05000354/FIN-2013004-02
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Finding | |
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| Title | Failure to Perform Maintenance in Accordance with Station Procedures Led to RCS Pressure Boundary Leakage |
| Description | A self-revealing finding of very low safety-significance (Green) and associated NCV of Technical Specifications (TS) 3.4.3.2, Reactor Coolant System (RCS) Operational Leakage, was identified on June 12, 2013, when a through-wall flaw was discovered in the RCS pressure boundary. Specifically, because Hope Creek failed to perform maintenance on a B residual heat removal (RHR) shutdown cooling (SDC) vent line in accordance with PSEG maintenance procedures, the plant operated with RCS pressure boundary leakage for a period of time prohibited by TS. Immediate corrective actions included vent line assembly replacement and examination of additional vent line assemblies installed on RHR piping in the drywell under the same design change. Planned corrective actions include visual examination of other components that had work involving cutting on small bore piping in the drywell. The PD is more than minor because it is associated with the RCS Equipment and Barrier Performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective to provide reasonable assurance that physical design barriers (fuel cladding, RCS, and containment) protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events. PSEGs failure to perform maintenance in accordance with station procedures resulted in plant operation with a condition prohibited by TS and the degradation of a principal safety barrier. The inspectors determined that the finding is of very low safety significance (Green) because the piping flaw, after a reasonable assessment of degradation, could not result in exceeding the RCS leak rate for a small loss of coolant accident (LOCA) and could not likely affect other systems used to mitigate a LOCA resulting in a total loss of their function. This finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the Human Performance area, Work Practices component, because PSEG did not ensure supervisory and management oversight of work activities, including contractors, such that nuclear safety is ensured. Specifically, management did not appropriately supervise workers to ensure work was performed in accordance with site maintenance procedures. Even though the PD could have occurred any time between November 2007 and May 2012, the inspectors determined that the performance characteristic associated with ineffective work activity oversight could not be conclusively placed in the earlier portion of that time window. In addition, PSEG had not previously implemented actions to specifically correct or eliminate the potential for this PD. As a result, the inspectors concluded that the PD is indicative of current performance. |
| Site: | Hope Creek  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000354/2013004 Section 4OA3 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2013 (2013Q3) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71153 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | F Ramirez J Furia G Dentel J Laughlin R Nimitz E Burket D Dodson S Ibarrola |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
| CCA | H.2, Field Presence |
| INPO aspect | LA.2 |
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Finding - Hope Creek - IR 05000354/2013004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Hope Creek) @ 2013Q3
Self-Identified List (Hope Creek)
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