05000306/FIN-2011004-05
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Incorporate Revised Battery Room Temperature Information into Existing Operability Recommendation |
| Description | An unresolved item (URI) was identified to review the sequence of events which led to not incorporating the results of Engineering Change 17949 into OPR 1265904. As discussed above, a battery room steam exclusion damper failed to fully close during routine testing conducted on August 24, 2011. The failure of the damper to fully close during the test was concerning to both the licensee and NRC personnel as subsequent actions needed to repair the damper could result in stopping all air flow into the battery rooms, raising battery room temperatures, and rendering equipment in the battery rooms inoperable. During the early morning hours of August 25, the inspectors observed maintenance activities in the battery room and discussed contingency actions with personnel located in the outage control center (OCC). The OCC personnel initially informed the inspectors that there were no plans to close the redundant steam exclusion damper once the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> allowed by the TRM had elapsed. This concerned the inspectors as TRM Action 3.0.b stated that Upon discovery of a failure to meet a TLCO [TRM Limiting Condition for Operation], the Required Actions of the associated Conditions shall be met, except as provided in TLCO 3.0.e. The inspectors discussed their concern with several members of licensee management. After several additional discussions with NRC management, the licensee indicated that the redundant battery room steam exclusion damper would be closed when the 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> elapsed. In addition, the licensee took actions to reduce reactor power on both units in an effort to minimize the potential battery room temperature increase. The inspectors monitored the reactor power reductions and the increasing battery room temperatures from the control room. Battery room temperatures increased and stabilized below the equipment operability limits. Based upon this information, the inspectors concluded that the licensee complied with the TRM requirements. On August 26, 2011, the licensee initiated CAP 1300997 to document that personnel had not incorporated the results of a previously completed engineering change document into a current OPR regarding battery room temperatures. Specifically, on January 11, 2011, the licensee identified inconsistencies with the calculations performed to determine the battery room heat up following a high energy line break in the turbine building via CAP 1265904. The licensee evaluated the condition discussed in CAP 1265904 by performing an OPR. The results of the OPR showed that as long as the battery room temperatures were maintained less than 89 degrees the equipment located in the battery rooms would remain operable following a HELB. The licensee used the OPR temperature limitations as a basis for reducing reactor power, and therefore reducing equipment operating and battery room temperatures, following the steam exclusion damper failure. Information provided in CAP 1300997 indicated that an engineering evaluation completed on April 4, 2011, allowed the battery room temperature to be as high as 95 degrees prior to the HELB without impacting equipment operability. However, this information had not been incorporated into the OPR associated with CAP 1265904. As a result, the licensee may have unnecessarily placed each unit in an increased risk condition due to reducing reactor power when it may not have been required. The licensee was continuing to evaluate this issue at the conclusion of the inspection period. Based upon this, the inspectors were unable to determine whether a performance deficiency existed. This item was determined to be unresolved pending a review of the licensees causal evaluation for this issue (URI 05000282/2011004-05; 05000306/2011004-05: Failure to Incorporate Revised Battery Room Temperature Information into Existing Operability Recommendation). |
| Site: | Prairie Island  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000306/2011004 Section 4OA5 |
| Date counted | Sep 30, 2011 (2011Q3) |
| Type: | URI: |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | |
| Inspectors (proximate) | R Baker S Bell D Mcneil D Oliver K Riemer K Stoedter M Phalen P Voss P Zurawskic Zoiad Betancourt J Beavers J Giessner K Stoedter M Phalen N Feliz Adorno P Cardona Morales P Elkmann P Zurawski S Shah V Meghani |
| INPO aspect | |
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Finding - Prairie Island - IR 05000306/2011004 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Prairie Island) @ 2011Q3
Self-Identified List (Prairie Island)
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