - IR 05000354/2014003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Hope Creek) @ 2014Q2
Self-Identified List (Hope Creek)
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