05000348/FIN-2014003-02
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Finding | |
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Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
Description | Technical Specification 5.4.1.a, Procedures, required that written procedures, specified in Regulatory Guide 1.33, Revision 2, Appendix A, February 1978, be established, implemented, and maintained. Regulatory Guide 1.33, Section 9a, stated that maintenance activities that can affect the performance of safety related equipment should be performed in accordance with written procedures, documented instructions, or drawings appropriate to the circumstances. Contrary to the above, since March 2002, station personnel failed to implement preventive maintenance procedure FNP-0-EMP-1313.12, Maintenance of Siemens-Allis 4.16kv Metal-Clad Switchgear MOC Switch on safety related 4160V MOC switches. As a result of not performing this procedure, safety-related MOC switches were not properly lubricated and sequencer B1G did not actuate during required surveillance testing. This prevented 1B EDG from loading during the performance of FNP-1-STP-40.0B, Safety Injection With Loss of Off-Site Power Test B Train on October 4, 2013. The licensee replaced the 1B EDG output breaker and its associated MOC switch. This issue was placed in the licensees corrective action program as CR 713134. The finding was screened in accordance with NRC Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609 Attachment 4, Initial Characterization of Findings and was determined to affect the Mitigation Systems Cornerstone as Short Term and Long Term Decay Heat Removal was affected and a detailed risk evaluation was required. A detailed risk evaluation was performed, in accordance with NRC IMC 0609 Appendix A, by a regional senior reactor analyst using both the licensee full scope probabilistic risk assessment and fire model and the NRC SPAR model. A one year exposure period was assumed. The dominant Unit 1 internal risk sequence was a single unit loss of offsite power (LOOP) with a common cause MOC switch failure and failure of the operator to load the sequencer leading to station blackout (SBO) and an unmitigated reactor coolant pump seal LOCA. The dominant Unit 2 internal risk sequence was a single unit LOOP with 2B EDG failure to run and 1/2AEDG failed due to MOC switch failure and failure to load the sequencer leading to SBO and an unmitigated RCP seal LOCA. The risk was mitigated by the recovery potential and the remaining mitigation equipment. The change in risk due to the performance deficiency was an increase in core damage frequency for both units of less than 1E-6 per year a Greenfinding of very low safety significance. This violation is associated with AV 05000348/364/2014-002-02. |
Site: | Farley |
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Report | IR 05000348/2014003 Section 4OA7 |
Date counted | Jun 30, 2014 (2014Q2) |
Type: | NCV: Green |
cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
Inspection Procedure: | |
Inspectors (proximate) | F Ehrhardt G Laska J Sowa P Capehart P Niebaum T Lighty T Stephen |
Violation of: | Technical Specification - Procedures Technical Specification |
INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Farley - IR 05000348/2014003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Farley) @ 2014Q2
Self-Identified List (Farley)
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