05000327/LER-1993-021
| ML20056E785 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Sequoyah  |
| Issue date: | 08/18/1993 |
| From: | Fenech R, Proffitt J TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY |
| To: | NRC OFFICE OF INFORMATION RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (IRM) |
| References | |
| LER-93-021, LER-93-21, NUDOCS 9308250168 | |
| Download: ML20056E785 (7) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| 3272093021R00 - NRC Website | |
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I Robert A Fenech vu P esoe,t seauce Nueear Pian + August 18, 1993 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ATIN: Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555 Gentlemen: TENNESSEE VALLEY AUT110RITY - SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCKET No. 50-327 - FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE DPR LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 50-327/93021 The enclosed LER provides details concerning the failure to perform a technical specification (TS) surveillance requirement to verify the , refueling canal water boron concentration. This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(1)(B) as an operation prohibited by TSs. Sincerely, l} f ' - /( < Robert A. Fenech Enclosure cc: See page 2 r c500:5 l i 9308250168 930818 F DR ADOCK 05000327 jf 1 PDR d
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U.S. Nuclear' Regulatory Commission l Page 2 : August 18, 1993 : I cc (Enclosure): INPO Records Center j Institute of Nuclear Power Operations ! 700 Galleria Parkway f Atlanta, Georgia 30339-5957 : i Mr. D. E. LaBarge, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission j One White Flint, North 11555 Rockville Pike l Rockville, Maryland 20852-2739 : NRC Resident Inspector i Sequoyah Nuclear Plant ( 2600 Igou Ferry Road : Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 37379-3624 l l Regional Administrator i U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission # Region II ! 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 . Atlanta, Georgia 30323-2711 !
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NRC form 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 (6-89)
- Expires 4/30/92 LICENSEE EVDIT REPORT (LER)
FACILITY tJAME (1) l DOCKET NUMBER (2) l PAGE (3) _lequoyphlN11 ear _Elanl_(SQN). Unit 1 10j510101013 12 17 1110Fl 01 5 : TITLE (4) l 131191.gj0 Perform _c Surveillance in the Refuelinc_[ anal Because of Miscommunication _LVINT_ PAY iS] I LL!LUUMBER (6) l REPORT DATE (7) l OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) l l l l l SEQUENTIAL l l REVISION] l l l FACILITY NAMES lDOCKETNUMBER(S) IMNTHLDAYJyLAJLlJEAR I l NUMBER l l nut @ER IMONTHl DAY lYEAR I 10151010101Il 1 I I l_I LI I I I I I . allLzLolallL1L31_13121 1 1 I O I DJ_01_BI 11819131 101sJn10101II i OPERATING l lTHIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR $: } MODE l l _ifheri_p.ng_gr_mgre of the followin2 I (lli (9) IfL}_]20.402(b) l_l20.405(c) l_l50.73(a)(2)(iv; Ll73.71(b) POWER l l_l20.dO5(a)(1)(i) l_l50.36(c)(1) l_l50.73(a)(2)(v) l_l73.71(c) j LEVEL l l_]20.405(a)(1)(ii) l_l50.36(c)(2) l_l50.73(a)(2)(vii) l_l0THER (Specify in I ___Il0L10J DJ 0j_ l 20 . 405 ( a ) ( 1 ) ( i i i ) lKKl50.73(a)(2)(i) l_l50.73(a)'2)(viii)(A)l Abstract below and in l_l20.405(a)(1)(iv) l_l50.73(a)(2)(ii) l_l50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B) l Text, NRC Form 366A) . I 120.405(a)(1)(v) l 150J3Le)(2)(iii) I 150.73(a)(2)(x) I ,
._ LICINSEE CONTACT FOR THLS_.1ER (12)
NAME l TELEPHONE 11VMBER ; lAREACODEl l_L P.rg11111.,_ComRlimte Licensino I6I1 15l8I413i-l61615l1 ;
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CDMPLEJTI_0!NE_11NE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAIL 1LRE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) l l l l REPORTABLE] l l l l l REPORTABLE l l CAUSLJ1YSIEMLf0 TITHE.NT_lMAfiUffCTURERI TO NPRD3 I ICAUSElSYSTEMICOMPONENTIMANUFACTURERITONPRDSJ , I i i I I I I l l l l ' l_1 L_L_LJ l I I I i 1 I i 1 1 I I I I I I I 1 1 i I I I l l l 1 1 I I I _1 1 ! I I I I I i l i I I l i I l l 1 I I I I I l __ SUPE 1EMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) l EXPECTED lMONTHlDAYlYEAR l _ l __ l SUBMISSION l l l l __L11s_(if_reimpJite f EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) I X 1 NO I DATE (15) l l l l l l i ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16) f f On July 20, 1993, at approximately 1800 Easter.' daylight time, it was discovered that a i boron analysis of the refueling canal as requireo by Technical Specification 3.9.1 had i not been performed. The boron analysis is. required when the refueling canal is. filled. I On several occasions between July 14 and July 19, 1993, Chemistry personnel requested the status of the refueling canal from Operations. Operations reported that the canal was drained when only the transfer canal was actually drained. The cause of this event was inadequate communications between Chemistry and Operations personnel. During , telephone conversations between the two groups the terms refueling canal and transfer l canal were used interchangeably without the proper understanding of the terms that were being used. Therefore, Chemistry personnel considered the refueling canal to be drained ; and did not obtain the sample to be analyzed. A sample of the refueling canal was obtained, analyzed, and determined to be acceptable. Appropriate personnel have been informed of the potential for miscommunication, and procedures will be revised as l appropriate. , i I NRC form 366(6-89) _
HRC fora 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 (6-89)
- Expires 4/30/92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
, TEXT CONTINUATION FACILITY NAME (1) lDOCKETNUMBER(2) I LER nut 1BER (6) l l PAGE f3) l l l l l SEQUENTIAL l l REVISION l l l l l !
Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN), Unit 1 l } YEAR l l NV!9ER I I NQMBijLl l l l l f 10j511[01013 12 17 19 l3 l-l 0 1 2 l 1 1-101 0 1 01 2[0FI 01 5 . TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Torm 366A's) (17) }
- 1. PLANT CONDITIONS '
Unit I was in Mode 6 in a refueling outage. j II. DESCRIPTION OF EVENT j A. Eyent I
~I On July 20, 1993, at approximately 1800 Eastern daylight time (EDT), it was discovered that a boron analysis of the refueling canal, as required by Technical Specification 3.9.1, had not been performed. The boron analysis is !
required when the refueling canal is f111ed. On several occasions between July 14 and July 19, 1993, Chemistry personnel , requested the status of the refueling canal from Operations. Operations , erroneously reported that the canal was drained. Based on the information Operations provided, it was concluded that an analysis was not required. : 1 B. Inonerable Structures,_Catupsnents. or Systems That Contribute _d to the Event
- None. {
C. Do.tes_ausLIimes_of_Maior Occurrenc_es ; July 12, 1993 Operations indicated that the refueling canal was at 1140 EST going to be drained. July 14, 1993 Chemistry personnel requested the status of the . at 0700 EDT refueling canal from Operations. Operations reported I that it was drained. July 16, 1993 Chemistry personnel requested the status of the at 1700 EDT refueling canal. Operations reported that the transfer canal was drained. .j July 17, 1993 A reactor cavity boron analysis was performed. 2100 EDT July 19, 1993 Operations reported to Chemistry that the refueling ; at 1320 EDT canal was drained. i NRC form 366(6-89)- [
NRC Form 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 (6-89)
- Expires 4/30/92 LICEN5EE EVDIT REPORT (LER)
TEXT CONTINUATION , FACILITY NAME (1) lDOCKETNUMBER(2)} LER_fRMBER (6) l l PAGE (3) l l l l SEQUENTIAL l l REVISION l l l l l Sequoyah Nuclear Plant ($QN), Unit 1 l jyIARl l NQMJER I I NUlf LR_j l l l l 10151010lpl3 12 17 19 13 1-1 0 l 2 l 1 1-1 0 1 0 1 01 310FI 01 5 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC form 366A's) (17) July 20, 1993 It was determined that the shield building Tritium at 1300 EDT analysis, required by ODCM surveillance 2.2.2.1.2 may not have been performed. The Tritium analysis is required when the refueling canal is filled. During the review of the shield building Tritium analysis issue, it > was determined that the refueling canal was filled and that the boron analysis had not been performed. D. 01her_Syalems_pr Secondary Funclinna_Aflected None. E. tielhpLoLRisrnvery During the review of the shield building Tritium analysis issue, it was determined that the refueling canal was filled and that the boron analysis had not been performed. F. Operator _Ac11pn , Upon discovery of the condition, Operations personnel were notified and Limiting Condition for Operation 3.9.1 was entered.
- c. SaletylyateELEeEPORacR Not applicable - No safety system responses were required.
1 III. CAUSE OF EVENT A. lmmedialm_Cause The immediate cause of this event was the failure to obtain and analyze the refueling canal water for boron because the refueling canal was considered to be drained. B. RuoLCauss The root cause of this event was inadequate communications between Chemistry ! and Operations personnel. During telephone conversations between the two groups, the terms refueling canal and transfer canal were used interchangeably [ without the proper understanding of the terms that were being used. Therefore, Chemistry personnel considered the refueling canal to be drained and did not > obtain the sample to be analyzed. 4 NRC form 366(6-89)
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NRC fom 366A U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Approved DHH nn. 3150-0104 , (6 89)
- Expires 4/JO/T LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) i
- TEXT CONTINUATION i FACILITY NAME (1) lDOCKETNUMBER(2) I LER NWBER (6} l l PAGE (3) l l l l$EQUENTIALl l REVISION l l l l l Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN), Unit 1 l lYEAR I l NUMBER' l I NUETJLJ l l l l 10151alninlLlL171913 l-l D l 21 1 l _l 01 0 1 01 41001 01 5_
TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC form 366A's) (17) C. Contrihuting_fattor Contributing factors to this event were that the Chemistry sampling procedure used different terminology for the same sample point and some operating ' procedures used different terminology to describe the same areas. Additionally, Chemistry personnel had not received training on refueling systems or refueling operations. IV. ANALYSIS OF EVENT On July 17, 1993, at 2100 EDT, the boron concentration of the refueling cavity was 2,605 parts per million (ppm); on July 20, 1993, at 1915 EDT, the boron concentration of the refueling canal was approximately 2,610 ppm. The sample point for the refueling canal and reactor cavity are the same. The refueling canal and reactor cavity are the same pool of water. Also, the residual heat removal (RHR) system, which takes suction from the RCS which is in direct contact with the refueling canal-and reactor cavity, was in service and daily boron concentration l analysis was performed. The pumping action of the RHR system provides mixing of the reactor coolant system (RCS) and maintains the baron concentration of the RCS, reactor cavity, and refueling canal consistent. The RHR boron concentration remained at approximately 2,600 ppm during this time. Therefore, it can be ? concluded that the concentration of the refueling canal did not change during this time, and that there were no adverse consequences to plant personnel or to the public as a result of this event. V. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS A. Imediftte_Cormtive Action i Upon discovery of the condition, Operations personnel were notified and LCO , 3.9.1 was entered. A sample of the refueling canal water was obtained at 1915 , EDT and analyzed in duplicate. The boron concentration results were 2,616 ppm -{ and 2,612 ppm. This event was discussed with appropriate Chemistry personnel to inform them of the potential for miscommunication. The Operations . Superintendent issued a memorandum to Operations personnel describing the event ; , and detailing the importance of understanding the terminology that is being !- used and to ask questions if the terminology being used is not familiar. B. Corr.er11v_e_Ac11sn_Io Prevent Recurrencf f The Chemistry surveillance instruction will be revised to clarify under what conditions the refueling canal is required to be sampled and analyzed. As an enhancement, the fuel handling instructions and associated operating
' instructions will be reviewed to ensure that the nomenclature for the refueling -
canal are consistent. , i NRC Fom 366(6-89) e
i HRC rorm 366A U.S. HUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Approved OMB No. 3150-0104 (6-89) ' Expires 4/30/92 LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)
- TEXT CONTINUATION l
FACILITY NAME (1) lDOCKETNUMBER(2) l LER NUMBER (6) l l pAGE (3) l l l l5EQUENTIALl l REVISION l l l l l Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN), Unit 1 l lYEAR l l NUMDER l l NUMBER l l l l l 10 l 5 lD]DJDjl_{2 17 19 13 l-l 0 1 2 I 1 l-l 0 1 0 1 01 Sl0Fl 01 5 TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC form 366A's) (17) Additionally, the Chemistry Training Program will be revised to include-refueling systems and operation. , l VI. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION A. Failed _ Components None. B. Previnus_S.imilar Events A review of previous reported occurrences was conducted to identify similar , events. Although there have been several reports associated with missed surveillances as a result of inadequate communications, none were identified that resulted from the misunderstanding of the terminology being used. C. Extent _oLCondi_ tion As a result of the misunderstanding associated with the level of water in the refueling canal, the shield building Tritium analysis, required by ODCM Surveillance 2.2.2.1.2, was not performed. The Tritium analysis is also required when the refueling canal is filled. VII. COMMITMENTS
- 1. The Chemistry surveillance instruction will be revised by January 14, 1994, to i clarify under what conditions the refueling canal sample is required to be I
obtained and analyzed. I f i i i r NRC form 366(6-89) l
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