05000348/FIN-2014002-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Implement Preventive Maintenance on 4160V Breaker Mechanism Operated Cell Switches |
| Description | An apparent violation (AV) of Technical Specification (TS) 5.4.1.a, Procedures, was identified for the licensees failure to perform preventive maintenance on safety-related 4160V breaker MOC switches in accordance with FNP-0-EMP-1313.12, Maintenance of Siemens-Allis 4.16kv Metal-Clad Switchgear MOC Switch . Specifically, the licensee did not lubricate 4160V breaker MOC switches in accordance with station procedure FNP-0-EMP- 1313.12. The licensee entered this issue into their corrective action program as CR 713134 and replaced the affected MOC switches. The failure to perform preventive maintenance on safety-related 4160V breaker MOC switches in accordance with FNP-0-EMP-1313.12, Maintenance of Siemens-Allis 4.16kv Metal-Clad Switchgear MOC Switch, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it adversely affected the equipment performance attribute of the mitigating systems cornerstone objective of ensuring the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, the failure to perform preventive maintenance procedure FNP-0-EMP-1313.12 adversely affected the reliability and capability of safety-related 4160V MOC switches, as evidenced by the B1G sequencer MOC switch failure on October 4, 2013. The inspectors evaluated the finding using IMC 0609, Appendix A, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) for Findings At-Power, issued June 19, 2012. A detailed risk analysis was required by a NRC Senior Reactor Analyst because the finding represented an actual loss of function of at least a single train for greater than its TSallowed outage time. The finding could not be screened to Green and is pending a final significance determination. The inspectors determined the finding had a cross-cutting aspect of teamwork in the human performance area because the licensee did not communicate and coordinate activities within and across organizational boundaries to ensure nuclear safety is maintained. Specifically, the licensee did not coordinate implementation of MOC switch preventive maintenance procedure FNP-0-EMP-1313.12 and the appropriate preventive maintenance rep-task was not created for these MOC switches. [H.4] The associated cross-cutting aspect is conditional on the final significance determination being White, Yellow or Red. |
| Site: | Farley  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000348/2014002 Section 1R12 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2014 (2014Q1) |
| Type: | AV: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.12 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | S Sandal A Alen A Vargas B Collins F Ehrhardt J Sowa P Niebaumf Ehrhardtg Laska J Sowa P Capehart P Niebaum T Lighty T Stephen |
| CCA | H.4, Teamwork |
| INPO aspect | PA.3 |
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Finding - Farley - IR 05000348/2014002 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Farley) @ 2014Q1
Self-Identified List (Farley)
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