05000302/LER-1984-001, Updated LER 84-001-01:on 840113,end Cap on Reactor Bldg Side of Spare Penetration 3531 Mistakenly Cut Off.Caused by Personnel Failure to Follow Applicable Engineering Procedures.Personnel Retrained

Updated LER 84-001-01:on 840113,end Cap on Reactor Bldg Side of Spare Penetration 3531 Mistakenly Cut Off.Caused by Personnel Failure to Follow Applicable Engineering Procedures.Personnel Retrained

ML20092N526
Person / Time
Site:	Crystal River
Issue date:	06/26/1984
From:	Thompson R, Westafer G FLORIDA POWER CORP.
To:	NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
References
3F0684-15, 3F684-15, LER-84-001, LER-84-1, NUDOCS 8407030243
Download: ML20092N526 (4)

LER-2084-001, Updated LER 84-001-01:on 840113,end Cap on Reactor Bldg Side of Spare Penetration 3531 Mistakenly Cut Off.Caused by Personnel Failure to Follow Applicable Engineering Procedures.Personnel Retrained

Event date:
Report date:
3022084001R00 - NRC Website

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u.3. NUCLEM4 E.EQuLATOT;Y Cu senc Pee aos IS42) ap, ROVED Oase peo 31to-410e LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) ,.

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REACTOR BUILDING CONTAINMENT PENETPATION NOT DESIGNED IN ACCORDANCE WITH FSAR Evges? OATE 193 LER NuesMR te) RGPORT DATE (71 OTHER PACILITIES INVOLVED (41 uCNT* OAv vtAR vtAR ag~ p,^, 6 a,*;;j;; .ON Ti. oAv vtAR P.civvv .-u oecmET ...ERis, N/A o,5go,o,o, , ,

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LICE 8 USEE CONTACT POR TMIS LER (129 8sLME TELEPHONE NUMSER AREA CODE R. H. Thompson, Engineer I 9101 4 7 i 915 i -i 3181012 '

ConsPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACM COesPONENT PaltuRE DESCRISED IN TMis REPORT 113)

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A NIH P i EiN i Ci3 ll i 0 Y i i i i i I I I I I I I I I I I I I I SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTEO H44 WONTM OAV vtAR vis !!! vee eenwere EMPLCTfD $UOhil3310N CA TR, NO l l l AS$TA ACT (&na,e to F400 speces. I a, eseresunem,ypesa e,ay.e-soere rysewe,resa I,aesi t1sa During a refueling outage (May 1983) the end cap of a penetration in the reactor containment building was incorrectly cut off. Subsequently a plant modification package was issued to replace the end cap. A routine review of the modification package on January 13,1984, discovered several ,

d: sign specifications that were inconsistent with FSAR commitments. oersonnel error is the cause l

( of this event in tt +t both the design engineer (on contract to Florida Power Corporation) and the verification engineer (a Florida Power Corporation employee) failed to follow applicable i cngineering procedures. The verification engineer has been retrained on following applicable

cngineering procedures. The design engineer no longer works for Florida Power Corporation. The

! results of the local leak rate test that was performed on the penetration (July 2,1983) and l

subsequent engineering evaluation (January,1984) indicate that the end cap will perform its intended safety function under the worst case LOCA conditions and thus justifies continued operation with the as-built penetration until the next refueling outage (March,1985). An cngineering evaluation was performed which concluded that the penetration is acceptable "as is" for the remainder of plant life.

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0 [51e 10 l0 l 3[ 0[2 814 01011 oF 011 012 0 13 r xr ,, . , w aae r.-e assa mm BACKGROUND In May,1983, during a refueling outage, the end plate on the reactor building side of spare penetration #3531 was mistakenly cut off. A plant modification package was issued on May 19, 1983, to replace the end cap on this penetration. The modification was installed on July 5,1983. >

IDENTIFICATION OF EVENT ,

A routine review of the modification package on January 13,1984, discovered:

1. ASTM A-36 was specified as the new end plate material (FSAR sections 5.2.2.4 and 5.2.2.4.2 require SA-516 Grade 60, impact tested to SA-300, and having certified mill test reports). li

2. All welding was required to be inspected per B31.7 - 1969. (FSAR sections 5.2.2.4.1, 5.2.2.4.3, and 5.2.2.4.4 require the NDE to be per ASME Section III Class B.)

3, The Modification Approval Record (MAR) specified a " soap test" to be performed on the welds on the Auxiliary Building side of the penetration during the Integrated Leak Rate Test.

This is not in compliance with 10CFR50, Appendix 3,Section IV. A, " Containment Modification." The proper test, however, was performed despite the MAR specifying the wrong test.

4. The safety evaluation in the MAR indicated that no changes to the FSAR were required.

(This is a violation of Safety Related Engineering Procedure (SREP) 6 Section V.3, in that the Design Engineer failed to identify the FSAR change, and a violation of SREP-4 in that the Verification Engineer failed to detect the error.)

5._ The applicable design drawing, S-521-036, was not changed to reflect the changes in the end plate thickness, plate material, and NDE. (This is a violation of SREP-2, Section D in that the Design Engineer did not correctly translate the design information onto the drawing and issue it as an interim drawing, and a violat6n of SREP-4 in that the Verification Engineer

' failed to detect the error.).

CAUSE OF EVENT Personnel error is the cause of this event in that both the Design Engineer (on contract to Florida P wer Corporation) and the Verification Engineer (a Florida Power employee) failed to follow applicable engineering procedures.

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j ANALYSIS OF EVENT An engineering evaluation was performed subsequent to the discovery of the erroneous design specifications. The results of the engineering evaluation and the local leak rate test that was performed on the penetration after the end cap was installed (July 2,1983) indicate that the end cap will perform its intended safety function under the worst case LOCA conditions, thus justifying continued operation with the as-built penetration until Refuel V (March,1985). An engineering cvaluation was performed to review the above five discrepancies and to determine if the as-built l reactor containment building penetration is adequate for the remainder of plant life (beyond Refuel V) or if another nodification is required to make the penetration consistent with FSAR c:mmitments. The engineering evaluation concluded that the penetration is acceptable "as is" for the remainder of plant life. A copy of the detailed evaluation is available on site and has been forwarded to the NRC Senior Resident inspector.

The applicable Safety Related Engineering Procedures governing plant modifications were also reviewed and are considered adequate if properly used.

Several other reactor containment building penetration plant modification packages were reviewed and found to comply with the FSAR. Hence, this event appears to be an isolated occurrence.

CORF":CTIVE ACTION Both the Design Engineer and the Verification Engineer had been trained in the use of applicable 5:fety Related Engineering Procedures governing plant modifications. The Verification Engineer has been tetrained on following applicable engineering procedures. The Design Engineer no longer works for Florida Power Corporation.

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June 26,1984 3F0684-15 Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

Subject:

Crystal River Unit 3 Docket No. 50-302 Operating License No. DPR-72 Licensee Event Report No. 84-001-01

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is Revision 1 to Licensee Event Report No.84-001 and the attached supplcmentary information sheet, which are submitted as stated in Florida Power Corporation's submittal of the subject LER on February 10,1984.

Should there be any questions, please contact this office.

Sincerely, t i G.R. Westafer Manager Nuclear Operations Licensing and Fuel Management RHT/nsw Enclosure ce: Mr. James P. O'Reilly Regional Administrator, Region II Office of Inspection & Enforcement -

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street N.W., Suite 2900 Atlanta, GA 30323 I

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GENERAL OFFICE 3201 Thirty fourth Street South e P.O. Box 14042, St. Petersburg, Florida 33733 e 813- 5151