On January 23, 2009 at 13:58 CST with the station at 100 percent power, Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc.
was inforMed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that the station was not complying with Technical Specification 3.7.a.7. The Technical' Specification requires the availability of 35,000 gallons of fuel oil for either diesel generator from two underground storage tanks. A siphon line connecting the two tanks was non functional and the station was relying on a temporary transfer pump to move fuel oil between the underground tanks. The function of the siphon line had been removed from the licensing basis in 1993. This required the station to declare both emergency diesel generators inoperable and enter Technical Specification 3.0.c, "Standard Shutdown Sequence.
The station made a request for a Notice of Enforcement Discretion for Technical Specification 3.7.a.7 while an exigent Technical Specification License Amendment was being processed. At 15:42 CST on January 23, 2009, the NRC granted the station a 14-day Notice of Enforcement Discretion. Although preparations were made to shutdown, no reactivity manipulations were performed.
This condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), "Any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications. |
Event Description:
At 13:58 CST on January 23, 2009 with the station at 100 percent power, Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc.
(DEK) was informed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that the station was not complying with Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.a.7.
At the time TS 3.7.a.7 stated for the emergency diesel generators (EDGs),[DG]:
TS 3.7.a.7 "Both diesel generators are OPERABLE. The two underground storage tanks combine to supply at least 35,000 gallons of fuel oil for either diesel generator and the day tanks for each diesel generator contain at least 1,000 gallons of fuel oil.
NRC staff determined that, without a siphon arrangement to equalize underground storage tank [TK] levels, Kewaunee Power Station (KPS) was not in compliance with the requirements of TS 3.7.a.7 that the EDG fuel oil storage tanks combine to supply at least 35,000 gallons for either EDG. In 1993, an evaluation determined the function of the siphon line was not required and other means could be used to transfer fuel oil between the underground storage tanks. Thus, DEK relied on a spare pump [P] to provide the combined fuel oil volume of at least 35,000 gallons. The use of a portable transfer pump was evaluated in 2008. The NRC determined that using a portable transfer pump was not consistent with the KPS licensing basis.
Therefore, compliance with TS 3.7.a.7 was not possible for the existing storage tanks without a siphon arrangement. Consequently, this condition rendered both EDGs inoperable.
With both EDGs inoperable, TS 3.0.c, "Standard Shutdown Sequence," was entered and preparations were being made to begin a plant shutdown.
In accordance with the guidance provided by NRC Inspection Manual, Part 9900: Technical Guidance, "Operations — Notices of Enforcement Discretion," dated February 7, 2005, DEK requested Enforcement Discretion from TS 3.7.a.7. At 15:42 CST on January 23, 2009, NRC verbally granted Enforcement Discretion to February 6, 2009. This period of 14 days was to allow time for NRC approval of proposed License Amendment Request 247 to reduce the required fuel oil volume for the seven day supply to the EDGs.
TS 3.0.c, "Standard Shutdown Sequence," was exited with there having been no reactivity manipulations.
Reactor power remained at 100 percent.
On February 6, 2009, NRC issued Amendment No. 203 that revised TS 3.7.a.7. The TS was revised from requiring "The two underground storage tanks combine to supply at least 35,000 gallons of fuel oil for either diesel generator and the day tanks for each diesel generator contain at least 1,000 gallons of fuel oil." to require each diesel generator's underground storage tank and corresponding day tanks to contain a minimum usable volume of 32,888 gallons.
The current TS 3.7.a.7 states:
TS 3.7.a.7 "Both diesel generators are OPERABLE and each diesel generator shall have:
A. Day tanks containing a minimum volume of 1000 gallons; B. An underground storage-tank and corresponding day tanks containing a minimum volume of 32,888 gallons of usable fuel; C. An OPERABLE diesel fuel oil transfer pump.
� The requirement to maintain a single failure design EDG syStem with sufficient fuel to operate for seven days is identified in ANSI N195-1976, "Fuel Oil Systems for Standby Diesel-Generators," section 5.2. DEK committed to meeting section 5.2 as part of its licensing basis when TS 3.7.a.7 was amended in 1989, ANSI N195-1976, section 5.2 states:
"The fuel oil system of single-unit nuclear stations shall be so designed that a single failure will not result in the loss of minimum diesel generator capacity. The on-site storage shall be sufficient to operate the minimum number of diesel-generators following the limiting design basis accident for either seven (7) days, or the time required to replenish the oil from sources outside the plant site following any limiting design-basis event without interrupting the operatibn of the diesel, whichever is longer.
In the ANSI Standard, "minimum diesel-generator capacity" is defined as: "The minimum electrical output from the diesel-generator to assure the operation of the minimum plant equipment required to prevent unacceptable consequences for any plant design basis event or accident condition.
DEK's position was that it could provide a seven day supply of fuel oil to either EDG, thus meeting TS 3.7.a.7.
With both EDGs inoperable based on the inability to meet TS 3.7.a.7, this condition is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), "Any operation or condition which was prohibited by the plant's Technical Specifications.
The overall safety significance is very small as discussed below.
The required minimum volume of fuel oil for the EDGs is sufficient to provide for seven days of continuous operation. Consistent with induS"try PRA models, the mission time for EDGs in the DEK Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) model is 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. Within this time window, it is postulated that for all accidents and transients modeled in the PRA, a safe stable condition is reached. The administratively controlled amount of available fuel oil allows EDGs to be operated for a significantly longer time than the 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> PRA mission time. Additionally, the offsite power non-recovery probability at seven days is negligible. Therefore, the above noncompliance with the 35,000 gallon requirement in TS 3.7.a.7 does not invalidate the PRA assumptions or assertions and there is no increased risk due to this noncompliance. The incremental conditional core damage probability (ICCDP) and the conditional large early release probability (ICLERP) are negligible.
Although unable to meet the requirement to automatically provide a seven day supply of fuel oil to one EDG given a single failure, ample time would be available to transfer onsite stored fuel oil manually to provide the seven day supply to one EDG.
Cause:
The licensing basis for the EDG fuel oil system was altered in 1993 by removing the function of the siphon line to provide an equal level in both underground storage tanks thus causing inability to comply with TS 3.7.a.7.
In, 2008, a temporary modification was developed that may have inappropriately approved the use of a portable transfer pump to maintain compliance with TS 3.7.a.7. A root cause is evaluating the condition, and if it is determined to be a cause of this event, a supplement to this LER will be made.
Corrective Actions:
License Amendment'No. 203 was approved by the'NRC on February 6, 2009 to identify fuel oil storage requirements that would provide for a seven day supply of fuel to either EDG without credit for connection between the two underground storage tanks.
Similar Events:
None �NRC FORM 366A (9-2007) PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER Serial No.09-195 cc: Regional Administrator, Region III U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2443 Warrenville Road Suite 210' Lisle, IL 60532-4352 Mr. P. S. Tam Sr. Project.Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory ComMission One White Flint North, Mail Stop 08-H4A 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD,20852-2/38 NRC Senior Resident Inspector Kewaunee Power Station
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05000410/LER-2009-001 | Momentary Loss of Control Power to High Pressure Core Spray, Pump Due to Degraded Fuse Block Connection | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | 05000266/LER-2009-001 | Component Coolina Water PumD Inoperable In Excess of Technical Specification Allowed Completion Time | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000263/LER-2009-001 | Containment Overpressure Not Ensured in the Appendix R Analysis | 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition | 05000250/LER-2009-001 | Procedure Inadequacy Causes Control Room Ventilation Isolation Technical Specification Noncompliance | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000237/LER-2009-001 | Common Mode Failure of Reactor Building Isolation Dampers | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000530/LER-2009-001 | Manual Reactor Trip Due to a Loss of Instrument Air to the Containment Building | | 05000457/LER-2009-001 | Reactor Trip on Over Temperature Delta Temperature due to a Signal Spike on One Channel With Another Channel Placed in the Tripped Condition for Surveillance Testing | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000413/LER-2009-001 | Both Trains of Chemical and Volume Control, Auxiliary Feedwater and Containment Spray Systems were Inoperable due to a Component Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000412/LER-2009-001 | Equipment Operability for Steam Generator Tube Rupture Safety Analysis Not Met | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vi) | 05000461/LER-2009-001 | Safety Function Lost Due to Capacitor Failure on Circuit Card | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | 05000382/LER-2009-001 | Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station 05000382 1 OF 3 | | 05000370/LER-2009-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000346/LER-2009-001 | Containment Air Cooler Fans Inoperable Due to Misapplication of Potter and Brumfield Rotary Relays | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000336/LER-2009-001 | Reactor Trip Due to High Pressurizer Pressure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000305/LER-2009-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000281/LER-2009-001 | Manual Reactor Trip Initiated to Replace a Rod Control Data Logging Card | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000261/LER-2009-001 | Emergency Diesel Generator Inoperable in Excess of Technical Specifications Allowed Completion Time | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000220/LER-2009-001 | Failure to Implement Required Technical Specification Actions Associated with Failed Surveillance Test | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000389/LER-2009-001 | Unit 2 Main Feedwater Isolation Valves Stroke Time Potentially Affected by Temperature | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(I)(B) | 05000321/LER-2009-001 | Pump Suction Swap for HPCI and RCIC Non-Conservative With Respect To Technical Specification Requirements | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000334/LER-2009-001 | Surveillance Test Inadvertently Violates Technical Specification 3.6.1 for Containment Operability | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000369/LER-2009-001 | III Duke Energy® BRUCE H HAMILTON Vice President McGuire Nuclear Station Duke Energy Corporation MGO1VP / 12700 Hagers Ferry Road Huntersville, NC 28078 704-875-5333 704-875-4809 fax bhhamilton@duke-energy.com June 24, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTENTION: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject: Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC
McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. 50-369, 50-370
Licensee Event Report 369/2009-01, Revision 0
Problem Investigation Process (PIP) M-09-02216
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 Sections (a) (1) and (d), attached
is Licensee Event Report 369/2009-01, Revision 0, regarding
the past inoperability of the Nuclear Service Water System
"A" Trains due to potential for strainer fouling.
This report is being submitted in accordance. with 10 CFR
50.73 (a) (2) (i)- (B), an Operation Prohibited by Technical
Specifications, and 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (v) (B), any Event.
or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of the
Safety Function.
This event is considered to be of no significance with
respect to the health and safety of the public. There are
no regulatory commitments contained in this LER.
If questions arise regarding this LER, contact Rick Abbott
at 980-875-4685.
Very truly yours,
Bruce H. Hamilton
Attachment
www.duke-energy.corn m U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Date
Page 2
CC: L. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator •U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region.II
Sam Nunn Atlanta Federal Center
•61 Forsyth Street, SW, Suite 23T85
Atlanta, GA 30303
J. H. Thompson, Jr. (Addressee Only)
Senior Project Manager (McGuire)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Mail Stop 0-8G9A
Washington, DC 20555
J. B. Brady
Senior Resident Inspector
U.S. Nucle'ar Regulatory Commission-
McGuire Nuclear Station
B. 0. Hall, Section Chief
Radiation Protection Section
1645 Mall Service Center.
Raleigh, NC 27699
NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB: NO. 3150-0104t EXPIRES: 08/31/2010
(9-2007) Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 50 hours. Repoded
lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments
regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internet e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information (See reverse for required number of collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or digits/characters for each block) sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER I 3. PAGE _McGuire Nuclear Station, . 0369 8 Unit 1 05000- OF 4. TITLE Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS)d
"A" Trains Past Inoperable when aligned
to the Standby Nuclear Service Water Pond due to'corrosion.
(SNSWP) | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat | 05000456/LER-2009-001 | Steam Generator Tube Exceeding Plugging Criteria Remained In Service During Previous Cycle | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000395/LER-2009-001 | Inadequate Procedure Results In EDG Not Obtaining Maximum Load Required By Technical Specification | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000336/LER-2009-002 | Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | 05000373/LER-2009-002 | Loss of Shutdown Cooling Due to Spurious Closure of the Shutdown Cooling Suction Isolation Valve | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat | 05000382/LER-2009-002 | Waterford 3 Steam Electric Station 05000382 10OF 4 | | 05000278/LER-2009-002 | Inoperable 'A' Wide Range Neutron Monitor Results in Condition Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000287/LER-2009-002 | Unit 3 Trip Due to Generator Phase Differential Lockout | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000263/LER-2009-002 | | | 05000412/LER-2009-002 | Unacceptable Indications Identified During Reactor Vessel Head Inspection | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | 05000354/LER-2009-002 | As Found Values for Safety Relief Valve Lift Setpoints Exceed Technical Specification Allowable | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000346/LER-2009-002 | Vibration Induced Failure of Temperature Instrument Results in Operation above Licensed Power Limit | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000261/LER-2009-002 | Failure to Complete Technical Specifications Required Action Within the Allowed Completion Time | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000334/LER-2009-002 | Feedwater Isolation Initiates Auxiliary Feedwater System During Refueling Shutdown | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | 05000254/LER-2009-002 | Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 05000254 1 OF 5 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | 05000305/LER-2009-002 | Steam Exclusion Door Blocked Open During Maintenance Activities | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | 05000250/LER-2009-002 | Turkey Point Unit 3 05000250 1 of 10 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | 05000220/LER-2009-002 | High Pressure Coolant Injection System Initiation Following a Manual Turbine Trip Due to High Turbine Bearing Vibrations | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000298/LER-2009-002 | Manual Scram On Low Water Level Caused By Turbine Trip From Hydraulic Fluid Leak | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000305/LER-2009-003 | Containment Spray Pump A Inoperable At Degraded Voltage Protection Setpoint | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000395/LER-2009-003 | ..Potential Loss of Residual Heat Removal System Safety Function In Mode 4 Due To An Unanalyzed Condition0 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability | 05000389/LER-2009-003 | RCP 2B2 Lower Seal Cavity Line Leak | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | 05000323/LER-2009-003 | Containment Sump Recirculation Valve Position Interlock Failure Due to Inadequate Testing | | 05000263/LER-2009-003 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | 05000261/LER-2009-003 | Manual Reactor Trip Due to Failure of 'A' Steam Generator Level Module | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000440/LER-2009-003 | Reactor Recirculation Pump Failure Results in Manual Reactor Protection System Actuation | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | 05000361/LER-2009-003 | Pressurizer Auxiliary Spray Failed Inservice Test | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(B), Loss of Safety Function - Remove Residual Heat | 05000457/LER-2009-003 | Drain Procedure for ECCS Suction Line Creates an Unanalyzed Condition Due to Inadequate Configuration Requirements | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | 05000237/LER-2009-003 | Emergency Diesel Generator Oil Leak | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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