09-27-2006 | On July 30, 2006, at 0730 hours0.00845 days <br />0.203 hours <br />0.00121 weeks <br />2.77765e-4 months <br />, a unit shutdown was initiated in accordance with Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.5, Containment Air Temperature, Action 3.6.5.0.1. This action requires that the unit be placed in Mode 3 within six hours if containment air temperature is not restored to within limits during the previous eight hours.
On July 29, 2006, at 2026 hours0.0234 days <br />0.563 hours <br />0.00335 weeks <br />7.70893e-4 months <br />, TS Condition 3.6.5.A was entered due to containment lower compartment average air temperature exceeding the TS Limiting Condition for Operation 3.6.5.b limit of 120 degrees Fahrenheit. Efforts to reduce the containment temperature during the eight-hour completion time of TS Action 3.6.5.A.1 were unsuccessful.
entered Mode 3 on July 30, 2006, at 1014 hours0.0117 days <br />0.282 hours <br />0.00168 weeks <br />3.85827e-4 months <br />. All safety systems and plant equipment used in the shutdown functioned as designed.
The causes of the Unit 1 shutdown were: 1) the containment cooling water system design did not support continued plant operation with sustained high cooling water ( Lake Michigan) temperatures and potential for cooler fouling; and 2) a failure by Engineering personnel to recognize and communicate that an evaluation supporting past operability would not permit unit operation under some possible operating conditions during the summer (a loss of operating margin), resulting in a delay in communicating the impact of the lost margin to station management so compensatory actions could be developed at an earlier time. Corrective actions include: 1) changes to engineering procedures for identifying and managing margin changes; 2) requirement to install a temporary modification for supplemental containment cooling prior to the summer season until a design change can be implemented; and 3) development of an analysis to support removal of containment ventilation cooling units for cleaning while at power. |
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LER-2006-001, Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specification Action 3.6.5.B.1Docket Number |
Event date: |
07-30-2006 |
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Report date: |
09-27-2006 |
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3152006001R00 - NRC Website |
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Conditions Prior to Event Unit 1 in Mode 1 at 100% power.
Description of Event
As a result of an NRC inspection finding, Indiana Michigan Power Company (I&M) had approved a revised methodology for calculating lower containment average air temperature on July 28, 2006. The new methodology calculated an average lower containment temperature that was higher than the previous method.
While unrelated to the revised methodology for calculating lower containment average temperature, in July 2006, Unit 1 lower containment high temperature alarms were being evaluated by Engineering personnel and troubleshooting efforts were not able to increase Non-Essential Service Water (NESW) cooling flow through the Containment Lower Ventilation Units (CLVs). A temporary modification (T-Mod) to add supplemental cooled water to the NESW header as it entered containment was developed; however, delays in completing the design and implementation prevented it from being fully functional prior to the TS required shutdown.
The average temperature in the Unit 1 lower containment volume was determined to exceed 120 degrees Fahrenheit using the revised methodology and Unit 1 was declared to have exceeded the Limiting Condition for Operation of Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.5.b and Condition A was entered as of 2026 hours0.0234 days <br />0.563 hours <br />0.00335 weeks <br />7.70893e-4 months <br /> on July 29, 2006.
Required Action A.1 for Condition A was to restore containment average air temperature to within limits with an 8 hour completion time. At 0426 hours0.00493 days <br />0.118 hours <br />7.043651e-4 weeks <br />1.62093e-4 months <br /> on July 30, 2006, TS 3.6.5 Condition B was entered when the 8-hour completion time of Required Action A.1 for Condition A was not met. In accordance with normal plant operating procedures and TS 3.6.5, Condition B, Required Action B.1, Unit 1 was shut down and entered Mode 3 at 1014 hours0.0117 days <br />0.282 hours <br />0.00168 weeks <br />3.85827e-4 months <br /> on July 30, 2006.
Cause of Event
The causes of the Unit 1 shutdown were:
1. The containment cooling water system design did not support continued plant operation with sustained high cooling water (Lake Michigan) temperatures and potential for cooler fouling.
2. A failure by l&M Engineering personnel to recognize and communicate that an evaluation supporting past operability would not permit unit operation under some possible operating conditions during the summer (loss of operating margin). The failure to recognize this loss of operating margin resulted in a delay in communicating the impact of the lost margin to station management so compensatory actions could be developed at an earlier time.
Contributing causes were that actions that were initiated to reduce the average temperature were hindered because the CLVs were partially plugged with sediment and the supplemental cooling T-Mod installation had numerous delays that were not resolved in a timely manner.
Analysis of Event
During an NRC inspection in May 2006, the NRC inspectors identified a finding that the methodology for calculating lower containment average air temperature was non-conservative. A past operability calculation was completed in June 2006 using an appropriately conservative volume weighted methodology. This calculation showed that under recent worst case conditions, average temperature in lower containment did not exceed 119.7 degrees Fahrenheit with sustained lake temperatures of 79 degrees Fahrenheit in 2005, and thus a past operability concern was not present. The fact that containment temperatures may not remain below 120 degrees Fahrenheit when lake temperature exceeded 79 degrees Fahrenheit (permissible temperature was 85.8 degrees Fahrenheit) was not addressed.
In addition to the new average air temperature calculation methodology of lower containment, two of the four CLVs in Unit 1 had significant blockage that was identified prior to the 2006 summer season. Performance of on-line maintenance to clear the blockage in the CLVs prior to the 2006 summer season would have improved CLV performance.
A T-Mod to provide supplemental containment cooling was initiated two weeks prior to the TS required shutdown.
The effort to implement this T-Mod was significantly larger than originally understood. Numerous equipment problems were identified during the installation and testing of the T-Mod, and these problems either delayed its implementation or resulted in reduced performance of the T-Mod below what was expected.
This event had minimal nuclear safety impact on the plant. A Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) was performed and determined there was no nuclear safety significance to this event. Unit 1 was shut down in a controlled fashion and manually tripped as part of the normal shutdown procedure at approximately 16.5 percent reactor power. All safety systems and plant equipment used in the shutdown functioned as designed. In that the shutdown was orderly, there was no significant probabilistic risk associated with this event.
Corrective Actions
Two of the four Unit 1 CLVs cooling coils were cleaned to remove sediment and debris.
The T-Mod for supplemental cooling was installed and used to reduce Unit 1 lower containment average air temperature to less than 120 degrees Fahrenheit.
Engineering procedures for calculations and modifications will be revised to provide explicit considerations related to identifying and managing operating and design margin.
The procedure for summer readiness will be revised to require installation of the supplemental containment cooling T-Mod during the summer months until such time that a design change is made that precludes the need for installation of the supplemental containment cooling T-Mod.
Analysis will be completed to determine when a CLV can be removed from service for cleaning, and maintenance activities to clean the CLVs will be generated when required.
Previous Similar Events
A review was conducted of station Condition Reports and LERs for the previous 3 years. No similar events were identified.
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05000305/LER-2006-010 | | | 05000456/LER-2006-001 | Unit 1 Reactor Coolant System Pressure Boundary Leakage Due To Inter-Granular Stress Corrosion Cracking of a Pressurizer Heater Sleeve | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(A), Seriously Degraded | 05000454/LER-2006-001 | Technical Specification Required Action Completion Time Exceeded for Inoperable Containment Isolation Valves Due to Untimely Operability Determination | | 05000423/LER-2006-001 | Loss Of Safety Function Of The Control Room Emergency Ventilation System | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident | 05000369/LER-2006-001 | Ice Condenser and Floor Cooling System Containment Isolation Valve inoperable longer than allowed by Technical Specification 3.6.3. | | 05000353/LER-2006-001 | HPCI Ramp Generator Signal Converter Failure | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(D), Loss of Safety Function - Mitigate the Consequences of an Accident 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | 05000352/LER-2006-001 | Loss Of One Offsite Circuit Due To Invalid Actuation Of Fire Suppression System | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000336/LER-2006-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(A), Loss of Safety Function - Shutdown the Reactor | 05000316/LER-2006-001 | Failure to Comply with Technical Specification 3.6.2, Containment Air Locks | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000315/LER-2006-001 | Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specification Action 3.6.5.B.1 | | 05000293/LER-2006-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv), System Actuation | 05000289/LER-2006-001 | | | 05000287/LER-2006-001 | Actuation of Emergency Generator due to Spurious Transformer Lockout | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000251/LER-2006-001 | Turkey Point Unit 4 05000251 1 OF 6 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000247/LER-2006-001 | Manual Reactor Trip Due to Multiple Dropped Control Rods Caused by Loss of Control Rod Power Due to Personnel Error | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000440/LER-2006-001 | Incorrect Wiring in the Remote Shutdown Panel Results in a Fire Protection Program Violation | | 05000413/LER-2006-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000368/LER-2006-001 | Completion of a Plant Shutdown Required by Technical Specifications Due to Loss of Motive Power to Certain Containment Isolation Valves as a Result of a Phase to Ground Short Circuit in a Motor Control Cubicle | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | 05000306/LER-2006-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(A), Completion of TS Shutdown | 05000298/LER-2006-001 | Cooper Nuclear Station 05000298 1 of 4 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000286/LER-2006-001 | I | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000282/LER-2006-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | 05000266/LER-2006-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function | 05000261/LER-2006-001 | Manual Reactor Trip Due to Failure of a Turbine Governor Valve Electro-Hydraulic Control Card | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000255/LER-2006-001 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | 05000461/LER-2006-002 | Turbine Bypass Function Lost Due to Circuit Card Maintenance Frequency | | 05000458/LER-2006-002 | Loss of Safety Function of High Pressure Core Spray Due to Manual Deactivation | | 05000456/LER-2006-002 | Units 1 and 2 Entry into Limiting Condition for Operation 3.0.3 due to Main Control Room Ventilation Envelope Low Pressure | | 05000443/LER-2006-002 | Noncompliance with the Requirements of Technical Specification 6.8.1.2.a | | 05000387/LER-2006-002 | DMissed Technical Specification surveillance requirement | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000362/LER-2006-002 | Unit 3 Shutdown to Inspect Safety Injection Tank Spiral Wound Gaskets | | 05000336/LER-2006-002 | Manual Reactor Trip Due To Trip Of Both Feed Pumps Following A Loss Of Instrument Air | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000316/LER-2006-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000315/LER-2006-002 | Failure to Comply with Technical Specification Requirement 3.6.13, Divider Barrier Integrity | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000293/LER-2006-002 | | | 05000289/LER-2006-002 | | | 05000251/LER-2006-002 | Intermediate Range High Flux Trip Setpoint Exceeded Technical Specification Allowable Value | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000440/LER-2006-002 | Scaffold Built in the Containment Pool Swell Region | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii)(B), Unanalyzed Condition | 05000413/LER-2006-002 | Safe Shutdown Potentially Challenged by an External Flooding Event and Inadequate Design and Configuration Control | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000388/LER-2006-002 | Missed Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 Entry for Unit 2 During Unit 1 ESS Bus Testing | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000348/LER-2006-002 | Main Steam Isolation Valve Failure to Close | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000305/LER-2006-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000301/LER-2006-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000286/LER-2006-002 | 450 Broadway, GSB P.O. Box 249 Buchanan, N.Y. 10511-0249Entergy Tel (914) 734-6700 Fred Dacimo Site Vice President Administration September 13, 2006 Indian Point Unit No. 3 Docket No. 50-286 N L-06-084 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Mail Stop O-P1-17 Washington, DC 20555-0001 Subject:L Licensee Event Report # 2006-002-00, "Manual Reactor Trip as a Result of Arcing Under the Main Generator Between Scaffolding and Phase A&B of the Isophase Bus Housing" Dear Sir: The attached Licensee Event Report (LER) 2006-002-00 is the follow-up written report submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73. This event is of the type defined in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an event recorded in the Entergy corrective action process as Condition Report CR-IP3-2006-02255. There are no commitments contained in this letter. Should you or your staff have any questions regarding this matter, please contact Mr. Patric W. Conroy, Manager, Licensing, Indian Point Energy Center at (914) 734-6668. Fred R. Dacimo Site Vice President Indian Point Energy Center Docket No. 50-286 NL-06-084 Page 2 of 2 Attachment: LER-2006-002-00 CC: Mr. Samuel J. Collins Regional Administrator — Region I U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspector's Office Resident Inspector Indian Point Unit 3 Mr. Paul Eddy State of New York Public Service Commission INPO Record Center NRC FORM 366 U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 06/30/2007
(6-2004)
. Estimated burden per response to comply with this mandatory collection request: 50 hours.DReported lessons learned are incorporated into the licensing process and fed back to industry. Send comments regarding burden estimate to the Records and FOIA/Privacy Service Branch (T-5 F52), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, or by internetLICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) e-mail to infocollects@nrc.gov, and to the Desk Officer, Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, NEOB-10202, (3150-0104), Office of Management and Budget, Washington, DC 20503. If a means used to impose an information collection does not display a currently valid OMB control number, the NRC may not conduct or sponsor, and a person is not required to respond to, the information collection. ■ 1. FACILITY NAME 2. DOCKET NUMBER I 3. PAGE
INDIAN POINT 3 05000-286 1 OF 6
4.TITLE: Manual Reactor Trip as a Result of Arcing Under the Main Generator Between
Scaffolding and Phase A&B of the Iso-phase Bus Housing | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000282/LER-2006-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v), Loss of Safety Function 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000269/LER-2006-002 | High Energy Line Breaks Outside Licensing Basis May Result in Loss of Safety Function | | 05000263/LER-2006-002 | | | 05000255/LER-2006-002 | | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications | 05000254/LER-2006-002 | Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station Unit 1 05000254 1 of 3 | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), System Actuation | 05000483/LER-2006-003 | Unexpected Inoperability of the Emergency Exhaust System due to Inoperable Pressure Boundary | 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(v)(C), Loss of Safety Function - Release of Radioactive Material 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii), Common Cause Inoperability 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications |
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