05000413/LER-2006-002, Regarding Safe Shutdown Potentially Challenged by an External Flooding Event and Inadequate Design and Configuration Control
| ML062710394 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Catawba  (NPF-035) |
| Issue date: | 09/14/2006 |
| From: | Jamil D Duke Energy Corp, Duke Power Co |
| To: | Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| LER 06-002-00 | |
| Download: ML062710394 (10) | |
| Event date: | |
|---|---|
| Report date: | |
| 4132006002R00 - NRC Website | |
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kDuke W Energy D.M. JAMIL Vice President Catawba Nuclear Station 4800 Concord Rd. / CN01 VP York, SC 29745-9635 803 831 4251 803 831 3221 fax September 14, 2006 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention:
Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555
Subject:
Duke Power Company LLC d/b/a Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (Duke)
Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1 Docket No.
50-413 Licensee Event Report 413/06-002 Attached is Licensee Event Report 413/06-002 entitled "Safe Shutdown Potentially Challenged by an External Flooding Event and Inadequate Design and Configuration Control."
There are no regulatory commitments contained in this letter.
This event is considered to be of no significance withrespect to the health and safety of the public.
If there are any questions on this report, please contact A. Jones-Young at (803) 831-3051.
Sincerely, D.M.
Jamil Attachment www. duke-energy. comr
Document Control Desk Page 2 September 14, 2006 xc (with attachment):
W.D. Travers Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 61 Forsyth Street, S.W.,
Suite 23T85
- Atlanta, GA 30303 J.F. Stang, Jr.
(addressee only)
NRC Senior Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop 8-H4A 11555 Rockville Pike Rockville, MD 20852-2738 A.T. Sabisch NRC Senior Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station INPO Records Center 700 Galleria Place
- Atlanta, GA 30339-5957
Abstract
On 05/22/06, while Unit 1 was shutdown in Mode 3, the Unit 2 Cooling Towers (CT) experienced excessive overflow due to clogged upper level CT screens.
This condition created a source of water that followed a flow path through unsealed electrical conduit penetrations to the 1A Diesel Generator (DG)
Room.
The water intrusion condition was discovered and stopped prior to any DG damage.
DG 1A was the only DG affected by this condition.
However, the presence of this flow path highlighted potential vulnerabilities in barriers to the Probable Maximum Precipitation (PMP) event that could challenge safe shutdown capabilities.
The identified flood protection deficiencies were attributed to inadequate design and configuration control of features to protect against flooding.
The flood protection deficiencies were corrected by the installation of new flood protection seal barriers.
This report does involve a safety system functional failure as it relates to a postulated PMP.
There was minimal safety significance to this event.
NRC FORM 366 (6-2004)
(If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (if more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of (If more space is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A) (17)
Manufacturing, Construction/Installation Deficiency.
Therefore, this event was determined to be non-recurring in nature.
Energy Industry Identification System (EIIS) codes are identified in the text as [EIIS: XX].
- - This event is not considered reportable to the Equipment Performance and Information Exchange (EPIX) program.
This event is considered to be a Safety System Functional Failure.
There were no releases of radioactive materials, radiation exposures, or personnel injuries associated with this event.