05000298/FIN-2011002-03
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Failure to Adequately Implement Foreign Material Exclusion Controls |
| Description | The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, associated with the licensees failure to adequately implement Procedure 0.45, Foreign Material Exclusion Program, Revision 33. Specifically, between November 24, 2010, and March 24, 2011 multiple occasions were identified where licensee personnel failed to implement appropriate foreign material exclusion controls in areas designated as Zone 1 areas around safety related equipment (e.g., failure to appropriately log material into and out of the zone, or appropriately lanyard material in the zone) as required by station procedure. This issue was entered into the licensee\'s corrective action program as Condition Reports CR-CNS-2010-9173, CR-CNS-2010-9678, CR-CNS-2011-2775 and CR-CNS-2011-3214. The failure of station personnel to follow Procedure 0.45, Foreign Material Exclusion Program, when working in Zone 1 foreign material exclusion areas around safety related equipment/areas, was a performance deficiency. The performance deficiency was more than minor because it affected the human performance attribute of the Barrier Integrity Cornerstone, and directly affected the cornerstone objective of providing reasonable assurance that physical barriers protect the public from radionuclide releases caused by accidents or events, and is therefore a finding. Furthermore, station personnels continued failure to implement appropriate foreign material exclusion controls could result in the introduction of foreign material into critical areas, such as the spent fuel pool or the reactor cavity, which in turn could result in degradation and adverse impacts on materials and systems associated with these areas. Using Inspection Manual Chapter 0609, Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 Worksheets (at power issues), and Manual Chapter 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations Significance Determination Process, Phase 1 guidance (shutdown issues), this finding was determined to have a very low safety significance because; the finding was only associated with the fuel barrier (at power), and did not result in an increase in the likelihood of a loss of reactor coolant system inventory, degrade the ability to add reactor coolant system inventory, or degrade the ability to recover decay heat removal (shutdown). This finding had a crosscutting aspect in the area of human performance associated with the work practices component, in that the licensee failed to define and effectively communicate expectations regarding procedural compliance and personnel follow procedures H.4(b) (Section 1R20). |
| Site: | Cooper  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000298/2011002 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Mar 31, 2011 (2011Q1) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Barrier Integrity |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | M Chambers T Farina V Gaddy C Steely G George J Josey |
| CCA | H.8, Procedure Adherence |
| INPO aspect | WP.4 |
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Finding - Cooper - IR 05000298/2011002 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Cooper) @ 2011Q1
Self-Identified List (Cooper)
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