05000286/FIN-2012003-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Inadequate Battery Voltage Drop Calculation |
| Description | The inspectors identified a finding of very low safety significance (Green) involving an NCV of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, Design Control, because Entergy staff did not ensure or verify the adequacy of design with respect to the 33 battery sizing calculation. Specifically, Entergy staff used an incorrect methodology for the safety-related 33 battery voltage drop calculation which provided reasonable doubt about the ability of the battery to operate safety-related breakers. Entergy staff entered this issue into the corrective action program and performed an operability evaluation, which concluded that the battery was operable, based on breaker testing and input from the breaker vendor. The inspectors independently reviewed Entergy staffs basis for operability and similarly concluded that the failure to account for control power wiring did not render the 33 battery inoperable. The performance deficiency was determined to be more than minor because it was similar to example 3.j of NRC IMC 0612, Appendix E, Examples of Minor Issues, in that, based on the minimum voltage available to the 31 auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pump breaker being below the manufacturers rating there was reasonable doubt that the 33 battery would have adequate capacity under all design conditions. In addition, the performance deficiency was associated with the design control attribute of the Mitigating Systems cornerstone and adversely affected the cornerstone objective of ensuring the capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences. The finding was of very low safety significance (Green) because it was not a design or qualification deficiency, did not represent a loss of system safety function, and did not screen as potentially risk significant due external events. The finding had a cross-cutting aspect in the area of Problem Identification and Resolution, Corrective Action Program Component, because Entergy staff did not thoroughly evaluate the problem such that the resolution addressed causes and extent of conditions, as necessary. Specifically, Entergy staff did not accurately evaluate the inadequate voltage drop calculation for the 33 battery and the extent of condition for the affected components. |
| Site: | Indian Point  |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000286/2012003 Section 1R15 |
| Date counted | Jun 30, 2012 (2012Q2) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | NRC identified |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.15 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | J Furia J Lilliendahl M Gray M Halter P Cataldo |
| CCA | P.2, Evaluation |
| INPO aspect | PI.2 |
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Finding - Indian Point - IR 05000286/2012003 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Indian Point) @ 2012Q2
Self-Identified List (Indian Point)
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