| 06-19-2006 | contain Foxboro signal conditioning modules that did not have the required safety-related quality classification.
Equipment powered through these relay racks was declared inoperable. The signal conditioning modules require a classification of safety-related for electrical boundary and non safety-related for function. Four modules were identified that did not have a safety-related classification in RR-119 and two modules were identified that that did not have a safety-related classification in RR-120.
The following instrumentation and equipment were declared inoperable for relay racks RR-119 (Train A) and RR-120 (Train B): Reactor coolant system subcooling, reactor vessel level indication system, pressurizer safety valve outlet temperature, pressurizer power operated relief valve outlet temperature, and shield building ventilation damper control.
The station entered a 12-hour Technical Specification (TS) action statement for both trains of the shield building ventilation system being declared inoperable. This TS was exited at 1611 CST on April 18, 2006 with the return to service of RR-120. A seven day action statement for one train of the shield building ventilation system being inoperable was exited with RR-119 returned to service at 2128 CST on April 18, 2006.
This event was reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) for any event that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems needed to control the release of radioactive material and is considered a safety system functional failure. |
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FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6 PAGE (3)
Event Description:
On April 18, 2006 at 1200 central standard time (CST), relay [RLY] racks [RK] RR-119 and RR-120 were identified to contain Foxboro signal conditioning modules that did not have the required safety-related quality classification. Equipment powered through these relay racks was declared inoperable. The signal conditioning modules require a classification of safety-related for electrical boundary and non safety-related for function.
Four modules were identified that did not have a safety-related classification in RR-119 and two modules were identified that did not have a safety-related classification in RR-120.
The following instrumentation and equipment powered through relay racks RR-119 (Train A) and RR-120 (Train B) were declared inoperable: Reactor coolant system subcooling [TI], reactor vessel level [LI] indication system, pressurizer safety valve outlet temperature [TI], pressurizer power operated relief valve outlet temperature [TI], and shield building ventilation damper control [CDMP].
The station entered a 12-hour Technical Specification (TS) action statement for both trains of the shield building ventilation system being declared inoperable. This TS was exited at 1611 CST on April 18, 2006 with return to service of RR-120. A seven day action statement for one train of the shield building ventilation system being inoperable was exited with RR-119 returned to service at 2128 CST on April 18, 2006.
The relay racks were declared inoperable due to non safety-related fuses [FU] and cables [CBL] installed in six of the signal conditioning modules in these relay racks. The instruments associated with the six modules were not found in TS required instruments or alarms. The concern was that a downstream failure on the non safety related modules could impact safety-related equipment since it did not have safety-related fault protection.
This event was reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) "Any event that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material." Event Notification 42509 was made on April 18, 2006 at 1922 CST.
An extent of condition was initiated to review all relay racks. Relay racks RR-101, RR-102, RR-103, RR-104, RR-105, RR-116, RR-117, RR-118, RR-119, and RR-120 were determined to have safety classification issues. Engineering evaluated if the equipment contained inside the relay racks was properly evaluated for the safety classification assignment. The purchase orders were reviewed for proper safety classification and the work history was reviewed for proper safety classification. All discrepancies were evaluated to determine the potential impact on safety related functions. Actions were taken as necessary to upgrade the applicable modules to the proper safety classification by either returning the module to the vendor for refurbishment and recertification or replacing the module. Further evaluation determined that none of the discrepancies impacted a safety-related function.
The Foxboro modules classified as non safety-related are maintained under the same vendor manuals, which use the same part numbers, as those classified as safety-related. All the parts purchased as spares are qualified as safety-related to avoid the possibility of putting non safety-related parts in safety-related applications. The power plug [CON] and cord set, chassis, fuse, and fuse holder are the same construction as all other Foxboro "H" line series of modules.
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) (6)LER NUMBER PAGE (3) Kewaunee Power Station 05000305 YEAR Event Analysis and Safety Significance:
This event is being reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B) "Any operation or condition that was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications" and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C) "Any event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.
Equipment and instrumentation important to safety that could potentially be lost were both trains of the shield building ventilation damper controls and accident instrumentation. The scenario would be for an internal electrical short to occur in a non safety-related Foxboro module in each of relay racks RR-119 and RR-120 that could cause the entire loss of safety-related power to the relay racks.
Proper functioning of the shield building ventilation system is required to establish containment integrity. TS 3.6.a states: "Containment system integrity shall not be violated if there is fuel in the reactor which has been used for power operation, except whenever either of the following conditions remains satisfied: (1) The reactor is in the cold shutdown condition with the reactor vessel head installed, or (2) The reactor is in the refueling shutdown condition.
TS Table TS 3.5-6 contains the specifications for the instrumentation declared inoperable. TS 3.5.e states:
`The accident monitoring instrumentation in Table TS 3.5-6 shall be operable whenever the plant is above hot shutdown." The basis for this is to assure there is sufficient information available to aid the operator in identification of an accident and assessment of plant conditions during and following an accident. Although this event caused some of the TS Table TS 3.5-6 instrumentation to be inoperable, operation was within the allowance of the specifications.
This is considered a safety system functional failure since this condition could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.
The safety significance associated with this event is minimal. The probabilistic risk model for Kewaunee analyzes for contributions to core damage and a large early release from containment. The shield building ventilation system is not a contributor to the core damage frequency or the large early release frequency, therefore the safety significance is minimal.
Cause:
The initial results of the investigation determined that the causes of the relay rack equipment safety classification discrepancies are inaccurate asset database information and the installation of non safety related modules in safety-related relay racks by the use of the asset database information in the development of maintenance work orders.
FACILITY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER (2) LER NUMBER (6 PAGE (3)
Corrective Actions:
1. The non safety-related signal conditioning modules for RR-119 and RR-120 were immediately replaced or unplugged.
2. An extent of condition review was performed to determine the safety-related functions of instrumentation and components powered through the relay racks and correct any discrepancies found.
3. The necessary safety classification changes to the asset database were identified and are in the process of being changed.
Similar Events:
None.
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| | | Reporting criterion |
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| 05000305/LER-2006-010 | | | | 05000456/LER-2006-001 | Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage Due To Inter-Granular Stress Corrosion Cracking of a Pressurizer Heater Sleeve | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | | 05000454/LER-2006-001 | Technical Specification Required Action Completion Time Exceeded for Inoperable Containment Isolation Valves Due to Untimely Operability Determination | | | 05000423/LER-2006-001 | Loss Of Safety Function Of The Control Room Emergency Ventilation System | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | | 05000369/LER-2006-001 | Ice Condenser and Floor Cooling System Containment Isolation Valve inoperable longer than allowed by Technical Specification 3.6.3. | | | 05000353/LER-2006-001 | HPCI Ramp Generator Signal Converter Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000352/LER-2006-001 | Loss Of One Offsite Circuit Due To Invalid Actuation Of Fire Suppression System | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000336/LER-2006-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor | | 05000316/LER-2006-001 | Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 3.6.2, Containment Air Locks | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000315/LER-2006-001 | Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specification Action 3.6.5.B.1 | | | 05000293/LER-2006-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | | 05000289/LER-2006-001 | | | | 05000287/LER-2006-001 | Actuation of Emergency Generator due to Spurious Transformer Lockout | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000251/LER-2006-001 | Turkey Point Unit 4 05000251 1 OF 6 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000247/LER-2006-001 | Manual Reactor Trip Due to Multiple Dropped Control Rods Caused by Loss of Control Rod Power Due to Personnel Error | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000440/LER-2006-001 | Incorrect Wiring in the Remote Shutdown Panel Results in a Fire Protection Program Violation | | | 05000413/LER-2006-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000368/LER-2006-001 | Completion of a Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications Due to Loss of Motive Power to Certain Containment Isolation Valves as a Result of a Phase to Ground Short Circuit in a Motor Control Cubicle | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | | 05000306/LER-2006-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | | 05000298/LER-2006-001 | Cooper Nuclear Station 05000298 1 of 4 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000286/LER-2006-001 | I | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000282/LER-2006-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000266/LER-2006-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | | 05000261/LER-2006-001 | Manual Reactor Trip Due to Failure of a Turbine Governor Valve Electro-Hydraulic Control Card | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000255/LER-2006-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000461/LER-2006-002 | Turbine Bypass Function Lost Due to Circuit Card Maintenance Frequency | | | 05000458/LER-2006-002 | Loss of Safety Function of High Pressure Core Spray Due to Manual Deactivation | | | 05000456/LER-2006-002 | Units 1 and 2 Entry into Limiting Condition for Operation 3.0.3 due to Main Control Room Ventilation Envelope Low Pressure | | | 05000443/LER-2006-002 | Noncompliance with the Requirements of Technical Specification 6.8.1.2.a | | | 05000387/LER-2006-002 | DMissed Technical Specification surveillance requirement | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000362/LER-2006-002 | Unit 3 Shutdown to Inspect Safety Injection Tank Spiral Wound Gaskets | | | 05000336/LER-2006-002 | Manual Reactor Trip Due To Trip Of Both Feed Pumps Following A Loss Of Instrument Air | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000316/LER-2006-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000315/LER-2006-002 | Failure to Comply with Technical Specification Requirement 3.6.13, Divider Barrier Integrity | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000293/LER-2006-002 | | | | 05000289/LER-2006-002 | | | | 05000251/LER-2006-002 | Intermediate Range High Flux Trip Setpoint Exceeded Technical Specification Allowable Value | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000440/LER-2006-002 | Scaffold Built in the Containment Pool Swell Region | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | | 05000413/LER-2006-002 | Safe Shutdown Potentially Challenged by an External Flooding Event and Inadequate Design and Configuration Control | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000388/LER-2006-002 | Missed Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 Entry for Unit 2 During Unit 1 ESS Bus Testing | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000348/LER-2006-002 | Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure to Close | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000305/LER-2006-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000301/LER-2006-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000286/LER-2006-002 | 450 Broadway, GSB
P.O. Box 249
Buchanan, N.Y. 10511-0249Entergy Tel (914) 734-6700
Fred Dacimo
Site Vice President
Administration
September 13, 2006
Indian Point Unit No. 3
Docket No. 50-286
N L-06-084
Document Control Desk
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Stop O-P1-17
Washington, DC 20555-0001
Subject:L Licensee Event Report # 2006-002-00, "Manual Reactor Trip as a Result
of Arcing Under the Main Generator Between Scaffolding and Phase A&B
of the Isophase Bus Housing"
Dear Sir:
The attached Licensee Event Report (LER) 2006-002-00 is the follow-up written report
submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. This event is of the type defined in 10
CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an event recorded in the Entergy corrective action process as
Condition Report CR-IP3-2006-02255.
There are no commitments contained in this letter. Should you or your staff have any
questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Patric W. Conroy, Manager,
Licensing, Indian Point Energy Center at (914) 734-6668.
Fred R. Dacimo
Site Vice President
Indian Point Energy Center
Docket No. 50-286
NL-06-084
Page 2 of 2
Attachment: LER-2006-002-00
CC:
Mr. Samuel J. Collins
Regional Administrator — Region I
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Resident Inspector's Office
Resident Inspector Indian Point Unit 3
Mr. Paul Eddy
State of New York Public Service Commission
INPO Record Center
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/30/2007
(6-2004)
. Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection
request: 50 hours.DReported lessons learned are incorporated into the
licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden
estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internetLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and
Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information
collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC
may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the
information collection.
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1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER I 3. PAGE
INDIAN POINT 3 05000-286 1 OF 6
4.TITLE: Manual Reactor Trip as a Result of Arcing Under the Main Generator Between
Scaffolding and Phase A&B of the Iso-phase Bus Housing | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000282/LER-2006-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000269/LER-2006-002 | High Energy Line Breaks Outside Licensing Basis May Result in Loss of Safety Function | | | 05000263/LER-2006-002 | | | | 05000255/LER-2006-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | | 05000254/LER-2006-002 | Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 05000254 1 of 3 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | | 05000483/LER-2006-003 | Unexpected Inoperability of the Emergency Exhaust System due to Inoperable Pressure Boundary | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability
10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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