05000348/FIN-2014003-01
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Licensee-Identified Violation |
| Description | Technical Specification 3.3.2, Engineered Safety Feature Actuation System (ESFAS) Instrumentation, required the ESFAS instrumentation for each function in Table 3.3.2-1 to be operable. Table 3.3.2-1, Function 4.e., Steam Line Isolation, required two (2) channels per steam line and is applicable in Mode 1 and Modes 2 and 3, except when one main steam isolation valve is closed in each steam line. When one channel is inoperable, Condition D required placing the inoperable channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />. Contrary to the above between October 25, 2013, and April 2, 2014, the 1B steam generator channel III steam flow instrument (FT-484) was found to have a trip setpoint above the TS required value of 110.3 percent. Action was not taken to either restore the flow transmitter to operable status or place the channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> until operations staff was made aware of the issue on April 2, 2014. Subsequently, FT-484 was recalibrated to within the TS allowable value and placed back in service on April 5, 2014. This issue was entered in the licensees corrective action program as CR 795798. Additionally, between May 8, 2013 and April 8, 2014, the 2C steam generator channel III steam flow instrument (FT-494) was found to have a trip setpoint above the TS required value of 110.3 percent. Action was not taken to either restore the flow transmitter to operable status or place the channel in trip within 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br /> until operations staff was made aware of the issue on April 8, 2014. Subsequently, FT-494 was recalibrated to within the TS allowable value and placed back in service on April 9, 2014. This issue was entered in the licensees corrective action program as CR 798185. The finding screened to Green, very low safety significance, in accordance with IMC 0609, The Significance Determination Process (SDP) For Findings At-Power, Exhibit 2, because it did not represent an actual loss of function of a single train for greater than its TS allowed outage time. Redundant instruments were available to actuate the main steam isolation function at the required setpoint. This violation is associated with LER 05000348/364/2014-003-00. |
| Site: | Farley  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000348/2014003 Section 4OA7 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2014 (2014Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Licensee-identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | F Ehrhardt G Laska J Sowa P Capehart P Niebaum T Lighty T Stephen |
| Violation of: | Technical Specification |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Farley - IR 05000348/2014003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Farley) @ 2014Q2
Self-Identified List (Farley)
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