05000348/FIN-2014004-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
Description | Technical Specification 3.5.2, Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) Operating required that two ECCS trains shall be operable in Modes 1, 2 and 3. When one or more trains is inoperable and at least 100 percent ECCS flow equivalent to a single operable ECCS train available, Condition A is entered and the required Action A.1 is to restore the train(s) to operable status within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Contrary to the above, between October 24, 2013 (when Unit 1 entered Mode 3) and March 1, 2014, the Unit 1 B train of the residual heat removal system was inoperable due to a valve actuator maintenance activity that resulted in less than adequate flow rate needed to support B train operability. The maintenance activity replaced an actuator linkage on the B train RHR heat exchanger discharge valve, Q1E11HCV603B. Following a RHR flow rate surveillance test conducted on Feb. 28, 2014, the reduced flow rate was identified. This issue was captured in the licensees corrective action program as CR 741001. The low flow condition was corrected by adjusting the full-open position of the Q1E11HCV603B valve and the train was restored to an operable status on March 1, 2014. Using IMC 0609 Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, the inspectors determined that the performance deficiency represented an actual loss of a single train of RHR for greater than its TS allowed outage time. A detailed risk assessment was performed by a regional Senior Reactor Analyst in accordance with IMC 0609 Appendix A using the NRC Farley SPAR risk model. The performance deficiency resulted in reduced RHR train B flow however, the resultant flow met accident analysis requirements except for the large loss of coolant accident (LLOCA). The detailed risk assessment determined that the PD resulted in a core damage frequency increase of <1 E-6/year, a GREEN finding of very low safety significance. This violation is associated with LERs 05000348/2014-002-00, -01 and -02. |
Site: | Farley ![]() |
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Report | IR 05000348/2014004 Section 4OA7 |
Date counted | Sep 30, 2014 (2014Q3) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | J Sowa K Miller M Franke P Niebaum |
Violation of: | Technical Specification |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Farley - IR 05000348/2014004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Farley) @ 2014Q3
Self-Identified List (Farley)
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