05000388/LER-2006-002, Regarding Missed Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 Entry for Unit 2 During Unit 1 Ess Bus Testing

Regarding Missed Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 Entry for Unit 2 During Unit 1 Ess Bus Testing

ML061870345
Person / Time
Site:	Susquehanna
Issue date:	06/14/2006
From:	Saccone R Susquehanna
To:	Document Control Desk, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
PLA-6061 LER 06-002-00
Download: ML061870345 (6)

LER-2006-002, Regarding Missed Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1 Entry for Unit 2 During Unit 1 Ess Bus Testing

Event date:
Report date:
Reporting criterion:	10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B), Prohibited by Technical Specifications
3882006002R00 - NRC Website

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Robert A. Saccone PPL Susquehanna, LLC Vice President - Nuclear Operations 769 Salem Boulevard

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JUN, 14 200O U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn: Document Control Desk Mail Stop O-P1-17 Washington, DC 20555-0001 SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 50-388/2006-02-00 LICENSE NO. NPF-22 PLA-6061 Docket No. 50-388 Attached is Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-388/2006-02-00. This event was determined to be reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

As part of a cause investigation for a late entry into TS LCO 3.8.1 for Unit 2, on April 19, 2006, it was identified that a reportable event had occurred during the 2004 Unit 1 refueling outage. On March 6, 2004, the Unit 1 4.16kV ESS 1A Bus was being tested in accordance with plant procedures. Unit 1 busses supply electrical power to common systems which impact Unit 2 safety systems and require entry into LCO 3.8.1 and 3.8.7 for Unit 2. However, when the ESS 1A Bus was de-energized, only LCO 3.8.7 was entered. Entry into Unit 2 LCO 3.8.1, Conditions A, B and D was missed, resulting in Required Actions A. 1 and B. 1 not being performed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and the mandated time for Unit 2 to be in Mode 3 being exceeded. Because no loss of safety function occurred, there was no impact to the power required to operate safety-related loads necessary to cool the reactor core, maintain containment integrity, and support other vital functions in the event of a postulated accident in one reactor unit, while safely shutting down the unaffected unit.

This event resulted in no actual adverse consequences to the health and safety of the public.

No commitments are associated with this LER.

Robeft Saccone Vice President - Nuclear Operations Attachment Document Control Desk "PLA-6061 cc:

Mr. S. Collins Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 475 Allendale Road King of Prussia, PA 19406 Mr. A. J. Blarney Sr. Resident Inspector U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 35 Berwick, PA 18603-0035 Mr. R. Osborne Allegheny Electric Cooperative P. 0. Box 1266 Harrisburg, PA 17108-1266 Mr. R. R. Janati Bureau of Radiation Protection Rachel Carson State Office Building P. 0. Box 8469 Harrisburg, PA 17105-8469

Abstract

As part of a cause investigation regarding a late entry into TS LCO 3.8.1 for Unit 2, on April 19, 2006, it was identified that a reportable event had occurred during the 2004 Unit 1 refueling outage. On March 6, 2004, the Unit 1 4.16kV ESS 1A Bus was being tested in accordance with plant procedures. The ESS 1A Bus was-de-energized and LCO 3.8.7 was entered for Unit 2. Unit 1 busses supply electrical power to common systems which impact Unit 2 safety systems and require entry into LCO 3.8.1 and 3.8.7. A review of operator logs for March 6, 2004, identified that only LCO 3.8.7 was entered when the bus was de-energized.

Entry into Unit 2 LCO 3.8.1, Conditions A, B and D was missed, resulting in Required Actions A.1 and B.1 not being performed within 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br /> and the mandated time for Unit 2 to be in Mode 3 being exceeded.

The apparent cause for this event was attributed to confusing language in TS 3.8.1 which resulted in an inaccurate interpretation by plant personnel regarding which LCOs were required to be entered to support Unit 1 ESS Bus testing.

Because no loss of safety function occurred, there was no impact to the power required to operate safety-related loads necessary to cool the reactor core, maintain containment integrity, and support other vital functions in the event of a postulated accident in one reactor unit, while safely shutting down the unaffected unit.

Interim compensatory measures were established to clearly state which TS LCOs were required to be entered during the remaining Unit 1 ESS Bus testing that was being performed during the Unit 1 refueling outage. PPL will revise TS 3.8.1 and/or Bases to provide clarity and remove interpretation on LCO applicability during ESS Bus testing.

NRC FORM 366 (6-2004)

(If more space Is required, use additional copies of (If more space Is required, use additional copies of (If more space Is required, use additional copies of NRC Form 366A)

Action(s) to Prevent Recurrence

• Revise TS 3.8.1 and/or Bases to provide clarity and remove interpretation on LCO applicability during ESS Bus testing.

PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS

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