05000266/FIN-2008005-02
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Finding | |
|---|---|
| Title | Draindown of RCS with Inaccurate Pressurizer Level Indication Due to Inadequate Procedure |
| Description | A finding of very low safety significance and associated NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings, was self-revealed for the failure to have procedures appropriate to the circumstances for the draindown of the RCS from a solid plant condition. Specifically, procedure OP-4D, Draining the Reactor Coolant System, did not require that the pressurizer level instrumentation reference line be filled within a defined period of time to ensure that the pressurizer level instrumentation functioned properly prior to draining the RCS. This resulted in the licensee draining approximately 2,000 gallons of RCS from the pressurizer without a valid control room indication of pressurizer level. The licensee performed an apparent cause evaluation and implemented corrective actions to address the procedure deficiencies and lessons learned from this finding. The finding was determined to be more than minor because the finding was associated with the Mitigating Systems Cornerstone attribute of operating procedure quality and affected the cornerstone objective to ensure the availability, reliability, and capability of systems that respond to initiating events to prevent undesirable consequences (i.e., core damage). Specifically, the pressurizer level instrumentation is utilized during shutdowns to detect and manually initiate mitigating actions for uncontrolled RCS inventory reductions. The inspectors determined that the finding could be evaluated in accordance with IMC 0609, Appendix G, Shutdown Operations SDP, dated February 28, 2005. The inspectors used Checklist 2 contained in Attachment 1 and determined that the finding required a Phase 2 analysis since the finding increased the likelihood of loss of RCS inventory based on level deviation in the control room(Section II.A. of Checklist 2). The inspectors and senior reactor analyst determined through Phase 2 analysis that this issue is best characterized as a finding of very low safety significance (Green). The inspectors also determined that the finding has across-cutting aspect in the area of problem identification and resolution, corrective action program, because the licensee failed to take appropriate corrective actions to address safety issues and adverse trends associated with the pressurizer level instrumentation in a timely manner, commensurate with their safety significance and complexity P.1(d).(Section 1R20.1 |
| Site: | Point Beach |
|---|---|
| Report | IR 05000266/2008005 Section 1R20 |
| Date counted | Dec 31, 2008 (2008Q4) |
| Type: | NCV: Green |
| cornerstone | Mitigating Systems |
| Identified by: | Self-revealing |
| Inspection Procedure: | IP 71111.2 |
| Inspectors (proximate) | D Mcneil R Jickling R Ruiz R Winter C Acosta J Jandovitz J Jacobson W Slawinski M Phalen M Kunowski P Higgins R Krsek V Meghani D Betancourt K Barclay D Dodson E Sanchez-Santiago |
| CCA | P.3, Resolution |
| INPO aspect | PI.3 |
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Finding - Point Beach - IR 05000266/2008005 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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Finding List (Point Beach) @ 2008Q4
Self-Identified List (Point Beach)
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